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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to explain variation in political liberalization among three 
post-communist Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. These 
countries share several common political outcomes such as the dominance o f the executive 
and a high degree o f  statism. Yet they also witnessed significant variation in political 
liberalization within a short period o f time after their independence in 1991. The fact that 
these countries share several common political, socioeconomic, cultural, and historical 
features makes the rise o f  this political variance more intriguing than the rise o f the above, 
however, salient, common political outcomes among them within few years o f their 
independence. An intriguing question arises here: Why these countries which share several 
common features experienced significant variation in political liberalization within few year 
of their independence? This study seeks to answer this question—a question which has 
been glaringly ignored in the recent scholarly political literature on Central Asia.
In order to  explain variation in political liberalization among these countries, this 
study emphasizes three variables: a) Russian minority; b) elite structure; and c) political 
orientation and strategic behavior o f political leadership. It argues that these countries 
show systematic variation in these three variables which account for variation in political 
liberalization among them. Each o f these explanatory variables is important in its own 
right and produces a significant separate effect on political liberalization. This study also 
makes a bold claim that this theoretical scheme helps explain not only variation in political 
liberalization among them but also aberrations in the political liberalization processes
vw
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within them. It further argues that influences other than these three variables produce, if at 
all, only short-lived relaxation o f political restrictions in the republics.
ix
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this study is to understand and explain variation in political 
liberalization among the three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Uzbekistan. Of course, these Central Asian republics share several common political 
features such as the dominance of the executive, secularism,1 and a high degree of 
statism. Yet they also witnessed many important different political outcomes within a 
short period of time after their independence in 1991. Although they share many 
authoritarian features, the fact that they have been variously described with epithets such 
as "an oasis of democracy in an authoritarian desert," "enlightened authoritarianism," and 
"the rule of old prince" clearly suggests the rise of important political differences among 
them in the post-independence period.2
The fact that these countries share several common cultural, socioeconomic, 
political, and historical features makes the rise of important different political outcomes 
among them more intriguing than the rise of the above, however salient, common 
political outcomes within few years o f their independence. An intriguing and important 
question that arises here and needs to be answered is why these countries which share 
several common features experienced important different political outcomes within a few 
years of their independence.
This study seeks to answer this question. However, this study is not intended to 
examine all the political dimensions along which these republics vary. This study has
1
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rather a modest objective in sight. It seeks to account for variation in the most important 
political dimension— political liberalization. We believe that the most pronounced 
different political outcome among these countries has thus far appeared in the area of 
political liberalization and that this political variance is significant enough to warrant an 
explanation.
A number o f reasons account for our choice o f political liberalization in the study 
of emergent dissimilar patterns of post-communist politics in Central Asia. First, political 
liberalization is a  worth studying subject in its own right. The importance of political 
liberalization as a precursor to the democratization process with its attendant 
consequences for nondemocratic societies is well-documented in the recent literature on 
regime change. It not only provides a very useful and convenient means o f capturing 
some of the very real differences that exist in the organization and conduct o f politics in 
developing countries, but also serves a base point from which progress o f these countries 
toward an enduring political alternative such as democratic rule could be charted, let 
alone its importance for groups and individuals caught in the middle o f coercive rule and 
democratic regime.3
Second, the study o f political liberalization will enhance the comparability o f our 
cases with other developing countries in general and the Muslim countries in particular. 
Let alone certain monarchical and other authoritarian societies in the Middle East which 
are trying to introduce political reforms and are increasingly being studied from the 
political liberalization perspective (Mufti 1999; Robinson 1998), some Islamic scholars 
who reject the concept o f liberal democracy as incompatible with the Islamic political
2
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system accept that under an Islamic regime individuals and groups enjoy certain political 
and civil rights which can be lumped together under the rubric of political liberalization 
(Maududi 1992, 22nd edition; 1993 16th edition).
Thud, an adequate understanding of political processes in the Central Asian 
countries cannot be gained without studying the question of political liberalization 
because it constitutes the core of the post-communist transition politics in these countries. 
The importance o f political liberalization for sociopolitical forces further increases 
because of its close connection with the post-communist economic transition underway 
in these countries and the consequent question of the access of these forces to economic 
resources being distributed under this transition.
Fourth, political liberalization is also worth studying for its future relevance to 
the politics o f these countries. Because these countries are far from becoming 
consolidated democracies, the question of political inclusion and exclusion with its 
attendant enormous consequences for political forces in these countries will continue to 
be at the core o f their politics for the foreseeable future. In addition, because these 
countries have powerful ethnic minorities, this question will continue to affect their 
relations with external powers affiliated with such minorities. Thus, we can safely expect 
political liberalization to stay with us in one way or another until these Central Asian 
countries decisively move either toward genuine democracy or toward some other 
enduring political alternative.4 If the political liberalization process is bound to critically 
affect the future o f Central Asian societies, an investigation of this process today can 
provide a solid background for the study of these societies tomorrow.
3
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IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
This study has both theoretical and empirical importance. Theoretically, this study 
will contribute to the scholarly efforts aimed at building theory about the post-communist 
polities where little democratization has occurred.3 Our information about 
post-communist politics in societies where outright authoritarian and semi-democratic 
regimes are emerging is extremely deficient. And it is difficult to formulate a reliable set 
of propositions about post-communist political processes in such societies. This study is 
intended to generate theoretical propositions about post-communist politics, redressing 
the lack of theory-grounded explanations of the emerging patterns of post-communist 
politics in these societies. In addition, the focus on the Central Asian countries will help 
broaden the empirical scope of the recent theoretical research efforts which paid more 
attention to post-communist polities in Eastern Europe and European parts of the former 
Soviet Union than to those in Central Asia. Without incorporating those post-communist 
regions which have not been focus of these research efforts, we can not be sure whether 
political processes unfolding in such regions such as Central Asia support or undermine 
theoretical insights o f the several bodies of post-communist literature developed mostly 
from the study o f the East European countries, the Baltic republics, and Russia.
This study will also contribute to the efforts aimed at understanding where and 
why certain countries, which begin their independence at the same point in time and 
share several common socioeconomic, cultural and political characteristics, experience 
important different political outcomes within a short span of time (Collier 1982). In 
addition, in the absence of mutually exclusive typologies of political regime types and
4
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subtypes and in the absence of prior theory and a well-developed typology of political 
regimes in the post-communist world, this study is expected to contribute, though 
indirectly, to the refinement o f typologies of political regime types and subtypes.6
The lack o f an adequate theoretical and comparative analysis in the existing 
literature on Central Asia further underscores the importance o f this study. Before 
Central Asia became independent in 1991, most studies o f the region were historical, 
descriptive and configurative in nature.7 Only few studies were o f comparative nature.8 
This situation continued in the post-independence period. After independence more 
emphasis has been given to geopolitical questions than to sociocultural and political 
processes within the Central Asian republics.9 Most studies which deal with 
sociopolitical processes in Central Asia are configurative and descriptive, offering little 
theoretical explanation of such processes. The few comparative studies done so far focus 
mostly on similarities among the regional countries (Hunter 1996; Lipvosky 1996; 
Clement 1994). Some of them even recognize the development o f these republics along 
different political paths (Motyle 1997:53; Hunter 1996:xviii, 40; Kangas 1994; Chavin 
1994:161; Halbach 1992). However, sufficient systematic attention has not been paid to 
studying and explaining these differences. This assertion is supported by a recent 
comparative study which lamented the lack of an adequate theoretical explanation of 
significant variation in political openness among these republics (CSCE, March 1998:39- 
42). We hope that this study will help remove this theoretical confusion among students 
of the Central Asian region.
5
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The empirical importance of this study is evident from the vantage point that we 
have very little hard evidence about Central Asia. Despite scholarly attempts to study 
Central Asia in the post-communist era, it is still not among the widely studied areas, and 
there is no extensive range o f hard evidence about it. Writers are trying to fill the gap 
in our information and knowledge about Central Asia. However, specialists are still 
deeply divided on how to characterize the Central Asian societies. It is fair to say that 
the Central Asian societies are still poorly understood and serious research is greatly 
hampered by the lack of reliable objective information. The existing studies of Central 
Asia provide only small amount of hard evidence on that region. This situation seems to 
have led many scholars to make rash and wrong judgments and predictions about the 
region.10 This study is hoped to generate not only hypotheses and propositions about 
post-communist politics but also empirical evidence about one of the most neglected but 
increasingly important areas in the post-communist world.
This study is also hoped to benefit a variety o f people and groups, governmental 
and nongovernmental, interested in Central Asia in one way or another. More 
specifically, this study will serve a double purpose: 1) For a general student and a 
specialist o f Central Asia, this study will offer sound information and source material for 
further study of a relatively obscure but increasingly important area in the 
post-communist world; and 2) for individuals and groups with economic, sociopolitical, 
and cultural stakes in Central Asia, this study will provide diversity of information to 
draw on in their dealing with Central Asia and help them avoid rash and wrong 
judgements and policies about that region.
6
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PREVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT
A full description o f our theoretical argument is offered in Chapter 1. In this 
section we will briefly summarize the main findings o f this study. We hope that this 
exercise will help prepare and guide the reader through our theoretical and empirical 
arguments. It is one o f the arguments of this study that our countries began to experience 
differential rates of political openness in the wake o f the Gorbachev reform program in 
the pre-independence period and that this variance became more pronounced in the post­
independence period. We further argue that the same set o f factors can adequately 
account for differential rates o f political openness among these republics in the pre- and 
post-independence periods.
In order to explain variation in political liberalization among our countries, we 
emphasize three factors: the Russian minority, elite structure, and political leadership. 
We argue in this study that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show systematic 
variation in these three variables which produce variation in political liberalization 
among them. Each o f our explanatory variables is important in its own right and 
produces a significant separate effect on political liberalization. We further argue that till 
now influences other than these three variables are found to produce, if at all, only short­
lived relaxation o f political restrictions in these republics.
Our first explanatory variable is a compound variable which involves focus on the 
proportional size, the level of politicization, and resourcefulness of the ethnic Russian 
minority in each republic. We find a positive impact o f the large ethnic Russian minority 
in proportion to the titular nationality on political liberalization. The relatively large
7
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Russian minority is more likely to be politicized, defend its own causes rather than to 
leave them to the governments of these countries and command considerable resources, 
including the support o f their coethnics, both the people and authorities, in Russia. The 
relatively large size o f politicized Russian minority means a reduced support base for the 
ruling elites (whose chief political opponents come from their own titular nationality), 
wider opposition to them, and higher costs of its repression, including inter-ethnic 
instability and the potential Russian intervention with serious consequences for their rule. 
All such considerations considerably constrain authoritarian impulses and contribute to 
relaxation of political control in republics with a relatively large size of the ethnic 
Russian minority.
The second variable that we emphasize is elite structure. The character o f elite 
structure in these republics is defined by the internal unity and cohesiveness o f the old- 
regime elites who include leaders of the (former) republican communist party, members 
of the parliament, important members of momenklatura, state functionaries, and heads 
of public enterprises in the pre- and post-independence period. The two basic elite 
structure types, consolidated and fragmented (or dispersed), emerged in these countries 
in the pre- and post-independence periods. We find that the consolidated elite structure 
has a negative impact on political liberalization in these countries. Such elite structure 
means that the support base of the old-regime elites is intact and that they have more 
freedom of action with their full access to power resources which they can readily use 
to crush opposition forces without paying enormous costs.
8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
On the contrary, the dispersed elite structure has a  positive impact on political 
liberalization in these countries. It is so because the fragmented elite structure is 
indicative of the dispersion of political resources, the rise of multiple power centers, a 
narrow support base for the ruling elites, their isolation from important sources of 
support, a reduction in the clientelist networks available to them, their need for societal 
allies, and a reduction in their capacity to thoroughly control and repress society with 
impunity. In addition, because certain disgruntled elites with their intact access to 
traditional sources o f support may be tempted to take up arms to defend their causes and 
protect themselves against excessive government repression, the fragmented elite 
structure increases the risk of civil war along tribal, ethnic, and regional lines and 
therefore the risk o f Russian intervention—a prospect which the governing elites very 
much like to avoid because of its potential serious consequences for their own power 
position, let alone for their societies. Thus, the dispersed elite structure considerably 
complicates the use o f indiscriminate repression of independent political forces and 
contributes to the expansion of independent political space in these republics.
The logic o f our theoretical argument has thus far been structural. We recognize 
that it has certain limitations. The large Russian minority and fragmented elite structure 
act as powerful constraints on the authoritarian impulses in the Central Asian republics, 
but they can not be shown to clearly determine a full range of variations in political 
liberalization among these countries. They account for the broad variance in the general 
direction o f the political liberalization process in our countries, but they can not 
adequately answer a  number o f specific questions. For instance, why does the political
9
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liberalization process experience aberrations in a republic when the above two causal 
factors remain constant? Why do ruling elites in these republics relax some activities but 
not others? And why do they some times tolerate the same independent political activity 
which they otherwise repress? These and other similar questions remained unanswered 
if we confine our theoretical argument to the above two structural explanatory variables. 
Therefore, we expand our theoretical argument and incorporate in it another explanatory 
variable, political leadership, in order to provide an adequate explanation of variation in 
political liberalization among the Central Asian countries. In this way, our theoretical 
argument is both structural and voluntaristic in nature.
The incorporation o f the political leadership variable is based on the assumption 
that political leaders are not simply forced by broad structural conditions into a 
predetermined direction, but rather they generally possess certain amount of autonomy, 
retain initiative, and mediate the gross impact of such conditions on the political process. 
In other words, even under powerful constraints produced by structural conditions they 
generally have a significant range of options in making political choices and decisions. 
Their actions tend to have cumulative effect which can increase or decrease the level of 
political liberalization in a republic. In addition, political leaders exhibit certain central 
political tendencies which are assumed to influence political liberalization. If these 
assertions are correct, then variations in political orientations o f the political leadership 
of the Central Asian republics and their concrete actions will help explain variation in 
political liberalization among them.
10
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In this study, political leadership refers to the presidents in charge of the post- 
communist transition process in these republics. In this study, we focus on two aspects 
of political leadership, its views about political liberalization and concrete actions related 
to it. We find that the political leaders o f these countries differ in their views about 
political liberalization. More specifically, they differ about whether, how and when 
political liberalization can be introduced in their societies. Some Central Asian political 
leaders doubt the readiness o f their societies for political liberalization, its compatibility 
with their political culture, and refer to its adverse consequences for their societies. 
While others have a more favorable view of political liberalization and its consequences 
for their societies. Political leaders with benign view of political liberalization are more 
likely to relax political control and to be responsive to the constraints of structural 
conditions—the Russian minority and fragmented elite structure— than the political 
leaders with ambivalent and negative views of political liberalization and its consequences 
for their rule and societies.
In addition to the political leaders’ view of political liberalization, we focus on 
their concrete political actions and find them relevant to the study of variation in political 
liberalization among our countries. Because there is no necessary connection between one 
class of actions and political liberalization and because actions o f political leaders are o f 
fluid nature, it becomes more or less an empirical question to investigate whether a 
concrete action of political leadership produces a positive o r negative impact on political 
liberalization in a republic.
11
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We observe systematic variation across our countries in three variables, the 
Russian minority, elite structure, and political leadership. Kazakhstan has the largest 
ethnic Russian minority, followed by Kyrgyzstan; Uzbekistan has relatively small Russian 
minority (see Tables 1 and 2). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both passed into the post­
communist transition phase with fragmented elite structures. Uzbekistan emerged out o f 
the transition phase with a consolidated elite structure which by and large remained intact 
in the post-independence period. Kyrgyz leadership exhibits very favorable views about 
political liberalization. Kazakh leadership exhibits moderately negative views about 
political liberalization. And Uzbek leadership has very negative views about political 
liberalization and its consequences for Uzbek society.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show considerable variation in political 
liberalization (see Table 7). The systematic variation across our countries in the three 
explanatory variables yields the following ranking. Kyrgyzstan scores higher in political 
liberalization than Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Barring few minor aberrations since mid- 
1994, the political liberalization process in Kyrgyzstan recorded sustained progress in 
almost all the areas of political liberalization in the post-independence period.
Although Kazakhstan’s record on political liberalization is modest in comparison 
to Kyrgyzstan, it is far better than that of Uzbekistan. In other words, Kazakhstan has 
a mixed record of political liberalization. After independence, it witnessed an overall 
improvement in the pre-independence level o f political liberalization and sizable 
independent political space became available to Kazakh society. Yet repression of
12
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independent political forces remained a serious problem in Kazakh society in the post­
independence period.
Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a relatively large ethnic Russian minority 
and fragmented elite structure but differ in the level of political liberalization. Kazakhstan 
ranks lower than Kyrgyzstan on the political liberalization scale. The moderately negative 
views of Kazakh leadership about political liberalization and the presence and demands 
of secessionist elements o f the Russian minority (which provides Kazakh authorities an 
easy excuse to repress certain unwanted opposition forces in the name o f inter-ethnic 
harmony and security and territorial integrity of the republic) explain the overall mixed 
record of political liberalization and its lower rank than that o f Kyrgyzstan on the 
political liberalization scale in the post-independence period.
Uzbekistan which scores low on all the three factors conducive to political 
liberalization has by all accounts made little or no movement toward political 
liberalization in the post-independence period. Tactics aside, no tolerated independent 
political activity existed in the republic in the post-communist era. In fact, in the absence 
of effective constraints, Uzbek authorities unhesitatingly unleashed indiscriminate 
repression and have been able to drive individual and organized opposition forces into 
exile or into underground and semi-underground positions in the post-independence 
period.
THE CASE FOR SELECTION OF CASES
The decision to study variation in political liberalization among three out of five 
Central Asian republics is not arbitrary. Quite the contrary. In fact, the three republics,
13
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are selected, and the two republics, Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan are dropped, for important reasons.
As already mentioned, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are distinctly 
located at three different points on the political liberalization scale (see Table 7). 
Kyrgyzstan represents the best case of political liberalization in Central Asia. Because 
of its relatively low ranking on socioeconomic factors commonly associated with political 
democracy, the fact that Kyrgyzstan, a small republic, surpasses the two most important 
republics in the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in almost all areas of political 
liberalization makes it an interesting and intriguing case study. Uzbekistan, the most 
populous republic in the region, is one of the worst cases o f political liberalization in the 
region. And, Kazakhstan, the second most populous but the largest republic in terms of 
area in Central Asia, represents a middle case of political liberalization, falling between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Hence, the study of the political liberalization process in 
these three countries can capture the maximum range of variation the Central Asian 
region has thus far experienced in political openness in the post-communist era. In other 
words, we can correctly identify and adequately explain the highest and the lowest points 
on the political liberalization scale o f Central Asia through our study of the political 
liberalization process in three rather than five Central Asian republics.
The reason for dropping Tajikistan from this study is that it is an abnormal case 
for the study of a subject like political liberalization. More precisely, it is a highly 
volatile country tom apart by a bloody civil war since 1992 between regional factions of 
different political orientations and ideological colors. These factions, especially the
14
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communist forces, readily seek help from hardened criminals in order to eliminate their 
opponents (Khazanov 1995:127). The massive involvement of external forces, including 
the Russian and Uzbek troops, in this war has further compounded the political scene in 
the republic. This war has thus far claimed more than 50,000 lives and produced large 
refugee waves, creating an abnormal situation for the study of political liberalization. In 
other words, such situation makes it very hard to document empirical evidence on 
political liberalization and affix the blame for violations o f civil and political rights of 
people.
The decision to drop Turkmenistan is based on the fact that there is no meaningful 
variation in political liberalization between Uzbekistan and the former. Both 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are located at the same point on the authoritarian scale. 
Both have experienced the rise of the most repressive regimes in Central Asia.11 We can 
save space and avoid duplication by dropping Turkmenistan—a country far less important 
than Uzbekistan—without affecting our conclusions.
This study will cover the period from the independence of the Central Asian states 
in 1991 to 1997. This cut-off date is not chosen on the basis of hard and fast rules. As 
is the case with running themes, we primarily chose this cut-off line for research 
purposes. In other words, we need to terminate our research on some point in order to 
make it manageable. However, the fact that discernible political patterns have emerged 
in Central Asia by 1997 also influenced our decision to choose it as the cut-off date for 
our research.
15
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ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is divided into six chapters, including this chapter. Chapter 2 clarifies 
definitional issues, provides a literature review of approaches to political liberalization, 
discusses inadequacy o f these approaches to the study o f variation in political 
liberalization among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and builds a theoretical 
framework to explain this political variance. The next three detailed chapters are devoted 
to the three countries. In these chapters we will apply the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2 to three republics. The location o f each republic on the political 
liberalization scale is discussed in a single chapter. In other words, we shall examine the 
impact of our three independent variables on political liberalization in each country 
chapter. Each country chapter serves as an important frame o f  reference for chapter 6. 
The sixth chapter makes an overall comparison o f our cases and matches our empirical 
findings to our theoretical expectations. Also, this chapter provides the summary 
conclusions of this study, and looks at prospects for the future evolution o f these 
countries along the dimension of political liberalization.
NOTES
1. Lipvosky views secularism as a sine quo non for the preservation of the Central Asian 
ruling elites’ power in the post-communist era (Lipvosky 1996:212).
2. Kyrgyzstan has been variously characterized "as an oasis of democracy in an 
authoritarian desert" (CSCE, March 1998:17), as "enlightened proto-authoritarianism" 
(Rumer 1996:74), and the Switzerland o f Central Asia (Kubicek 1997:643-4). Karimov 
has been described as "old prince" (Carlisle 1995:197).
3. These points are borrowed from Conteh-Morgan (Conteh-Morgan 1997:6-7).
4. All the Central Asian ruling elites claim that the current nondemocratic regimes are 
temporary arrangements and that they intend to move toward genuine democracy as the 
conditions are ripe for such a  move.
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5. In the recent post-communist transition literature the democratizing polities in the 
former communist world received far greater scholarly attention than those in which 
outright authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes emerged (McFaul 1993; Rozman 
1993; Ekiert 1991; Korosenyi 1991).
6. For partial efforts to develop typologies of political regime types and subtypes see 
Lijphart 1968; Linz 1975; Park 1977; and Gasiorowski 1990.
7. These studies include Allworth (1973), Akiner (1994), Carlisle (1991), Critchlow 
(1991).
8. These studies include Fierman (1991).
9. Major works which focused on geopolitical question include Mandelbaum (1994), 
Malik (1994), Olcott (1994a), Rubinstein (1994), and Menon (1995).
10. Brzezinski predicted ethnic and border conflicts in the region. He also considered 
inter-ethnic conflicts as inevitable part of the process of exodus of several millions 
Russians who live in the Central Asian countries (Rumer 1996:13). Rumer rightly 
observes that none o f such dire predictions has thus far come to pass (Rumer 1996:13). 
Wimbush and Broxup predicted Islamic revolution (Rezun 1992:130).
11. For an excellent synopsis o f the characteristics o f despotic states o f Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, see Olcott (1995:218).
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION
INTRODUCTION
After their independence in 1991, the Central Asian republics experienced several 
similar and dissimilar important political outcomes. The notable common political 
outcomes include the rise o f presidential ism, dominance o f the chief executive, 
secularism, and a high degree of statism. The most pronounced different political 
outcome has so far appeared in the area o f political liberalization.1 The fact that these 
republics witnessed significant variation in political liberalization within a few years o f 
their independence is more intriguing than the emergence of the above, however salient, 
common political outcomes because they share several common socioeconomic, political, 
cultural, and historical features. This variance has been ignored in both bodies o f 
literature, the recent theoretical literature on the post-communist transition and the 
comparative empirical literature on Central Asia. Although there are several bodies o f 
theoretical literature that for almost half a century have informed studies of the various 
aspects o f political liberalization, without a detailed and systematic study of the political 
liberalization process in the Central Asian countries we can not be sure whether any and 
which body o f the existing theoretical literature can best explain variation these countries 
experienced in political liberalization within few years of their independence.
This study is an attempt to redress this academic lacuna in a  systematic manner. 
And the purpose of this chapter is to prepare a theoretical base for such an effort and to 
immerse the reader in its theoretical argument. This chapter intends to accomplish five
18
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things. First, it seeks to define and discuss our dependent variable, political 
liberalization, in order to provide focus to this study. Second, it will review major 
theoretical approaches, which have informed numerous studies o f the political 
liberalization process in many parts o f the world over the past several decades, to show 
the richness of theoretical literature one can draw on to study the question of political 
liberalization. Third, we will briefly critique these approaches to demonstrate that 
although most theoretical approaches help us understand the overall low level o f political 
openness and democratization in the Central Asian countries, no single approach on its 
own can adequately explain the significant variance they experienced after independence 
in the area of political liberalization. However, we will also show that some theoretical 
approaches are more relevant than others to our concern and that we can increase their 
explanatory power for our inquiry if we modify their original arguments. Fourth, we will 
build our own theoretical model which draws on certain existing theoretical approaches 
but modifies their original arguments in order to adequately account for variation in 
political liberalization among the three Central Asian countries. The selection of such 
theoretical approaches and modification of their original argument were dictated by the 
detailed case studies. In other words, our theoretical model derives from the detailed 
study of our countries. Finally, we will briefly present our empirical argument, showing 
how our independent variables vary across our countries and whether they produce 
expected results.
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DEFINITION OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The comparative politics literature has not been consistent in the use of political 
liberalization. It has been defined in different ways. The purpose here is not to expose 
inadequacies o f various existing definitions of this term in order to develop an exhaustive 
definition of political liberalization, but rather to develop a working definition which 
could provide focus to this study.
One can find three broad conceptualizations of political liberalization in the 
existing literature on political regime change. One group of regime analysts uses 
political liberalization and democratization interchangeably (Conteh-Morgan 1997).2 
According to another perspective, political liberalization is more broad and inclusive than 
democratization. Arguing that democratization may accommodate nonliberal beliefs and 
practices within a  constitutional order which more or less satisfies the procedural 
requirements o f political democracy,3 advocates of this perspective conceptualize 
political liberalization as encompassing not only a democratic constitutional order but also 
a change in political culture of society leading to the adoption of liberal and civic beliefs 
and practices (Cotton 1991:312). Still another group of scholars conjoins political 
liberalization and democratization as two related but not synonymous phenomena. 
According to this perspective, political liberalization can exist without democratization. 
However, advocates of this viewpoint differ over the specific components of political 
liberalization (O ’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:7; Kaufman 1986:92-99; Przeworski 
1991:51-99).4
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Building on the conceptualization in which political liberalization can exist without 
democratization,5 this study views political liberalization as a process of loosening 
political restrictions, and restoration of political rights and those civil rights (such as 
freedom of speech) which have political bearings under an authoritarian regime.6 At the 
more concrete level, political liberalization involves a decrease in repression, the 
corresponding decline o f fear of repression in society, and the extent of freedom 
available to political forces for voicing individual and/or collective dissent, for interest 
articulation and representation, and for waging a political struggle through individual 
or/and collective efforts to modify the rules o f the political game. In short, political 
liberalization refers to opening and loosening o f the prevailing coercive political regime. 
VARIOUS TH EO RETICA L APPROACHES T O  PO LITICA L LIBERALIZATION 
The study o f political liberalization received a great deal o f scholarly attention 
over the past two decades.7 In several communist and noncommunist countries around 
the world, the breakdown of various communist and authoritarian regimes during this 
period began with the process o f political liberalization. Thus, it was logical for regime 
analysts to focus on political liberalization in order to fully understand and explain the 
unraveling of old regimes and the rise of new ones. In addition to provoking scholarly 
debates on various aspects o f political regime change, this sustained scholarly endeavor 
produced an insightful body o f literature on political liberalization.8 
STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES
One can find in the existing literature several different theoretical approaches to 
the study of political liberalization. Modernization theory is one o f the leading
21
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theoretical approaches to the question of why an authoritarian regime liberalizes its 
restrictive practices and/or is ultimately replaced by a  democratic one. In most of the 
early modernization theoretical literature, the question of political liberalization was 
addressed as part of a general process of political development, and democracy was 
viewed as the final stage of such process. A host o f socioeconomic factors associated 
with capitalist economic development were believed to facilitate this evolutionary 
process. These socioeconomic factors include higher levels o f per capita income, 
urbanization, literacy, education, and mass media exposure. As modernization theory 
postulates, because a wealthy, industrialized economy is associated with higher levels of 
these factors, an evolutionary, inexorable process o f transition toward democracy is set 
in motion in nondemocratic countries as their economies develop (Lemer 1958; Lipset 
1959, 1994; Deutsch 1961).’
A number of reasons have been offered for the positive correlation between 
capitalist economic development and the regime transition toward democracy in 
nondemocratic polities.10 However, the most common line of argument is that as 
countries develop, their economic and social structures become complex, the politically 
relevant strata o f the population expand, the demands for governmental services and 
political participation multiply, new autonomous social and political groups arise, 
organize, and begin to resist dictatorial forms of control. As a result, the system can no 
longer be effectively and efficiently run by an authoritarian regime. In addition, capitalist 
economic development produces a class structure which is conducive to democratization. 
It produces a middle class (Lipset 1959 and 1994), bourgeoisie (Moore 1966),11 and
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working class (Therbom 1977; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Stephens 
1993:438)12 that stand up against the coercive state, provide resources for autonomous 
societal groups, and seek access to national political process. In short, industrial 
capitalism increases economic benefits for the masses; it spreads authority and democratic 
aspirations among various societal groups, intensifying demands for the political benefits 
of democracy (Dahl 1989; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994:903); and its promotes civic 
cultural attitudes conducive to democratization (Huntington 1991:69). Thus, the above 
development-related socioeconomic factors generate growing social pressures and 
conditions which facilitate the relaxation of political restrictions under an authoritarian 
regime and its ultimate replacement with a democratic regime.
In spite of a  continued scholarly effort to reconfirm it (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck
1994), the basic notion that capitalist economic development is a requisite to democratic 
development continued to remain suspect in certain academic quarters (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997). However, after having gone out o f fashion as a dominant grand theory 
due to a variety of reasons, modernization theory has made a strong comeback and has 
been used to explain the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in the communist and 
noncommunist world over the past two decades (Pye 1990).
In 1990, Lucian Pye used modernization theory to account for the political 
liberalization and democratization processes underway in the communist and 
noncommunist countries around the world. He claimed that the key factors responsible 
for what he called "the crisis o f authoritarianism" and "great transformation"13 over the 
past decade were all those critical variables the early modernization and political
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development theorists had identified as conducive to political liberalization and 
democratization. More specifically, he emphasized the vulnerability of the authoritarian 
regimes to the pressures created "by the increasingly significant flows of international 
trade, finance, and communication; by the effects of contemporary science and 
technology; and by all the other development-related socioeconomic factors lumped under 
the rubric o f modernization." Because the authoritarian regimes are the most vulnerable 
to these pressures, they are therefore being seriously undermined and, as a result, are 
liberalizing their practices (Pye 1990). It is, however, important to note that he does not 
view political liberalization as a necessary outcome, but rather as one o f the policy 
measures an authoritarian regime may adopt in response to these pressures.14
Another body o f literature that explains political regime variation in economic 
terms is produced by the Marxist authors. According to these authors, throughout human 
history each mode of production produced an appropriate political form that furthered the 
interests of economically dominant class. The capitalist mode o f production produced, 
as the argument runs, political democracy as an instrument of exploitation and repression 
of labor by the dominant class, the bourgeoisie. According to the Marxist perspective, 
the bourgeoisie uses democratic mechanisms to capture the state from the traditional 
power elites (Arat: 1988:21), to arbitrate disputes among its members, and to decide 
periodically which of its members are to repress and crush the working classes (Femia 
1993:47-51). Hence, the modernization and Marxist perspectives both assign causal 
significance to socioeconomic factors, though they differ on how these factors operate.
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Another set o f socioeconomic factors that is thought to facilitate the political 
liberalization and democratization processes relates to social structural conditions of 
society. These conditions include a relative equality (in terms of social and economic 
status) among individuals and social groups, a dispersion o f the means of violent coercion 
in society, cultural homogeneity,13 an array of relatively autonomous social classes 
(such as feudal, aristocracy, in addition to ones discussed above) and groups (such as 
regional groups, occupational groups, and ethnic and religious groups), cohesiveness of 
elites, and other cross-cutting cleavages (Dahl 1971, 1982; Lijphart 1977; Muller 1988; 
Huntington 1984).
The most common argument offered to establish a connection between social 
structure and the political liberalization and democratization process refers to the 
widespread dispersion o f power and other political resources in a society in such way that 
no single, unified group could monopolize them. According to this argument, a  relatively 
even distribution o f  power in society increases the cost o f repression and violence, which 
in turn increases the likelihood that the government will tolerate an opposition, creating 
the most favorable conditions for competitive politics (Dahl 1971:48-51).
The above social structural conditions informed the theoretical and analytical 
frameworks o f a number of scholars who sought to explain the wave of liberalizations 
and democratizations which swept through the communist and noncommunist countries 
over the past two decades. However, most o f these frameworks emphasized the role of 
autonomous social groups lumped under the rubric o f civil society (Schmitter 1986:6-8; 
Kaufman 1986:92; Lewin 1988; Huntington 1991:72-85; Lipset 1994:12-14).16 The rise
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(or a change in the orientation)17 o f  such autonomous social formations is said to be 
supportive of a strong civil society capable of creating favorable conditions for political 
liberalization and eventual democratization o f public and political life (Schmitter 1986:6- 
8; Kaufman 1986:91-93; Huntington 1984:203). More specifically, a strong civil society 
is capable of escaping subordination to state authority, resisting and countervailing the 
state, articulating its demands (including ethical concerns) long repressed or ignored by 
the authoritarian rulers or accommodated to their needs, publicly acting in the defense 
o f its legitimate interests, and becoming a support base for the institutionalized political 
parties which are viewed as a necessary condition for a modern political 
democracy(Lipset 1994:12-14; Arato 1991:198, 203-204; Gellner 1991:50; Schmitter 
1986:6-8; O ’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:49).18 In addition, state power is constrained; 
and the cost o f repression exceeds the cost o f toleration, providing the basis for political 
liberalization, for increased societal control o f the state, and for eventual democratization 
of public and political life (Schmitter 1986:6-7; Kaufman 1986:92; Huntington 
1984:203).
Another group of scholars who focus on social structural conditions used the 
cohesiveness of elite structure as a variable to study the recent regime change. Many 
scholars find that the erosion o f internal unity and cohesiveness o f ruling elites was 
critical to the recent wave of regime change and related phenomena around the world 
(Stepan 1986, 1988; Huntington, 1991, 1991-92; Easter 1997). According to some 
scholars, the erosion of the elite unity which could occur for many reasons, including 
policy differences, leads one faction o f elites to activate and enlist societal support in
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order to strengthen its own position vis-a-vis the rival faction, precipitating a situation 
conducive to political liberalization (Stepan 1986, 1988).
Another body of literature focuses on political culture19 of both the elite and the 
masses to account for the rise of political regime. According to the political cultural 
theory, every political system is embedded in a particular political culture (Almond 
1956:396). The political cultural values found to be compatible with and conducive to 
political democracy include tolerance, interpersonal trust, egalitarianism, national- 
political identity,20 empathy,21 and a willingness to compromise, accommodate, 
cooperate, and associate (Almond and Verba 1963, 1980; Huntington 1984:209; 
Huntington and Dominguez 1975:32; Dahl 1971, 1989; Diamond 1993). Political cultural 
theorists weave dense and complex relationships between these values and democracy. 
However, according to the most common line of argument, the above cultural traits 
produce flexible and negotiable political objectives, mediate and attenuate political 
conflict, balance cleavage and conflict with the need of consensus, and promote 
participatory atmosphere—all favorable conditions for democratic development (Diamond 
1993:10). Some political cultural theorists emphasize the importance of a democratic 
culture of the political elites and activists (Dahl 1989:260-1), while others emphasize the 
importance o f a democratic culture of the masses, too (Diamond 1993).
More often than not, political culture is viewed as an intervening variable which 
influences and guides rather than predetermines political structures and political behavior 
(Eckstein 1988; Laitin 1988:589-591; Almond 1988; Brown 1989; Dahl 1971; Ellis and 
Colye 1994:2-3; Inglehart 1997).22 In other words, most scholars view political culture
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both as cause and effect, although they differ on the sources of political cultural 
change.23 Because the erosion or the breakdown in congruence between political culture 
and political regime will trigger political change (Huntington and Dominguez 1975:17), 
one can safely extrapolate that an authoritarian regime is likely to open up and relax its 
practices when the political cultural values supportive of democracy will begin to take 
root in society. According to many scholars, the explanation of the recent political 
liberalization and democratization process which swept through the communist and 
noncommunist countries over the past two decades partly lies in their political cultures 
which, for several reasons,24 experienced many important changes both at the elite level 
and the mass level. The most prominent political cultural changes include the loss o f faith 
in the efficacy o f authoritarian rule, the loss o f faith in the many long-sustaining myths 
about an all-seeing leadership and planning, the widespread aversion to social and 
political violence perpetrated in the name o f both reactionary and socialist/communist 
ideologies, and the rise and transformation o f most political, social, and cultural forces 
who publicly recognize the virtue o f ideological tolerance, appreciate the higher 
ideological prestige o f democracy, and attribute high intrinsic value to its establishment 
and consolidation (Silva 1998:85-87; O ’Donnell 1986:15-17; Diamond 1993; Brown 
1989; Reinsinger et al. 1994:185; Lapidus 1989; Bahry 1993).
In addition to the above socioeconomic and cultural factors, some scholars assign 
causal significance to political institutions in their explanation of political outcomes, 
including political regime variation (Huntington 1965, 1968; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). 
Huntington is credited for innovating the institutional approach to study regime change.
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According to him, the most critical explanatory variable in the study o f regime change 
is the level o f  political institutionalization22 of a national society. Although his variant 
of the institutional perspective is a  critique of the modernization approach for its 
assumption o f  a more or less linear relationship between economic modernization and 
democracy, Huntington concedes that economic development and social mobilization are 
responsible for expanded political participation. However, he argues that the degree of 
political institutionalization, not economic modernization, o f  a  society will determine 
whether this situation will evolve into stable democratic regime or degenerate into 
praetorian regime. According to his argument, political institutions with a high level of 
institutionalization socialize and induct the newly mobilized political actors into the 
prevailing political channels, procedures, and norms. The smooth socialization and 
induction into the national political process is conducive to the rise of stable democracy. 
On the other hand, political institutions with a low level of institutionalization are unable 
to handle the increased political participation and other societal demands and pressures. 
As a result, demonstrations, strikes, riots, and violence engulf polities, giving rise to 
praetorianism o f which military rule is the usual form (Huntington 1965, 1968; 
Huntington and Dominguez 1975).
The implication of the above argument for political liberalization is that it occurs 
under both high and low levels o f political institutionalization. Although certain features 
of political liberalization such as interest articulation, rallies, demonstrations, and 
sometimes even group formation do appear in societies with a low level of political 
institutionalization, political liberalization of this sort is o f  temporary nature with
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virtually little possibility of evolving into a  stable democratic regime as it quickly gives 
way to praetorian and repressive regime. The gradual political liberalization process 
introduced in societies with a high level of political institutionalization is more likely to 
prolong and mature into stable democracy.
Another variant of the institutional perspective recognizes the causal importance 
of political institutionalization for political liberalization but argues that its impact on 
political liberalization is mediated by the type of political regime in power. Some 
scholars argue that because o f the temporary nature o f military-led authoritarian regimes 
whose declared goal has almost always been to prepare the way for a return to a civilian 
rule are less likely to institutionalize themselves than the civilian-led authoritarian 
regimes (Rouquie 1986:108-109; Linz 1973:234-5). As a result o f their temporary nature 
and a consequent void in their political institutionalization, military-led authoritarian 
regimes are more likely to permit the ptomised political liberalization than the civilian- 
led authoritarian regimes (Gasiorowski 1995) which often seek to institutionalize 
themselves as enduring political alternatives.
In addition to the above structural factors which reside within national societies, 
some scholars focus on international influences to explain why an authoritarian regime 
liberalizes its practices and moves in a democratic direction (Huntington 1984, 1991; 
Whitehead 1986; Pye 1990; Case 1993; Abrahamsen 1997; Bratton and Walle 1994:453). 
The international factors that are thought to be conducive to democratic development 
include colonial rule,36 foreign occupation and direct imposition of democratic rule by 
the occupation power, efforts and influence of powerful democratic states,27 the decline
30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
or withdrawal of the influence of an authoritarian hegemon, demonstration effect of 
successful democratization on other countries,28 the end of the cold war, and 
international financial institutions.29 Some scholars attribute authoritarian regimes in the 
Third World countries to their economic dependence and their peripheral position in the 
world economic system (Chirot 1977; O’Donnell 1979; Jackson etal. 1978; Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979; Portes 1976; Frank 1969; Bollen 1983; Wallerstein 1974), implying that 
political repression will end when these countries will throw off shackles o f economic 
dependence and peripheral position in the capitalist world system through socialist or/and 
nationalist revolution.30 However, some scholars argue that in certain conditions 
political democracy is possible to arise in economically dependent countries. According 
to O’Donnell, in the easy phase of ISI, a native bourgeoisie and working class come 
together to challenge the political and economic hegemony of the export-oriented 
oligarchy and provide a base of support for populist democratic regime (O’Donnell 
1973).31
Although advocates of many structural approaches present a large body of 
empirical evidence in support of their claims (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Ingiehart 
1990; Bollen 1983),32 some scholars argue that the structural explanations that focus 
only on the above enduring structural factors are inherently inadequate and problematic 
because they ignore two important sets of causal factors, concrete historical situations and 
political actors, and therefor cannot fully explain political regime variation (Gasiorowski 
1995).
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HISTORICAL SITUATION-ORIENTED APPROACHES
The first set of causal factors ignored by the structural theories o f regime change 
involves immediate concrete historical situations that consist o f quite momentous 
contemporary events such as economic crisis, war, and other political crises (Huntington 
1991; Gasiorowski 199S; Remmer 1990). Some scholars argue that such immediate 
concrete historical situations set off the political liberalization and democratization 
process in authoritarian societies. A number of studies have argued that international debt 
crisis, inflation, recession and defeat in war produce legitimacy crisis for authoritarian 
regimes, cause splits within the ruling bloc (prompting its reform-oriented members to 
court civil and political society in order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the 
conservative members), and trigger the breakdown of such regimes (Huntington 1991:59; 
Epstein 1984; Richards 1986; Markoff and Bretta 1990; Remmer 1990; Gasiorowski
1995). According to Huntington, both rapid economic growth and economic recession 
produce various crises that weaken authoritarian regime and provide the context for 
political regime changes (Huntington 1991:59).
In spite o f their emphasis on immediate concrete historical situations, some of 
these authors concede that the political liberalization and democratization process is more 
likely to be set off "when triggering events occur in conjunction with certain structural 
factors that act as background conditions that magnify the effect o f these events on 
regime change" (Gasiorowski 1995). According to the recent scholarship on regime 
change over the past two decades, the background conditions which magnified the effects 
o f immediate concrete historical situations on the political liberalization and
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democratization process around the world include the active international efforts to 
promote democratic development, the decline of the influence o f authoritarian states such 
as the former Soviet Union, widespread changes in political culture of authoritarian 
societies, new positive attitudes toward democracy among influential societal groups such 
as business, military elite, certain sections of the ruling alliance, and intellectuals, and 
the end of the cold war (Remmer 1990; Huntington 1984, 1991; Abrahamsen 1997). 
PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACHES
The second set of causal factors ignored in the structural explanation o f political 
regime variation relates to the strategic behavior of important political actors and the 
consequent sequences of events (Rustow 1970; Przeworski 1991; Gasiorowski 199S; 
Kitschelt 1992). In fact, some scholars even reject the claim of structural approaches 
that the structural conditions determine regime change. At most the structural factors, in 
the opinion of these scholars, constrain what "is possible under a  concrete historical 
situation" (Przeworski 1986:48). These scholars offer alternative, process-oriented 
explanations33 which focus on the contingent factors such as the sequence o f events, the 
internal power struggles among the ruling elites, and the strategic behavior of the 
important political actors (Rustow 1970; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986; 
Przeworski 1986, 1991; Di Palma 1990; Young 1992: Stepan 1988; Casper and Taylor
1996).
Assumptions o f rational choice approach and game theory provide foundations for 
most process-oriented models o f  political regime variation (Collier and Norden 1992; 
Casper and Taylor 19%). The common claim of these models is that the explanation of
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political regime variation lies not in the structural factors but in political choices and 
decisions that political actors make, and the preferences and strategies they adopt in their 
political struggles. In contrast to the structural approaches which hold political actors’ 
preferences constant, focus on changing structural factors claiming that these factors 
determine regime change, and assume that political actors face extremely narrow choices, 
process approaches emphasize the contingency of actions, preferences, strategies of 
political actors, and political outcomes. As process-oriented authors argue, political 
actors can shape the context in which other actors make choices, can manipulate "their 
own and their adversaries’ cognitive and normative frames" and that choices of political 
actors depend on "a continuous redefinition” of their "perceptions o f preferences and 
constraints” (Kitschelt 1992). By "deliberate and lasting compromises o f core disputes 
among" themselves, national elites can achieve "consensual unity” or "elite settlement” 
which produces political stability and increasingly leads to political openness and to stable 
democratic regimes (Higley and Burton, 1989, 1998).
In short, the process-oriented authors emphasize the contingency of individual 
choices, strategies, and political outcomes and suggest that such contingent factors may 
bring about regime change which no political actor anticipated or desired at the outset 
(Kitschelt 1992; Collier and Norden 1992; Casper and Taylor 1996). Thus, according to 
process-driven explanations, human actions and consequent sequences o f events, not the 
structural conditions, bring about political regime changes.
A number of process-oriented scholars argue that some sequences of events are 
more likely than others to facilitate the shift from an authoritarian regime to a more open
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and competitive regime (Rustow 1970; Dahl 1971:33). These scholars have tried to 
identify certain specific historical-political processes, sequences o f events and phases, and 
crises which facilitate this shift. According to Rustow, "the dynamic process of 
democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle" that 
"is likely to begin as the result of the emergence o f a  new elite that arouses a depressed 
and previously leaderless social group into concerted action." He argues that what 
concludes this protracted political struggle is a deliberate decision of important political 
actors to accept diversity in unity, and to institutionalize democratic procedures (Rustow 
1970:352-358). Dahl identifies three paths from authoritarianism to democracy, although 
he admits that almost an infinite number o f paths can be invented. He prefers the 
sequence in which political liberalization precedes mass participation. He argues that 
under political pressures of oligarchical elites a closed hegemonic regime liberalizes its 
practices and allows for contestation between these elites, and then competitive 
oligarchies will evolve into inclusive political regimes (Dahl 1971:7-8,33-47).
Although process-oriented scholars assign causal significance to human actions, 
some of them appreciate that "the strategic behavior of political actors (is) embedded in 
concrete historical situations" (Przeworski 1986:47) and that certain background 
conditions such as national unity (Rustow 1970) and the existence of nation-state (Linz 
and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1991) are important for human actions to set off the 
democratization process.
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ELECTIVE AND INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES
Instead o f offering exclusively structural explanation or process explanation of 
regime change, a number o f  scholars draw insights from both types o f explanations (Dahl 
1971; Huntington 1991). In fact, some scholars argue that structural and process-oriented 
approaches are not mutually exclusive (Collier and Norden 1992; Kitschelt 1992). 
Kitschelt believes that structuralist and process-driven analyses do not directly compete 
with each other but focus on different objects o f explanations with different research 
methods and comparative designs. He thinks that structuralist approaches are good at 
explaining the general causes o f regime breakdown and the consolidation of new ones. 
Process approaches best explain, in his opinion, "the timing o f breakdown and transition 
as well as specific trial-and-error process of searching for a new viable regim e." In his 
view, these two types o f approaches "represent only strands within the structuralist 
camp" (Kitschelt 1992:1028-1029). Yashar also makes more or less similar arguments. 
He regrets the fact that in pursuit of methodological purity and analytical clarity, scholars 
have neglected the simple point that structuralist and process-oriented approaches address 
different questions. He rather suggests an integrative approach to study questions of 
political liberalization and democratization. The integrative approach he suggests 
emphasizes to focus on "historically constructed conditions that have undergirded 
authoritarianism and the actors that have set out to overcome them." He argues that 
structures "provide constraints within which and against which actors maneuver." 
However, at times, actors challenge the very structures in place, facilitating political
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
outcomes, including political liberalization and democratization, which even they had not 
hoped for (Yashar 1997:2-3).
A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING THEORETICAL APPROACHES
The above theoretical approaches broaden our overall understanding of a host of 
factors related to political liberalization. The results of the past research on political 
liberalization and democratization are in many ways impressive. Some theoretical 
approaches still inform much o f the academic discussion on political liberalization. 
However, the fact that a large body of empirical evidence is available to support the 
plausibility o f  these approaches confronts us with the problem o f overdetermination. In 
other words, we have multiple plausible theoretical approaches to study political 
liberalization. The multiplicity o f plausible approaches also implies that each approach 
is applicable to, at least, a few cases, but no single approach can necessarily explain 
every case o f political liberalization.
Because these approaches seem plausible and their assumptions sound partly true, 
each of them seems potentially useful in thinking about political liberalization. Although 
these approaches are worth keeping in mind when explaining the overall tenuous 
democratization process in our countries, none of them seems by itself to adequately 
account for the significant variation they experienced in political liberalization in the 
post-independence periods. A number of scholars have used some of the above 
approaches to study the post-communist politics in Central Asia.34 However, few studies 
have tried to examine and explain variation in political liberalization among the regional 
countries in the post-independence era. Such studies relate a large number of explanatory
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variables to this variation without a  careful and systematic analysis. The explanatory 
variables used in such studies to explain variation in political liberalization among these 
countries include the historical and cultural legacies such as nomadic versus sedentary 
and strong versus weak Islamic traditions, Asian mentality, the continuity o f Soviet 
institutions (including the change of ruling elites), the strength of opposition and the level 
of threat to ruling elites, numerical strength of minorities (especially the Russian 
minority), and the fear o f inter-ethnic conflict, various external pressures, the impact of 
the Tajik conflict, and the varied policy responses of ruling elites which reflect their 
priorities and capacities in meeting the challenges in the post-communist era (Matveeva 
1999; CSCE 1998:40-2).35 Some of these variables seem to vary across our countries 
and can potentially explain the political variance, but their true explanatory power has 
not been explored in a systematic fashion. However, most of the above variables seem 
to have little or no explanatory power36 and have already been correctly and 
systematically dismissed in serious analyses (CSCE 1998:40-2; DeWeese: 1994; 
Shahrani:1991).
In fact, it is unwise for us to assume that this variation is overdetermined. In 
other words, we can not employ all the existing theoretical approaches to explain this 
variation. Therefore, we need to exercise great care in selecting approach(es) in order 
to offer an adequate theoretical explanation o f variation in political liberalization among 
our countries. Because there are multiple plausible theoretical approaches to explain this 
political variance in Central Asia, our choice o f the relevant explanatory variables must 
be dictated by the empirical evidence. In other words, the post-communist political scene
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in our countries must dictate the selection o f relevant approaches to explain the variance 
these countries experienced in the area of political liberalization in the post-independence 
period.
A careful examination of the post-communist political scene in Central Asia 
sufficiently illustrates that some approaches are of little or no help in explaining the 
variance in political liberalization among our countries. It is so because the variables 
these approaches use to study political liberalization in other cases either do not exist37 
in our countries or do not produce expected results or produce more or less similar 
effects in each of them and therefore do not explain the political variance that exists 
among them. More precisely, approaches which use socioeconomic factors associated 
with capitalist economic development, dependency situation, foreign domination, political 
culture, inherited political institutionalization, class structure, tribal social structure, and 
other historical legacies explain little or no variance in political openness among our 
three Central Asian countries.
This critique is by no means intended to refute these approaches. Rather, we 
wish to emphasize their limitations in explaining the significant variation in political 
liberalization among our countries. Of course, the robust finding o f many cross-national 
studies—a positive correlation between capitalist development and democracy—is hard 
to dismiss. The overall low level of capitalist development o f our countries (see Tables 
4 and 6) can account for the lack of democratic rule among them. However, it can not 
explain the significant variation in political liberalization among them because the way 
they rank on socioeconomic factors associated with capitalist development does not
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produce expected results. On some factors our countries show quite similar trends. On 
others they differ, but their differences in most cases are quite small. For instance, all 
the three countries have more than 90% literacy rate; Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan show 
quite similar trends on urban population, labor force by occupation, and GDP by sector 
(agriculture, industry, and services). Kazakhstan outscores both on these factors (see 
Tables 4 and 6). However, the results are not in the expected directions. Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan remarkable differ in the level o f political liberalization. Kazakhstan scores 
lower than Kyrgyzstan on the political liberalization scale, although it scores higher than 
Uzbekistan on this scale. Likewise, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show similar trends on 
the GNP per capita but outscores Kyrgyzstan in this regard (see Table 6). However, both 
scores lower than Kyrgyzstan on the political liberalization scale—a result contrary to the 
modernization theoretical expectations. In short, the limitations of these approaches 
become more obvious when asked to explain why Kyrgyzstan, a country with the least 
propitious socioeconomic conditions and which many students of the region viewed as 
the most ill-prepared republic of all the former Soviet republics for a democratic 
transition due to its historical legacies (Huskey 1997:243), consistently surpassed both 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in all areas of political liberalization in the pre- and post­
independence periods.
Likewise, besides socioeconomic variables associated with economic development 
and considered to set in motion the democratic process (with political liberalization being 
part o f it), other variables listed above do not vary across our countries in a way as to 
cause the significant political variance that exists among them. In other words, the
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Central Asian countries share, broadly speaking, social and historical experiences, 
including their tribal, Muslim, Czarist, and communists pasts (Khazanov 1995:115), their 
dependent position in the world capitalist system, including their relationship with the 
Soviet center in the Soviet period (Khazanov 1995:115; Gleason 1991), class structure 
and tribal social structure. Because our countries have very more or less similar trends 
on these variables, we can not use them to explain the significant variation among them. 
Hence, approaches which incorporate these factors can be safely ignored.
This assertion is also true of the political cultural approach. The Central Asian 
countries share the main sources o f political culture, including historical tradition and 
experience (Brown 1989:19; Laitin 1988; O ’Donnell 1986:15-18; Huntington and 
Dominguez 1975:15), indoctrination (Eckstein 1988: Taylor 1989:135; Gibson 1996:955) 
and modernization experiences (Lipset 1994; Inglehart 1988, 1990). We have no 
persuasive reason to expect significant variation in their political cultural values. 
Preliminary evidence collected through a survey of political cultural habits and attitudes 
of the people in two of the three countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, shows 
remarkable similarities in their political cultures. If fact, differences in their attitudes 
toward different political systems are quite small (see Tables 10 and 11; Lubin 1995a; 
Pilon 1998). Consequently, we can not expect that such small differences would causes 
the significant political variance that exists among our countries. Although some scholars 
did refer to some small and insignificant differences in the political cultural values among 
and within these countries, they did not use them to explain the rise o f significant 
differences in political liberalization among them (Huskey 1997).38 And that is precisely
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the point we wish to emphasize in this critique. In fact, political cultural approach can 
not even explain aberrations in the political liberalization process within our countries, 
let alone among them.
In addition, in the light of the recent information on the popular attitudes, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to explain not only significant variation in political 
liberalization among these countries, but also the rise o f despotic regimes in Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. Contrary to the common view (promoted by the Central Asian ruling 
elites and their supporters and some Western observers) that the Central Asian political 
cultures are not suitable for political democracy, the recent evidence shows that the 
Central Asian populations "are supportive of democratic rights, while generally 
dissatisfied with their own governments’ performance in defending these rights, and are 
hopeful for progress without recourse to violence. " This evidence which was gathered 
through surveys conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in late 
1996 further makes it clear that the Central Asians "today exhibit a fairly widespread 
desire to participate in the political life of their nations" (Pilon: 1998:90).
The preceding discussion suggests that we need to look elsewhere to find relevant 
variables to adequately address the question o f variation in political liberalization among 
our countries in the post-independence period.
Approaches which appear to be more relevant to the focus of our inquiry are 
those which emphasize ethnic pluralism (and concomitant consequence of dispersion of 
political resources in a society), varied elite structure, and political leadership. As already 
mentioned, a body o f comparative politics literature postulates that ethnic pluralism can
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push a society in a democratic direction under certain conditions. The most emphasized 
conditions under which ethnic heterogeneity can set off the political liberalization and 
democratization process include a multiple balance o f power achieved through the 
existence of more than two resourceful ethnic groups and the desire of the ethnic leaders 
(supported by a sufficient number of their followers) to cooperate with each other for a 
variety of reasons, including national unity, independence, peace, stability, and formation 
of a coalition government. In other words, ethnic pluralism characterized by a multiple 
balance of power prevents any single unified ethnic group from even approaching a 
monopoly o f political resources and forces ethnic leaders and their followers to master 
the art of conciliation and coalition formation in order to achieve their objectives. And 
this, in turn, helps promote political liberalization in multi-ethnic societies (Dahl 
1971:113-123, 1996:178; Lijphart 1977; Huntington 1984:205; Kothari 1971).
In its existing form, this approach pays little or no attention to the support which 
ethnic minorities in an authoritarian state receive from external sources and its impact 
on political liberalization. This situation exists in other areas o f the world, too, but is 
more acute in the Central Asian context. A number o f scholars emphasize the relevance 
of ethnic pluralism, especially the Russian minority, to the building of the post-Soviet 
polity in Central Asia. Beissinger is one of such scholars. In fact, in 1991, he predicted 
that ethnic pluralism in Central Asia would greatly influence the post-Soviet politics in 
Central Asia (Beissinger 1991:31). Khazanov later elaborated on the theme and referred 
to the Russian minority’s identification with Russia as an important factor contributing 
to its political activism and consequently fanning inter-ethnic competition in Kazakhstan
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(Khazanov 1995:115-73). However, he also does not clearly show the relevance of this 
identification and inter-ethnic competition to the democratization process in the Central 
Asian region. The Central Asian cases amply show that if an outside powerful ethnic 
patron identifies with and extends support to its coethnics living in an authoritarian 
society, it is likely to contribute to their strength and politicization, protect them from 
excessive repression of their authoritarian rulers,39and help promote political 
liberalization in such society.
In many countries around the world, there are powerful ethnic minorities which 
adopt a democratic posture in order to enlist international support for their causes. One 
obvious response the authoritarian rulers of the multi-ethnic countries with such powerful 
minorities may adopt in response to persistent international pressure is to relax political 
restrictions and accommodate certain concerns of such minorities.40 In most instances, 
the international support for the democratic concerns of such minorities comes from 
democratic states. However, in the Central Asian republics, the Russian minority that 
once enjoyed the status of a dominant group under the communist rule now finds it 
advantageous to defend its privileges in democratic terms and draws support for its civil 
and political rights and other causes from Russia, a country with little or no manifest 
interest in democratic promotion around the world. In other words, authoritarian rulers 
are likely to liberalize their practices when their powerful minorities enlist the external 
support of a  powerful (especially a contiguous country with ethnic ties with such 
minorities) for their democratic causes, even if this powerful country has little or no 
demonstrated commitment to democratic promotion. Authorities o f such powerful country
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more often than not use democratic rhetoric as the least expensive but effective strategy 
to preserve the privileges of their co-ethnics in an authoritarian country. Thus, the 
explanatory power of a model based on ethnic pluralism greatly increases if we 
incorporate such external support as a factor contributing to the politicization and 
resourcefulness of an ethnic minority.
Another theoretical scheme that appears to be relevant to our inquiry is the one 
which incorporates elite structure as an explanatory variable in the study of political 
liberalization. More specifically, promising for our inquiry is the extent to which the elite 
structure in an authoritarian society is cohesive or fragmented. In many studies of the 
recent regime change around the world, a number of scholars have found a fragmented 
elite structure to be a favorable condition for political liberalization. As already 
mentioned, some factions of ruling elites may promote autonomous societal forces and 
enlist their support in an effort to enhance their own position vis-a-vis their political 
rivals within the ruling circles. This situation helps expand independent political space 
in an authoritarian society.
This theoretical scheme needs modification and further development in order to 
be applicable to the Central Asian context. In its existing form, it focuses on national 
elites and their modern support bases, including political parties and various social 
classes. However, it pays inadequate attention to the national elites’ traditional support 
bases, such as family, tribe, and clan, etc. If elite structure is a  relevant category to 
study political liberalization in Central Asia, then the focus on these support bases is 
important because the Central Asian elites heavily rely on them in their political struggle.
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In addition, those who used elite structure as an analytic category to study the post- 
communist political life in the former Soviet republics, including our countries, saw no 
variance, contrary to the fact, in elite structure in our countries and, hence were led to 
emphasize common political outcomes among them (Easter 1997). We believe that this 
is a mistaken view o f elite structure in Central Asia. We find that our countries 
considerably vary in elite structure and we expect that varied elite structure in them can 
help explain variation in political liberalization among them.
The third approach which we find relevant to our inquiry focuses on political 
leaders. As already noted, process-oriented approaches assume that political actors are 
not merely forced by structural conditions to make pre-determined choices; but rather 
they prove innovative in overcoming such conditions and/or maneuver their way out of 
their constraints, producing intended and unintended consequences. A number of factors 
related to political leaders, including their interests, preferences, political ideas, political 
and economic strategies, actions, and sequence of actions, etc., are believed to influence 
political outcomes.
We intend to draw on this approach in our effort to build a model to explain 
variation in political liberalization among our countries. However, unlike many process- 
oriented explanations which assume that political outcomes are influenced by rationally 
self-interested political leaders who seek total control of the state (Malloy 1987:237), we 
do not intend to impute any interests to them. Not only it is hard to conclusively show 
which interests political leaders are pursuing at a particular point in time and which 
interests are prompting them to take certain actions but the focus on interests also creates
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other problems. If  we assume that all the Central Asian leaders, as rationally self- 
interested political actors, seek total control of the state and/or seek to perpetuate their 
rule, then the focus on their interests can not help explain why their countries vary in 
political liberalization. In other words, in order to explain variation that exists among 
these countries, we need to focus on dimensions along which these political leader vary 
and which produce different political outcomes in spite o f their common interests. Thus, 
instead o f focusing on their interests, we will focus on two aspects, political orientations 
and strategic behavior (including concrete actions) o f political leaders.
This scheme raises a conceptual problem which needs clarification. The danger 
in this scheme is that it is vulnerable to criticism on account of involving a cause-effect 
relationship between political orientations and actions o f leaders. More precisely, critics 
can argue that how political leaders act is influenced by their ideas about political and 
socioeconomic matters, and the relative merit of different available options. In our case, 
this criticism means that acts of the Central Asian leaders which we are treating as an 
independent variable in our scheme may, in effect, be an aspect of political liberalization, 
our dependent variable. This is a  legitimate concern which must be addressed before we 
proceed further in our inquiry.
We know that a number of scholars refuse to reduce political beliefs and ideas to 
mere epiphenomena; they rather treat them as relatively independent, though not as 
uncaused primary, variables in the explanation of democratic outcomes (Dahl 1989:260- 
61). Can actions o f political leaders be put in the same category? In the comparative 
politics literature, political actions and strategic behavior of political leaders are treated,
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just like political beliefs, ideas, and ideologies of leaders, as relatively independent, 
though not uncaused primary, variables in the explanation o f political outcomes, 
including the rise and demise of democratic regimes (Stepan 1988; Diamond, Linz, and 
Lipset 1990). Political actions and strategic behavior of political leaders may not always 
be determined by their ideas and views. A number of other factors, including the force 
of events and emotion, can also cause the leaders to take actions and make strategic 
choices which may assume their own momentum and autonomy and produce 
consequences which no one intends and anticipates. In addition, a political leader may 
take an action which is not in accordance with his central political tendencies, ideas, and 
beliefs. In other words, at times political actions of political leaders can not be 
reasonably and consistently linked to their political orientations.
Conscious of this conceptual confusion surrounding our scheme, we will focus on 
such political actions which are either inconsistent with central political tendencies of the 
Central Asian leaders but produced consequences consistent with their political 
orientations o r are of such nature that they can not be characterized as pro- and anti­
democratic actions. Two examples will illustrate this point. The ban on the republican 
communist party in the immediate post-independence period by the president of 
Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, a reformist leader who later legalized it, falls in the former 
category of actions. The decisions of Sultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakh president, to quit 
the republican communist party and not to join any political party in the wake of the 
August 1991 abortive coup fall in the second category of actions.
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A more detailed discussion of these examples and their impact on political 
liberalization in both the countries is presented below. Here, it will suffice to point out 
that the Central Asian political leaders differ in their views about political liberalization, 
and they also took certain concrete actions which influenced political liberalization in one 
way or another. We assume that variation in their political orientations will help explain 
the variation in political liberalization among their countries. And different concrete 
actions which these political leaders took at different times will not only help explain 
variation in political liberalization among our countries but also aberrations in the 
political liberalization process within them.
Building on the preceding promising theoretical schemes, an effort is made in the 
next section to lay out a theoretical framework to adequately explain variation that exists 
among the three Central Asian republics.
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA: A THEORETICAL MODEL
The dependent variable in this study is political liberalization. The theoretical 
framework we developed to study political liberalization in post-communist Central Asia 
contains three independent variables. These independent variables are: a) the size of the 
Russian minority in proportion to the titular nationality; b) elite structure; and c) political 
leadership (see Figure 1).
The dependent variable is shown at the top and independent variables on the left 
side of Figure 1. Each row on the table depicts the impact o f a particular independent 
variable on our dependent variable. We have decomposed our dependent variable into 
high/moderate/low trichotomy and two independent variables, Russian minority and elite
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structure, into large/small and high/low dichotomies, and third independent variable, 
political leadership, into reformist/cautious reformist/anti-reformist trichotomy, showing 
causal relationship between dependent and independent variables in an oversimplified 
manner for the convenience of the reader. In fact, this format enables us to show to the 
reader in a very simple way whether an independent variable has any effect on the 
dependent variable and whether this effect is positive or negative.
Our first independent variable is the size of the Russian minority in proportion 
to the titular ethnic group in each of the three Central Asia republics, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Although all the three republics house the Russian minority, 
they vary in its size relative to the size of the titular nationality (see Tables 1 and 2). One 
of the assumptions o f our theoretical model is that a large Russian minority constitutes 
a favorable condition for political liberalization in the Central Asian republics. This study 
hypothesizes a positive impact of a large Russian minority on political liberalization in 
post-communist Central Asia, for the following reasons.
First, elites and governments in power in each o f the Central Asian republics 
under study are identified with the titular ethnic group. Most transition policies these 
elites pursue are tailored to address the concerns of the titular ethnic group. As a result, 
the Russian minority, like other nontitular ethnic minorities, is alienated from these elites 
and their ethnonationalist policies. Since both the ruling elites and the main opposition 
forces trying to displace them come from the same titular ethnic group, the sheer large 
size of the alienated Russian minority means that the elites and governments in power 
have a reduced social base to draw support from in their political struggle and, hence,
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there are less aggressive in the use o f repression in such struggle. In addition, if the 
Russian minority strives to advance its own agenda, it means wider opposition to the 
ruling elites and higher cost involved in its repression. And, if it champions causes with 
democratic trappings without challenging the sovereignty and territorial integrity o f a 
republic, it makes it harder for the rulers o f these republics to find reasonable excuses 
to unleash widespread repression and justify it, especially to the Russian authorities who 
have publicly avowed to use force, if necessary, to protect the Russian-speaking 
population living in the ’near abroad’.
Second, what makes the Russian minority a favorable condition for political 
liberalization in Central Asian societies is its resourcefulness. The Russian minority’s 
resourcefulness stems from both endogenous and exogenous factors. The former include 
the numerical strength, higher and specialized education, technical skills, professional 
status, and economic conditions o f the Russian minority. The latter include the Russian 
government’s political, material, and moral support.
As compared to its proportion, the Russian-speaking population outnumbers the 
titular nationality in higher and specialized education and consequently in the makeup of 
the technological elite and skilled industrial workforce.41 This fact helps the Russian 
minority become a very resourceful social group. In addition to the above factors, the 
Russian government’s support to the Russian minority also contributes to its 
resourcefulness and hence effectively protects it from outright repression in societies with 
a relatively large Russian minority.
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We expect that a large Russian minority is likely to attract more Russian 
government’s support than a small Russian minority. The reasons for this expectation 
include: a) the active and much-publicized involvement o f large Russian minorities in 
politics to preserve their privileges; b) the potential loss o f the credibility of Russia’s 
pronounced commitment to protect the rights of the Russian minorities in the former 
Soviet republics if they are subjected to an outright repression; and c) greater chances 
of winning concessions for them from the governments o f the former Soviet republics 
with relatively large Russian minorities.
On the one hand, the Russian minority’s resourcefulness resulting from both 
internal and external factors helps it in its survival as an effective social group and in its 
struggle against both the titular nationality and the government. And, on the other hand, 
it discourages the Central Asian authorities from subjecting it to outright and 
indiscriminate repression, which could potentially set off massive Russian outmigration, 
depriving the republic of skilled manpower, with an adverse impact on the already fragile 
transition economy.
In addition, in view of the explicit Russian commitment to use all available 
means, including force, to protect the Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics, 
the high level o f Russian support to these Russian minorities serves as a clear signal to 
the Central Asian ruling elites that Russia is serious in its commitment. In view of the 
dependence o f the Central Asian republics on Russia, the presence o f Russian troops on 
their soil, and the potential Russian capability and willingness to make and break the 
governments in the region (as the Tajik case illustrates), the Russian government’s
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support to the Russian minority weighs heavily in the calculations of the ruling elites and 
generates lot o f pressure on them, prompting them to accommodate the sociopolitical and 
cultural concerns o f this group. In other words, this pressure prompts them to provide 
independent political space to the Russian minority and, hence, to other autonomous 
opposition forces.
If the ruling elites spare the resourceful (and politicized) Russian minority but use 
excessive force against the opposition forces o f the titular nationality, they risk 
undermining their nationalist credentials with potentially adverse consequences for their 
rule—a prospect they would like to avoid. As a  consequence, the ruling elites in 
republics with a relatively large size of the politicized and resourceful Russian minority 
are constrained in the excessive use of force against both the titular opposition groups 
and nontitular groups and are likely to relax political restrictions and provide political 
space to independent opposition forces.
Third, the large size and resourcefulness o f the Russian minority induce its 
members to organize, put up an active defense o f their interests, and make demands on 
the state. The titular opposition forces and the Russian minority are allies in the post­
communist era in the sense that both are opposed to the ruling elites for their respective, 
although often mutually conflicting, concerns. This situation is conducive to political 
liberalization because the government has a large size of opposition to deal with and finds 
it increasingly difficult to silence it through outright repressive methods.
A large, resourceful, and politicized Russian minority contributes to political 
liberalization yet in another way. More often than not the Russian minority and titular
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nationality operate and interact with each other in the political arena in a competitive 
manner. The politicized Russian minority and the titular ethnic group are involved in an 
interactive relationship. They often make mutually exclusive demands on the state. The 
ruling elites often find it difficult to reconcile these conflicting demands. The action taken 
by one group to achieve its objectives activates the other, and so on and so forth. This 
interactive relationship sets in motion a chain of pressures, counterpressures, 
mobilization, and countermobilization, galvanizing the political arena in the republics 
with large Russian minorities. In other words, the volume o f autonomous political 
activity greatly increases. As a result, the ruling elites often find it advantageous to offer 
limited political liberalization rather than paying the enormous cost required to suppress 
all this autonomous political activity and risk other political eventualities, including civil 
war and the reaction o f the Russian government.
Conversely, if the Russian minority is small in proportion to the titular ethnic 
group, it is less likely to engage in an independent political struggle to promote its 
interests for fear of antagonizing the incumbent authority, let alone the titular majority, 
with little or no chance of substantive achievement. It is more likely to depend on and 
cooperate with the government in power to ensure its security and welfare. In such a 
case, the incumbent authority rather than the ethnic Russian minority is more likely to 
receive the Russian government’s encouragement and support for the protection of the 
interests of this minority. We assume this situation to be prejudicial to political 
liberalization as it strengthens the ruling elites against the opposition forces and builds 
no pressure on them to tolerate independent political activity and liberalize their
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authoritarian practices. The above discussion leads us to expect that the republics with 
relatively large Russian minorities will score higher on political liberalization than those 
with smaller Russian minorities.
Can we expect the same results in Estonia and Latvia which each houses a large 
Russian minority in proportion to the titular nationality (see Table 1)? In other words, 
does the large Russian minority constitute a  conducive factor for political liberalization 
in these republics the way it does in the Central Asian republics? Is Russia as effective 
in pressurizing these republics on the question o f the Russian diaspora as it is in the case 
o f the Central Asian republics housing large Russian minorities? According to a common 
impression which seems to have developed due to the situation in the early phase of their 
independence, the presence o f large Russian minorities undermines rather than advances 
the political liberalization process because the nationalizing Baltic republics exclude them 
from the political processes. This is a mistaken view.
According to the Freedom House rating, both Estonia and Latvia have 
increasingly become free countries since their independence (see Table 8). Also, the 
Russian diaspora in these republics can engage in most independent political activities 
which can be lumped together under the rubric o f political liberalization. In fact, the 
Russian population of these republics is found resisting their nationalizing policies 
through periodic strikes and demonstrations (Smith and Wilson 1997). In addition, the 
Russian population (especially citizens) o f these republics can form organized political 
parties to pursue its interests (Laitin 1998). In fact, what is at stake in these republics is 
not the question of political liberalization (as is clear from the fact that the Russian
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population can engage in such political activities without being subjected to repression), 
but rather the question o f citizenship (Laitin 1998) which, according O ’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986), falls under the rubric of democratization. In Central Asia, it is not the 
question of citizenship because the Russian population there has been granted citizenship; 
it is rather the question of their freedom to exercise this and other civil and political 
rights lumped under the rubric of political liberalization.
Russia is less effective in winning concessions from the Baltic republics than the 
Central Asian republics on the question of citizenship for their Russian population. In 
fact, Russia can exercise more effective pressure on the Central Asian republics than the 
Baltic republics to protect their Russian population from repressive measures for two 
important reasons. First, Russia has withdrawn troops from the Baltic republics but not 
from the Central Asian republics. Russian troops still guard the latter’s borders and have 
the capability to depose and instal governments in these republics. Tajikistan is a case 
in point. The presence of Russian troops effectively protects the Russian minority from 
excessive repression in Central Asia. Second, the cost o f Russian military action in behalf 
of the Russian minority in the Baltic republics is potentially far greater than in the 
Central Asian republics. It is so because the Western industrialized countries are likely 
to react more sharply in the case of the former than the latter. This is clear to the Central 
Asian republics with a large, politically active Russian minority, discouraging them from 
unleashing indiscriminate repression in society.
The second independent variable in our model is elite structure. In this study, 
elite structure refers to a patterned set of relationships that developed among elites of the
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old regime. The leaders of the republican communist party, important members of 
nomenklatura, members of the parliament, state functionaries, heads o f public 
enterprises, and other important figures (such as tribal and clan leaders) under the 
tutelage of the republican communist leadership comprise this elite. In this study, we will 
focus on the structure o f old-regime elites as they passed from the breakdown phase into 
the post-communist transition phase. The character of the structure of old-regime elites 
is defined by their internal unity and cohesiveness and the extent to which they retain 
access to their public and nonpublic power resources.42 On the basis of this definition, 
we can identify two basic elite structure types—consolidated and fragmented (or 
dispersed)—that emerged in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era.
A consolidated elite structure means that old regime elites pass into the post­
communist transition phase structurally intact. The consolidated old regime elites 
maintain their internal unity and cohesiveness and retain access to power resources. They 
do not suffer major defections. Above all, they are unified in keeping new political actors 
out of the national political process and exhibit a remarkable consensus on the pace and 
direction of the post-communist transition. All of this means that unified elites have 
more freedom o f action in controlling independent political activity.
In contrast, a fragmented elite structure means that the old-regime elites 
experience serious internal fragmentation during the regime breakdown and transition 
phases. The fragmented old-regime elites join different groups and alliances and often 
adopt conflicting political agendas. Although some old-regime elites may remain in 
power, many suffer the loss of power positions and public (and in certain cases
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nonpublic) power resources. When they are fragmented, most old-regime elites face real 
political competitors in their struggle for power resources in the post-communist era—a 
beneficial situation for political liberalization.
Drawing on the prevailing scholarly argument that elite structure influences 
regime change,43 this study hypothesizes that variation in the structure o f the old-regime 
elites helps explain variation in political liberalization among the Central Asian republics 
in the post-Soviet era. This study expects a positive effect of the fragmented elite 
structure on political liberalization. It is so because this type o f elite structure is 
indicative of a narrow support base of the ruling regime. It undermines a government’s 
capacity to control and repress society because of the defection of its important allies, 
its isolation from important sources of support, a reduction in the clientelist networks 
available to the ruling elites, and the rise o f broad movements and challenges from above 
and from below. If the elite structure is fragmented, opposition forces become stronger 
and are able to resist restrictions on their political activities. The above conditions 
produced by a Augmented elite structure facilitate the decisions of the ruling elites to 
provide political space for autonomous opposition activities.
The fragmented elite structure facilitates political liberalization in our countries 
yet in another way. That is, fragmented elites of the old regime tend to draw support 
from their old connections, including those located in Russia, which contributes to their 
strength and prove an effective shield against indiscriminate and outright repression. If 
such old connections include the Russian government’s support, it effectively discourages 
the elites in power to eliminate their former comrades (and present political opponents)
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from the national political process through indiscriminate repressive measures. In other 
words, the ruling elites can impose certain restrictions on their political opponents, but 
can not unleash widespread repression to completely eliminate them without the risk of 
prohibitive costs.
In addition to the above conditions, another factor that figures most prominently 
in the decision o f the ruling elites to tolerate independent political activity is the specter 
of civil war. If the ruling elites unleash excessive and indiscriminate repression against 
their opponents, civil war becomes a real possibility under a fragmented elite structure 
because fragmented elites with traditional sources of support (such as tribal, clan, ethnic, 
and regional) at their disposal can be tempted to use them to defend themselves against 
the government repression. The Tajik civil war is a case in point. The civil war increases 
the risk of Russian intervention and the removal o f the ruling elites from their power 
positions. Again, the Tajik case illustrates the point, and serves as a lesson to the ruling 
elites in other republics. The above discussion leads us to expect greater political 
liberalization in the Central Asian republics where a fragmented elite structure has 
emerged.
Our theoretical argument has thus far been structural. We are confident that the 
above two structural independent variables can adequately account for the broad variance 
in the general direction o f the political liberalization process in the post-communist 
Central Asian republics. However, they have their own limitations. Although the large 
Russian minority and a fragmented elite structure considerably constrain authoritarian 
impulses in our countries, but they can not be shown to clearly determine a full range
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of variations among and aberrations in the political liberalization process within them. 
If we confine our focus to these two variables, we can not adequately answer certain 
specific questions related to the political liberalization process in Central Asia. For 
instance, why does the political liberalization process shift back and forth in a republic 
when the above two explanatory variables remain constant? In other words, what 
explains aberrations in the political liberalization process within a country? Why do 
ruling elites relax restrictions in some areas o f political liberalization but not in others? 
And why do they some times tolerate the same independent political activity which they 
otherwise repress? In view of the fact that the above two variables experience no 
change, what explains the timing of certain political liberalization-related developments? 
And why are some societal groups included in political liberalization and others excluded 
from it?
The above two structural independent variables cannot adequately address these 
questions. In order to provide satisfactory answers to these and other similar questions, 
we expand our theoretical argument and introduce the third independent variable, political 
leadership, in our model. In this study, political leadership refers to the incumbent 
presidential leaderships in charge of the post-communist transition process in our 
countries. O f course, these incumbent presidents put together teams of their own 
choosing. These teams often share their political approach and assist them in directing 
this transition. We will focus on two aspects o f political leadership, its views about 
political liberalization and its concrete actions and strategic behavior. In this respect, the 
logic o f our theoretical argument is both structural and voluntaristic.
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The assumption o f this study is that political leaders are not simply forced by 
broad structural conditions into a predetermined direction; but rather they have central 
political orientations which influence political outcomes; they generally retain initiative; 
they mediate the gross impact of structural conditions on the political process; and their 
actions may produce outcomes which no one intended or anticipated.
The central political tendencies of political leaders are likely to magnify or 
weaken situational stimuli for a particular course of action. In other words, if political 
leadership is reformist, it will react favorably even to weak situational press for a 
reformist course o f action, and vice versa. If political leadership is anti-reformist, it will 
forcefully resist pressures conducive to political liberalization. Even under powerful 
constraints o f structural conditions a significant range of options is available to political 
leaders to make political choices and take actions. The choices they make and the actions 
they take tend to have cumulative effect which can increase or decrease the level of 
political liberalization in a republic. One set o f decisions and actions taken at one point 
in time, practically and effectively, if not theoretically, rule out another set of decisions 
and actions down the road. Hence, if a decision conducive to political liberalization is 
taken at one point in time, it is likely to facilitate other decisions and actions which may 
further deepen the political liberalization process. If these assertions are correct, then 
variations in political orientations of the political leadership of the Central Asian 
republics and their concrete actions will help explain variation in political liberalization 
among them.
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Our focus on the central tendencies of the Central Asian leaders is very much in 
line with the serious analyses o f the region. After the abortive coup against Gorbachev, 
serious scholars like Beissinger could foresee that "the varied ideological colors o f the 
elites who were left in power at the time of the Union’s collapse will have an enormous 
impact on subsequent politics in the area, including the complication of efforts to 
construct a post-Soviet community." He also referred to the significant variation in 
ideological colors o f the Central Asian leaders (Bessinger 1991:31, 35). However, his 
recommendation to focus on the political orientations o f the incumbent political 
leaderships was largely ignored in the subsequent analyses of the post-communist politics 
in the region.
We concur with Beissinger that the Central Asian political leaders differ in their 
views about political liberalization. More specifically, they differ about whether, how and 
when political liberalization can be introduced in their societies. Some Central Asian 
political leaders outrightly reject political democracy as unsuitable for their societies. In 
fact, they believe that political democracy is not compatible with the political culture o f 
their societies. Others, especially moderate reformist leaders, doubt the readiness of their 
societies for political reforms. In addition, they enumerate a number o f adverse 
consequences of for the their societies during the transition period. However, they 
manipulate and moderate rather than forcefully resist pro-reform pressures. Still others 
have a more favorable view of political liberalization and its consequences for their 
societies. Political leaders with benign view of political liberalization are more likely to 
relax political control and to be more responsive to even weak constraints o f structural
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conditions than the political leaders with negative views about political liberalization and 
its consequences for their rule and societies.
The choices the political leaders make and the actions they take may or may not 
be in accordance with their central political orientations. We assume that political leaders 
are innovative and at times take actions which are contrary to their central political 
tendencies. However, these actions do influence the political liberalization process in one 
way or another. Because actions o f political leaders are o f fluid nature, it becomes more 
or less an empirical question to investigate whether a concrete action of political 
leadership produces a positive or negative impact on political liberalization in a republic. 
Because leaders take different (and at times inconsistent) actions, we assume that 
variations in their concrete actions will help us explain not only variation in political 
liberalization among our countries but also aberrations in the political liberalization 
process within them.
THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT
As Figure 1 shows, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan score higher than Uzbekistan on 
political liberalization—a conclusion supported by the Freedom House rating of these 
countries on political and civil rights index (see Table 7). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
both have large Russian minorities in proportion to their titular nationalities. Preliminary 
evidence also shows that these minorities receive the Russian government’s help in their 
struggles to defend their political, civil, and cultural rights.
In addition, the elite structure in both countries is fragmented. In Kyrgyzstan, 
the communist party suffered serious splits even before independence. A reformist group
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of communist party members was formed within the Kyrgyz parliament in 1990. This 
group entered into an alliance with a group o f independent members o f the parliament 
and proved critical in the victory of reform-oriented Askar Akayev in the October 1990 
parliamentary election for president. This situation continued in the post-independence 
period.
In Kazakhstan, the republican communist party lost its monopoly over access to 
power resources. It also suffered splits. A number of its members left the party to join 
other political formations and/or operate independently. One section of the republican 
communist party not only opposed the Kazakh president but it also had to face other 
political competitors in the post-Soviet period. In fact, Nazarbayev helped transform not 
only a section o f the communist party into a  new political formation but also helped 
create two more political parties which now rival the communist party. Thus, the large, 
resourceful, and politicized Russian minority, and a fragmented elite structure help 
explain why Kazakhstan scores higher on political liberalization than Uzbekistan. 
However, these factors can not explain why Kazakhstan scores lower on political 
liberalization than Kyrgyzstan which also have a relatively large Russian minority and 
a fragmented elite structure. In order to explain the mixed record of Kazakhstan on 
political liberalization, we need to turn to the political orientations of the Kazakh 
leadership and its certain concrete actions which increased and/or decreased the level of 
political liberalization in the republic.
In contrast to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan scores quite low on 
political liberalization. The small Russian minority, little or no Russian government’s
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support to it, and a consolidated elite structure are responsible for the low level of 
political liberalization in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the consolidated elite structure was 
put in place before independence. The Uzbek elites closed their ranks partly in reaction 
to the center-sponsored purges of nomenklatura involved in alleged widespread 
corruption. After independence, the communist party suffered few defections and was 
successfully transformed into a new ruling party headed by the Uzbek President, Islam 
Karimov. These factors produced a low level of political liberalization in Uzbekistan.
The leadership of Akayev played an important role in promoting political 
liberalization in his republic. Even before independence, he, unlike other Central Asian 
leaders, was enthusiastic supporter of the Gorbachev reform. His pro-reform political 
orientations persisted in the post-independence period. In addition, he relied on more than 
one political party and group for his support. Hence, by entering into alliance with old 
as well as new political actors, Akayev expanded political space available to society.
Like Akayev, Nazarbayev collaborates with more than one political group, 
producing almost similar consequences for political liberalization. Certain actions of the 
political leaders are responsible for greater political liberalization in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. However, due to his ambivalent views about political liberalization and its 
consequences for his society and the presence and demands of secessionist elements 
among the Russian minority (which provide him a more or less safe pretext to repress 
certain unwanted opposition elements) explain why Kazakhstan lags behind Kyrgyzstan 
in political liberalization.
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The political leadership in Uzbekistan is anything but reformist. Before 
independence, it showed rhetorical solidarity with the central leadership on political 
reform, but systematically subverted its implementation when it belatedly made its way 
to Uzbekistan in the late 1980s. After independence, the Uzbek leaders made no secret 
of their quite negative views of the center-sponsored political reform program and their 
determination to roll it back. Immediately after independence, they doubted the readiness 
of their society for political reforms—a position which remained unchanged thereafter. 
In the absence o f structural constraints, the Uzbek leaders had more freedom o f action 
to conduct the post-communist transition in accordance with their central political 
tendencies and designs. As a result, tactics aside which produce(d) short-lived moments 
of political openness, there exists no tolerated independent political activity in the post­
communist Uzbekistan.
NOTES
1. The state-sponsored ethno-nation building is another important area in which the three 
Central Asian republics significantly differ.
2. Conteh-Morgan conceptualize democratization as a transitional stage on a continuum 
starting with authoritarian rule to democratic governance. He argues that it can be seen 
unfolding in countries instituting multiparty systems, national conferences on political 
reforms, holding free and fair competitive elections, establishing mechanisms to ensure 
participation at all levels o f politics, and creating responsible leadership and civil liberties 
(Conteh-Morgan 199S:6). This conceptualization implies that political liberalization will 
ultimately mature into political democracy. Lee views political liberalization as a 
necessary condition for democratization; however, he is opposed to reducing 
democratization to political liberalization (Lee 1993:351-356).
3. Cotton argues that political cultural approach suggests the possibility of 
accommodating illiberal beliefs and practices rooted in political culture o f societies within 
constitutional arrangements (Cotton 1991).
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4. For a representative work, see O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986). 
O'Donnell and Schmitter conceptualize political liberalization as a process o f redefining, 
extending and making certain rights effective that protect both individuals and social 
groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties. The list of 
individual and group rights which they identify elevate their conceptualization of political 
liberalization to an ideal-type which they concede has probably never been totally and 
unconditionally observed in any country and that its content has changed over time 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:7). Kaufman (1986) and Martin (1986) offer rather a 
conservative conceptualization of political liberalization. Their conceptualization of 
political liberalization under an authoritarian regime includes features which according 
to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and Przeworski (1991) are the features of 
democratization. These features refer to the authoritarian regime’s experimentation with 
guided and controlled democracy. In other words, during the political liberalization 
process the authoritarian regime may adopt formal democratic institutions but these 
institutions are often without democratic content.
5. This study views democratization as process o f transforming a non-democratic state 
into a democratic state. As Huntington proposes, democratization involves three things: 
a) the end of a non-democratic regime; b) the establishment of a democratic regime; and 
c) the consolidation of the democratic regime (Huntington 1991:35). Huntington believes 
that "Modern democracy is not simply democracy o f village, the tribe, or the city-state; 
it is democracy o f nation-state and its emergence is associated with the development of 
the nation-state" (Huntington 1991:13). Linz and Stepan (1996) share this view. 
However, unlike Huntington and Linz and Stepan, Ambrose believes that groups and 
communities, in addition to states, can also be transformed into democratic entities 
(Ambrose 1995:19).
6. The troublesome aspects of the conceptualization o f political liberalization offered by 
O’Donnell and Schmitter are that it puts equal emphasis on civil as well as political 
society and includes conditions (such as the protection o f individuals and groups from 
arbitrary acts o f parties other than the state) which perhaps no state will ever be able to 
satisfy. Moreover, it establishes a link between political liberalization, law and order 
situation in a country and the state capability to deal with it. However, theoretically as 
well as practically, it is possible that a country has a democratic regime, but is suffering 
from internal social and political strife. India is just one example. According to our 
conceptualization, political liberalization is primarily related to the extent of political 
space an authoritarian regime makes available to society.
7. Before the breakdown of authoritarian regimes over the past two decades, political 
liberalization was seldom studied as a separate subject o f political inquiry. While it has 
always been a presumption of the evolutionary model o f political development outlined 
by modernization theorists that political liberalization would occur (and ultimately mature 
into consolidated political democracy) in nondemocratic countries when they would begin 
to attain a higher level of socioeconomic development, it was only after the recent regime
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change that regime analysts systematically studied political liberalization (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).
8. As already mentioned, the question o f political liberalization has been around for quite 
some time. One o f the interesting debates the recent regime change has provoked is 
focused on the question o f how to compare various aspects of recent political regime 
change, including the question of political liberalization, in the communist and 
noncommunist world. Some scholars find it appropriate to examine the post-communist 
transitions with the analytical categories developed from the study of regime change in 
the noncommunist world (Karl and Schmitter 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1994; Hasegawa 
1992). Others argue that the post-communist transition is a  unique phenomenon which 
is fundamentally different from the post-authoritarian transition. They insist on 
developing new analytical categories in order to properly study the post-communist 
transition (Ekiert 199). Both groups use a number of theoretical schemes to explain the 
beginning of political liberalization under authoritarian and communist regimes. In this 
chapter, we shall discuss various approaches both groups use to study political 
liberalization.
9. The thesis that economic development has a positive correlation with democracy has 
generated an enormous amount of research. There is a long list o f scholarly studies that 
subsequently reconfirmed this empirical connection. For representative work, see 
Coleman (1960), Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979, 1983), Huntington (1984, 1991), Lipset, 
Seong, and Torres (1993), Diamond (1992), Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1988:xxi), 
Waisman (1992:140-55), and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994).
10. In addition to these effects, a wealthy, industrial economy, as the argument runs, 
lessens the tensions o f political conflict and facilitates accommodation and compromise 
in the political arena by offering alternative opportunities and abundant economic 
resources to unsuccessful political leaders (Huntington 1984:199). For an excellent 
synopsis of the reasons for the positive correlation between democracy and economic 
development, see Huntington (1984), and Przeworski and Limongi (1997).
11. Marx is believed to be among the first scholars to identify the bourgeoisie as the 
major force responsible for the rise of democracy. According to him, the capitalist class 
uses democratic mechanisms to capture the state from the traditional power elites (Arat 
1988:21).
12. Therborn argues that although the rise of market economy and the middle class have 
eroded state power and enlarged human rights, it was the working class, especially in the 
capitalist world, that championed the rights of political parties and the expansion of 
suffrage (Therborn 1977). John Stephens observes that capitalist development causes 
democratization "because it is associated with a transformation of the class structure 
strengthening the working class" (Stephens 1993:438).
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13. He uses the two terms, "the authoritarian crisis” and "great transformation,” with 
reference to the transition process underway in the nondemocratic countries in the 
communist and noncommunist world. The term "the crisis o f authoritarian" is used to 
refer to the grand failure of dictatorial rule "to deliver on its promises of purposeful 
efficiency," the state-initiated "liberalization practices," and the democratization process 
underway in the nondemocratic communist and noncommunist countries. The "great 
transformation", a term he borrows from Karl Polanyi (1944), refers to the process in 
which "transnational forces involving a dynamic world economy and revolutions in 
technology and information are compelling authoritarian governments to open up their 
economies" as well as political system (Pye 1990).
14. In addition to political liberalization, other common possibilities include: a) 
democratization— "decisive transitions from autocratic rule toward democracy" (Pye 
1990:5; Huntington 1991:59); b) an abrupt overthrow o f a dictatorial regime; and c) 
increased repression (Pye 1990:5; Huntington 1991:59). Other scholars also refer to 
some of these possibilities in their analyses of regime transition (Linz 1978:35; 
Huntington 1984:212-14, 1991:110-63; Share and Mainwaring 1986:177-79).
15. Huntington is o f the view that under certain conditions, ethnic, racial and religious 
diversity may facilitate the development of at least limited forms of democracy. 
However, he asserts that "In most cases of communal pluralism, democracy can operate 
only on a consociational rather than a majoritarian basis." And he believes that such 
democracy "often break(s) down as a result of social mobilization that undermines the 
power of elites or as a result of the intrusion of external political and military forces." 
(Huntington 1984:205). Dahl also believes that a heterogeneous country can experience 
competitive politics if "it is not segmented into strong and distinctive subcultures; or if 
it so segmented, its leaders have succeeded in creating a consociational arrangement for 
managing subcultural conflicts" (Dahl 1996:178).
16. A number o f social groups ranging from religious associations such as the Catholic 
Church (Huntington 1991:72-85) to middle-sector groups such as salaried class and small 
local producers (Kaufman 1986:90-93) to environmental and cultural groups (Butterfield 
and Weigle 1991) to a host of other voluntary associations (Schmitter 1986:6-8) are 
thought to have played a critical role in the democratization process in the world over 
the past two decades. Schmitter believes that in addition to autonomous social formations, 
"independent territorial communities, especially town and cities" greatly facilitated the 
recent democratization process around the world (Schmitter 1986:6). Moshe Lewin is 
believed to be first to introduce and emphasize the importance of the concept of civil 
society to the study o f politics in the Soviet Union. He is o f the view that modernization 
slowly expanded civil society which in turn is responsible for perestroika and glasnost 
(Lewin 1974, 1988). Arato differs with Lewin’s notion of a slowly and expanding civil 
society in the Soviet Union. He rather argues that independent social movements and 
initiatives did not arise in the pre-Gorbachev period. He also rejects the notion that 
modernization is responsible for the rise of civil society which facilitated perestroika and 
glasnost. He rather refers to "the self-constitution of civil society in independent
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movements and initiatives" and the role o f the state (the reform-oriented Gorbachev team) 
in providing opportunity structure for the beginning of self-organization. He also 
suggests the possibility of the republic level administrative structures contributing to the 
rise and politicization o f independent social movements and initiatives (Arato 1991-202, 
212).
17. A change in the orientation of the already existing social groups can facilitate the 
initiation o f  the political liberalization and democratization process in a country. 
Huntington believes that the pro-democracy change which occurred in the Catholic 
Church played a  significant role in undermining authoritarianism (Huntington 1991:72- 
85). In a similar fashion, Kaufman finds that the defection o f the middle-sector groups 
from an authoritarian coalition and their support to anti-regime coalition forces greatly 
facilitated the political liberalization process in many South American countries (Kaufman 
1986:91-93).
18. O ’Donnell and Schmitter are of the view that the resurrection of civil society begins 
after some political liberalization has been introduced in a country (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986:48). In other words, civil society can help expand and deepen political 
liberalization, but cannot be the cause of it. The assumption underlying this position is 
that authoritarian rule destroys autonomous political spaces and is able to orient most of 
its subjects toward the pursuit of exclusively private goals (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986:48). In other words, no autonomous grass-root organizations exist before political 
liberalization. In spite o f its merits, this view does not capture the reality in many 
countries including Pakistan where autonomous social organizations such as religious 
formations existed before different authoritarian regimes liberalized their practices. And 
such formations pursued goals with explicit political implications. One o f such goals was 
the demand for the introduction of an Islamic system in the country.
19. Political culture has been defined in different ways. According to Huntington and 
Dominguez (1975:15), political culture "consists of empirical beliefs about expressive 
political symbols and values and other orientations of the members of the society toward 
political objects" (Huntington and Dominguez 1975:15). Larry Diamond defines political 
culture as "a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and 
evaluations abut the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that 
system" (Diamond 1993:7-8). Sidney Verba defines political culture as a "system of 
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which 
political action takes place” (Verba 1965:513). Some scholars went beyond this subjective 
and psychological definition of political culture to include behavior ( Tucker 1987:3-6; 
White 1984:62). According to Archie Brown, despite some important differences 
between ideology and political culture, "the substance of one can impinge upon and 
intertwine with the other" (Brown 1989:2).
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20. Huntington and Dominguez believe that "The most crucial political belief for political 
modernization is...the extent to which individuals consider themselves unambiguous 
members o f a given nation" (Huntington and Dominguez 1975:32).
21. For Daniel Lerner, empathy is the capacity of a person to see himself in his other 
fellows’ situation (Lerner 1958:49-50).
22. The crude version o f the political cultural theory sees in political culture a causal 
determinism. According to the crude political culture theory, political culture of a society 
is relatively impervious to change, and it more or less predetermines both political 
structures and political behavior. Howard Wiarda (1974) is often criticized for such a 
rude political cultural theory. Pye is also criticized for his explanation of Asian political 
development through a  political cultural perspective which "approaches the deterministic 
model in several basic assumption" (Diamond 1993:9). For a critical review o f the crude 
version o f the political cultural theory, see Diamond (1993). Although the assumptions 
Diamond (1993) found in Pye’s work approach the deterministic model, Pye at other 
places recognizes the malleability of political culture: "A political culture is the product 
of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals 
who currently make up the system; and thus it is rooted equally in public events and 
private experiences" (Pye 1965:8).
23. There are three broad sources of political culture: a) historical tradition and 
experience (Brown 1989:19; Laitin 1988; O ’Donnell 1986:15-18; Huntington and 
Dominguez 1975:15); b) indoctrination (or artifice) (Eckstein 1988; Taylor 1989:135; 
Gibson 1996:955); and c) modernization (Lipset 1994).
24. The much-cited sources of these political cultural changes include the painful 
experience o f social conflict (i.e., strikes, protest rallies, street violence, and shortage 
of food and consumer goods) prior to the rise of authoritarian regime, the painful 
experience o f bloody military coups, the "unusually repressive and socially regressive" 
authoritarian regimes, the failed economic policies o f such regimes, the destruction o f 
the myth about the inevitability and irreversibility o f the socialist process, generational 
gap, intellectual debates (especially in the USSR), and modernization (O’Donnell 1986; 
Silva 1998; Diamond 1993).
25. Huntington defines institutionalization as a "process by which organizations and 
procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1965:394).
26. This is more true o f the British and American colonial rule than of other colonial 
powers. As Huntington reported, as of 1983, no former colony of France, Belgium, and 
the Netherlands was a democracy (Huntington 1984:206). However, some former British 
colonies, as Myron Weiner observes, existed with a continuous democratic experience 
(Weiner 1987). The two prominent examples are Sri Lanka and India.
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27. Kitschelt considers the focus on international efforts to promote democracy as a 
process approach to the study of political regime (Kitschelt 1992).
28. Huntington argues that demonstration effects are increasingly possible because of the 
almost instantaneous transmission o f information about significant political events around 
the world. The successful democratization demonstrates to other societies that leaders and 
groups have an ability to end an authoritarian regime; that it could be done; that how it 
can be done; and that how and what dangers could be avoided (Huntington 1991:33, 
100).
29. During the cold war, the Soviet Union and the United States supported all kinds of 
countries to secure allies. Once it was over, it caused a substantive reduction in 
resources available to authoritarian regimes. In addition, aid donors announced that aid 
would be available to those who undertake political reforms (Abrahamsen 1997:130-131).
30. In fact, dependency and world system theorists concede that independent economic 
development is conducive to a humane political regime. However, they argue that 
economic development and peripheral position in the world economic system distort most 
of the usual consequences o f socioeconomic development associated with the rise of 
political democracy. The common argument offered to establish a  connection between 
economic dependence and lack of democracy focuses on the relationship between the 
elites in the periphery and the elite in the core. The former are said to maintain 
authoritarian regime with the support of the latter. This support is thought to hinder the 
processes associated with socioeconomic development that contribute to democratic 
development. Contrary to the assumption of modernization theorists that industrial class 
will challenge authoritarian regimes, in the dependent countries this class becomes a vital 
part o f the system of domination. Thus, the core and noncore elites resist the pressure 
of the working class for more political and economic rights. An end to this situation will 
bring about an end to political repression in the Third World countries (Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979; Frank 1969; Portes 1976; Chirot 1977; O’Donnell 1979; Bollen 1983; 
Evans 1979).
31. Cardoso, on the other hand, believes that although there is a certain "elective 
affinity" between the structures produced by associated-dependent development and the 
centralization of power, but because the political form (the regime) is distinct from the 
pact o f domination (an alliance of hegemonic classes) which gives the State its social 
base, the same style of associated-dependent development is "consistent with democratic 
regime" (Cardoso 1989 :301, 310-311).
32. In his cross-national study o f relationship between world system position, dependency 
and democracy, Bollen finds "support for the belief that different positions in the world 
system are associated with different levels of political democracy even after controlling 
economic development" (Bollen 1983:477). However, Muller’s cross-national study does 
not support Bollen’s position (Muller 1985).
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33. Some scholars argue that the structural and process-driven approaches are not 
mutually exclusive (Collier and Norden 1992). Kitschelt believes that "structuralist and 
process-oriented analyses do not directly compete with each other but focus on different 
objects of explanations with different research methods and comparative designs." He 
thinks that structuralist approaches are good at explaining "the general causes of regime 
breakdown and the consolidation o f new regimes. Process approaches may explain the 
timing of breakdown and transition as well as specific trial-and-error process o f searching 
for a new viable regime." In his view, the "two currents represent only strands within 
the structuralist camp" (Kitschelt 1992:1028-1029).
34. The approaches used toward these ends include modernization theory (Bohr in Rezun 
1992, p. 129), cultural theory (Huskey 1997), social structural approaches focusing on 
various cleavages along ethnic, regional, tribal, and religious lines (Huskey 1997), and 
dependency approach (Huskey 1997).
35. Lately, Anna Matveeva tried to explain the emergent political differences in Central 
Asia. According to her, "political diversification" in the Central Asian region is the result 
of the different "policy responses adopted by the leaderships" to constraints produced by 
fundamental structural elements related to the demise of the communist order. These 
different policy responses reflect the leaderships’ "varying priorities and capacities in 
meeting the challenges of the new era .” The challenges and concerns (or "fundamental 
structural elements" she referred to here as the true factors shaping the post-communist 
political order in Central Asia are the challenges and concerns of both the elites and the 
masses in the post-communist era. These include the need to construct new power 
relations, nation-building, the presence of minorities and the possibility o f inter-ethnic 
conflict, division o f society along regional, tribal, or clan lines, and economic transition 
(Matveeva 1999:24-6).
36. In this category, we can include the historical and cultural legacies, the continuity 
of Soviet institutions, the Tajik civil war, the powerful opposition and the gravity of 
threat to the incumbent ruling elites, and Asian mentality.
37. For example, feudal and industrial classes do not exist in these republics.
38. Huskey referred to differences in political culture that exist in different parts of 
Kyrgyzstan, but he did not explain aberrations in the political liberalization process 
within Kyrgyzstan as well as variation among the regional countries in political 
liberalization (Huskey 1997).
39. The Kosovo crisis is the best example of an ethnic minority can enlist international 
support, including military intervention, for its democratic rights.
40. This point is taken from Whitehead (Whitehead 1986:8-9).
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41. According to one estimate, approximately three times more Russian-speakers are 
employed in industry than members of the titular nationality. The same is true o f the 
makeup o f the technological elite (Current Digest Press, no. 17, 1993:12). The 
importance of this workforce can be partly judged from the fact that students o f the 
region have described the outmigration of the Russian-speakers as "brain drain" (Olcott, 
1997:213).
42. This definition is borrowed from Gerald Easter (Easter 1997:187-88). However, I 
believe that his position that a consolidated structure of old- regime elites prevailed in 
all the post-communist Central Asian republics is incorrect. In fact, even if we use his 
criteria to characterize elite structures in these republics, a cursory look would 
sufficiently expose structural variations of old-regime elites in these republics. It is 
interesting that he characterizes elite structure in Russia as reformed, but that in 
Kyrgyzstan as consolidated. A careful examination will fully reveal that elite structures 
in both the countries are similar in many respects. Both countries have reform-oriented 
presidents, reform-oriented administrative teams under the leadership of the chief 
executives, reformed former communist elites in power position, the hardcore 
communist elites out o f high public offices, power struggle between the chief executives 
and the legislatures, alliances between reformed former communist elites and new 
political actors, etc,.
43. Many scholars used elite structure to explain political outcomes , including political 
regime changes (Huntington 1991-92; Higley and Burton 1989; Stepan 1986, 1988) and 
variation in institutional choices in the post-communist world (Easter 1997).
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CHAPTER 3
UZBEKISTAN 
THE RISE OF A POST-COMMUNIST AUTHORITARIAN 
POLITICAL ORDER
INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 1991, the Republic of Uzbekistan, one of the 15 Soviet 
republics, declared independence. After independence, Uzbek ruling elites publicly 
expressed their resolve to continue the transition process the central authorities had 
initiated under the rubrics o f perestroika and glasnost in the pre-independence period. 
However, as of 1997, the post-communist transition process in Uzbekistan made little 
meaningful progress toward the expressed goals of democracy and a free market 
economy. In fact, as Uzbek ruling elites set out to handle without central dictates the 
unprecedented and monumental task o f the post-communist transition, gradual 
reformism became the most authoritative slogan for them. According to their 
approach, gradual economic transition was to precede gradual political transition.
The Uzbek government has so far handled the economic transition in an erratic 
way. Presidential decrees have been regularly issued as quick fixes to complex 
economic problems such as liberalization of prices, inflation, unemployment, and 
privatization. Still, the overall economic transition has proceeded at a slow pace. 
Although the state still controls most o f the economic activity in the country, it does 
allow Uzbek society to engage in some sort o f autonomous economic activity. The 
same, however, can not be said of the political transition.
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As compared to economic space, political space available to Uzbek society is 
much more restricted. In fact, the political transition witnessed fewer aberrations and 
erratic shifts than the economic transition. In other words, after independence, the 
Uzbek leadership has consistently refused to introduce even gradual but genuine 
political reforms. It has rather established political structures and procedures which 
are democratic in appearance but not in content. Since independence, barring few 
tactical and short-lived pro-reform moves and periods of limited political openness, 
genuine political liberalization has never been tried in Uzbekistan. In fact, Uzbek 
authorities have relentlessly and successfully sought to repress all forms of political 
dissent, muzzle the independent print media, and establish compliant political 
structures, including sociopolitical groups, in the post-independence period. It is no 
exaggeration that if we keep in view its record on political liberalization in the pre- 
independence and immediate post-independence periods, Uzbekistan experienced 
deliberalization rather than liberalization in many respects in the post-1991 
presidential election period.
This chapter is devoted to the in-depth study o f the level of political 
liberalization which Uzbekistan achieved in the post-independence period. The in- 
depth study of the post-independence political liberalization process in the republic 
will involve a systematic examination o f the empirical evidence and its 
correspondence with the expectations o f our theoretical model. In other words, we 
will study the extent to which our independent variables produced the expected 
outcomes in Uzbekistan. Before we examine the empirical data on political
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liberalization, we will first discuss the extent to which our independent variables hold 
in the republic. A concise discussion in this regard will be useful for interpreting the 
empirical evidence and for assessing its correspondence with our theoretical 
expectations. The next section of the chapter is devoted to the study of the late 
introduction of glasnost in Uzbekistan and its restricted impact on Uzbek politics. The 
ongoing political transition in Uzbekistan is rooted in the center-sponsored political 
reform initiatives in the pre-independence period. The study o f the pre-independence 
reform measures will provide us a proper background to comparatively understand the 
current post-communist political transition in that country. We will then focus on the 
first phase of limited political openness in the immediate post-independence period 
and examine its relationship with the short-lived intra-elite power struggle. This phase 
lasts until the December 1991 presidential election. The remaining chapter will focus 
on the long spell o f  thorough repression o f independent political activity and 
independent mass media outlets. In addition, we will also examine the second brief 
period of limited political openness during 1995-96, followed by a new wave of 
repression. In the last pan, we shall discuss the sham competitive electoral process 
and its exclusive openness to the pro-government individuals and political formations. 
Main findings of the chapter will be summarized in the conclusion.
A SMALL AND POLITICALLY INACTIVE RUSSIAN MINORITY
At the time o f independence, Uzbekistan was home to almost two million 
ethnic Russians,1 who made up 8.3% of its total population and 34% of the 
population of the capital city, Tashkent (see Table 1 and 3). The size of ethnic
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Russians in proportion to the titular Uzbeks, who make up 71 % of the total 
population (Table 2), is not only small, it is also in constant decline, primarily due to 
Russian out-migration. According to the 19% estimates, Russians dropped to 5.6% 
and Uzbeks increased their share o f the total population to 76.6% (see Table 2). 
Although Russian out-migration began in 1990, it did not gain an alarming momentum 
until after the breakup of the Soviet Union. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan lost once and for all their previous status as the 
dominant sociopolitical group and consequently their out-migration gained an 
unprecedented momentum. According to one source, the number o f Russians desiring 
to leave Uzbekistan increased from 25% in 1991 to 75% in 19% (Olcott 19%:543; 
Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press No. 28, 19%: 19).
In addition to suffering a constant decline in their relative size, ethnic Russians 
are among the least politically active ethnic groups in Uzbekistan. Ethnic Russians do 
not have any vocal and effective sociopolitical association o f their own to promote 
their interests in Uzbekistan in the post-independence period.2 In fact, most Russians 
in Uzbekistan do not pursue a  political course of action to redress their grievances. 
Also, they keep away from the intra-Uzbek political struggle for fear of reprisals from 
both the government and opposition forces. Those Russians who are active in Uzbek 
politics are small in number. The political survival and well-being of such activists 
are tied to their membership in the ruling party and an open alliance with Uzbek 
ruling elites.
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Instead o f entering into an open alliance with Uzbek ruling elites, most ethnic 
Russians extend their passive support to them.3 They extend such support in the 
belief that, as compared to other viable alternatives such as nationalist and Islamic 
governments, the incumbent Uzbek government is the best available guarantee for the 
protection o f their interests in the post-Soviet period. There is a common impression 
among the Russian population of Uzbekistan that "were it not for Karimov, the 
Russians would be fleeing" the republic (BBC, June 12, 1993). As a consequence, 
this population is supporting rather than opposing his government and authoritarian 
policies.
Given their enormous economic, educational, and professional resources, and 
the reservoir of support from their co-ethnics in Russia, ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan 
could have generated effective pressure on the Uzbek government for greater political 
liberalization had they directed these resources toward that end. Their survival 
strategies in the post-Soviet period, namely migration and passive support for the 
incumbent Uzbek government, work to the advantage of the latter, which would have 
paid a greater price to suppress the largest and most resourceful ethnic minority in the 
country if the Russian minority had been politically active to promote its interests in 
Uzbekistan. Also, the current role of the Russian minority serves Uzbek ruling elites 
from another vantage point. On the one hand, they use its protection and maintenance 
of inter-ethnic harmony as pretexts to restrict political space for Uzbek society, 
including its Russian element. On the other hand, they use the current passive role of
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their Russian minority as proof o f the absence of an ethnic, especially Russian, 
problem and as proof of the effectiveness of their repressive measures.
Thus, the migration trends among ethnic Russians, the absence of effective and 
vocal Russian sociopolitical associations committed to the advancement of their 
interests, and their active and passive support for Uzbek ruling elites hardly build any 
pressure for political liberalization in the republic in the post-independence period; 
rather, these factors facilitate the Uzbek rulers’ efforts to curb autonomous political 
activity in their society. The above factors also undermine another factor with 
enormous potential for promoting political liberalization in Uzbekistan: Russia’s 
support for ethnic Russian minority.
In the post-Soviet period, Russia was expected for several reasons to support 
the Russian minority in Uzbekistan. These reasons include the explicit commitment of 
the Russian authorities to protect the rights of ethnic Russians living in the ’Near 
Abroad’ with all possible means, including the use of force if necessary, the unique 
position that Russia occupies in Central Asia, the overall repressive political situation 
in Uzbekistan, the enormous magnitude of and potential for Russian exodus from 
there, and the serious socioeconomic and political consequences this exodus would 
have for Russia. Although Russia sought to persuade and pressure Uzbekistan on 
behalf of the Russian minority, its efforts have thus far produced nothing more than 
empty declarations. The failure of its initial modest efforts did not prompt Russia to 
pursue a more aggressive approach toward Uzbekistan. It appears instead to have 
accepted the failure o f its policies. In fact, the absence of Russian activism in
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Uzbekistan and the consequent Uzbek denial of the existence o f a  Russian problem led 
the Russian authorities to concede that the problem o f the Russian population in that 
republic "is past its peak" (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press No. 31, 1995:20-1).
In addition, the Russian perception of its geopolitical interests and sources o f threats 
to these interests in Central Asia obliged Russia to avoid an aggressive approach 
toward Uzbekistan.
The breakup o f the Soviet Union has unleashed new political forces in the 
former Soviet space. The potential rise of nationalist-democratic and Islamic forces 
into power in Central Asia is viewed in Moscow as an ominous development for 
several reasons, including the welfare of ethnic Russians in that region. The 
importance of close cooperation and willingness o f the incumbent Uzbek government 
to combat these forces increased its value for the Russian authorities. The Uzbek 
government and its policies appeared to the Russian authorities as the best available 
guarantee, as compared to other viable nationalist-democratic and Islamic political 
alternatives, for the protection of the Russian population of Uzbekistan. As a 
consequence, they downplayed the cause of ethnic Russians in the republic and ended 
up supporting the Uzbek government against Uzbek opposition forces. That the Uzbek 
dissidents living in Russia have been harassed and arrested by both the Uzbek and 
Russian secret services and police is an unmistakable show of Russian support to the 
Uzbek government in its efforts to suppress opposition forces (Khazanov 1995:151; 
Russian Press Digest, November 11, 1993).4 This situation strengthened the Uzbek
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government but undermined the prospects for greater political liberalization in Uzbek 
society.
REMARKABLE UNITY OF UZBEK RULING ELITES
Uzbekistan is one the two countries (Turkmenistan being the other) in Central 
Asia in which ruling elites o f the Soviet era showed remarkable unity in the post- 
Soviet period. Barring a  few cases of individual splits, the elite structure in 
Uzbekistan has so far remained intact. The remarkable unity among Uzbek ruling 
elites developed and solidified during the Soviet period, for several reasons. These 
reasons include the development of a multifaceted network of relationships as part o f 
the survival strategy of the indigenous population under Soviet rule, the rise o f Uzbek 
nationalism vis-a-vis the center much earlier than in other Central Asian republics 
(Critchlow 1991), and various policies such as emphatic pursuit o f nativization of 
cadres and affirmative action sanctioning preferential treatment to the indigenous 
nomenklatura.
Before independence, Uzbek elites demonstrated their unity and cohesiveness 
on several occasions. The most vivid display of this unity occurred during the 1983 
infamous cotton affair, a  scandal of widespread political corruption in Uzbekistan 
cotton procurement agencies. In addition to eliminating corruption, the central 
authorities used the cotton affair to rid echelons o f power in Uzbekistan of the long- 
secure elites. The central authorities carried out massive arrests and purges following 
the exposure o f the cotton affair. Some local kingpins even received death sentences.
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However, the central anti-corruption campaign backfired. Uzbek elites 
progressively hardened and united to resist the center’s anti-corruption campaign and 
scheme to replace them with non-Uzbek cadres in the party and government 
apparatus. For all practical purposes, the center called off its anti-corruption campaign 
in early 1989 in large part due to the determined and united resistance of Uzbek 
elites. After the center called off its anti-corruption drive, Uzbek elites under the 
leadership of Islam Karimov rejected the central version o f the cotton scandal, 
protested against injustices done to innocent people during the investigation, and 
sanctioned a quiet rehabilitation o f those cadres who had lost their positions in the 
massive purges. This rehabilitation policy gained momentum as the center 
progressively lost control over developments in the republics. The overall protective 
conduct o f Uzbek elites, which enabled thousands of compromised cadres to smoothly 
weather the cotton affair, could not have failed to promote and solidify among the 
Uzbek cadres feelings o f gratitude and bonds o f loyalty toward each other in general 
and the leadership in particular.
The renewed unity enabled Uzbek ruling elites to develop concerted responses 
to other developments before independence. These developments included the question 
of sovereignty, the August 1991 abortive coup in Moscow, the termination of the 
Uzbek communist party’s organizational and ideological ties with the CPSU following 
the coup, and the independence of Uzbekistan.
In the post-independence period, the cohesiveness o f Uzbek ruling elites did 
not suffer any major blow. In the immediate post-independence era, there were only
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odd cases of dissent within the ruling party and government apparatus which could not 
shake consolidated elite structure to its foundation. Although Uzbek elites closed 
ranks for national causes and for preservation of their power position in Uzbek 
politics, this unity did not mean an unchallenged position for Karimov. In fact, after 
independence there were still prominent former communist figures who had 
considerable clout in Uzbek politics. In September 1991, almost two hundred 
members of the Uzbek parliament signed a letter o f protest against the increasingly 
dictatorial position of Karimov. Vice President Shukrulla Mirsadov reportedly 
masterminded this protest letter after he gathered support from certain forces in 
Moscow during his visit in early September 1991 (Olcott 1993a: 57; Fierman 
1997:378, 404; Russian Press Digest October 29, 1991).
Karimov responded to his critics in parliament and avoided a showdown with 
them at the time. This episode showed the vulnerability o f the Uzbek elite structure to 
fragmentation and the controversial position of Karimov within the ruling party. In 
case the elite structure suffered fragmentation, there was enormous potential for a 
grand alliance among opposition forces, disgruntled members of the revamped Uzbek 
communist party, and their supporters in Moscow against Karimov’s rule. It would 
have been very difficult for him to move against such an alliance.
This challenge, however, did not develop into an enduring position, and his 
challengers did not form a solid and resourceful bloc of prominent political figures 
within the ruling party and government apparatus. Thus, the Uzbek elite structure 
survived the most serious threat o f disintegration in the immediate post-independence
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period. As it became clear that the Uzbek elites structure was solid enough to sustain 
such threats, Karimov unhesitatingly moved after the 1991 presidential election to deal 
his critics and rivals within the party and government apparatus with a heavy hand. In 
the post-1991 presidential election period, he was able to purge his potential 
challengers, including Mirsadov, without seriously damaging the internal integrity of 
the elite structure.3 The ouster of Mirsadov and other dissenting voices within the 
party, parliament, and the executive branch o f government without any uproar and 
serious crack within the Uzbek elite structure demonstrated two things. First, unity 
among Uzbek ruling elites is solid and not easily eroded. Second, this unity has 
involved the recognition and acceptance o f  Karimov as the unchallenged primary actor 
in Uzbek politics.
Since the ouster of Mirsadov and other dissenters, the party and parliament 
members have faithfully avoided criticism o f Karimov and his transition policies, 
allowing him to single-handedly direct the course of the post-communist transition.
The Uzbek parliament has quietly accepted the advisory role, approving presidential 
decrees by a unanimous vote. Of course, these decrees include measures which are 
aimed at eliminating the potential political rivals of Karimov and his ruling party, the 
People’s Democratic Party.
This above discussion makes it clear that the former communist cadres have so 
far remained united under the leadership o f  Karimov, with their full access to the 
state resources and control over distribution o f benefits in Uzbek society. And this 
situation offers little optimism for a relaxation of political controls in Uzbekistan.
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ANTI-REFORMIST UZBEK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Before independence, the successive Uzbek communist political leaders, 
including Karimov, who came to power during the center-sponsored reform program 
were anything but reformist. While they endorsed the cultural, social, and ecological 
issues which the rising informal sociopolitical groups championed in the pre­
independence period, they continued to condemn the techniques of such groups, the 
character o f their leaders, and the chaos they were allegedly creating in the republic. 
The Uzbek communist leaders also took practical measures, including the use of 
force, to restrict their activities and to prevent them from becoming a legitimate force 
in Uzbek politics (Fierman 1997:368-377).
As compared to his two predecessors, Usmankhoajaev and Nishanov, Karimov 
increasingly became candid in expressing his anti-reformist views. After the center 
lost power vis-a-vis the republics in 1991, he made no secret of his hostile attitude 
toward independent political activity and his readiness to use force to curb it. He 
urged the central leadership "to make the party truly democratic and democratize in 
parallel the entire power structure in the country" (Tass, April 16, 1991), because this 
decentralization process was bound to give him more latitude in governing Uzbek 
society. However, the Uzbek leader opposed the idea o f uniformly incorporating non­
communist sociopolitical forces in the democratization process for several reasons, 
including the deterioration of order and the immaturity of the Soviet people in many 
parts of the country (BBC, June 3, 1991).
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Assessing the center-sponsored political reform program in June 1991, the 
Uzbek leader regretted that the democratization process was getting out of control. He 
accused the rising autonomous sociopolitical groups, especially in Uzbekistan, of 
doing politics of rallies, creating inter-ethnic tension, and committing pogroms and 
arson, and advocated to give up the interests of a small number activists of such 
groups in order to protect the interests of the majority which, in his view, was not 
interested in the negative politics o f the former. He lamented that such groups were 
acting as a negative opposition which was busy in defending the interests of 
individuals striving for power. He advised them to become a constructive opposition 
which should cooperate constructively with the ruling forces and at the same time 
should defend convictions, policies, and decisions which correspond to the group 
rather personal interests (BBC, June 3, 1991).
The Uzbek leader advocated a quite conservative approach to introduce the 
democratization process in the country. According to his opinion, before taking 
practical measures to introduce "comprehensive democracy” in society, "one should 
think about whether this democracy is governable or not, whether you control the 
processes, or the processes will control you." He insisted that the establishment and 
maintenance of order and discipline should take precedence over the inclusion of non­
communist sociopolitical forces in the democratization process because "There is no 
democracy without order." In addition, he emphasized the evolutionary nature of 
democracy and its close relationship with the political awareness and political culture 
of the masses. Because democracy has certain stages which must correspond to the
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political awareness and political culture of the masses and because the Soviet 
republics considerably varied in these dimensions, the Uzbek leader viewed it unwise 
to implement an identical form of political reform program in various parts of the 
country. The most unsuitable republics for the introduction of the center-sponsored 
political reform program were, in the eyes o f Karimov, the Central Asian republics 
whose masses respect authority rather than democratic spirit (BBC, June 3, 1991).
His anti-reformist views of the pre-independence period left no doubt that 
Uzbek society would witness little genuine political reform, at least for the 
foreseeable future, if Karimov had a free hand to decide the fate o f the 
democratization process underway in his republic. The fate of political reforms in 
Uzbekistan in the post-independence period remarkably corresponded to his anti­
reformist views o f the pre-independence period. In other words, Uzbek society 
witnessed little genuine political liberalization in the post-independence period.
After Uzbekistan declared independence in August 1991, Karimov was free to 
rule without Moscow’s dictates. However, he appeared to have no clear blueprints of 
his own to deal with the post-communist transition because soon after independence 
he expressed apparently quite contradictory views about the political future of Uzbek 
society. For instance, the Uzbek leader made it clear in an interview in September 
1991 that his republic was not yet ready for democracy and a market economy. 
However, in the same interview, he alluded to the possibility of holding presidential 
and parliamentary elections. He also promised a law that "will provide for a multi-
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party system" (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 37, 1991:16; The Associated 
Press, September 17, 1991).
Of course, there were signs in the immediate post-independence period that the 
Uzbek leader was in the process o f refining his ideas, views, and strategies about the 
future of Uzbek society. However, a close examination o f his views and the occasions 
on which they were expressed makes it clear that Karimov was consistent in terms of 
expressing different views for different purposes and audiences. The purpose o f his 
pro-democracy statements was to address international concerns (The Associated 
Press, February 16, 1992; BBC March 11, 1992). He continued to express his 
customary rhetorical commitment to democracy mostly on diplomatic occasions but 
made no political concessions to Uzbek society. For instance, with James Baker, the 
US Secretary o f  State, on his side in Uzbekistan in January 1992, Karimov told 
reporters that "Uzbekistan is prepared to build an open society where there will be no 
dictates of a  single party" (The Associated Press, February 16, 1992).6 However, 
such statements have no correspondence, whatsoever, with his actions in the post­
independence period.
As compared to his sporadic pro-democracy statements mostly issued for 
diplomatic consumption, Karimov has been more consistent in expressing his anti­
reformist views. His anti-reformist statements have been primarily aimed at the 
domestic audience and have so far remarkably corresponded to his actions in the post­
independence era.
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As views of the Uzbek leader crystallized over time and he began to express 
them in a  consistent manner in the post-independence period, it became clear that 
independence brought no notable change in his pre-independence anti-reformist views; 
rather, he became more vocal in expressing them in the post-independence period. In 
other words, his views about the priority o f stability and economic issues over 
political reform, the need for constructive rather than negative opposition forces, the 
destructive consequences o f the indiscriminate inclusion o f non-communist forces in 
the democratization process, the evolutionary nature o f democracy, and the 
authoritarian political culture of Uzbek society remained unchanged (BBC, June 12, 
1993).7
In addition, after independence, Karimov openly began to say that Western 
democracy was unsuitable for Uzbekistan. He plainly told foreign reporters; "It is not 
necessary for us to adopt Western democracy spiritually alien to us. We shall have 
our own, national democracy which will help Uzbekistan become one o f the leading 
countries o f the world" (Khazanov 1995:143). After independence, the Uzbek leader 
was attracted toward the Turkish, the Chinese, and the South Korean models all of 
which contained a strong authoritarian element (The Associated Press, September 17, 
1991; The Independent, December 21, 1991:8).® He soon gave up the pretence of 
following other models in favor o f his own model of development which was no less 
authoritarian. His model was inspired by "the Code o f the medieval despot Timur" 
(Khazanov 1995:144).
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In fact, the Uzbek leader was o f firm belief that the transition period needed 
an iron hand in order "to prevent bloodshed and confrontation and to preserve ethnic 
and civil concord, peace and stability in our region. It is necessary for democracy’s 
progress" (BBC, February 18, 1993; Russian Press Digest, February 12, 1993). He 
admitted that his activities were somewhat authoritarian, but justified them by citing 
the need o f a strong executive and central authority during the transition (BBC, 
February 18, 1993). In addition, he also de-emphasized the role of parliament in the 
transitional period. In one of his interviews, Karimov plainly stated: "I am for a 
strong executive, not something amorphous called here and there a parliamentary 
democracy. This is in a transitional period, I believe, an impermissible luxury” (BBC, 
June 12, 1993). He envisioned a gradual and slow change in Uzbek society.
Affirming that he would bring about political change in his republic "from the top 
down amid order and discipline" (The Washington Post, September 16, 1991:A18), 
the Uzbek leader perceived the Uzbek opposition forces as a negative phenomenon 
which constituted the most serious threat to order and discipline, and thus to political 
reform, because they engage in the protest politics to advance personal interests of 
individual political leaders. In addition, he was critical o f Uzbek opposition forces 
because they offered no constructive alternative and because o f their efforts to oppose 
"the man in power" rather than to fight for the cause and ideas they profess (BBC, 
June 12, 1993). In his address to the parliament in August 1996, he complained that 
so far he has not seen a constructive and genuinely democratic opposition in 
Uzbekistan (CSCE, March 1997:4), implying that the existing Uzbek opposition
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forces are unfit to have an access to the political process. Thus his views about how 
and when authoritarian polities should democratize and his assessment o f the 
prevailing circumstances in Uzbekistan rendered the inclusion of the whole Uzbek 
society in the political liberalization process a remote possibility in the post­
independence period.
The above discussion of the extent to which our three explanatory variables 
hold in Uzbekistan offers little optimism for political liberalization in that country. In 
other words, the small Russian minority in proportion to the titular ethnic group, 
remarkable unity of Uzbek elites, and anti-reformism o f the Uzbek political leadership 
lead us to expect low level of political liberalization in Uzbekistan. Because these 
variables saw little change in the extent to which they held in Uzbekistan in the pre- 
and post-independence periods, we expect low level o f political liberalization in both 
the periods. However, the main difference between the two periods is the role the 
central authorities played in influencing the reform process in the republic. This role 
is present in the pre-independence period but absent in the post-independence period. 
Whatever political openness was available to Uzbek society in the pre-independence 
can be attributed to this role. However, at the same time, a small and politically 
inactive Russian minority, cohesive elite structure, and anti-reformist orientation o f 
the Uzbek leadership militated against the deepening o f glasnost in Uzbekistan.
LATE AND RESTRICTED GLASNOST IN UZBEKISTAN
Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet president, began to introduce economic and 
political reforms after he assumed power in March 1985. His political reforms under
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the rubric o f glasnost made their way to some Soviet republics much earlier than to 
others. Uzbekistan witnessed the late arrival of the center-sponsored political reforms. 
In fact, the Gorbachev reform initiatives were not only delayed in Uzbekistan but they 
also had little meaningful impact on Uzbek politics, for several reasons.
Gorbachev shared with his predecessors the view of Islam as a troublesome 
and reactionary force. He feared that Islam would undermine his reform initiatives.
He also attributed the alleged widespread corruption in the Central Asian republics in 
general and Uzbekistan in particular to Islamic culture (Olcott, 1990a:375).9 Thus, 
despite his professed commitment to widespread openness, including religious 
tolerance, Gorbachev endorsed an all-out attack on religion in Central Asia. In a 
secret resolution in 1986, the CPSU also declared Islam as an obstacle to 
socioeconomic development in the country (Khazanov 1995:131). The central and 
local press carried articles condemning Islam and Islamic practices as obstacles to the 
development of society (BBC, July 13, 1985). The Uzbek communist party affirmed 
and decided upon a plan of action in 1986 to combat religious influences in Uzbek 
society. As of 1988, when political openness had made significant progress in other 
areas, the Uzbek communist party under the leadership o f Rafiq Nishanov was still 
engaged in Islam-bashing in Uzbekistan (Olcott, 1990a:375; Haghayeghi 1995:47-55). 
Such an attack attested to the selective practice o f glasnost and made the Central 
Asian peoples skeptical of glasnost and o f the intentions of the central authorities, 
discouraging them from all sorts o f active participation in the political process in the 
republic.
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The continued anti-corruption campaign and massive purges, which followed 
the exposure o f the infamous ’cotton affair’ after the death of Brezhnev further added 
to this skepticism, which in turn checked the rise of informal groups and a 
reform-oriented alliance o f the communist elites in Uzbekistan. The anti-corruption 
campaign and massive purges created a national anger and united the Uzbek 
communist elites in their resistance against the center. Under this atmosphere, the 
reform-oriented group was difficult to form within the Uzbek communist party. Once 
united in common cause against the center, the members o f the Uzbek ruling elites 
who had democratic tendencies were unlikely to break ranks with their national 
comrades, identify themselves with and support the Moscow-sponsored reform 
initiatives.
The proliferation o f informal groups was not a welcome prospect for the 
central authorities during the anti-corruption campaign. In fact, they had a very 
negative view o f the Uzbek informal groups. One Soviet official observed that there 
was "a far-reaching shadow headquarter o f opponents of perestroika" which was 
exploiting informal groups for its sinister purposes (Critchlow 1991:146). The Soviet 
authorities suspected that the local informal groups were associates o f the corrupt 
Uzbek officials. The central authorities also blamed the Uzbek informal groups for 
exploiting extremely sensitive national issues and pushing Uzbek society in an 
anti-Soviet direction (Critchlow 1991:146-7).
The above Soviet perception o f the local informal groups suited the Uzbek 
leaders who were least interested in, and rather resisted, the full scale implementation
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of political reforms in their republic. The Uzbek communist leadership was, in fact, 
skeptical about the merits of glasnost. It was not viewed as a panacea for the 
problems o f Uzbek society. In addition, the Uzbek communist elites were unlikely to 
fully identify themselves with the center-sponsored reform initiatives after their 
humiliation in the anti-corruption campaign.
The Uzbek leadership resisted the full scale implementation of glasnost for the 
obvious reason o f the potential arrival of new rivals on the Uzbek political scene and 
the fear of losing power to them. This partly explains why the Uzbek ruling elites 
graciously tolerated informal groups with local agendas and limited following, but 
were not ready to tolerate the growth of those groups with national agendas which 
could potentially challenge and discredit the incumbent Uzbek communist leadership. 
Thus, the interests of the central and Uzbek authorities coincided on the question of 
formation and operation o f independent social and political groups in Uzbekistan. This 
situation partly explains why the central authorities took little or no notice of the lack 
of progress in the implementation of their much trumpeted policy of political openness 
in that republic.
Uzbek society itself is partly responsible for the late arrival of glasnost. If the 
central authorities were not pushing political reforms in Uzbekistan as they were 
doing elsewhere, and if the local authorities were skeptical about its merits, the 
people of that republic were also not willing (and politically not conscious of the 
need) to precipitously engage themselves in bold political adventures. In fact, with the 
decades of absolute repression under Soviet rule in the background, it was natural for
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Uzbek society to be slow and cautious in its response to the policy o f glasnost. This 
fact was not lost on those Uzbek democratically-oriented individuals who tried to 
awaken Uzbek society from the deep social and political slumbemess and encourage 
its "active participation in social and political life” (Guardian, October 25, 1990:9) in 
order to end the communist rule in the republic.10
However, as glasnost began to bring about sea changes in the political arenas 
of other communist societies, Uzbek society could not remain unaffected. In fact, 
once these sea changes appeared and were tolerated in other communist societies, it 
became difficult for the central and local authorities to isolate Uzbek society from 
their effect. Over time, the Uzbek intelligentsia began to trust Gorbachev’s intentions, 
appreciate the scope of glasnost and respond to it in a number of ways. The Uzbek 
people began to organize themselves into informal groups, associations and 
movements. These formations began to make demands on the authorities and 
undertake actions, including protests and demonstrations, to accomplish them.
Despite the fact that the Uzbek leadership was averse to independent social and 
political formations, they tolerated these groups without considering them capable of 
making any positive contribution to the welfare o f the Uzbek society. Most informal 
associations and movements pursued local agendas with limited followings. However, 
some associations and movements championed a wide variety of causes, including 
causes of national and political importance. For instance, much of the program of the 
Birlik movement, which was organized in November 1988, focused on social, 
economic and ecological issues but it also included more sensitive issues such as
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human rights, status o f the Uzbek language, and sovereignty and ultimately 
independence o f the republic (Haghayeghi 1995:66-67; Fierman, 1997:367; The 
Independent (London), May 28, 1990:6). Another organization, Islam and 
Democracy, pursued the goal of cleansing Islam in the Soviet Union. The pursuit of 
this stated goal, however, soon brought it into an open conflict with the official 
clerical establishment in Uzbekistan (Haghayeghi 1995:85).11
Associations such as Birlik and Islam and Democracy with national agendas 
posed a real challenge to the monopoly o f the Uzbek ruling elites over politics in 
general and national interest articulation in particular. As compared to the Uzbek 
communist leadership’s negative view o f glasnost, such informal groups fully 
supported the reform initiatives and viewed the petitions, demonstrations and rallies as 
appropriate forms o f participation (Fierman, 1997:367). True to their word, but to the 
chagrin o f the Uzbek authorities, these associations staged protest rallies to voice their 
concerns and demands. These protest rallies were first organized in Tashkent in 
December 1988 and later in other cities o f Uzbekistan in support o f Uzbek language 
and culture. Birlik’s leaders addressed these rallies with and without official 
permission.
The Uzbek communist party under Rafiq Nishanov adopted diverse, manifold 
and shifting responses to these informal groups and their challenges. The initial 
attitude of the Uzbek authorities toward important informal groups was that o f denial 
and dismissal. Their formation was tolerated and even certain concessions were made 
to them. However, the Uzbek authorities denied them official recognition, considering
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them incapable o f playing a positive role in the conduct o f Uzbek politics. Birlik and 
certain other opposition groups were the favorite targets of condemnation in internal 
party reviews, party conference reports, and the republic’s press.12 In addition to 
internal party reports, the party news media also attacked the techniques and the 
character o f the Birlik leadership. In fact, the Uzbek communist party leadership was 
averse to the politics o f demonstrations, and Birlik was quite good in that.
The Uzbek authorities during the Nishanov era created various hurdles for 
informal groups like Birlik, but refrained from using frequent and excessive brutal 
force to curb the formation and activities of these groups. Even the unauthorized 
meetings, demonstrations and rallies Birlik and other informal groups organized in 
support o f their demands were often tolerated.13 The leadership of Birlik and other 
informal groups were also permitted access, though limited, to the republic’s press. 
For instance, a favorable review o f the poetry o f Muhammad Solih, a Birlik leader, 
was published by a literary magazine at a time when he was under venomous attack in 
the main news media. He was also permitted to publish his defense in the republic’s 
press (Fierman, 1997:368, 402). At about the same time, Nihsanov’s policy toward 
the informal groups further changed for the better. His administration put on a 
friendly outward face toward the opposition groups. It publicly admitted that the 
informal groups can play a constructive role in solving the social and political 
problems o f Uzbek society. Lending credence to its claim, the Uzbek communist 
leadership sent Birlik and religious leaders to the Fergana Valley to control riots there 
in early June 1989.
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Building on the shift that occurred toward the end of the Nishanov era, the 
Uzbek communist party further softened its attitude toward the informal groups and 
their agenda after Islam Karimov came into power in June 1989. The main purpose 
behind this shift was to dissuade the emerging opposition forces from politics of 
protest rallies and to disarm them of such issues which they could use to potentially 
arouse the masses. Making a distinction between those who pursued their agendas in a 
peaceful manner and those who preferred protest politics and brought the masses into 
the streets, the Uzbek authorities granted the so-called the law-abiding leaders positive 
recognition and permitted them greater freedom to promote their ideas (Fierman, 
1997:369). However, they adopted a shifting policy toward those who often brought 
the masses into the streets in support of their demands.
Initially, the Uzbek communist party under the new leadership of Karimov 
pursued a flexible approach, encompassing almost all the important informal groups 
and trying to dissuade them from street politics, essentially through negotiations and 
concessions. However, it later sought to control, undermine, and repress those 
individual leaders and informal organizations who continued to hold protest rallies and 
refused to operate within prescribed parameters. This second approach will be 
discussed in detail later in the chapter. Here, we focus on the first approach which 
granted the informal groups more breathing space than they had during the Nishanov 
era.
One o f the most salient features o f this approach was that the Karimov 
administration appropriated most of the popular issues on the agenda of most of the
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important informal organizations. This appropriation was to serve the important 
purpose of controlling protest politics. In fact, this move could potentially end the 
monopoly of individual leaders and informal organizations over certain popular issues 
and disarm them of the issues they exploited to organize protest rallies. In short, this 
move sent a clear message that the informal groups and masses need not resort to 
protest politics and confront the Uzbek authorities because the latter also supported 
their causes: rather, they should become a constructive opposition and cooperate with 
the Uzbek authorities in pursuit o f these causes.
Over time the Karimov government moved beyond the sheer adoption of the 
opposition groups’ agenda. It further changed its policy toward them. It permitted the 
state-controlled mass media to debate very sensitive issues such as Uzbekistan’s 
relations with the center, sovereignty, pre-communist history, and ecological and 
other social problems o f the republic. Also, a dialogue began between the Uzbek 
authorities andkhe informal groups (CSCE, March 1997:1). This change was, in fact, 
concomitant with the increasingly positive attitude o f the central authorities toward 
informal groups and with the Uzbek authorities’ public recognition that informal 
groups were capable o f  playing a positive role in Uzbek politics. Karimov publicly 
spoke of the informal groups as "a natural and objective" development in the 
democratic evolution and an "indicator o f the politicization" o f Uzbek society. 
Recognizing past mistakes, including the attitude of denial, which the Uzbek 
communist party committed in its approach toward the informal groups and 
movements, Ktuimov emphasized the change in the party policy from "total
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non-recognition to constructive dialogue" with these forces. The republic press 
published favorable accounts of the initial contacts between the Uzbek authorities and 
leaders of the informal organizations with the "hope for fruitful cooperation in the 
very near future" (Fierman, 1997:369).
Of course, there were still many serious restrictions in place: yet, after the 
opposition-government dialogue, independent political space expanded for the 
opposition groups. They were relatively free to function, hold meetings, recruit 
supporters and occasionally issue publications to articulate and communicate their 
views to the Uzbek people (CSCE, March 1997:1-3). In addition, the Uzbek 
authorities opened up new opportunities for the participation of certain informal 
groups in the electoral process. In the Fall of 1989, they announced multi-candidate 
elections for the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, to be held in February 1990. Despite 
numerous restrictions, this campaign afforded the informal groups an opportunity to 
expand their base and articulate and promote their agendas. Ignoring the calls o f some 
groups for a boycott, most informal groups participated in the elections and a number 
of nonparty candidates defeated the party nominees (OSCE Digest, April 1990:3). 
Developments o f this sort had been hard to conceive of in the past. In this sense, they 
signified the growing tolerance of the republican communist party of the emerging 
political competitors. This fact held the promise for more political openness for 
Uzbek society in the future.
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RETRENCHMENT OF GLASNOST UNDER KARIMOV BEFORE 
INDEPENDENCE
As events unfolded, the promise of more political openness turned out to be a 
false promise. Over time, it became clear that the Uzbek authorities would accept the 
expansion of political space at the pace and for groups of their own choosing. In 
February 1990, the Uzbek authorities introduced a restrictive legal measure which 
dealt with associations in Uzbekistan. This measure focused on many things relating 
to associations, including rules concerning the creation of associations, their efforts to 
gather support, their funding, their access to mass media institutions, and their right 
to establish such institutions. The law also specified penalties for a wide variety of 
violations of these rules by associations and their leaders. This measure was very 
vague and amenable to varying official interpretations. The Uzbek authorities 
effectively used these loose measures and their varying interpretations to arrest the 
growth of the so-called extremist political formations like Birlik and Islamic 
Republican Party (IRP).
As the 1990 election campaign proceeded, it became clear to the authorities 
that certain groups would campaign and contest elections in a manner contrary to their 
preferences. This was an unpalatable and potentially dangerous situation for the 
Uzbek ruling elites. In reaction, they began to shrink the political space available, 
especially to the so-called noncooperative and extremist individual leaders and 
organized groups. In its October 1989 resolution "On Measures for the Stabilization 
of Social-Political Situation in the Republic,” the Uzbek Supreme Soviet lashed out at 
those who championed human rights and the politics of unsanctioned rallies and other
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acts of extremism. The Supreme Soviet authorized the security forces to use clubs, 
handcuffs, and other special devices to keep civil peace. The opposition forces were 
reminded that the offer of cooperation did not extend to those who resorted to the 
politics of protest rallies (Fierman, 1997:370).
Uzbek rulers began to carry out their threats prior to the parliamentary 
elections. Although they created obstacles for almost all the informal groups in the 
electoral process and manipulated electoral procedures to preserve the power position 
of the Uzbek communist party, opportunities for the so-called extremist groups were 
particularly restricted, and some even faced outright exclusion from the electoral 
process. Uzbek rulers created numerous obstacles against their participation in the 
nomination process. Their nomination meetings were often blocked and their 
organizers discredited. Their several requests to hold election rallies were turned 
down.
Of course, the 1990 parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan were, as some 
observers noted, "more democratic than the Soviet variety", but they "left very little 
room for opposition forces to organize and promote their candidates" (Fierman. 
1997:371). It was reflected in the foregone election results. One-third of the seats won 
by the Uzbek communist party members were uncontested (OSCE Digest, April 
1990:3). Most nonparty members who won their seats reportedly had the blessings of 
the Uzbek authorities. Nonparty winners who were suspected to have enjoyed the 
official blessings included Muhammad Solih, a Birlik leader.14
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The Uzbek authorities used both cooptive and coercive methods to emaciate 
the opposition. In addition to encouraging splits among the opposition ranks and 
creating associations sympathetic to them, the Uzbek authorities tried to coopt 
individual opposition activists (Guardian, October 25, 1990:9).13 The most common 
method the Uzbek authorities readily used to take care of the inconvenient individual 
opposition leaders and groups was coercion and intimidation.
in order to sound law-abiding, the Uzbek authorities, once they decided to 
pursue an aggressive approach toward inconvenient opposition groups and independent 
media outlets, began to lay down the legal foundations for restrictive and repressive 
conditions for them. Soon after the 1990 parliamentary elections, the Presidium of the 
new Uzbek Supreme Soviet decided to ban public rallies until the social-political 
situation was stabilized. On paper, the opposition could hold sanctioned public 
meetings in closed locations. However, in practice, most groups which the Uzbek 
authorities viewed as non-cooperative and extremist were unable to hold such 
meetings. The leaders of these groups became targets of official criticism and their 
attempts to organize public rallies were thwarted by all means necessary, including 
the use of force.16
In February 1991, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet passed a law which made it a 
criminal offense to insult the honor and dignity of the president and other top officials 
of the republic. This law specified the heavy penalty of six years o f imprisonment for 
repeat offenders and those who use the mass media. The law also authorized the
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
closure of a mass media institution that was found to be guilty o f repeated infractions 
in this regard.
As the Uzbek authorities increasingly became aggressive toward the opposition 
forces in the wake of the 1990 elections, opposition groups like Birlik began to use 
foreign media, especially the Russian media, to criticize the authoritarian tendencies 
o f Karimov. After the Russian press and electronic media began to publish and 
broadcast Uzbek opposition’s criticism of the Uzbek leadership in general and after 
the IRP tried to hold its founding congress in particular, the Uzbek authorities took 
practical measures to restrict the access of informal groups and the access o f the 
masses to independent foreign media outlets (Russian Press Digest, May 7, 1991; 
BBC, August 3, 1991).17
After the center-sponsored reform program increasingly deepened in response 
to the profound the economic crisis in the country and many republics, including 
Uzbekistan, declared sovereignty with the due consent o f the center,18 the Uzbek 
authorities became less and less sensitive to the political reform program of the 
central authorities— who were increasingly becoming preoccupied with the future of 
the union than with the political reform program. A small and cooperative Russian 
minority and cohesive elite structure rendered it less expensive for Uzbek ruling elites 
to deal with the opposition forces in an aggressive way and to shape Uzbek society 
according to their own political vision.
The opposition forces recognized this fact. In response to this reality and the 
growing repression of the Uzbek authorities, Birlik, which was once accused o f being
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a radical nationalist movement, began to enter into alliances with national level 
democratic and republican level Russian-oriented movements in order to protect itself 
from repression (Russian Press Digest, May 7, 1991; BBC, August 28, 1991).19 
However, to the dismay o f opposition forces, such alliances proved less than effective 
in protecting them from repression, for several reasons.
First, because such alliances were involved with so many issues in many 
republics, they could not remain focused on Uzbekistan only and. hence did not 
consistently generate enormous pressure effective enough to discourage the Uzbek 
authorities from unleashing repression against the opposition in the republic.
Second, such alliances were formed at the time when the Uzbek leadership 
backed by a cohesive republican communist party was increasingly becoming 
autonomous and therefore could weather the occasional uproar and criticism of the 
autonomous forces working at the national level. In fact, the Uzbek communist party, 
unlike the Kazakh and Kyrgyz communist parties, did not experience any split due to 
the center-sponsored reform program and/or inter-ethnic violence. As a result, 
throughout the glasnost period, it remained united and was able to resist pro-reform 
pressure.
Third, the Russian-oriented group, Intersoyuz, in Uzbekistan was too 
insignificant and weak to matter. Because most Russian residents in Uzbekistan were 
not politicized and thousands were migrating from Uzbekistan during the period 1990- 
91, the Intersoyuz leadership was unlikely to be able to deter repression through 
mobilizing large segment of the Russian minority in Uzbekistan and/or through
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persuading the central and Russian authorities to exert enormous pressure on Uzbek 
authorities. Perhaps this partly explains why Intersoyuz could not play a significant 
oppositional role in the republic. As a result, the opposition's maneuvers to escape the 
increased repression through such alliances before independence came to naught. 
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN INDEPENDENT UZBEKISTAN
The basic authoritarian orientation and character of the Uzbek regime 
remained unaltered in the post-independence period. As before independence, the 
Uzbek rulers' approach toward political liberalization in the post-independence period 
witnessed shifts between short-lived, modest relaxations of political control and 
extreme repression.
In retrospect, the political openness during the glasnost and immediate post­
independence periods appears particularly striking considering the high level of 
repression in the post-1991 presidential election period. The highest point in the 
relaxation of the post-communist authoritarian system in Uzbekistan occurred during 
the period between independence and the 1991 presidential election. However limited 
and short-lived, political openness of this period has so far gone unsurpassed. In fact, 
in the period that followed the 1991 presidential election, the Uzbek authorities 
extensively rolled back whatever limited political openness had previously been 
available to Uzbek society. Barring a few encouraging tactical moves made in 
1995-96, the Uzbek authorities took no substantive initiatives which could inspire a 
reasonably positive assessment about the relaxation of the Uzbek post-communist 
authoritarian regime after the 1991 presidential election.
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The remaining portion of the chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of the 
two short-lived periods o f relaxation as well the long spell o f extreme repression in 
the post-independence period in Uzbekistan.
SELECTIVE POLITICAL OPENNESS AFTER INDEPENDENCE
As already pointed out, in the immediate pre-independence period. Uzbek 
authorities had begun to shrink even the modest independent political space which 
they had made available to Uzbek society under glasnost. Interestingly, instead of 
further shrinking it, Uzbek rulers expanded it in important respects in the immediate 
post-independence period. Although several political restrictions were still in place, 
the overall approach the Uzbek authorities adopted toward political liberalization 
during this period was much more flexible than the one they adopted during the 
preceding months in the pre-independence period. Also, during the immediate post­
independence period, political liberalization reached a level which it never reached 
again in the later post-independence period.
Although this short-lived relaxation of political control came about at an 
intriguing juncture,20 we can make sense of it if we relate it to the temporary 
jockeying among the ruling party elites for power position in the post-communist state 
structures. More specifically, the decision to expand rather than further shrink 
independent political space in the immediate post-independence period was a tactical 
response the Uzbek leadership adopted to neutralize certain potential competitors 
within the ruling party and state structure.
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Because the republican communist party was reincarnated intact into a new 
party, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, with its unhindered access to the 
party and state resources, many prominent ex-communist leaders, besides Karimov, 
wielded considerable power and influence in the ruling party circles and state 
institutions. In other words, the Uzbek President’s position was not unchallenged, but 
rather he could still face a challenge to his authority from many influential ex- 
communist leaders of his party.
Such a challenge appeared, albeit temporarily, on the Uzbek political scene 
about one month after the proclamation of independence. At a session of the 
parliament, almost 200 deputies signed and circulated a letter critical of the dictatorial 
position of the president (Russian Press Digest, October 29, 1991).21 The president’s 
press service admitted that the parliament expressed dissatisfaction with Karimov. 
However, it claimed that this was nothing "unusual" and that the President made no 
attempt to suppress criticism. At the same time, it accused the Russian press for 
reporting a distorted version o f the episode before it occurred. The scant evidence 
available on this episode suggests that perhaps the Russian press leaked the 
information about the attempts Mirsaidov may have made during his visit to Moscow 
in early September to enlist support of powerful forces in his bid to oppose the 
increasingly dictatorial style o f Karimov (Fierman 1997:378, 404).
In his response to the rising challenge from within his own party, Karimov 
eschewed an outright confrontation with his challengers. Instead, he successfully tried 
a subtle method to neutralize their challenge. He tried to enlist support of independent
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nationalist opposition forces such as Erk and Birlik and certain local religious-oriented 
groups in the republic. He himself suggested in September 1991 the possibility of 
holding new parliamentary elections in 1992 (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 37. 
1991:16). He was reportedly pleased with the anti-communist and anti-parliament 
rhetoric o f the nationalist opposition groups like Birlik and certain local religious 
groups in the republic. In addition, he tolerated (and perhaps encouraged) a number 
of rallies o f certain Muslim groups who pressed the President to meet their demands, 
including the removal of the communists from the political scene, ban on the 
republican communist party, nationalization of its property, dismissal of the 
parliament and new parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis (Russian Press 
Digest, October 21, 1991). Above all, Karimov decided to renew his popular 
mandate, while the legitimacy of the parliament was still open to question. The main 
purpose of all these maneuvers and relaxation was to augment his political options and 
send a clear message to his challengers both in Tashkent and Moscow: If the power 
struggle continued and he was challenged, he was ready to promote and make 
alliances with his open critics in the nationalist and religious groups who were eager 
to cooperate with him in order to drive ex-communists out of power and undermine 
interests o f their Russian supporters in Moscow.
As a result of the short-lived power struggle among the ruling party elites, the 
immediate post-independence period experienced a substantive relaxation of political 
controls in Uzbekistan. However, it was meant to be a controlled relaxation. The 
Uzbek leadership was careful enough not to let an opposition group become a
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formidable force in Uzbek politics. As was the case with the glasnost period, the 
Uzbek authorities were more tolerant toward the groups they believed were willing to 
operate within the permissible zone of activities than toward those who stepped out of 
this zone and engaged in impermissible activities such as unauthorized and unwanted 
public demonstrations. This approach was quite evident in the differential treatment 
Birlik and Erk received from the Karimov government in the immediate post­
independence period.
Erk was reportedly created out of Birlik with the blessings o f the Uzbek 
authorities. It adopted a cooperative rather than confrontational stance toward Uzbek 
rulers. Such an attitude earned Erk preferential official treatment in the immediate 
post-independence era. Within less than a week after the declaration of independence, 
the Uzbek authorities permitted Erk to register itself as a political party. In addition to 
bringing other advantages such as permission to publish its own newspaper, this 
official recognition enabled Erk to field its candidate in the December 1991 
presidential elections.
Some other opposition groups, besides Erk, were also granted concessions, 
though not at the same scale.22 In October 1991, Uzbek authorities released six 
Birlik activists who were arrested on felony charges in Kokand.23 In addition, 
despite their aversion to Birlik’s use of protest rallies as part of its political struggle, 
the Uzbek authorities approved its application for registration as a popular movement 
in November 1991.24 However, Birlik was not permitted to participate in the 1991 
presidential elections.
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In addition to registered groups like Erk and Birlik, some other unregistered 
informal groups were also allowed to form and operate—o f  course, within limits. 
These groups include the Free Peasant Party, the Committee to Save the Aral, and 
Homeland National Independence Front.
The rise of two Islamic organizations, Islamic Lashkari (Islamic Army) and 
Adolat (Justice) in the Fergana Valley in Fall 1991 represents one of the most 
interesting and paradoxical aspects o f the Uzbek government’s official approach 
toward emerging informal groups. The Uzbek authorities not only tolerated the 
formation and operations o f these organizations but also cooperated with the latter to 
combat the rising crime rate in the region. In order to placate demonstrators of these 
organizations who were protesting against Karimov’s failure to keep his promise of 
meeting their representatives during his visit to the Fergana Valley in November 
1991, he flew back to the Fergana Valley the very next day to listen to their ideas and 
demands, including the establishment o f an Islamic state and legalization of the IRP. 
Of all their demands, the only demand that Karimov accepted was the demand of 
converting the ruling party building into a mosque. The whole episode of these 
organizations appears particularly striking considering the harsh treatment the Uzbek 
authorities meted out to the IRP. However striking, it is another piece of evidence 
attesting to the limited and selective liberalizing approach the Uzbek authorities 
followed in the immediate post-independence era, before imposing an extremely 
repressive regime.
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As part o f its selective and limited liberalizing approach toward opposition 
groups, the Uzbek leadership made modest concessions to some o f them on the 
question of their direct participation in the electoral process and their access to the 
mass media. After independence, Karimov decided to renew his mandate through 
direct presidential election in December 1991. The election was ostensibly open to all 
the qualified candidates. In principle, all registered political parties could nominate 
their candidates and other public associations could do so through gathering the 
required signature o f 60,000 voters. In practice, only the ruling party and Erk were 
able to field candidates, Karimov and Solih, respectively. Despite his pro-government 
leanings, the fact that Solih challenged Karimov in the presidential election, held 
election rallies, presented his agenda to the masses, and appealed openly for public 
support against his rival is particularly striking in comparison with the conduct of 
Soviet elections.
In fact, the 1991 presidential election marked the apex o f the liberalizing 
approach of the Uzbek leadership in the post-independence era. The Uzbek authorities 
spared opposition groups, including the IRP and Birlik, from persecution during the 
election period. The election fervor generated a lot o f political activity by the 
opposition forces, most of which the Uzbek rulers grudgingly tolerated. The election 
period offered opposition forces a rare opportunity to establish contact with the 
masses and promote their views. Birlik, for one, approached thousand o f voters to 
gather the required signatures for nomination of its candidate in the presidential
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elections. In this process, it was able to expand its base and communicate its message 
beyond party circles to the Uzbek people.
The republic’s press also became relatively open and accessible to the 
opposition forces during the election campaign. For instance, it provide some 
coverage to the election campaign of Solih. He could now use it with relative ease to 
promote his views. Also, despite their failure to nominate their candidate in the 
presidential elections, the Birlik leaders were permitted to use the republic's press to 
discuss sensitive issues such as rules and regulations governing the presidential 
election. Of course, they were dissatisfied with the existing rules and called upon the 
Uzbek government to democratize them. The Uzbek rulers tolerated this criticism of 
the electoral system, though they did not concede to any o f these demands.
The relative liberalism of the Uzbek authorities discussed in the preceding 
pages by no means suggests that they ever lowered their guard during this period, in 
fact, as it happened during the glasnost period, the Uzbek leadership ran two parallel 
processes in the immediate post-independence period, relaxing certain political 
controls and keeping in place certain restrictions, including repressive measures, in 
order to keep the political situation under its firm control. It allowed all the registered 
and unregistered organizations to engage only in easily controlled activities. The 
requests of most of these organizations to hold public rallies in support of their causes 
were rarely approved. Rather, at times their efforts to hold unauthorized public 
demonstrations were unhesitatingly crushed with all available means, including the use 
of force.
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Even during this period of relative openness, the Uzbek authorities continued 
to keep under control all sorts of unwanted mass activities. The Uzbek authorities 
dispersed a Birlik-organized mass meeting held in support o f the democratic forces in 
Russia in September 1991. Almost one hundred participants, including the Birlik 
leadership, were arrested and fined. The second effort Birlik made within days to 
organize another protest rally met with a similar fate. A delegation from Russia and 
journalists from the British television company. CNC, who were in Tashkent to cover 
the Birlik-organized rally were detained (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no.37, 
1991:15-16). In fact, the Uzbek authorities made use o f all the means at their disposal 
to ensure that opposition forces did not become a serious challenge to them. All kinds 
of legal procedures were put in place to legalize actions of an exclusionary, 
controlling, repressive nature against the opposition forces.
The 1991 presidential election was ostensibly open to all qualified parties, but 
the Uzbek authorities manipulated electoral procedures to preclude any real contest in 
the election. Erk, a very small party allegedly created with official support and with 
no real chance to win, was permitted to participate in the presidential election.
Whereas Birlik, a much stronger party, was kept out of the election race for the 
obvious purpose o f avoiding a real contest. Even Erk reported several violations of 
the election laws. It alleged that it was not represented in election commissions at all 
levels. The Erk leadership also charged that the state-owned press was willing to 
publish neither information about the electoral procedures nor criticism of the Uzbek 
government. The Uzbek authorities were blamed for other malpractices, including the
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delivery of extra ballots to the polling stations (Fierman, 1997:380-1). Some other 
violations o f the election laws were also committed.33
Birlik was the strongest o f  all the registered and unregistered opposition 
groups whose existence the Uzbek authorities tolerated during the period of relative 
openness before the beginning o f 1992. Its claim of having thousands o f members is 
partially supported by the fact that it was able to gather within days more than 60,000 
signatures required under the electoral law to nominate its candidate in the 
presidential election. Instead of outperforming Birlik in the presidential election with 
the help of their tremendous material and organizational resources, the Uzbek 
authorities rather manipulated its exclusion by declaring 25,000 signatures as invalid. 
In fact, this exclusion was not an isolated incident, but rather one more piece of 
evidence of selective political openness during this period and the Uzbek authorities’ 
patterned behavior toward Birlik. It is no exaggeration to say that Birlik was singled 
out for increasingly harsh treatment.
Even during the period o f relative openness before 1992, Uzbek rulers never 
lost sight o f the their goal of a systematic emasculation o f Birlik as a political force in 
Uzbek society. They would not hesitate to use force, if necessary, to prevent Birlik 
from expanding its base and promoting its ideas through public rallies. Its exclusion 
from the presidential election was ensured through the manipulation of electoral rules. 
Although the Uzbek authorities permitted the state-controlled media to adopt a more 
favorable stance toward Birlik during this period than during the previous period, they 
shut down Birlik’s own publications.
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This discriminatory and repressive attitude toward Birlik worsened in the 
period that followed the 1991 presidential election. However, this worsening was pan 
of an overall intensification in repression which engulfed not only Birlik but other 
opposition groups, too. It is no exaggeration to say that once the presidential election 
was over, the period of limited political openness in Uzbekistan was also over.
Following the presidential election, Karimov was able to control intra-party 
dissension, consolidate his position in the party, and reduce the parliament to a pliant 
institution. In addition, he was able to win support of both the Russian authorities 
(Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 1994:20) and his Russian-speaking 
population which was frightened by democratic slogans (Current Digest of Post-Soviet 
Press, no. 51, 1993:24)“  and whose leadership was supportive of Karimov’s 
repression o f the opposition forces (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 31, 
1993:10). It is no exaggeration that once the parliament and other prominent ex- 
communist leaders lost the clout vis-a-vis the president and he was able to consolidate 
his power position, he unleashed an intensified repression against almost all forms of 
independent political activity, marking an end o f the short-lived period of limited 
political openness.
The next portion o f the chapter will examine the repressive policy the Uzbek 
authorities pursued toward in the period that followed the 1991 presidential election. 
We will focus on the salient outcomes such as almost complete emasculation o f 
independent opposition forces, effective curtailment of the rise of a viable political 
alternative to the incumbent Uzbek regime, the exclusion o f independent political
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forces from the electoral process, and repression o f independent institutions o f mass 
media.
THOROUGH REPRESSION OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY
It did not take the Uzbek leadership long after the 1991 presidential elections 
to mark the end o f whatever limited political openness it had made available to Uzbek 
society before and after independence. In January 1992, the student body in Tashkent 
provided the Uzbek government the first opportunity to demonstrate its utter aversion 
to protest politics, dissent, and acts of disobedience and its readiness to crush such 
acts with an iron hand.
Despite their recognition of the importance of social protection o f the 
population during the transition period, the Uzbek authorities did not adopt adequate 
and timely measures in this regard before freeing prices on January 16, 1992. This 
act of freeing prices hit the students hard and compounded their growing frustration 
over delays in the payment of their stipends. On the same day the government freed 
prices, almost 5,000 students held a protest rally in front of the presidential palace in 
support of their demands. On their refusal to disperse, the special security forces 
opened fire on the protesting students. The police chased the fleeing students, sprayed 
their dormitories with bullets, broke into them, and beat up students with clubs. 
According to official reports, two students were killed and two were wounded as a 
result of the police firing. However, unofficial sources disputed this figure. The very 
next day the students held another demonstration. They not only presented their 
economic demands but also raised banners demanding the resignation o f Karimov and
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others responsible for the death of their comrades. The security forces again used 
force to disperse the protesters. The Uzbek government closed educational institutions 
and sent students home on an unscheduled long winter vacation in the middle of the 
exams (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, No. 3, 1992:27).
The Tashkent students were not alone in suffering a fate of this sort. The fate 
of other independent opposition forces after the 1991 presidential election was also not 
enviable. As already mentioned, several independent groups were organized in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Most of them survived into 1992. New groups were also 
formed in 1992 (Hunter, 1996:51-52; Haghayeghi, 1995:84-127; Fierman, 
1997:367-388). However, in the post-1991 period, it became increasingly very 
difficult for them to engage in open political activity. As a result, most of them were 
forced into underground and semi-underground positions within a year or so after the 
presidential election. In fact, in the post-1991 era, the Uzbek leadership was not 
willing to make even modest concessions to the opposition forces, despite the fact that 
certain opposition members made goodwill gestures to it during the explosive situation 
arising out of the student demonstration. Instead o f exploiting the explosive situation 
to their advantage, the Birlik and Erk leaders urged the protesting students to maintain 
calm. The Uzbek president appreciated this positive act and promised in public to 
register Birlik and IRP (Fierman, 1997:383). Like so many his other promises, this 
one, too, proved a false promise. Interestingly, in January 1992, Birlik gathered more 
than the required number o f signatures for registration as a legal political party. 
However, contrary to the promise of the Uzbek president, its application was rejected.
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Like Birlik, other parties were also denied registration in 1992. In fact, the 
government amended the law on public associations. The new law prohibited the 
formation o f political parties based on religion and ethnicity. The government used 
this law to deny registration to many political parties, including the IRP and the 
People’s Movement o f Turkestan. The latter called for unification o f the Muslim 
Central Asian republics (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1992:975).
The use of force to put down the student demonstrations and the rejection of 
Birlik’s application for official recognition constitute part of the evidence which amply 
shows that what the Uzbek authorities sought in the post-1991 era was a thorough and 
systematic emasculation of independent opposition forces. All sorts o f repressive and 
cooptive measures were used to silence the leaders and activists o f independent 
opposition forces with various orientations. Also, Uzbek rulers sought to block the 
access of their opponents to all the potential sources of support inside (including the 
government circles) and outside the country.
After rejecting Birlik’s application for registration, the Uzbek authorities began 
to adopt regulations which imposed insuperable restrictions on the functioning of 
opposition groups and served as a legal basis for repressing any opposition group of 
their choosing. One o f these measures was to prevent the illegal financing o f public 
associations. In April 1992, the Supreme Soviet presidium passed a resolution which 
made it illegal for public associations pursuing political objectives to solicit money for 
their publications from domestic religious formations or foreign sources. The same
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resolution called upon the Ministry o f  Finance to ensure strict observance of this and 
other relevant regulations on public associations. It was also instructed "to review 
declaration on sources o f funding for all associations seeking registration in the 
republic" (Fierman, 1997:384). In addition to this restrictive measure, the Uzbek 
authorities made effective use o f several other measures to repress the opposition 
forces.
The Uzbek opposition forces were conscious of the fact that a determined 
effort was underway to eliminate all the potential sources o f opposition to the 
incumbent regime in their country. They were, however, not willing to give up their 
struggle and leave the political scene to the Uzbek rulers so easily. In addition to old 
groups which tried to sustain their activities, new opposition groups with new 
programs came into existence. Babur Shakirov,27 a political dissident of the Soviet 
era, challenged the legitimacy of the existing political system. In May 1992, he tried 
to organize Milly Majlis, which was to serve as an alternate parliament. The 
repression o f such an organization was a foregone conclusion. The government 
blocked the effort after the first meeting o f the Milly Majlis. The participants of the 
first meeting were interrogated by the security forces. Three leaders of the Milly 
Majlis, Babur Shakirov, Hazaratkul Khodaberdiev, and Atanzar Aripov, were arrested 
on charges o f attempting to overthrown the constitutional government (US State 
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992:973).
Another organization which emerged during 1992, with a new program was 
the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU). Abdumannob Pulatov, the brother
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Abdurrahim Pulatov, a Birlik leader, headed this human rights organization. This was 
a smart move because it could potentially internationalize the cause of the opposition 
forces and enlist the support of foreign governments and other powerful international 
agencies working to promote human rights around the world. However important, this 
human rights organization met more or less the same fate that other opposition groups 
were suffering at the hands of the Karimov government. Its application for official 
recognition was rejected and its leaders and activists were tortured, imprisoned, and 
exiled.
The increasing repression brought the two most important competing parties, 
Birlik and Erk, closer to each other. It was clear to them that they ought to cooperate 
if they wanted any true relaxation of the existing repressive political system in their 
country. As repression intensified, Solih, who was accused of pro-government 
tendencies, became convinced of the futility o f his cooperation with the Uzbek 
government. In May 1992, he expressed his frustration in an article. He made it 
clear in that article that cooperation of his party "with the official powers was on the 
basis of mutual respect, pluralism of opinions, and political freedom." He also 
underlined the possibility and necessity of cooperation with "other political forces...in 
the interests o f civil peace and a stable society" (Fierman, 1997:385, 406). Instead of 
criticizing each other, the Erk and Birlik leaders marked the beginning o f  their 
cooperation at a joint conference held in May 1992 to demand dissolution o f the 
parliament and new parliamentary elections. In the same news conference, they
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announced their plans to hold demonstrations in Tashkent and other cities in support 
of these demands.
Instead of receiving a sympathetic ear from Karimov, who himself, as already 
mentioned, had earlier suggested the possibility of holding new parliamentary 
elections in 1992 (Current Digest o f  Soviet Press, no. 37, 1991:16), these demands 
rather provoked a harsh reaction from his government. In fact, as o f  May 1992, with 
the parliament and the ruling party more or less under full executive control, the 
Uzbek authorities were not willing to tolerate any challenge to their legitimacy and 
other acts of dissent such as those announced in the joint news conference o f Birlik 
and Erk. On May 28, 1992, some men attacked the Birlik leader, Abdurrahim 
Pulatov, with iron rods. He suffered serious injuries and was taken to the hospital for 
treatment. This incident happened when Pulatov left the headquarters o f the Internal 
Ministry where he was called in for questioning just two days before the announced 
demonstration. The opposition quarters blamed the Uzbek government for the attack. 
Quite expectedly, the Uzbek government denied any role in the attack; it blamed the 
unidentified assailants and promised to investigate the incident. As the opposition 
expected, investigation made no headway and consequently no one was arrested. 
Instead o f hoping justice, Pulatov feared for his life. In view of ever increasing 
repression since early 1992, he left the country for Turkey in December 1992.
Like Pulatov, the Erk leader, Solih, also paid the price for his part in 
co-sponsoring the May 1992 protest rally in particular and his overall opposition to 
the Karimov government in general. By May 1992, it was clear that Solih had shed
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his pro-government leanings. In view of the fact that the political opposition had little 
means to make itself heard, Solih tried to take advantage o f his seat in the Supreme 
Soviet and speak in the July 1992 session o f the Supreme Soviet about the growing 
repression in Uzbek society. However, he was prevented from doing so. In protest, 
he left the session and resigned from the Supreme Soviet, which in his view was no 
more a legal body. His resignation did not satisfy the Uzbek authorities. They sought 
his complete silence. After Solih’s departure from the Supreme Soviet, the Uzbek 
authorities mounted tremendous pressure on him and his party. He was accused of 
high treason for alleged involvement with the Milly Majlis. As a result, before he 
could be arrested and put on trial, he fled the country in April 1993 for his life—quite 
a satisfactory outcome from the official point o f  view.
Like Solih, other independent parliamentarians were either removed or kept 
under constant threat o f removal under a law passed within weeks after Solih’s 
departure from the Supreme Soviet. As part o f their repressive strategy against Solih 
and his party, Erk, the Uzbek authorities removed a number o f Erk deputies from 
their parliamentary positions. Erk deputies Jahangir Mamedov, Murat Djuraev,
Inamjan Tursunov, and Atajan Palvanov were deprived o f their parliamentary seats 
through dubious legal means. Those means involved constituents’ meetings which 
were held to recall their respective representatives from the parliament. Some deputies 
quietly gave in to outright threats (US State Department, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1993:1143).
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Beating o f political opponents has been a  regular feature o f government 
strategy to deal with its political opponents in the post-1991 period. The case o f 
Pulatov is already mentioned. He was not alone in suffering street beating. In separate 
incidents, other opposition activists were also beaten on the streets by unknown men 
who were never arrested and punished. Independent sources argued on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence that such beatings were part of a calculated government effort 
to intimidate the opposition. Among the prominent victims who were subjected to 
street beatings in 1992 were Abdulla Yusupov, the Khorezm Regional Chairman of 
Birlik, Miralym Adylov, Birlik Presidium member who was beaten thrice, and 
Ravshan Dzuraev, the leader of Birlik’s youth movement. Like Birlik leaders 
mentioned above, the leader of the People’s Movement o f Turkestan, Bahram Gaib, 
was also beaten on the street in 1992.
The above pattern o f 1992 beatings continued in 1993. On different occasions 
throughout the year, several opposition activists were beaten in the streets. In separate 
cases involving important political figures, those who were beaten in 1993 included 
Shukrat Ismatullaev, co-chairman of Birlik, Shukrulla Mirsaidov, former vice 
president, and Samat Murad, chief secretary of Erk Party. AH suffered serious 
injuries (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 
and 1993:971 and 1138, respectively). The number of street beatings o f opposition 
figures declined in the subsequent years for the simple reason that as a result o f 
severe political repression fewer and fewer people were willing to challenge the 
Karimov government.
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In addition to arresting and beating, the Uzbek government also dismissed its 
political opponents from jobs as part of its systematic strategy to thoroughly 
emasculate the opposition (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 3, 1993: l l ) .2® In 
1992-93, political repression engulfed universities and colleges. Many opposition 
figures, especially from Erk and Birlik, were dismissed during this period. In 1992- 
93, almost 100 people from Birlik and Erk were claimed to have been dismissed from 
their positions for their political affiliation and views. Notable among them include 
Birlik co-chairman Shukrat Ismatullaev, Marat Zakhidov (a Birlik activist), Talib 
Yakubov (all three were professors at the Tashkent State University), Yadgar Obid 
and Gulchekhra Nurallaeva (both members of the Writers’ Union). In 1994, three 
students of journalism were expelled from the Tashkent State University after they 
criticized the way the government-controlled press was treating the Erk leader, Solih. 
The department o f journalism was also closed. Later, the students were allowed to 
reenter the university and the department was reinstituted.
The leaders and activists of parties and movements other than Birlik and Erk 
also fell victim to the growing repression. On December 8, 1992, the Uzbek Supreme 
Soviet approved a new constitution with all its democratic and human rights trappings. 
Around the time the constitution was approved, the Uzbek authorities detained leaders 
of Erk, Birlik, the HRSU, and the Free Peasants’ Party in order to prevent them 
from attending an international conference "Human Rights and the Fate of Nations" 
organized by an American Jewish human rights organization and the Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz human rights organizations in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. All roads
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leading to Bishkek were blocked and the conference invitees were taken to police 
stations and were forced to sign statements that they would not leave the country 
(Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 49, 1992:27).
On the same day when the parliament approved the constitution, the Uzbek 
special security forces abducted and repatriated three Uzbek dissidents and human 
rights activists, including Abdumannob Pulatov, from Bishkek. The abductees were in 
Bishkek to attend the international human rights conference. On his repatriation, 
Pulatov was tried on charges of using the news media to insult the honor o f the 
president. He was found guilty and sentenced to three years in a corrective labor 
colony, though he was later amnestied under a presidential decree (Current Digest o f 
Post-Soviet Press, no. 4 , 1993:31). Like his brother who had left the country earlier, 
Pulatov also fled the country in February 1993. He soon arrived in the United States 
and since then has been involved in monitoring and publicizing human rights abuses 
in his country.
Unlike Pulatov who was arrested for an explicit political offense, most 
opposition activists were arrested for nonpolitical crimes. Those arrested were often 
accused of drunkenness, hooliganism, illegal possession o f  narcotics and weapons, 
etc. In 1992, Pulat Akhunov, a Birlik activist, was arrested for hooliganism, and 
Bahram Gaib, the leader o f the People’s Movement of Turkestan, was arrested for 
drunkenness. In July 1993, while in prison serving his term, Akhunov was charged 
with illegal possession o f narcotics and sentenced to an additional three years in 
prison. In February 1993, Inamjan Tursonov, the regional chairman of the Erk Party
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in the Fergana Valley and a former deputy, was found guilty of hooliganism and 
sentenced to two years in prison.
The pattern continued in the subsequent period. In 1994 alone, six prominent 
opposition figures were arrested on charges o f drug possession, weapon possession, 
hooliganism, misappropriation o f government funds, and possession o f unlawful 
printed material. Those arrested on such charges included Mikhail Ardzinov (a 
prominent leader o f  Human Rights Society o f Uzbekistan), Mamadan Makhmudo (an 
Uzbek writer and close friend of Solih), Nasrullah. Saidov (Erk secretary in Bukhara), 
Saparboy Bekchanov (an Erk activist), Nosir Zokir (Erk chairman of the Namangan 
province), Atmatkhan Turakhanov (Erk chairman o f the city of Namangan), and 
Vasilya Inoyatova (one o f the three human rights activists held in jail in order to 
prevent them from attending human rights conference in Kazakhstan in April 1994).
In March 1995, Ibragim Buriev, an opposition activist, was arrested for possession of 
weapons and drugs. The Islamic activists were favorite targets to be rounded up on 
such charges. Beginning with the arrest of activists of Adolat in 1992, the government 
has routinely booked Islamic dissidents on nonpolitical charges. In 1995, religious 
leaders from the Kokand area were charged with narcotics and ammunition.
Less prominent opposition activists were also subjected to various repressive 
measures, including imprisonment, detention, beatings, harassment, dismissals, etc. 
Those not too fearful to continue to dissent were forcibly prevented from relating 
their plight to visiting international dignitaries, especially from the Western countries 
(CSCE, March 1997:2).
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In addition to the above cited repressive measures, the Uzbek authorities did 
not hesitate from physically eliminating their political opponents. Politically motivated 
disappearances and assassinations have occurred during the post-1991 period. The 
Islamic activists bore the brunt of such violent measures. The first politically 
motivated disappearance occurred in December 1992. Abdullah Otaev, the leader of 
IRP, was abducted by six men, according to his wife. After that, she never heard 
from him. As of 1997, there were no results of government investigation, if any. into 
his abduction. Most independent observers suspect that he is either dead or in the 
custody of the Uzbek security forces (Fierman, 1997:387). In August 1995, the imam 
of an Andijon mosque, Abduivali Kori Mirzaev, and his assistant were reportedly 
detained at the Tashkent airport by the security forces while en route to a conference 
in Moscow. As of 1997, there is no information on their whereabouts. In 1995. 
Bakhtiar Yakubov, a local businessman, died o f torture in the custody at the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. He was a witness in a criminal case against opposition leader 
Ibragim Buriev. Another Islamic activist related to the above missing imam also 
disappeared in 1997. It is believed that these activists are either dead or in the custody 
of security forces (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 1995 and 1997:1111 and 1391, respectively).
The crackdown on individual opposition leaders and activists was partially 
producing the desired results. Not only many individual leaders and activists were still 
politically alive, though in a subdued form, but also opposition parties, groups and 
movements as collective independent political activity were reluctant to withdraw
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from the political process. Besides continuing the repression of individual political 
leaders and activists, the Uzbek authorities set out to remove opposition parties and 
movements from the Uzbek political scene. The first independent organization to 
suffer repression and to be forced into underground position was Adolat in the 
Fergana Valley. After the presidential election, Karimov crushed Adolat. He arrested 
its members and put them on trial on various charges, including destablizing the 
country, preaching fundamentalist Islamic views, possessing illegal weapons, etc.
They were given varying terms of imprisonment (Current Digest o f  Post-Soviet Press, 
no. 51, 1993:24). The other independent registered and unregistered parties alike soon 
met a similar fate.
As already mentioned, Erk was allowed to register as a political party and 
Birlik as a social movement in 1991. In addition to plain coercive measures, legal 
means were also used with the help of compliant judicial bodies to force opposition 
groups out o f the official political process and deprive them of any legal basis for 
their existence and operation. In 1992, the Uzbek authorities sought to undermine the 
financial base of Birlik and Erk. Their bank accounts were frozen. Erk had to suffer 
the seizure o f its assets on account of nonpayment of expenses in December 1992. 
Making effective use of a restrictive law it passed, the Supreme Soviet demanded an 
inquiry to find out Birlik’s compliance with the Law on the Public Associations in 
December 1992. According to findings of the inquiry, Birlik was guilty of violating 
several provisions of the said law. The Ministry of Justice requested the Supreme 
Court to abolish Birlik. It was reasoned that Birlik had repeatedly organized
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unauthorized demonstrations and rallies and that "In 1991-92. 166 peoples received 
administrative penalties and 20 people faced criminal charges" due to activities of the 
Birlik leaders and activists. Other reasons included the use o f the mass media to 
discredit the authority, honor and dignity of the president and other public officials. 
Without giving Birlik enough time and a fair chance to defend its position, the 
Supreme Court suspended the activities o f Birlik for three months in its decision on 
January 19, 1993 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 3, 1993:24-5).
As if what the parliament, media and courts were doing was not enough, the 
president used his own executive and legislative powers to expedite the process of 
emasculating independent opposition forces and force them out of the official political 
process. In March 1993, the Cabinet o f Ministers passed a resolution which mandated 
re-registration of all public associations by October 1993. The Erk leadership did not 
seek re-registration. The Birlik leaders, however, decided to apply for registration. 
They mailed an application but the Ministry of Justice claimed that it never received 
the application (Fierman, 1997:388). Thus, the Uzbek authorities were able to 
deprive the two most active and strong opposition parties of legal foundations for their 
existence and operation. After the registration was over, it became clear that the 
government did not register even a single true opposition group. Hence, no opposition 
group could now legally operate in the country.
As a result o f increased repression in 1992-93, independent political opposition 
parties and most individual opposition activists were forced underground, semi­
underground, abroad or into inactivity. The extent to which the opposition was
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emasculated can be assessed from the fact that, as o f 1997. it did not try, after the 
last attempt in May 1992. to hold public rallies. In 1993-94, Karimov remained busy 
in building compliant political structures (which will be discussed later) and in 
further consolidating his power position in the republic. As a consequence of 
increased repression and executive-centered state-building, by 1993-94, one of the 
most authoritarian regimes in Central Asia was installed in Uzbekistan—a regime 
which had all the democratic trappings but no content, and which never ceased to 
extol virtues of gradual reformism in the transition from communism to political 
pluralism.
SHORT-LIVED TACTICAL POLITICAL OPENNESS
Once serious potential challengers from the opposition as well as within the 
government and the ruling party circles (which will be discussed later) were 
thoroughly emasculated, Karimov felt safe and decided to try his much-trumpeted 
gradual reformism. His hardened approach toward the opposition witnessed a thaw in 
1995-96. However, rather than gradually evolving into genuine political openness and 
democratization, this thaw turned out to be of short duration and of fleeting nature, 
followed by a new wave of repression against the opposition. We shall first discuss 
the tactical thaw.
The first sign of the thaw appeared when the Uzbek government released five 
political prisoners in November 1994, almost one month before the parliamentary 
elections. The release o f these prisoners was attributed to the effort of international 
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
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The Uzbek opposition viewed the release as a political move, intended to enhance 
Karimov’s image in the eyes of US administration which had on several occasions 
turned down his request for an official visit to Washington (Current Digest of Post- 
Soviet Press, no. 46, 1994:28). As we shall see, these influences and corresponding 
political changes proved to be of fleeting nature so far as genuine political 
liberalization is concerned. In addition, this short-lived thaw was intended to coopt the 
opposition forces rather than to let them pursue genuine independent political activity 
in the republic. After the opposition refused to oblige the authorities, the latter 
unleashed a new wave of repression.
After conducting the multi-candidate and multi-party parliamentary elections in 
which almost all the electoral candidates were pro-government, the government 
showed further magnanimity in, at least, recognizing the existence of an opposition. 
The first unmistakable sign in this regard was the mission of the two Uzbek cabinet 
ministers, Abdulaziz Kamilov (Foreign Minister) and Alishr Mardiyev (Justice 
Minister) to win the opposition leaders abroad and to persuade them to cease their 
dissident activities. In this regard, notable event was the visit of the Justice Minister 
to Washington in January 1995. He travelled to the United States to participate in a 
meeting with the opposition leaders, including Pulatov and Solih. The meeting was 
organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Although 
nothing concrete came out of the meeting, its symbolic importance was immense.
That is, the meeting was an evidence of the Uzbek government’s willingness to enter 
into a political dialogue with those political leaders who were officially accused of
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serious anti-state crimes (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 13, 1995:22;
CSCE, March 1997:3). Following this meeting, the government took a number of 
encouraging steps which promoted the impression that the much-trumpeted gradual 
reformism was ultimately dawning and raised hopes that more political openness was 
on its way to Uzbekistan.
In addition to building government-controlled institutions (such as a human 
rights office in the parliament in February 1995 and a commission on constitutional 
and civil rights in May 1995) to monitor human rights situation in the country, the 
Uzbek government permitted international human rights and broadcasting agencies to 
open their offices in Tashkent, to visit the country, and to broadcast their programs.
In July 1995, the CSCE’s Warsaw-based Office of Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) opened its office in the capital city. The New York-based 
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki was able to send its representatives to Uzbekistan twice 
in 1995, after it had been denied such a visit for two and a half years. In March 
1996, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was permitted to broadcast its 
program in Uzbekistan. One month later, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty received 
permission to open an office in Tashkent. In June and July 1996, the Soros 
Foundation’s Open Society Institute and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki opened their 
offices in the capital city, respectively. Interestingly, before the former received 
permission to open an office in Tashkent, in its May report on Uzbekistan, it had 
reported a marked improvement in human rights situation in that country.
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Around the time when these developments were occurring, Karimov publicly 
spoke about the need to speed up political reforms which, in his view, were lagging 
behind economic reforms and the gap was detrimental to overall development o f the 
country—a position contrary to his earlier views on the sequence and pace of 
economic and political transitions. Ignoring his earlier views, he publicly called for 
greater democratization, stating that active opposition parties, a free press, and 
respect for citizens’ rights are essential to Uzbekistan’s development (CSCE Digest, 
February 1997:20).
Around this period, he signed several amnesties. In June 1996, he pardoned 
almost 80 political prisoners, including members o f  Erk, who were in jail for 
allegedly anti-state and terrorist activities. The list also included four organizers of the 
student protests in Tashkent on January 16-17, 1992 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet 
Press, no. 25, 1996:22). He took this action just tens days before his long-sought visit 
to the United States. In addition, before the release o f these prisoners, in its letter to 
President Clinton on June 10, 1996, the opposition had explicitly indicated its 
readiness for establishing a dialogue with the Karimov government. While in the 
United States, Karimov permitted Pulatov to return home without fear o f repression. 
Earlier, he had already promised to register Pulatov’s human rights organization. His 
pro-reform measures are said to be linked with his desire to win his much-desired 
meeting with President Bill Clinton in particular and to build a good working 
relationship with the United States in general (CSCE, March 1997:3, 12; CSCE,
March 1998:6). No matter how closely his pro-reform measures were linked to such
135
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
concerns in immediate terms, such influences proved, at best, to be of transient 
nature in the long run so far as the introduction of genuine political liberalization is 
concerned and were intended, as already mentioned, to coopt the opposition forces 
through persuading to engage in the so-called constructive opposition activities.
However, we must hasten to add that the pro-reform shift continued even after 
Karimov’s June 1996 visit to the United States. In July 1996, the parliamentary 
commission created to monitor constitutional civil rights o f the citizens was permitted 
to issue a report critical of government agencies for their "bureaucratic, callous, 
indifferent treatment” of the people (FBIS, July 18, 1996:56-57). The next month he 
signed another amnesty and reduced jail terms for some prisoners.
In addition, keeping his promise to Pulatov, Karimov let the former return to 
the country the same month. Also, in September 19%, he granted permission to 
Pulatov’s Human Rights Society o f Uzbekistan to hold a founding conference in order 
to meet the legal requirement for registration. However, the high point of high pro- 
reform shift reached when in September 19%, he permitted the ODIHR to organize 
an international conference on National Human Rights Institutions in Tashkent. The 
Karimov government created a remarkably open atmosphere for conference 
participants. At the conference, Pulatov, Mirsaidov, and representatives of 
independent Islamic community were free to speak and exchange arguments with the 
government representatives. The opposition’s interventions at the conference were 
strongly critical o f the government’s human rights policies. Interestingly, Pulatov’s 
interview with Uzbek state radio was aired without censoring any of his remarks
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(CSCE, March 1997:6-8). As the ODIHR conference was over, the period o f pro- 
reform measures was also over, ushering in a  new wave of repression.
A NEW WAVE OF REPRESSION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION
The above pro-reform developments which occurred in 199S-96 generated 
optimistic assessments and projections in many concerned circles about future 
improvements in political liberalization in Uzbekistan. However, it did not take these 
projections long to crash. As already mentioned, the ODIHR conference was the 
highest point o f such assessments. Although it was only after the conference that the 
Uzbek government took concrete steps which decisively shattered optimism about 
political liberalization prospects in Uzbekistan, there were disturbing indicators even 
before the conference.
Around the same time in 199S when Karimov was calling for more political 
reforms, Mirsaidov was beaten in the street, Erk activists were convicted of anti-state 
crimes such as attempting to overthrow the constitutional order o f the country, and 
other opposition activists were arrested for nonpolitical crimes. In his address to the 
parliament in August 1996, Karimov declared that he would welcome constructive 
opposition—an opposition capable o f promoting development and renovation of 
society. However, in his next breath, he excluded all Uzbek opposition groups from 
the category o f constructive opposition by stating that unfortunately, he had 
experienced those who "pretended to be an opposition" and "choose the way of 
pseudo-democratic...extremist slogans and action" (CSCE, March 1997:4). Although 
the Karimov government had granted permission to international agencies to open
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offices in Tashkent and monitor human rights situation in the country, it showed little 
sensitivity to them. The broadcast of BBC and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty were 
reportedly jammed. Almost two weeks before the ODIHR conference, John MacLeod, 
the director of the recently opened Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, was picked up 
from a street in Tashkent during night, taken to police station, humiliated and accused 
of drunkenness, possession o f weapons and possession of drugs. The Uzbek 
authorities reluctantly admitted to the police excesses against MacLeod after lot of 
Western pressure. In addition, they were using various bureaucratic and technical 
pretexts to prevent Pulatov from organizing a founding conference o f the HRSU, and 
ultimately allowed him again under Western pressure (CSCE, March 1997:5-6).
Soon after the ODIHR conference was over, the government-controlled press 
printed scathing articles against the opposition leaders like Pulatov and Mirsaidov.
The former was blamed for riding the wave o f false democracy in the early 1990s, 
for engaging in protest politics, and for plunging the country into the depth of chaos 
and civil confrontation. He was also rebuked for his alleged failure to understand the 
role and place of a constructive political opposition. The latter was accused of 
corruption, and his advocacy for democracy and human rights was dismissed as a 
mere change of methods. Quite high officials such as the Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz 
Kamilov, participated in the attack on the opposition (CSCE, March 1997:8-9). It 
appears that the Uzbek leadership was expecting appreciation rather than criticism for 
allowing the opposition leaders to return to politics. It was displeased by the 
candidness the opposition leaders showed during the ODIHR conference. Also, having
138
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
served his tactical purpose of meeting with the US president, Karimov had no strong 
reason to change his policy toward the opposition and to move ahead toward genuine 
political liberalization and democratization.
After the ODIHR conference, the Karimov government quickly retrenched 
whatever political openness it had made available to the opposition in 1995-96. Within 
less than a month after the first ODIHR conference, ODIHR organized a round table 
on Media Issues in the Transition to Democracy in Tashkent. Unlike the previous 
conference, the Uzbek organizers did not invite representatives of independent media. 
Also, no independent advocate o f media freedom or any opposition leader attended 
the meeting. In December 19%, the Uzbek parliament passed a law on political 
parties. This law made it more difficult for political parties to register. For instance, 
it increased the number of signatures from 3,000 to 5,000 which a parties need for 
official recognition.
In January 1997, the Uzbek government rejected the application o f the HRSU 
for registration, despite Karimov’s commitment to register it. Again citing technical 
problems, the government rejected the HRSU’s application for registration in April 
and August 1997. Another leader of the HRSU, Mikhail Ardzinov, after he split from 
Pulatov, organized the founding conference o f an independent human rights 
organization, the Independent Human Rights Organization o f Uzbekistan, in August 
1997. The conference took place in secret and without government approval because 
the authorities did not respond to his request for holding such a conference. He tried 
to register his organization with the government. In December 1997, the application
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of Ardzinov was rejected on technical grounds. As of 1997, as a result o f government 
restrictive registration policy and other repressive measures, there was no single 
independent registered opposition group legally operating in Uzbekistan. Unregistered 
opposition parties and movements are effectively prevented from freely operating in 
the country (CSCE, March 1997:6-12; CSCE, March 1998:7-8).
In addition to blocking the rise of organized independent political activity, the 
Uzbek government continued to repress individual political dissidents in the post- 
ODIHR conference period. In May 1997, the security forces confiscated the passport 
of Ardzinov and refused him exist visa. He was later given an exit visa in November 
1997. On December 21, 1997, he was detained by the Samarkand police for 
organizing an illegal meeting. He was set free a day later, but was reportedly abused 
during his one day detention. The Islamic dissidents were special targets of 
government repression. In June 1997, an Islamic teacher, Rahmatjon Otaqulov, was 
convicted o f the illegal possession of drugs and weapons. He was sentenced to 
imprisonment for three and a half years. Another Islamic teacher, Olimjon Gafurov, 
received one year prison term for similar charges. In August 1997, one more assistant 
of the missing imam Abduvali Mirzaev disappeared. The assistant, Nematjon Parpiev, 
went to the local market but never came back.
Unlike 1995, there were no specific amnesties for political prisoners in 1997. 
Rather, the government refused to release even those political prisoners who had 
served their full terms of imprisonment or were eligible for their release under annual 
amnesty. Using its favorite pretext, the threat o f Islamic fundamentalism, the Uzbek
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government charged several political prisoners and Islamic activists with minor 
breaches o f prison regulation and blocked their release. For instance, Abduraub 
Gafurov, was sentenced to an additional three years in prison for such breaches. It is 
interesting to note that the security forces closed his trial and did not allow even 
foreign observers to attend it.
As of 1997, according to the list compiled by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 
there were 20 to 30 political prisoners in Uzbekistan. In its August 1997 issue, the 
Turkistan Newsletter, affiliated with Erk, put the number of political prisoners at 40 
(CSCE, March 1998:9). This figure must be read in view of the fact that in addition 
to official hurdles, it is difficult to document all instances of political arrest because 
most political dissidents are arrested on criminal, nonpolitical charges such as 
drunkenness and because arrests o f less prominent, especially in remote areas go 
unnoticed. The above examples clearly show that the post-ODIHR conference period 
was the return of Soviet-style repressive methods.
REPRESSION OF INDEPENDENT MASS MEDIA
Accompanying the crackdown on individual leaders, activists and independent 
opposition formations was the systematic effort of the Uzbek authorities to ensure that 
neither their own repressive actions nor the views of their opponents got an extensive 
coverage in the mass media. It is clear in the above pages that by disallowing the 
opposition forces to hold public meetings, protest rallies and demonstrations, the 
Uzbek government had effectively blocked a very valuable means to promote their 
views beyond party members. As already mentioned, after 1992 the opposition did not
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try to hold public rallies. The ban on such activities had, without any doubt, made it 
extremely difficult for the opposition forces to openly transmit their message and 
relate their continuing plight to the Uzbek masses. What further worsened the 
situation in this context was the complete government control o f the state-owned 
mass media, its almost complete inaccessibility to the opposition forces and thorough 
repression o f the independent media outlets.
Coinciding with their efforts to suppress dissenting individual and organized 
political voices, the Uzbek authorities made a systematic effort to muzzle the 
independent mass media and prevent their use in support of opposition causes. In fact, 
they instituted comprehensive censorship and established strict guidelines for the mass 
media to follow. These guidelines specified what was permissible in print and what 
was not. In this context, the Uzbek authorities identified a number o f vague 
punishable offenses, including criticism of the president, disclosure of state secrets, 
and other anti-state activities. These guidelines were so vague that the Uzbek 
government could bend their interpretation to suit any occasion. The central and local 
Uzbek authorities created various hurdles for opposition publications even if they saw 
no violation o f these guidelines. They interfered with opposition publications often 
without any justification. In fact, printing facilities have been under full control o f the 
local and central authorities in Uzbekistan. As o f 1997, there was no private printing 
house in the country. The government has effectively used its control over printing 
facilities to block publication of unwanted material. The opposition publications paid 
prohibitively high prices and at times their printing was blocked on the lame excuse
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of inadequate capacity. Without giving any sound reason, even the local authorities at 
the level of oblast were able to block any opposition publication within their 
jurisdiction.
Of course, the purpose of the official guidelines for the mass media and 
frequent interference with opposition publications was to stem the flow of undesired 
information. The majority o f newspapers and electronic mass media were 
government-controlled. The law permits the establishment o f  independent media 
outlets, including newspapers. However, mass media institutions must register with 
the government before they begin their operations. The government has effectively 
used the registration requirement against independent newspapers critical of the 
Karimov government. In 1992, the Uzbek authorities refused to register Birlik’s 
newspaper, Mustaqil haftalik. The hunger strike o f Birlik activists in support of their 
demand for registration o f the newspaper was of no avail. Birlik leaders were able to 
print several editions o f their newspaper in Moscow and smuggle them into 
Uzbekistan for distribution. The security forces raided houses o f Birlik activists and 
confiscated almost 8,000 copies o f the newspaper. After 1992, Birlik ceased its effort 
to publish a newspapers. In April 1992, another newspaper, Businessman , was 
officially registered. After it published several articles critical o f economic transition 
policies of the government, it was shut down in August the same year.
Toward the end o f 1992, the code on the conduct o f the mass media was 
further supplemented with a new article which heightened the risks for those involved 
in issuing publications without official permission. Of course, it was not the last legal
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measure which the Uzbek authorities put in place to control access of opposition 
forces to the mass media. In May 1993, the Uzbek authorities devised a new statute 
"Law on Protection o f State Secrets” which made it a punishable offense to reveal 
any information that would hurt not only the national security interests of the country 
but also its interests in "the areas of science, technology, and production and 
management" (Fierman, 1997:387). In addition, a cabinet resolution passed in 1993 
made it unlawful for individual citizens and journalist collectives to set up a media 
outlet.
The Uzbek authorities readily used the criminal code to harshly cut short any 
attempt to move outside the vaguely defined permissible zone of journalistic 
activities. The government instituted comprehensive censorship, banned obstinate 
opposition publications, and harassed and tortured renegade journalists. Soon after 
the 1991 presidential election, the authorities began to tighten censorship and institute 
other restrictions on the flow o f information. As already mentioned, because of their 
status as registered public associations, Erk and Birlik occasionally issued their 
publications. However, by the summer of 1992, it became very difficult for the 
editors o f Erk newspaper to publish and distribute any material which was critical of 
the Uzbek government officials and policies. As a result, the size and the quantity of 
the newspaper decreased. Also, it was now available only through subscription. The 
Uzbek government banned it altogether in January 1993 and has not been published 
since then. As o f  1997, Erk proved to be the last independent opposition newspaper to 
be published in Uzbekistan.
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In addition to newspapers affiliated with Birlik and Erk, other independent 
publications were also subjected to repression. In the post-independence period, a 
number of independent publications which had sprouted up during the glasnost period 
and several publications affiliated with the former communist party and its affiliates 
such as Young Communist Leagues, began to publish articles in a democratic spirit. 
In addition to the publications of Birlik and Erk, the government decided to control 
other independent publications, too. In 1993, the government mandated reregistration 
of all the newspapers, weeklies, and magazines by January 1994. The reregistration 
procedures required these publications to provide information about the sources of 
funding, means of distribution, founders, and sponsors. As already mentioned, at the 
same time, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a resolution which prohibited individuals 
and journalists’ collectives from establishing mass media institutions. As the 
reregistration of the print news media was complete by January 10, 1994, no 
independent and opposition publication was registered (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet 
Press, no. 2, 1994:28-29). As a result, the opposition was forced to publish their 
newspapers from abroad. In December 1995, Uzbek dissidents living abroad joined 
hands with dissidents from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to found a magazine, 
Tsentralnaya Azia (Central Asia), from Switzerland. The magazine, devoted to social 
and political affairs o f the region, became one of the chief spokesmen of the 
opposition (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 22, 1996:19-20). Likewise, Erk 
began its own newspaper, The Turkistan Newsletter from abroad (CSCE, March 
1998:9).
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In addition to repressing opposition publications, the Uzbek government did 
not spare even pro-government newspapers if they were found to be stepping out of 
the permissible zone of activities. Even pro-govemment newspapers were punished 
for showing nominal and symbolic independence. For instance, in August 1996, 
Vatan, the newspaper o f  a pro-govemment party Vatan Taraqiaty, was temporarily 
shut down after it published an analytical piece on the August 19%  speech of 
Karimov in the parliament (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 19%: 1214).
Like opposition newspapers, independent individual journalists who dared 
question the government conduct were also subjected to repressive measures, 
including beating and arrest, and imprisonment on various crimes. For instance, one 
journalist , Abdurashid Sharipov, was beaten in 1992. In 1993, the editors and key 
bookkeepers o f Erk were tried for their involvement in misappropriation of 
government funds which the government allegedly provided. According to Erk 
activists, these charges were false because the newspaper never received any 
government economic assistance. Even individual citizens and political activists were 
arrested for possession o f  the banned newspapers like Erk. For instance, one of the 
charges under which eight Erk activists were arrested was that copies o f the 
newspaper Erk were found in their homes. Two other activists and a Birlik leader, 
Vasilya Inoyatova, were arrested for the same charge in 1993. In 1997, the editor of 
Hurriyat (Freedom), an Uzbek-language newspaper —established in January 1997 and 
initially escaped censorship with the support o f Karimov— received several warnings
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from officials after the newspaper published an attack on censorship and criticized 
some aspects o f electronic media in the country. The editor of the newspaper resigned 
when it became clear that the paper will be censored (CSCE, March 1998:9).
In addition to controlling the republic’s mass media, the Uzbek authorities also 
sought to tame the foreign mass media operating in Uzbekistan. In fact, they made 
little distinction between the national and foreign institutions of mass media and 
journalists so far as their efforts to block damaging information through repressive 
measures were concerned. As with the national mass media, the Uzbek authorities 
spared no effort to block access of opposition forces to the international mass media 
and discourage the latter from providing objective coverage to their activities.
Like the national newspapers, the government also censored foreign 
newspapers printed in the country. It will suffice to mention a few salient examples 
out o f numerous cases. Publication of Izvestiia, a Moscow-based newspaper, was 
suspended twice 1992. In the Fall of 1992, the Uzbek authorities refused to print the 
edition of Izvestiia in Tashkent. What triggered this refusal was the protest of the 
newspaper against the decision of the Uzbek government to remove from its Tashkent 
edition an article which was critical of tightening censorship in Uzbekistan.
Following its protest, 17 workers at the printing house refused to print the paper.
They accused Izvestiia o f interfering in the internal affairs of their country and 
stirring up ethnic discord conducive to destabilization of the situation there. The list 
of foreign newspapers which were granted accreditation by the Uzbek Ministry o f 
Foreign Affairs did not include the name o f Izvestiia (Current Digest of Post-Soviet
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Press, no. 49, 1992: 32). In fact, after its last suspension, Izvestiia could never 
publish again from Uzbekistan.
During the same period, the Uzbek authorities banned the importation of 
another Russian newspaper, Komsomol skaia pravda. Like Izvestiia and Pravda, 
Argumenty 1 fakty became persona non grata in Uzbekistan (Current Digest of Post- 
Soviet Press, no. 4S, 1992:24). In 1994, another Russian newspaper, Sevodnya, was 
added to the list o f banned publications after it published a number of critical articles 
on human rights situation in Uzbekistan. The well known Russian newspaper, 
Nezavismaya gazeta, was also banned (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 46, 
1994:28; no. 41, 1996:13-4). In short, as of 1997, after passing a  number of anti­
media regulations, the government did not allow general distribution of foreign 
newspapers and other publications, with the exceptions o f two to three conservative 
Russian newspapers. Only subscribers have access to foreign newspapers. It must be 
kept in mind that newspapers critical o f the government have not been allowed to 
come out and circulate. In addition, Russian broadcasts are available in Uzbekistan, 
but the government continued to black out those broadcasts which were found to be 
critical o f its policies.
Individual writers and journalists were discouraged from reporting about the 
Uzbek opposition causes. Tactics the Uzbek authorities used for this purpose 
including detention, restriction on movements, deportation and other forms of 
pressure. Very tedious procedures were put in place for foreign journalists desiring to 
operate in Uzbekistan (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 49, 1992:32). Many
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foreign journalists were denied accreditation. Some were deported from Uzbekistan 
for simply having contact with the opposition. Most instances of deportation involved 
Russian journalists (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 25, 1992:9). In October 
1994, the Uzbek government refused to renew the accreditation of Steven Le Vine, a 
free lance journalist for several U.S. publications because o f his articles critical of 
Karimov and his human rights record (US State Department, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1994:1040). In 1996, four Russian journalists were 
denied accreditation without specifying any reason. The first journalist to lose 
accreditation and previous privileges was the correspondent of Pravda. After him, a 
female correspondent for the Interfax economic news agency and head of the Itar-Tass 
bureau were denied accreditation. The request o f the staff correspondent of 
Rabochaya tribuna for accreditation was rejected by the Uzbek government. The 
authorities even did not bother to respond to the letter of the editorial staff who 
wanted to known the reason for denial of accreditation (Current Digest of Post-Soviet 
Press, no. 41, 1996:13-4).
The unaccredited journalists were denied participation in press conferences and 
other officials functions. In order to maintain the status of desirable staff 
correspondent, the accredited journalists were required to show political correctness in 
their publications on events in Uzbekistan. They were expected to exercise restraint in 
their judgement on the level of democracy and to ignore mass disturbances and 
political scandals in the republic. Instead, they were under an unstated obligation to 
report Karimov’s economic and political achievements (Current Digest of Post-Soviet
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Press, no. 41, 1996:14). In addition, reports o f Uzbek government detaining the crew 
of foreign news media (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 18, 1993:20) and 
harassing and threatening the local translators working for foreign journalists and 
other foreign mass media outlets have been appearing in the post-independence 
period.
REPRESSION O F  DISSENT W ITHIN RULING PARTY AND GOVERNM ENT 
Like its position toward independent opposition forces and national and foreign 
mass media discussed in the above pages, the Karimov government showed no 
tolerance toward dissenting voices within the ruling party and government apparatus. 
After almost two hundred members of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet singed, as already 
mentioned, a  letter o f protest against the increasingly dictatorial position o f Karimov, 
taming dissenting voices within his own party and government apparatus became one 
of his top priorities. One of the first things Karimov did after the 1991 presidential 
election was t5  restructure political power in the country. He abolished the post of 
vice president occupied by his potential rival, Mirsaidov. The latter was given another 
position in the government but he resigned in protest. Mirsaidov’s resignation did not 
bring his plight to an end.
In July 1992, soon after Solih quit the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, the parliament 
passed a law curtailing the powers of its own members. This law authorized 
parliament to curtail, under exceptional circumstances, the privileges o f  its sitting 
members. The exceptional circumstances which could make a sitting member lose his
i
privileges were worded in very vague language. The law covered acts that could
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"besmirch or discredit the high calling of people’s deputy" or destabilize 
"sociopolitical situation" in the country, or involve simple "calling for such acts..." 
(Fierman, 1997:386).
Of course, the purpose o f this law was to intimidate non-compliant members 
of the parliament and drive them out of this body. The Uzbek rulers made effective 
use of this and other laws to make an example out o f Mirsaidov and other 
non-compliant members of the parliament. They did not have to wait for long to reap 
the fhiits o f this law. In August 1992, Mirsaidov resigned his seat in protest against 
this law. In August 1993, he was charged with corruption and misuse of power, and 
sentenced to three years in prison. Later, he was amnestied under a presidential 
decree, but "was forced to live in virtual house arrest" (Fierman, 1997:386-7, 406).
Despite the fact that Mirsaidov and other convicted political figures were out 
of jail, they were disqualified from running for any public office, hence effectively 
barred from challenging Karimov politically (Kangas, 1994:180-2). The disgraceful 
departure of Mirsaidov and other influential political figures and their disqualification 
from holding any public office served Karimov well. Since then, the members of the 
ruling party, government apparatus, and parliament have rarely dared challenge 
Karimov’s position as the primary actor in Uzbek politics rather, they have been fully 
supportive of his effort to build compliant political structures and run mock 
democracy in the country.
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ELECTORAL PROCESS: A PLAYFIELD FOR RULING PARTY AND LOYAL 
OPPOSITION
As already mentioned, soon after independence the Uzbek president promised 
to build the republic’s electoral process on democratic principles. He also alluded to 
the possibility o f  holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the near future. 
As these elections were held over time, it became clear that the electoral process was 
open for participation only to the ruling party and loyal opposition forces—individual 
political leaders as well as organized groups.
In fact, even well before these elections were held, there were indications that 
independent political groups which could pose a serious challenge to the Uzbek rulers 
would be kept out o f the electoral process. While within weeks after independence the 
Uzbek president was speaking of holding democratic elections in the country in the 
near future, he doubted Birlik’s participation for lack o f its registration as a political 
party. True to this fateful statement, Birlik could not participate in the electoral 
process because it was never granted an official recognition as a political party. In 
fact, before it was outlawed in 1993, Birlik was recognized as a social movement, not 
as a political party. As a result, it was not entitled to the rights and privileges which 
were available to political parties, including the right to nominate a candidate in an 
election without submitting thousands of signatures. The Uzbek rulers found ways to 
block the participation of independent groups like Birlik in the electoral process even 
if the latter were able to gather the required signatures to nominate a candidate.
Not only independent groups were kept out o f the electoral process. The 
Uzbek leadership also manipulated electoral rules and used other extralegal tactics to
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ensure that no true contest ever took place even between the ruling party and the loyal 
opposition forces, preserving the dominance o f  the ruling party and its leadership in 
Uzbek politics.
The manipulation of the electoral process was quite evident in the 1991 
presidential election. The 1991 presidential election was planned for December 1991, 
but election rules were not published until November 23. According to these rules, a 
registered political party could nominate its candidate. Other public associations with 
non-party status were required to gather a specific number of signatures o f voters to 
be able to nominate a candidate in the upcoming presidential election. As a result, two 
parties, PDPU and Erk, were able to nominate their candidates, whereas Birlik was 
required to gather the signatures to be able to nominate its candidate. It is important 
to remember that Erk was then cooperating with the government.
In addition to a delay in the publication o f general election rules, the 
procedures regarding collection of signatures were further delayed for three more 
days. Due to holidays and the time required to call a nomination meeting, political 
groups with non-party status were in effect given only one day to collect the required 
number of signatures (Fierman, 1997:379). As already mentioned, Birlik was still 
able to gather 60,000 signatures but the Uzbek authorities found a way to keep Birlik 
out of the presidential election through rejecting thousands of the signatures as false.
After the presidential election, the Uzbek leadership would not venture another 
electoral show until almost all the independent opposition forces were either forced to 
flee the country or driven into underground and semi-underground positions. Once it
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was achieved, the Uzbek authorities set out to restructure the parliament and 
reformulate electoral rules. During the period from December 1993 to May 1994, a 
body o f laws governing elections to a new parliament and all sorts o f councils down 
to the level o f town council was adopted. In September 1994, parliamentary elections 
were scheduled for December 1994. At the same time, a constitutional amendment 
was passed which increased the number o f seats in the parliament from ISO to 250. 
According to new election laws, only two types o f public associations, oblast councils 
and registered political parties, can nominate candidates in the parliamentary 
elections. Considering that most o f the old relationships between masses and official 
powers were carried over into the post-communist era, that oblast chiefs are appointed 
and controlled from above, and that secret voting is not in vogue in Uzbekistan, it is 
not difficult to understand the reluctance of most voters to vote against the local 
political bosses. Through such electoral and other administrative devices, the Uzbek 
authorities were able to block the nomination o f renegade candidates even at the local 
level.
In theory, the new election rules provided for a multiparty parliamentary 
election. Political parties were granted the right to nominate their candidates.
However, a party must be registered at least six months prior to adoption of this law 
in order to be able to nominate its candidates. Thus, in practice, this provision 
reduced the December 1994 parliamentary elections to a friendly electoral contest 
between two parties, PDPU and Vatan Taraqiaty. As compared to the 1990 
parliamentary elections, the December 1994 parliamentary elections offered the Uzbek
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electorate a greater choice of candidates. However, this choice did not involve 
election of potentially renegade candidates. In fact, it was still impossible for a 
candidate opposed to government policy to contest election. The Uzbek rulers made 
an example out o f Rustam Usmanov, an outspoken candidate o f the Vatan Taraqiaty, 
when the Central Electoral Commission Election disqualified him as candidate for 
"preparing and distributing leaflets which denigrated citizens’ constitutional rights and 
freedoms" (Fierman, 1997:391).
As a result o f  all these electoral and other administrative devices, the PDPU 
retained its dominant position in the parliament while giving out some parliamentary 
seats to its sister party, Vatan Taraqiaty. Later, as already mentioned, other pro- 
govemment parties and formations were awarded parliamentary seats through 
unopposed by-elections.
At its first session, the new parliament voted to extend through a popular 
referendum the term o f Karimov until the year 2000. The Soviet-style referendum 
took place in March 1995. According to official figures, out o f 99.6 percent of the 
voters who voted, 99.4 percent voted yes. After the referendum, the parliament voted 
to include this extension o f three years in his first term, making it legally possible for 
Karimov to run again for the second term in the year 2000. By holding the 
referendum, Karimov spared himself the trouble of arranging a sham contested 
presidential election in order to prove that the country’s electoral process was 
competitive.
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CONCLUSION
As compared to other, especially European, parts of the former Soviet Union, 
Gorbachev’s political reform program belatedly made its way to Uzbekistan and had 
limited impact on Uzbek politics. However, in retrospect, Uzbek society enjoyed 
more political openness in the late 1980s than in the post-Soviet era. Although 
autonomous sociopolitical groups were not registered in the pre-independence period, 
their leaders were by and large able to engage in a number of independent political 
activities without being subjected to brutal repressive measures such as torture, 
imprisonment, and disappearance. The pre-independence political openness was 
primarily a weak reflection of the center-sponsored reform program rather than a 
result of the political vision of the republican communist leadership. Because the 
Uzbek authorities were unable to openly defy the central authorities, they, in spite of 
their aversion to the center-sponsored reforms, had to tolerate some independent 
political activity and could not unleash the level of repression they freely unleashed in 
the post-independence period. Although Uzbek authorities tolerated some independent 
political activity in the pre-independence period, they successfully resisted the 
inclusion of more societal elements in the democratization process in correspondence 
with their political vision. They were able to resist such an inclusion because they 
faced little effective pressure in the absence o f a large, politicized Russian minority, 
and in the presence of a cohesive elite structure in the republic.
After independence, the Uzbek authorities built political structures and 
procedures with all the western democratic and constitutional ideals. Tactics aside,
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these ideals turned out to be nothing more than sheer trappings and the Uzbek 
leadership never made a genuine effort to put them into practice. Rather, it unleased a 
rein of terror to completely silence both individual and organized opposition voices in 
the post-independence period. After Birlik and Erk were disfiranchised as political 
formations in 1993, no tolerated individual and organized opposition activity 
whatsoever existed in the republic. This was also true of the electoral process. No 
independent individual and organized electoral participation was allowed.
Independent media outlets met a similar fate in the post-independence period. 
The Uzbek authorities instituted comprehensive censorship, banned opposition 
publications, and harassed and tortured renegade journalists. Let alone the personal 
criticism o f the leadership and the coverage o f their repressive actions, they did not 
tolerate even criticism of their policies. The post-independence repressive policy 
engulfed the foreign mass media and journalists operating in Uzbekistan.
Inconvenient foreign television broadcasts were jammed, newspapers banned and 
journalists deported and imprisoned.
The Uzbek leadership has postponed political liberalization on the pretext of 
local conditions, including political culture and stability, and put in place one o f the 
most regressive regimes in the region. However, at the same time, it has promised to 
build a truly democratic polity. How long it will take the incumbent leadership to 
achieve the required stability before the it decides it is safe to initiate the political 
liberalization process? Will the incumbent leadership ever try to fulfill its promise of 
building a democratic polity? In other words, will it initiate the political liberalization
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process by controlling its parameters? Or will it continue to postpone it and/or pass it 
on to its political descendants until the appropriate conditions are developed in the 
republic?
There is no indication that the incumbent leadership has made any preparation 
to initiate the political liberalization process. In fact, Karimov has consolidated 
personal power and is unlikely to dismantle the power structure and political machine 
he took lot of pains to build around himself. More importantly, he is left with little 
time to prepare himself for and initiate the political liberalization process. According 
to the law, he can not serve more than two consecutive terms. If he decides to 
remain in power beyond the year 2,000, he will have to manipulate the constitution, 
keep in line ambitious political allies, keep intact the political machine he built around 
him, and scare away the latent opposition forces. Of course, he can not achieve all 
this without the continued policy of repression. In such case, there is little hope for an 
improvement in political liberalization.
Because the incumbent leadership appears ready to unleash excessive 
repression and because it has so far been able to satisfy people’s basic needs without 
raising their expectations for sociopolitical change, adequate pressure for political 
liberalization is unlikely to develop from below in the foreseeable future. If the 
political liberalization process is to begin under the incumbent leadership, the most 
favorable condition for such a prospect would be the rise o f a powerful challenger to 
the president from within the ruling alliance accompanied by a split in the hitherto 
cohesive elite structure along regional and tribal lines, political mobilization o f
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religious forces, and their formal or informal alliance with democratically oriented 
forces. If this happens, Karimov will face the following two likely options: a) to 
initiate political liberalization, enlist support o f the excluded and marginalized secular 
societal forces in order to improve his position vis-a-vis the splintered and religious 
groups, and to accommodate the former in the newly created independent political 
space: or b) use excessive repression to neutralize the challenge. In the later case, he 
is likely to risk a civil war among regional and tribal forces, let alone other 
prohibitive costs. Such a challenge is by no means on the horizon; however, it is 
more likely to develop if the incumbent president decides to perpetuate his rule with 
no end in sight for ambitious political, regional and clan leaders. More likely but less 
dramatic scenario is the leadership change. In other words, a genuine movement 
toward political liberalization will have to await the departure o f the incumbent 
leadership. The best hope is that after the incumbent leadership leaves office, the 
political machine built around it is likely to weaken and certain reformist elements in 
the power structure (or tribal and regional groups within the ruling alliance) may 
demand more independent political space for themselves and hence prove catalyst for 
the relaxation o f excessive political control in the country.
NOTES
1. The influx o f Russian settlers into the Central Asia region began with the Russian 
conquest of the large portion of the region in the 19th century and continued 
afterwards under various pretexts.
2. Ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan organized an inter-ethnic movement, Intersoyuz, in 
1989. This movement failed to draw a large scale following. As a result of a small 
following and government pressure, Intersoyuz withered away in the post-
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independence period (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 31,
1991).
3. In the 1991 presidential election, they supported Karimov because he promised to 
maintain inter-ethnic peace in Uzbekistan (Russian Press Digest, February 4, 1992).
4. The Uzbek secret service agents reportedly harass Uzbek human rights activists in 
Moscow. The Russian authorities refuse to register such activists as refugees and have 
made it clear to them that they would not help them avoid persecution (Russian Press 
Digest, November 11, 1993).
5. Mirsadov resigned from the government on January 13, 1992, and warned about 
the advent of a dictatorial regime in the republic (Russian Press Digest, January 27,
1992). He later resigned from the parliament and was subjected to repression. 
However, his resignation from the government and parliament and subsequent 
repression by Karimov did not create any uproar among his former comrades.
6. In his telegram to George Bush, the US President, Karimov affirmed that he was 
strengthening the democratic foundations o f society (BBC, March 11, 1992).
7. In one of his interviews, Karimov said: "I do not tire o f reiterating to my critics: 
reforms are under way here, democratic processes are under way, and we are 
building a democratic society based on the rule of law. The stages through which we 
are passing are another matter" (BBC, June 12, 1993).
8. The Turkish model was described by Karimov as a "secular and civilized" road of 
development (Russian Press Digest, May 15, 1992).
9. Gorbachev continued to have a negative perception of Islam. Buying the Uzbek 
authorities' interpretation of the June 1989 ethnic violence in Fergana Valley that a 
religious political party, Islam and Democracy, fanned this violence, Gorbachev 
observed: "Islamic extremism has bared its teeth" in the Fergana Valley (Financial 
Times (London), June 14, 1989:A2; The Daily Telegraph, June 15, 1989:14).
10. Abdurrahman Pulatov, the leader o f an independent but unregistered civic 
movement, Birlik, admitted that democratic forces were weak in the republic and that 
it would take time to arouse people from social passivity (Guardian. October 25, 
1990:9).
11. Islam and Democracy reportedly held its founding congress in Kazakhstan on 
October 25, 1988. The organization played an important role in removing Mufti 
Babakhanov in 1989 through holding a series o f  demonstrations against him in 
February 1989. The Mufit was accused of immoral conduct (Haghayeghi 1995:85).
160
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12. For example, the Uzbek communist party continued to view Birlik as an extremist 
formation unworthy of any cooperation. Internal party reports condemned the 
’cliques’ and 'self-proclaimed leaders” for their efforts "to create extremist 
formations and informal associations* like "Birlik" and "Free Union of Uzbekistan 
Youth’ (Fierman, 1997:368).
13. Birlik requested permission to hold a rally in support of Uzbek language in early 
1989. When the authorities continued to refuse permission for two months, the Birlik 
leadership held rally without permission on March 19, 1989. A large number of 
people participated in the rally without government interference (Fierman 1997:367-
8 ).
14. Solih reportedly won the 1990 election and separated from Birlik with the support 
of the Uzbek authorities two days after the election to create his own political party, 
Erk (Will). Erk had many communists in its ranks and its leadership hilly supported 
the CPSU platform, emphasizing the need to outlaw public associations which called 
for violence and ethnic strife and pursued militant and unconstitutional causes (Tass, 
February 27, 1990). However, like Birlik, Erk also supported independence— a 
demand which suited the Uzbek authorities.
15. The respected Uzbek writer, Shukrullo Yusupov, who was a leading supporter of 
Birlik and veteran of five years in Stalin’s camps in the early 1950s, was appointed to 
the presidential council (Guardian, October 25, 1990:9).
16. For instance, the Birlik leadership came under severe official criticism a few days 
after the elections, and its attempt to hold a public rally in the town of Parkent on 
March 3, 1990, was quelled with the use of force which resulted in a number of 
deaths and scores o f injuries. The attempt by the IRP to hold its founding congress in 
Tashkent in January 1991 met a similar official response.
17. Of course, opposition groups like Birlik and IRP were prohibited from publishing 
their own newspapers. International media outlets also became targets. In March 
1991, the Karimov government reportedly banned the reception of the Kyrgyz 
television broadcast in order to prevent Uzbek people from learning about impressive 
democratic achievements in Kyrgyzstan (Russian Press Digest, May 7, 1991). In 
addition, foreign journalists, including two representatives of the Radio Liberty, were 
deported from the republic in 1991 before independence (BBC, August 3, 1991).
18. Uzbekistan declared sovereignty on June 20, 1990.
19. Birlik entered into alliance with Intersoyuz, an association which was founded in 
1989, to represent the interests of the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan. 
Abdurrahim Pulatov, a Birlik leader, conceded that without such alliances the 
authorities would have crushed his movement (Russian Press Digest, October 31,
1990; BBC August 28, 1991).
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20. In the immediate pre-independence period, the central authorities pushed for more 
relaxation o f  political controls, whereas the Uzbek authorities tried to retrench 
whatever relaxation was available to Uzbek society. In the immediate post­
independence period, the Uzbek leadership was free o f the central dictates and 
enjoyed more latitude to intensify repression o f  the opposition forces, but it decided 
otherwise. As compared to their aggressive approaches toward their critics in the 
immediate pre-independence and post-1991 periods, the Uzbek authorities tolerated 
their critics even though their repression did not involve a prohibitive cost because 
they lacked a strong support base in Uzbek society. Moreover, the Uzbek leadership 
adopted a relatively flexible approach toward them even though they were busy in 
discrediting it for its supportive role in the August 1991 putsch, criticizing its 
authoritarian methods, and mocking its decisions such as proclamation of 
independence as nothing more than a cover to "preserve a totalitarian regime in a 
separate republic" ( Russian Press Digest, August 27, 1991; The New York Times, 
September 18, 1991:A1).
21. The Russian press which had already published reports o f the growing distance 
between Karimov and the ex-communist party elite in the republic reported the bold 
behavior of "previously dormant deputies" in the parliament (Russian Press Digest, 
October 29, 1991).
22. Birlik received some important concessions which, the Birlik leadership believed, 
were reflective o f the fact that the authorities had realized the ineffectiveness of 
authoritarian methods and therefore had begun to compromise (Russian Press Digest, 
November 20, 1991).
23. These activists were released in order placate the Birlik leadership which was 
unhappy with the decision of the authorities to turn down its application for 
registration as a political party. Although the authorities refused to register it as a 
political party in order to prevent it from fielding a candidate in the upcoming 
presidential elections in December 1991, they promised the Birlik leadership to 
register it as a movement (Russian Press Digest, October 8, 1991).
24. This development enthused the Birlik leaders. They interpreted it as the first 
genuine democratic step toward the democratic development o f Uzbek society 
(Fierman, 1997:379). O f course, this official recognition meant relatively more 
freedom of action.
25. For instance, the election law that all the presidential candidates should have 
equal access to the government-controlled media was clearly violated. The state mass 
media provided extensive coverage to the election campaign o f Karimov. The 
state-controlled television regularly broadcast his speeches. However, his rival,
Solih, could get only 15 minutes of air time (with two minutes of his speech lost due 
to censorship) after Birlik and Erk activists demonstrated in support o f such media 
coverage (Fierman, 1997:380).
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26. Interestingly, it was among the Russian minority that Karimov enjoyed the 
greatest influence (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 51, 1993:24).
27. Babur Shakirov was imprisoned during the Soviet era for his political views. 
After his release he left the country. After independence he came back to participate 
in politics under the impression that things would be different. He was dismayed to 
find that old power structures were still in place in his country even after 
independence (Moscow News, January 16, 1993).
28. According to one report, virtually all known opposition activists were fired from 
their jobs (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 3, 1993:11).
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CHAPTER 4 
KAZAKHSTAN
THE RISE OF AN ENLIGHTENED AUTHORITARIAN REGIME? 
INTRODUCTION
At the time of its independence and the formal break of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991, Kazakhstan was in the throes of economic and political reforms the 
center had sponsored under the rubrics of perestroika and glasnost. Although pre­
independence economic reform measures were initially introduced in the republic in 
line with the central guidelines, Kazakh authorities at times went ahead of the center 
and took independent initiatives to deepen the process o f economic transition.1 
However, the same can not be said o f political reforms. Before independence, they 
expressed rhetorical solidarity with the center on its political reform program but 
sought to subtly circumvent its full enforcement.
After independence, Kazakh authorities were free o f the central dictates to 
decide the fate o f the center-sponsored reform program. While they acknowledged 
enormous obstacles in their way, they publicly expressed their firm commitment to 
the transition process underway in the republic and to build Kazakh polity on free 
market and democratic principles. The Kazakh leadership made reasonable progress in 
dismantling, though gradually, bases o f command economy and introducing instead 
free market principles. Although Kazakh authorities’ pre-independence lack of 
enthusiasm for genuine political reforms raised doubts about the face value of their 
commitment to democratic principles and the future of such reforms, Kazakhstan 
witnessed an overall improvement in political liberalization in the post-independence
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period. However, its record o f political liberalization is modest in comparison to that 
of Kyrgyzstan, but it is certainly far better than that o f Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan’s middle position on the political liberalization scale is intriguing 
because it clearly surpasses Kyrgyzstan and roughly matches Uzbekistan in 
socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with political democracy. In this 
chapter, we intend to address this intriguing question with the help o f our theoretical 
framework. It is our contention that the way our three independent variables, the 
Russian minority, elite structure, and political orientation o f the Kazakh leadership, 
operate(d) in Kazakhstan accounts for its middle position on the political liberalization 
scale. Before we examine our empirical evidence on political liberalization and its 
correspondence with our theoretical expectations, it is important for us to first discuss 
the extent to which these independent variables hold in that country. A brief 
discussion o f these variables will be useful for interpreting the empirical data and for 
assessing the adequacy o f our theoretical framework.
Because the post-independence political liberalization is rooted in the pre- 
independence political reform initiatives and in order to adequately appreciate the 
level of political liberalization Kazakhstan achieved in the post-independence period, 
we will also examine the extent to which the center-sponsored political reforms under 
the rubric o f glasnost affected that republic in the pre-independence period. In fact, 
such discussion will help us to properly appreciate the difference between the pre- and 
post-independence periods in terms political liberalization in Kazakhstan and enhance 
our comparative understanding o f various phases o f political liberalization in that
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republic and across the countries under study. The remainder o f the chapter will focus 
on various aspects of political liberalization in the post-independence period. More 
specifically, the rise of political parties and social movements and the freedom of 
action they enjoyed, the openness o f the electoral process, and the freedom of the 
independent mass media will receive our special attention. Main findings of this 
chapter will be summarized in the conclusion.
A LARGE AND POLITICIZED RUSSIAN MINORITY
Kazakhstan houses the largest and the most politicized Russian minority in 
Central Asia. At the time o f its independence, it was home of more than six million 
ethnic Russians who made up 37.8 percent o f the total population. The Russian 
minority is mostly concentrated (59.1 %) in Alma Ata, the capital city (see Table 3), 
and northern industrial regions o f the republic. Ethnic Kazakhs who made up 39.5 
percent of the total population at the time o f independence (see Table 2) are a 
minority in the capital city, making up only 22.5 percent o f its population (see Table 
3). They are mostly concentrated in the south (Khazanov 1995:163, 258; Heleniak 
1997:368-370). According to the 1996 estimate, Russians dropped to 33.9% and 
Kazakhs increased their share to 47% (see Table 2). In addition to their distinct 
geographical concentration, Kazakhs and Russians are separated by division of labor. 
As compared to Kazakhs who dominate in the humanities, ethnic Russians are mostly 
involved in natural sciences and medicine. Consequently, the bulk o f technical elites, 
skilled labor force, and office corps in the army comes from the Russian minority 
(Khazanov 1995:165; Kubicek 1997:645).
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The Russian minority has been increasingly shrinking in proportion to the 
titular nationality primarily due to its out-migration. As a result of its accelerated out­
migration after the demise o f the Soviet Union, its share o f the total population 
dropped to 33.9 percent in 1996; whereas the titular nationality increased its share to 
47 percent (Heleniak 1997:369). In spite of its shrinking size, the Russian minority 
continues to be a very resourceful, politicized ethnic group in Kazakhstan.
A number of internal and external factors significantly contribute to its 
resourcefulness. Internal factors include its sheer large size, concentration in the 
urban and northern industrial areas, technical and professional skills, economic 
strength, and political activism. The support of its co-ethnics in Russia, including the 
Russian troops based on Kazakh soil, constitutes the most important external source of 
its resourcefulness, and effectively underwrites its security in the republic. In fact, 
Kazakh authorities are seeking ways to accommodate the Russian minority not only 
because of its importance for economic and sociopolitical stability of the republic but 
also because of Russian authorities’ expressed concern with and readiness to use 
material and political means to promote its welfare. Not to speak of regular Russian 
support for those Russian political dissidents who accept the integrity o f Kazakh state, 
Russian authorities have at times supported and sheltered even secessionist elements 
of the Russian minority in Kazakhstan (Khazanov 1995:171; Russian Press Digest,
June 1, 1991).
The resourcefulness o f the Russian minority resulting from both internal and 
external sources has been a valuable asset in pursuit of its interests in the republic.
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Especially, the politically active members of the Russian minority greatly benefitted 
from it in their political competition with other sociopolitical groups, including the 
titular nationality, in the pre- and post-independence periods. The Russian minority 
demonstrated its independent political activism on many occasions after the Soviet 
leadership introduced political reforms in the pre-independence period. The first 
unmistakable sign of its independent political mobilization became visible in 
December 1986 when armed units o f ethnic Russians beat Kazakh nationalist 
demonstrators who were raising anti-Russian slogans and protesting on the streets of 
Alma Ata the dismissal of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, a Kazakh, and the appointment of 
Gennady Kolbin, a Russian, as the first secretary of the Kazakh communist party 
(Khazanov 1995:166-7). In the wake of these nationalist riots, Kolbin set up more 
armed units of ethnic Russians in Alma Ata, further strengthening them in the 
republic (Reuter September 27, 1990).
The Russian minority did not lag behind the titular nationality in organizing its 
own informal sociopolitical groups such as Wisdom,2 Yedinstvo (Unity), and Social 
Democratic Party and in using protest politics to promote its interests after glasnost 
made its way to Kazakhstan in the late 1980s (Haghayeghi 1994:192). These groups 
joined hands with the communist members of the Russian minority to strongly oppose 
the sovereignty and language laws the Kazakh parliament passed in the late 1980s and 
to press for their own demands, including the status o f Russian language as an official 
language in the republic. These groups organized a number of protest demonstrations
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in support of their demands in the pre-independence period (Pomfret 1995:79: 
Khazanov 1995:170).3
The Russian minority’s political activism did not subside with the demise of 
the Soviet Union. Rather, not only the Russian minority has become more politicized 
but has also taken on a new dimension o f secessionism in the post-Soviet period. The 
transition policies of Kazakh authorities in the post-independence period are in pan 
responsible for this situation. In fact, most of these policies are tailored to the needs 
of the titular nationality, but are detrimental to the interests of the Russian minority. 
In order to promote its interests, the Russian minority has organized many vocal 
sociopolitical groups such as Lad (Harmony), Slavic Movement, and the Congress of 
Russian Communities and resorts to protest politics in the post-independence period. 
Its overall political mobilization, especially the rise of highly politicized and 
secessionist groups, renders the use of excessive repression to depoliticize it a very 
risky proposition for Kazakh authorities.
FRAGMENTED ELITE STRUCTURE OF KAZAKHSTAN
In Kazakhstan, the communist elite structure began to lose its cohesiveness as 
soon as Gorbachev introduced his reform program. As the central leadership began to 
deepen its reform program, a section o f the Kazakh communist elites distanced itself 
from the republican leadership and supported the center-sponsored unabated criticism 
of it for a host o f serious problems in the republic. The first serious split in the 
republican communist party became open at the 16th party congress held in February 
1986 when a number of leading delegates, including the prime minister of the
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republic, Sultan Nazarbayev, handed down a long list of accusations, including 
political corruption, to the republican leadership (BBC February 13 and 21, 1986:
The Economist, February 15, 1986:49 U.S. Edition). As a result, the republican 
communist party split into pro- and anti-Kunayev factions. The anti-Kunayev faction, 
including its members in the republican press, continued to criticize the republican 
leadership with impunity—an unprecedented development that introduced the principle 
of open debate at least among the party circles.
The republican communist elites further split after the central leadership 
imported Kolbin into Kazakhstan to replace Kunayev as the first secretary of the 
republican communist party in December 1986. Kolbin’s appointment suggested that 
no local communist leader was competent enough to assume the leadership role in the 
republic. Of course, it annoyed even those Kazakh communist leaders who were 
opposed to Kunayev.4 The use o f massive force by Kolbin to handle the December 
1986 Alma Ata nationalist riots further angered them. Let alone the pro-Kunayev 
faction, even important members o f the anti-Kunayev faction soon began to publicly 
question Kolbin’s policies and style and method of leadership. The growing party split 
along ideological, inter- and intra-ethnic lines prompted certain communist leaders to 
make allies outside the communist party and promote their concerns (BBC, March 4, 
1989).
The republican communist elite structure continued to disintegrate even after 
Kolbin was recalled to take up an assignment at the center in June 1989. In fact, in 
the wake of his departure, the republican communist party further split along ethnic
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lines. After he left his post, activists of the titular nationality became more vocal in 
their demands, forced Kazakh authorities to reinterpret the 1986 riots, and received 
open support for their concerns from the leading Kazakh communists, including 
Nazarbayev who replaced the former as the first secretary of the republican 
communist party (Tass February 23, 1990; Russian Press Digest, September 2, 1990). 
The Russian communists were displeased with Kazakh authorities' attempts to make 
"national heroes out of the nationalist criminals” involved in the December 1980 riots 
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, November 1, 1990). Likewise, in the 
wake of the growing ascendancy of Kazakhstan in its relationship with the center and 
consequently the growing ascendancy of the titular nationality partially reflected in the 
language and sovereignty laws, the support for the interests of the Russian minority 
and opposition to pro-Kazakh policies, including the language and sovereignty laws, 
solidified among the Russian communists (Russian Press Digest September 28, 1990). 
A number of republican deputies of Russian origin formed a democratic block within 
the republican parliament to defend civil, political, and cultural rights of minorities 
and publicly opposed a number of official positions, including the language law and 
declaration of sovereignty (Russian Press Digest, October I, 1990; Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast, October 16 and 17, 1990; BBC November 2, 1990).
The rise o f a Russian-oriented parliamentary group proved fateful for the 
future of the republican communist party. In fact, it turned the nascent inter-ethnic 
divide in the republican communist party into an enduring sharp split which in large 
part accounts for the failure of the party to transform itself intact, like the Uzbek
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communist party, into a ruling party in the post-independence period. These deputies 
and other communist elites of Russian origin became more aggressive supporters of 
the Russian minority after Kazakh authorities and elites tried to pursue explicitly pro- 
Kazakh policies in the post-Soviet period. As a result of their respective intractable 
positions on sensitive nationalist issues, including language and economic and political 
reforms, most Russian and Kazakh communist elites failed to narrow their political 
differences and remain united in a single political party in the post-independence 
period. Instead, they patronized their respective ethnic communities and ethnic- 
oriented political groups in the post-independence period. In fact, the inter-ethnic 
tension and competition exist even in those parties, such as the Socialist Party and 
People’s Congress, which are sponsored by Nazarbayev to unify political elites o f 
different ethnic origin. Even these parties have come to be identified with specific 
ethnic groups, the Socialist Party with Russians and People’s Congress with Kazakhs 
(Olcott I993a:57).
The multiple split among the post-independence political elites was amply 
reflected not only outside but also inside the parliament in the post-Soviet period, 
prompting Kazakh authorities to work harder to strike a balance between the 
contending factions of political elites, including various tribal and clan leaders, in the 
republic (Khazanov 1995:125-6, 165-6). Soon after the 1994 parliamentary elections, 
a number o f political parties and social movements, including ethnic-oriented and 
ideological ones, joined forces to form a constructive opposition bloc in the 
parliament. Such opposition bloc had the support of 85 deputies who held the illegal
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decisions and actions of Kazakh authorities responsible for the disastrous situation in 
the republic and demanded the resignation of the incumbent government (Russian 
Press Digest, May 28, 1994). The same group of deputies later resisted the 
dissolution of the parliament in 1995 and entered into alliances with other political 
forces to oppose the authoritarian practices in the republic. In short, the disintegration 
of elite structure which began in the pre-independence period inexorably continued in 
the post-independence period, increasingly dispersing political resources and raising 
the cost o f depoliticization of society in the republic.
NAZARBAYEV: A CAUTIOUS REFORMIST LEADER?5
In the wake o f the Gorbachev reform program, Nazarbayev, then the prime 
minister o f the republic, distanced himself from his conservative mentor, Kunayev, 
and adopted a reformist posture. As already mentioned, at the 16th republican party 
congress held in February 1986, he denounced his mentor for promoting a  false sense 
of economic success and hiding serious economic problems in the republic (BBC, 
February 13, 1986). By taking similar pro-reform positions in the subsequent period, 
he quickly succeeded in building his image as a firm supporter of the Gorbachev 
reform program. Such image won him the confidence of Gorbachev and the 
leadership position in Kazakhstan in June 1989.
After he assumed the leadership position and began to clearly articulate his 
views about the reform process underway in the country, it became quite clear that 
Nazarbayev was an enthusiastic supporter o f economic rather than political reforms. 
However, his concept o f economic reforms involved: a) economic autonomy for the
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Soviet republics;6 and b) a movement toward market-based relations. In fact, he was 
convinced o f the importance o f market-based relations for the much-needed 
socioeconomic acceleration in the country.7 However, he left no doubt that his 
republic would make such shift in a gradual manner, slower than the rest o f  the 
country, and was likely to last longer, for a number of reasons, including the oriental 
mentality o f his people, the pervasive influence o f the communist party, and 
sociopolitical situation in the republic.6
As compared to his economic approach which was gradual but reflected a 
genuine concern for market-based reforms, Nazarbayev adopted a more conservative 
outlook toward the question of political reforms. Although he supported limited 
democratization of internal party life (BBC, March 8, 1990), he was averse to 
genuine democratization o f public life in the pre-independence period. Also, he called 
for political decentralization that was meant to enhance autonomy of the republican 
communist party rather than Kazakh society vis-a-vis the CPSU (Tass, February 23 
and March 19, 1990). Given his growing control in the republic, such autonomy 
essentially meant his own autonomy in the republican affairs.
Although Nazarbayev praised the Gorbachev reform processes for enabling the 
Kazakh people to speak loudly of their national aspirations (Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast, May 31, 1991), he resented the sequence of such 
processes. More specifically, he believed that one of most serious mistakes the central 
leadership made in the transition process was that it let political reforms take 
precedence over economic reforms (BBC, November 29, 1991). According to his
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understanding, a smooth transition to a market economy requires strict discipline and 
full scale democratization o f society during the transition is a  sure recipe for social 
unrest.9 Responding to an assertion that the relative social peace in the republic was a 
product o f its lagging behind the country in the democratization process, Nazarbayev 
remarked that he was "proud of such a lag" and attributed it to "the civic and political 
maturity of the population o f Kazakhstan" (Russian Press Digest, June 13, 1990).
Likewise, the Kazakh leader saw the rise of new public associations of 
"different nationalities, views, convictions and....interests” as a positive development 
which could potentially "cement society hundreds of times stronger than the party- 
state monopoly on everything" (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, May 
31, 1991), and suggested to implement their productive proposals without delay and 
to find mutual understanding with them, instead of rejecting them (Tass, August 25, 
1989 and December 11, 1990). However, he was averse to their involvement in 
protest politics and was unwilling to provide them expansive independent political 
space. He rather wanted to coopt their leaders into responsible positions in the party 
and government (Tass, August 25, 1991).
Independence brought little or no notable change in Nazarbayev’s views about 
political reforms. If anything, he became more candid in their expression in the post­
independence period. While he viewed the rise of various political movements and 
parties as part of a "logical, democratic process" in the post-independence period 
(BBC, May 14, 1993), he continued to express his utter aversion to their protest 
actions and call them a potential source of a "serious rupture" in society (Agence
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France Presse, June 18, 1992). In fact, in his scheme o f things, economic reforms 
continue to take precedence over political reforms. The Kazakh president almost 
always referred to the need for economic acceleration to justify his political 
machinations, including institutional engineering10 and the postponement o f full scale 
democratization of society.
More importantly, he did not hide his inclination toward authoritarianism as a 
transitional stage on the road from totalitarianism to a market economy and 
democracy (Khazanov 1995:148). And, if  his views are of any guidance, this 
transitional stage is bound to last long. Reacting to the negative international 
assessment of the March 1994 parliamentary elections, Nazarbayev left no doubt 
about it in his following remarks: "We have not lived to reach the European standard 
yet — in terms of either our economy, our development, or our democracy. 
Yesterday’s party discipline...(means) it is a long way to democracy. We cannot have 
such a level o f democracy (that) exists in France or Britain" (BBC, March 12, 1994). 
Almost a year later, he reiterated this position. In a response to his critics who 
described the April 1995 referendum held to extend his term o f office until the year 
2000 as another example of ’renewed authoritarianism’ in Central Asia,11 the Kazakh 
president justified it in the following words: "We are Asian countries — we have our 
own certain mentality. It’s impossible in the last three or four years to establish the 
same kind of democracy you have in England" (The Associated Press, April 30, 
1995). He also reminded them that "Democracy is only just knocking at our door"
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and they "don't have to mourn for something we never had" (Deutsche Presse - 
Agentur, April 30, 1995).
The preceding discussion makes it clear that, in spite of his somewhat 
favorable opinion about the Gorbachev reform program, Nazarbayev was primarily a 
leader with little sympathy for genuine political openness. In the light o f his views, 
we can expect him to tolerate modest political openness but not full scale 
democratization o f Kazakh society. Also, we can expect him to temper factors 
conducive to speedy and expansive political liberalization both in the pre- and post­
independence periods.
GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE KUNAYEV ERA
Almost one month before Mikhail Gorbachev was named the first secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 10, 1985, Dinmukhamed 
Kunayev, the first secretary of the communist party o f Kazakhstan was proclaiming 
that his republic was rising to the "new heights of socioeconomic and cultural 
development" (BBC, February 13, 1985).12 However, challenging such lofty claims 
within less two weeks after the former assumed power, the central newspapers, 
especially Pravda, began to depict a rather bleak picture of the socioeconomic and 
cultural development o f the republic and blamed it on the republican leadership. The 
central authorities soon joined the press in this crusade (Pravda, March 18, 1985; 
Current Digest o f  the Soviet Press no. 11, 1985:3; Pravda, March 29, 1985; BBC, 
December 29, 1986).13
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The Kazakh leadership immediately abandoned its earlier complacent view of 
the socioeconomic and cultural development of the republic. It conceded to the 
existence of serious problems in the party discipline and distortions in the socialist 
development of the republic and promised to correct the situation and promised to 
rectify the situation (BBC, July 13, 1985). Kazakhstan saw a  flurry o f activities 
geared toward socioeconomic revitalization but no reported movement toward the 
formation of autonomous sociopolitical groups and independent institutions of mass 
media during the last one and a half year o f the Kunayev rule. Although limited 
democratization o f party life made the republican leadership accessible to intra-party 
criticism which was regularly reported in the central and republican press, it was still 
beyond the reach of criticism from non-party sources. In fact, this situation was very 
much in accordance with the central authorities’ focus on economic acceleration and 
party discipline rather than on democratization of public life during this period.14
Although a hostile approach o f the republican leadership toward the potential 
sources of independent political activity13 remained intact during one and a half year 
of the Kunayev era, it can be safely said that at least a basis for the rise of such 
activity was truly laid during this period.
As a result o f a number o f reasons, including the center’s unabated sharp 
criticism o f Kunayev and his close associates, and local rivalries among the republican 
party elites, a section o f the republican party distanced itself from him and joined the 
central authorities in their criticism o f him for a host o f serious problems in the 
republic (BBC, February 13 and 21, 1986; The Economist, February 15, 1986:49
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U.S. Edition). As a result, the republican communist party split into pro- and anti- 
Kunayev factions. In the wake of this split and increasing central pressure for 
socioeconomic acceleration, Kunayev had little choice but to tolerate his critics in the 
spirit of openness and socialist democracy—an unprecedented development that 
facilitated the introduction o f the principle of open debate, and rendered the leadership 
open to criticism, among the party cadres. Once established for party cadres to 
discredit Kunayev, it became difficult for his successors to deny it to both party 
cadres and non-party activists concerned with a host of societal issues.
In addition to introducing the principle of openness, the Kunayev era can also 
be credited for raising a number o f issues such as environment around which various 
autonomous sociopolitical groups were later organized. In fact, a number o f such 
issues were raised in an exchange o f criticism and counter-criticism between the 
central leadership and its local allies on the one hand and pro-Kunayev faction on the 
other.16 After acknowledging a number of serious problems facing the republic, it 
became difficult for both the republican and central leaders to justify repression of the 
communist and non-communist activists who advocated these issues and sought to 
organize sociopolitical groups around them in the subsequent period.
In spite of this open debate about the republic’s problems and massive purges 
of the corrupt party cadres carried out under his supervision, Kunayev failed to please 
the central authorities and continued to face unabated sharp criticism for political 
cronyism and poor economic performance in the republic. The lack o f improvement 
in the situation was squarely blamed on the political machine he built over the last
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two decades. Because this political machine was built under and around Kunayev, the 
central leadership became convinced that it was extremely difficult to completely 
break it while he was in power. As a result, the central authorities sent a  senior 
representative to oversee his replacement in a plenary session of the republican 
communist party central committee on December 16, 1986.17 
GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE KOLBIN ERA
Kunayev’s removal hardly surprised anyone. It was long expected.18 In fact, 
the surprising and fateful decision was the appointment of Gennady Kolbin, breaking 
the traditional practice o f appointing a member of the titular nationality as first 
secretary, with a Russian as second secretary, in a non-Russian republic. It also 
suggested that no local party leader was reliable and fit for the job the central 
authorities wanted to accomplish in Kazakhstan—an offensive proposition even for the 
anti-Kunayev faction in the republican communist party.
Almost within 24 hours of the announcement of the decision to replace 
Kunayev with Kolbin, student-led riots broke out in Alma-Ata against this decision.19 
The central and republican authorities were shocked because such riots were unheard 
of for a long time. In addition to showing disapproval of the above decision, the 
Alma-Ata riots displayed an anti-Russian content. However, it was blown out of 
proportion by the authorities. Angered by the false and provocative rumors that the 
rioters were seizing Russian educational institutions and killing Russians in the streets 
(FBIS, December 9, 1988:71), the authorities used massive force to quell the riots.
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According to the questionable initial official figures, at least two people died, almost 
two hundred were injured and one hundred were detained.20
In his immediate reaction, Kolbin strongly condemned the prevalence and 
manifestation of nationalist sentiments in the republic and resolved and sought to 
activate available resources to combat this negative phenomenon. He led a massive 
campaign to expose and punish those who incited and took part in the riots.21 His 
campaign contained, albeit temporarily, the eruption of independent political activity 
along the lines in Russia and the Baltic republics. It created an atmosphere o f fear, 
coerced Kazakh activists into a low profile, and contained the galvanizing impact of 
these riots on Kazakh society, hence its immediate further politicization.22 However, 
this situation did not persist for a long time and restricted glasnost made its way to 
Kazakhstan during the Kolbin period for a number o f  reasons.
First, it was difficult to insulate Kazakh society from the impact of the 
intensifying reform program underway in the country for a long time without brutal 
repression and enormous cost. In fact, Kolbin was imported into Kazakhstan to 
implement the center-sponsored reform program, not to insulate the republic from it. 
The fact that the central leadership was increasingly calling for more political 
openness across the country rendered it difficult for Kolbin, its trusted representative, 
to defy it and continue his confrontational approach toward Kazakh society.
Second, the split in the republican party made it difficult to effectively pursue 
reform program, let alone a  sustained confrontational approach. In fact, the very 
decision of the central authorities to import Kolbin into the republic annoyed even
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those Kazakh leaders who were opposed to Kunayev. The way the authorities handled 
the Alma-Ata riots further angered them. Let alone the pro-Kunayev faction, even 
important Kazakh leaders o f the anti-Kunayev faction soon began to question Kolbin’s 
policies and style and method o f leadership. In fact, Kolbin remained an outsider, 
exposed to criticism under the principle o f openness he himself championed in his 
attack on the previous republican leadership, and did not receive the kind of 
cooperation he needed for his success. The party split, which further deepened with 
the passage of time, not only complicated his anti-corruption campaign (and pursuit of 
perestroika) but also made it difficult for him to arrest the growth of what he called 
subversive activities o f independent sociopolitical associations. It became a difficult 
task because certain party activists and bodies reportedly protected those members of 
informal associations who were allegedly involved in such activities (BBC, March 4, 
1989).23
Third, Kolbin’s approach toward the Alma Ata riots and corrective measures 
he adopted to fix mistakes in the nationality policy o f his predecessor(s) obliged him 
to discontinue his initial hostile approach to Kazakh nationalists. In their initial 
analysis o f the riots, central and republican authorities blamed that the flawed 
nationality policy of Kunayev unduly benefited the Kazakh nationality and in part 
caused these riots. This analysis infuriated many leading Kazakh figures, including 
party members, who began to speak of socioeconomic and cultural injustices done to 
the Kazakh nationality. For instance, an increasingly number o f leading members of 
Kazakh intelligentsia came forward and began to highlight how the Kazakh language
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was restrained and the scope of its use was narrowed in the republic over time and 
called for measures, including legal guarantees, to promote it (FBIS, December 9, 
1988:70; Tass, August 22, 1989). The authorities soon realized that it was very 
difficult to improve the situation without addressing genuine grievances of the Kazakh 
nationality and reducing inter-ethnic tension in the republic. In addition, Kolbin knew 
that he had authorized the use o f massive force on the basis of false information and 
had annoyed many leading Kazakh communists in the process (FBIS, December 9, 
1988:71). He later tried to compensate his mistake by adopting a  relaxed approach 
toward Kazakh society, if not toward the corrupt party cadres. Although purges of 
corrupt party cadres continued unabated, an appeasement policy toward the Kazakhs 
nationality and its concerns, including the language, was underway within weeks after 
the riots.24
Party and nonparty activists surprised Kolbin when they quickly seized upon 
the opportunity his appeasement policy had created for them to come out in support of 
their causes, including the language, sovereignty, and environment.25 Partly 
encouraged by his defensive and apologetic stance on a number o f issues, including 
the riots, they began to speak and organize autonomous sociopolitical groups for their 
causes. In spite o f his aversion to the rise of autonomous sociopolitical forces,26 he 
found it difficult after his call for reconciliation (The Associated Press, January 22,
1987) to crush them and undo his own claims of progress in the republic. As a result, 
limited independent space became available to Kazakh society and a host of 
autonomous sociopolitical groups began to form around various causes during the
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Kolbin period. Almost 70 to 100 autonomous sociopolitical groups were reportedly 
active in Kazakhstan by the time Kolbin left office in June 1989 (BBC, December 24, 
1988; BBC, January 14, 1989).27
Although Kolbin relaxed his approach toward independent sociopolitical 
initiatives, this relaxed approach was by no means comprehensive. In other words, the 
independent space his relaxed approach initially created was available to certain forces 
for limited activities. More specifically, such space was available to those autonomous 
sociopolitical forces who, although critical of the flawed policies o f the party and 
government, did not seek to challenge the party dominance, avoided politics o f rallies 
aimed at discrediting the party leadership, and expressed, at least rhetorical, support 
to the center-sponsored reform program. Those independent sociopolitical initiatives 
which, in the eyes of the republican authorities, represented a  threat to the social 
peace and existing power structure were in most cases repressed and their advocates 
were subjected to punitive measures, including arrest and imprisonment.28 In 
addition, autonomous sociopolitical groups could not freely establish independent 
institutions o f the mass media and participate in the electoral process29 in the 
republic during the Kolbin era.
In spite o f these restrictions on autonomous sociopolitical forces, there is no 
denying the fact that glasnost made its way to Kazakhstan during the Kolbin period. 
The fact that political groups such as the Democratic Union and Popular Front could 
form and engage in independent political activities, however limited, especially 
toward the end of the Kolbin era shows that the republican authorities relaxed their
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approach, at least in practical if not in rhetorical terms, even toward those groups 
which aspired to the role of opposition to the communist party and made no secret of 
their objective o f  changing the communist system in the country (BBC December 24,
1988). Hence, we can safely say that in spite o f the aversion of the republican party 
and authorities to independent political space, it was surely expanding when Kolbin 
left his post in June 1989.
GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE NAZARBAYEV ERA
The central committee of the republican communist party relieved Kolbin of 
his duties and elected Sultan Nazarbayev as first secretary of the party on June 22, 
1989. Independent political space further expanded under the latter. In fact, it is no 
exaggeration that autonomous sociopolitical initiatives, in spite of the republican 
leadership’s aversion to them, acquired greater salience under Nazarbayev than under 
his two predecessors. A number of reasons account for the qualitative improvement 
glasnost experienced during the Nazarbayev era before independence.
First, central authorities introduced more profound political reforms, including 
the sanctioning o f  political parties, independent newspapers, and organized non- 
communist participation in the electoral process. These reforms reverberated in 
Kazakhstan, too, as the republican authorities were obliged to follow suit, at least 
partially in order to demonstrate their commitment to such reforms.
Second, in the wake of the departure of Kolbin, Kazakh activists became more 
aggressive in voicing their demands and received open support from the leading 
Kazakh communists, including Nazarbayev himself. Likewise, ethnic Russian rapidly
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became politicized and began to aggressively voice their own demands in the wake of 
growing ascendancy o f the Kazakh nationality in the republic. A number of Russian 
sociopolitical formations, in addition to the armed units o f Russian volunteers set up 
by Kolbin to protect 'citizens’in Alma-Ata in the wake o f the 1986 riots, arose in the 
republic. Like supporters of the titular nationality, there were supporters of the 
Russian minority in the republican communist party. The support for the Russian 
minority solidified within the party as the republican authorities began to pursue pro- 
Kazakh policies. Thus, the political mobilization of the two most resourceful ethnic 
groups complicated the excessive use of repression in the republic.
Third, the fact that the support for the titular nationality and Russian minority 
solidified in the republican communist party deepened and accentuated the split among 
the republican party circles along ethnic lines. As already mentioned, a number of 
republican parliamentarians o f Russian origin formed a democratic block within the 
republican parliament to defend civil, political, and cultural rights o f minorities and 
publicly opposed a number of official positions, including the language law and 
declaration o f sovereignty. This situation made it harder for the Kazakh authorities to 
suppress general societal dissent and opposition to their policies. In fact, in view of 
their own support for the interests of the titular nationality and their need for societal 
support in their efforts to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the center, let alone the 
central authorities’ concern and the active defense o f the leading republican Russian 
communists for the interests of the Russian nationality in Kazakhstan, the outright 
repression of activists o f either nationality became a costlier and riskier proposition. It
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was not expedient for the republican authorities to alienate Kazakh activists and lose 
their much-needed support through repressive policies toward them at the time when 
they were trying to win more autonomy from the center. At the same time, it was 
also not expedient for the authorities to repress Russian activists and provide 
justification for and strengthen secessionist voices, let alone other adverse 
consequences.
As a result o f Nazarbayev’s relaxed approach he pursued due to the above 
factors, many new autonomous formations, including explicitly political groups with 
anti-communist orientation, arose during his rule before independence. The most 
prominent autonomous groups formed to champion exclusively Kazakh interests 
included Alash Party for National Independence, and Azat (Freedom). Alash pursued 
a radical, anti-communist program. It openly aspired for power and called for the full 
independence o f the republic and the establishment o f an Islamic state (Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press, no. 16, 1991:12; Haghayeghi 1995:86). A number of localized 
autonomous formations exclusively committed to Russian and Cossack causes also 
arose. These formations included Rebirth, Cossack Society, and Popular Movement 
for Revival. Rebirth and Cossack Society represented secessionist tendencies.30 The 
republican authorities admonished the extremist and secessionist groups (Official 
Kremlin International News Broadcast, September 25, 1990), but took no practical 
measures to repress them.
In addition to these exclusivist Kazakh and Russian autonomous groups, a 
number of inter-ethnic political groups, parties, and movements arose to apparently
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represent broader interests of society. These groups included Social Democratic 
Party. Yedinstvo (Unity), National Democratic Party, Democratic Election-90, and 
Democratic Kazakhstan (a parliamentary group). Although these groups were formed 
with inter-ethnic trappings, most of them came to be identified with the interests of 
one or the other nationality.31
According to official reports, more than 100 informal formations, including 
both political and apolitical,32 were operating in the republic in September 1990 
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, September 25, 1990). However, 
because o f the republican authorities’ aversion to autonomous sociopolitical initiatives, 
a predominant majority o f them was not registered. Legally, only registered 
formations could operate in the republic. Nonetheless, both registered and 
unregistered sociopolitical groups engaged in a number o f independent activities, 
including founding conferences, public debates, and authorized and unauthorized 
rallies,33 for the most part, with impunity. At times these groups were very critical 
of the authorities. For instance, the parliamentary group, Democratic Kazakhstan, 
launched a scathing attack with impunity on the republican authorities for 
concentrating power in the executive bodies (Russian Press Digest, October 1990)34 
and criticized their positions on the questions of sovereignty and official language.
In spite o f their aversion to rallies held in support o f causes contrary to their 
purposes, Kazakh authorities, for the most part, refrained from the use of force to 
control such rallies and put away their organizers. Rather, they resorted to 
manipulative practices to curtail the incidence o f such activities. They blocked the
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registration of many inconvenient autonomous formations, often denied permission 
even to registered groups to hold rallies, reminded them of the need to preserve peace 
in the republic, admonished organizers of unauthorized rallies and administered token 
punishments to some of them in order to discourage them from such activities 
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 18, 1990). In addition, they 
tried to keep at least the capital city free of rallies and demonstrations through 
negotiating with informal formations a  year long moratorium on such activities in the 
first week o f October 1990 (Tass, October 3, 1990).
In addition to sociopolitical groups, the mass media also benefitted from the 
somewhat relaxed approach of Nazarbayev. At times, the official mass media was 
permitted to report activities and views which were critical of certain official policies, 
the ruling party, and the republican as well as the central authorities.33 In addition to 
occasionally making the official mass media accessible to opposition activists, Kazakh 
authorities grudgingly allowed a number of informal formations and individuals to 
publish registered newspapers such as S-Democrat, Era o f Compassion, and Freedom 
Banner, and tolerated the circulation o f unregistered newspapers such as Alas (the 
underground newspaper o f Alash) (BBC, September 29, 1990 and March 15, 1991; 
Russian Press Digest, May 12 and 23, 1991).
As compared to their somewhat relaxed approach toward the rise of 
autonomous sociopolitical groups and the newspapers, the republican authorities 
jealously guarded the electoral process from independent individual and organized 
participation. Although the March 1990 republican parliamentary election was a multi-
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candidate election, the contest was mostly among communist candidates. Kazakh 
authorities ensured that leading communist figures win their seats unopposed. Also, 
they resorted to manipulative tactics to keep unwanted party as well as independent 
candidates out o f the electoral process. Consequently, 96.7 percent of the new 
deputies were members o f the communist party (BBC, January 29, 1990; Tass, March 
26 and April 3, 1990).
The above discussion clearly shows that in spite o f many restrictions on 
independent sociopolitical initiatives and occasional punitive actions against activists 
of autonomous formations, independent political space considerably expanded during 
the Nazarbayev era. However, this expanded space was by no means equally available 
for all sorts o f independent political activities. In fact, opposition activists could 
engage in some political activities more freely than others. More specifically, 
independent political space the authorities provided Kazakh society was more readily 
available for group-formation and to some extent rallies than for the rise of 
independent institutions o f mass media and for independent organized participation in 
the electoral process before independence.
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
Although Kazakhstan formally announced its independence in December 1991, 
it was, like any other independent republic, free to decide the fate of political reform 
in the wake o f the 1991 abortive coup at the center. Kazakh authorities reaffirmed 
their commitment to the post-communist transition after the coup. Whatever progress 
occurred in various areas o f political liberalization before the coup remained intact
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during the period between the coup and the formal announcement of independence o f 
the republic in December 1991.
After independence, Kazakhstan witnessed an overall improvement in political 
liberalization. Genuine, though weak, political opposition arose in the republic. The 
number of independent sociopolitical groups increased. Although certain serious 
restrictions remained in place on them, these groups continued to engage in a host of 
independent political activities. Although independent individual and organized 
electoral participation continued to face serious restrictions, the post-independence 
electoral system was still an improvement on the previous one. Independent 
institutions of the mass media witnessed qualitative as well as quantitative progress in 
the post-independence period. In spite of the fact that certain topics were declared or 
considered to be ’off-limits’ and both the official and private mass media practiced 
self-censorship, they could still provide coverage to activities and views of the 
opposition and publish and broadcast information critical o f the Kazakh government 
and its policies.
The remainder o f this chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of our 
empirical evidence on political liberalization and its correspondence with our 
theoretical expectations. More specifically, we will examine progress and lack of 
progress in different areas o f political liberalization in the post-independence period 
and relate it to our three independent variables without maintaining a sequence in 
them: a) political orientation, decisions, and policies o f the Kazakh leadership; b) 
political mobilization of the large, resourceful Russian minority; c) fragmented elite
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structure in Kazakhstan. In the preceding pages, we have discussed in detail the extent 
to which these variables hold in Kazakhstan. In the following pages, we will briefly 
revisit them with a view to highlight their relationship with our empirical data on 
political liberalization.
In the wake of the August 1991 putsch, Nazarbayev (who joined, although 
somewhat late, the anti-putsch forces led by the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin) 
resigned from the CPSU. In addition, he issued a presidential decree banning the 
presence o f all political parties, including the communist party, in state structures. 
According to this decree, people with formal party affiliations were forbidden to hold 
senior positions in the government (Reuters, August 22, 1991; BBC, August 30,
1991). In addition to resigning from the republican communist party and suggesting it 
to break its ties with the CPSU, he publicly resolved not to join any political party 
(Current Digest of the Soviet Press, no. 6, 1993:21; Haghayeghi 1995:128). In the 
wake of such decisions and actions, the republican communist party disbanded itself 
and made an unsuccessful effort to transform itself intact into a new political party; 
many leading communists left the party and joined other political groups or made 
their own.
All these developments further eroded the position and unity o f the already 
split republican communist party and elite structure, dispersed political resources in 
Kazakh society, and diminished the party’s usefulness as an effective tool of political 
control in the republic. In addition, once Nazarbayev lost attraction in the party, he 
had little or no incentive to use state power to promote one faction o f old communists
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at the cost of another faction of old communists or any other political force—a 
propitious situation for the rise o f a multiparty political system in the post-communist 
period.
However, Nazarbayev was aware of the importance of an organized political 
support base independent of state power during the difficult time o f transition and 
shifting political loyalties. In view of the fact that republican communist party was 
considerably weakened due to many reasons, including multiple deep division, and 
that Kazakh society and elite structure were sharply divided along ethnic lines, it was 
difficult to create a single strong and unified organized support base out o f the 
existing sociopolitical forces in the republic. As a result, Nazarbayev looked toward 
diverse individual and organized sources of political support. In this context, he not 
only helped the republican communist party transform itself into a new political party, 
Socialist Party, but also helped create two more broad-based, inter-ethnic political 
parties, the People’s Congress and Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan, in order 
to muster support o f as many political elites as possible in the post-independence 
period.
Although these parties lent support to Nazarbayev on different issues, they at 
times criticized him and his policies. In addition, these parties competed with each 
other and at times entered into alliances with other more independent nationalist 
parties. This situation complicated and increased the cost o f outright repression of 
active political forces in society because it meant repression o f his own allies, 
including political leaders o f international repute and with considerable political clout
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in society, and Kazakh- and Russian-oriented nationalist parties he needed for equally 
important reasons. The rise of nationalist parties served two purposes for Nazarbayev. 
First, he used the presence and demands of Kazakh nationalist parties to convince the 
Russian-speaking population in the republic and Russian authorities that as compared 
to other potential alternatives he was best suited to serve their interests and to win 
their support. Second, he allowed moderate Kazakh and Russian nationalist parties to 
operate but repressed radical Kazakh and Russian political groups and activists who 
he perceived as his most hardened and dangerous enemies.
Another important restraint against the option o f indiscriminate repression of 
opposition forces, along the lines in Uzbekistan, has been the large, resourceful 
Russian-speaking population of the republic. In the wake o f the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, the political loyalty o f the Russian nationality largely shifted to "Mother 
Russia" rather than to the new political identity, the Kazakh state. Russians living in 
the Russian-dominated northern and eastern provinces feel as if they still live in 
"Mother Russian” (Olcott, 1995b: 182). In fact, the Russian-speaking population has 
increasingly become disgruntled, politicized, and organized in response to a number 
of developments, including the change in its status from a dominant ethnic group to a 
minority ethnic group and its slow but steady marginalization in Kazakh society in the 
wake of perestroika, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and ethnonationalist policies of 
the Kazakh state.
The growing resentment among the Russian-speaking population has 
manifested itself in moderate as well as radical demands ranging from local control
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and autonomy to secession of the Russian-dominated areas. This situation posed a 
potential threat to the territorial integrity o f the new Kazakh state. What unnerved 
Kazakh authorities most was the statement o f the Russian authorities in the fall 1991, 
indicating their intention to readjust the Russian borders with its neighbors. 
Nazarbayev had to expend enormous political capital and work hard to extract a 
public commitment of Yeltsin to the territorial integrity of his republic. However, the 
specter of the Russian intervention still hanged over his head due to the new Russian 
foreign policy doctrine under which the Russian government reserved the right to use 
force, if necessary, to protect the Russian-speaking population in the ’near abroad’. In 
view o f this situation, Kazakh authorities found it expedient to exercise caution 
especially in their dealing with the Russian-speaking population in the republic.
Kazakh authorities recognized that the Russian-speaking population was most 
unlikely to offer real political allegiance to them in the foreseeable future. In addition, 
it increasingly became difficult for them to create a loyal political group acceptable to 
the majority of this population. An indiscriminate policy of repression of political 
activists of the Russian nationality was also ill-advised because it would heighten the 
importance of the secession option and transform the low profile local struggle of 
secessionist forces into an active struggle with potentially adverse consequences for 
the territorial integrity of the country. In fact, this was a real possibility because many 
of them looked toward Russian authorities for a signal to agitate for their demands 
(Olcott, 1995b: 182). More importantly, it would certainly internationalize their cause, 
further infuriate Russian nationalist politicians like Zhirinovsky who threatened to
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make war on Kazakhstan to protect Russian-speaking population (The San Francisco 
Chronicle, December 20, 1993:A 12), and provoke Russian authorities to invoke their 
right to intervene in the ’near abroad’ on behalf o f the Russian-speaking population 
and to renege on their public commitment to the territorial integrity o f Kazakhstan.
Kazakh authorities adopted a multiple approach toward this problem which 
further facilitated the rise o f genuine political opposition in the republic. In order to 
assure Russian authorities o f the safety and welfare o f the Russian-speaking 
population in Kazakhstan and to win support and cooperation, if not political loyalty, 
of this population, Nazarbayev made a public commitment to protect its interests and 
offered it a  number o f cultural, economic, and political concessions, including the 
extraordinary degree o f local autonomy for some Russian cities and towns (Olcott, 
199Sb:182) and the freedom to organize moderate political groups devoted to the 
interests of the Russian nationality in the republic.
However, it was obvious that Nazarbayev would brook neither secessionist 
claims nor a serious challenge to his authority. Also, in accordance with his overall 
conservative approach toward political reforms and his understanding of limited 
acceptable political openness during the transition, he was expected to temper the 
potential favorable impact o f the Russian political activism and fragmented elite 
structure on political liberalization and resist greater democratization o f public life in 
the post-independence period. In view of the presence o f structural constraints o f the 
Russian minority and fragmented elite structure, he made a very selective use o f 
repression in order to deal with secessionist claims, challenges to his authority, and
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pressures of autonomous political forces for political openness beyond acceptable 
limits. In fact, the Kazakh leader made a skillful use of the pretext o f inter-ethnic 
accord to occasionally justify repression of both Kazakh and Russian radical groups. 
Because independent political space was available to Kazakh society and because 
Kazakh authorities avoided extreme repressive measures such as political 
assassinations and long term imprisonments for political offenses, even radical groups 
and individual activists kept coming back into the political arena and could 
intermittently engage in a number of independent political activities in the republic.
The net effect o f the above conducive and nonconducive factors was a mixed 
record of Kazakhstan on political liberalization in the post-independence period. Still, 
as compared to its record in the pre-independence period, Kazakhstan witnessed an 
overall improvement in almost all areas of political liberalization in the post­
independence period. And, this improvement earned Kazakhstan a middle position on 
the political liberalization scale between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
THE RISE OF WEAK BUT GENUINE POLITICAL OPPOSITION
The freedom o f political forces to organize themselves is one area o f political 
liberalization which recorded sustained progress in the post-independence period. The 
autonomous sociopolitical groups formed in the pre-independence period continued to 
exist and operate after independence. Not only many of the pre-independence 
autonomous groups evolved into explicitly political groups and played the role of an 
active opposition but also new political groups continued to arise and oppose the 
Kazakh authorities in the post-independence period.
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The range of independent political activities these opposition groups could (and 
did) engage in also widened after independence. This assertion does not suggest that 
opposition groups and individual activists were never subjected to repression for their 
political activities. Quite the contrary. However, it is important to note that Kazakh 
authorities made a very cautious and selective use of repression against their 
opponents. In other words, unlike the Uzbek political opposition which was totally 
crushed through brutal repressive measures, including assassinations, Kazakh 
opposition was largely spared of indiscriminate and brutal repression and was able to 
enjoy a sizable independent political space in the post-independence period. This fact 
is amply reflected in the area of group formation.
As o f 1997, Kazakhstan housed more than a dozen autonomous political 
formations o f  various orientations, in addition to independent human rights groups and 
independent professional associations and almost over one hundred other 
socioeconomic and cultural associations. A detailed discussion of all the existing 
independent sociopolitical formations and their orientations is outside the scope of this 
inquiry. For the purpose of this study, it will suffice to briefly mention important 
political formations, their orientations, and the freedom o f action they enjoyed in the 
post-independence period.
A number of autonomous political formations Kazakhstan housed in the post­
independence period can be broadly divided into liberal democratic, ethnonationalist, 
and communist parties and movements. The major liberal democratic formations 
include the Socialist Party, the People’s Congress, National Democratic Party, and the
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Party of the Law-Based Development of Kazakhstan. The prominent ethnonationalist 
parties and movements formed to promote the interests of the titular nationality 
include Zheltoqsan, Alash, Azat, and the Republican Party of Kazakhstan. The major 
autonomous formations formed to exclusively promote the interests of the Russian- 
speaking population include Yedinstvo, Social Democratic Party, Lad (Harmony), the 
Semirechye Cossack Society, Party of Democratic Progress, the Russian Community 
of North Kazakhstan, and the Russian Center. In 1992, the Communist Party was 
formed to promote Leninist principles.
In addition to these groups, Kazakhstan housed a number of other autonomous 
associations which pursued agendas with political overtones. As a result, they often 
found themselves in opposition to the authorities. These associations included human 
rights groups and labor and trade unions. Independent human rights groups included 
the Kazakh-American Bureau on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the Alma-Ata 
Helsinki Commission and Legal Development o f Kazakhstan, and the Democratic 
Committee on Human Rights. Independent labor and trade unions include groups like 
Independent Trade Union Center and Worker’s Movement (an affiliate group of the 
Communist party). A number of the above explicitly political and other groups have 
also joined hands to create two broad-based national movements, Republic and 
Azamat. In addition to these two broad-based national movements, autonomous 
groups of various orientations have been entering into loose alliances in support of 
their causes. Alliances o f  this sort include Kazakhstan’s Social Protection 
Coalition,36 anti totalitarian league,37 and People’s Front.38
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Kazakh authorities at times bent the law on public associations, which is not 
only illiberal but also loose and liable to misuse, to delay, block, and cancel 
registration of various autonomous formations, including Kazakh radical groups like 
Alash and Russian radical groups like Semirecheye Cossack Society.39 However, the 
sheer presence o f a large number o f registered autonomous groups, including Russian- 
oriented moderate groups like Lad, partly confirms that the constitutional right of 
association is generally respected, if somewhat circumscribed, in Kazakhstan.
In addition to enjoying considerable freedom o f action in the area of group 
formation, most independent sociopolitical groups, both registered and unregistered, 
have been able to engage in a host independent political activities with impunity in the 
post-independence period. They have been able to hold press conferences to criticize 
human rights violations and heavy-handedness of Kazakh authorities toward opposition 
(BBC, November 14, 1996 and December 30, 1997), party congresses, and round 
tables to form alliances and to discuss important political issues, including platforms 
and strategies to counter one man and/or one party rule (Current Digest o f the Post- 
Soviet Press, no. 7, 1993:22; Russian Press Digest, December 2, 1993; BBC April 
14, 1994 and September 26, 1996).
In fact, let alone the registered parties and movements, unregistered 
autonomous sociopolitical formations have also been able to hold public meetings, 
publish their own newspapers, and run cultural centers in the post-independence 
period (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1997:1144). More importantly, autonomous formations, especially the registered ones,
200
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conducted and/or strove for their right to conduct activities Kazakh authorities abhor 
most. More precisely, these groups continued to hold rallies, authorized and 
unauthorized, publicly criticize the authorities, talk about sensitive topics like ethnic 
relations, participate (or continued to push for participation) in elections, and set up 
independent institutions of mass media. However, unlike the activities discussed in the 
preceding paragraph which entailed little or no serious punishment for those who 
conducted them, most of these activities did entail punitive consequences for those 
who were involved in them. In fact, most o f political dissidents who were persecuted 
for political reasons were persecuted for their participation in unauthorized rallies, for 
their attempts to fan social tensions, for their actions prejudicial to the security and 
integrity o f the state, and for sullying honor and integrity of the leading state officials, 
first and foremost the head of state.
According to the law, public associations, including political parties, need a 
prior approval to hold protest rallies in support of their demands and causes. 
Unauthorized rallies, protests, marches, and demonstrations are considered illegal. 
Those who organize them and participate in them are subject to prosecution. Only 
registered public associations could be granted permission for such activities. How did 
Kazakh authorities apply the law? In other words, how far was the constitutional right 
o f peaceful assembly respected in Kazakhstan in the post-independence period?
Kazakh authorities’ record in this context is mixed.
As already mentioned, the Kazakh leadership was averse to politics o f rallies 
and made no secret of it. Ideally, it wanted autonomous sociopolitical formations to
201
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
voluntar ily renounce it. Most opposition formations refused to oblige them in this 
regard Unlike Uzbekistan where no opposition rally was allowed to take place 
from 1993 through 1997. numerous rallies, authorized and unauthorized, were held by 
both registered and unregistered sociopolitical groups in Kazakhstan in the post- 
mdepcndence period. Both sanctioned and unsanctioned protest rallies were held on a 
number of occasions to publicize and support various opposition demands and causes, 
tncluding exclusive Kazakh and Russian interests (Reuters, November 30, 1991; BBC, 
December 20. 1991), resignation of the government due to flawed economic policies 
(Russian Press Digest, June 22, 1992), opposition to extending the president’s term of 
office and adopting the constitution through a referendum (BBC, April 27, and August 
17. 1995;), and protest against falling living standards (BBC, November 14, 19%). 
More importantly, unauthorized rallies were held to protest widespread official 
corruption and the president’s dictatorial policies, including political persecution of 
opposition parties (Agence France Presse, December 8, 19%; BBC, September 11 
and December 1, 1997).
In spite of their aversion to protest rallies and demonstrations, Kazakh 
authorities avoided brutal repressive measures to completely rid politics o f such 
activities because o f the prohibitive cost involved in depoliticizing political activists of 
both the titular nationality and Russian minority. Thus, Kazakh authorities’ aversion 
to protest action and the prohibitive cost of ridding politics of such activities partly 
account for their erratic approach in this regard. In some cases, they readily allowed 
the registered independent sociopolitical groups to hold public meetings, rallies, and
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demonstrations. As o f 1997, many authorized rallies were reportedly held in different 
parts of the country. However, in most instances, they delayed or denied permits for 
such activities (BBC, July 20, 1995 and November 14, 1996) on many grounds, 
including lame excuses.41 However, the most common reason the authorities cited to 
refuse to issue a permit was the presumed inability of rally organizers to guarantee 
public safety and order (BBC, November 14, 1996).
The denial o f permits for protest actions failed to stop opposition groups from 
organizing such activities in support of their causes. Most of the opposition groups 
which planned protest rallies held them even if they were denied a permit for such 
activities. As o f 1997, more unsanctioned rallies have been held than the sanctioned 
rallies in Kazakhstan. The authorities pursued a less than consistent approach toward 
unsanctioned rallies.
In some cases, they took no punitive measures and tolerated unsanctioned 
rallies.42 In other cases, they issued symbolic administrative warnings and 
reprimands without prosecuting rally organizers. Certain rally organizers and 
opposition leaders were harassed and intimidated with the threats of prosecution on 
corruption charges. Those who were harassed and intimidated include the former 
speaker of the parliament, Serikbolsyn Abdildin (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 
no. 17, 1995:22) and the co-chairman of the Azamat movement and the former 
cabinet minister, Petr Svoik (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights for 1996:991). Both attempts, however, failed to intimidate the two leaders and 
Kazakh authorities decided not to initiate legal proceedings against them.
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In most cases, they prosecuted and punished rally organizers. In fact, as of 
1997, more opposition leaders were persecuted for their role in unsanctioned rallies 
than for other offenses combined. Leaders of almost all ardent opposition groups 
(such as Alash, Azat, Zheltoqsan, Azamat, W orkers’ Movement of Kazakhstan, and 
others representing Russian causes) have been reprimanded, fined, arrested, put in 
jails and/or beaten for their participation in unauthorized activities (BBC, August 24, 
199S and December 30, 1997). Those prosecuted and convicted for their role in 
unsanctioned public activities received varying sentences. In most cases, these 
sentences included small fines and/or short jail terms of 7 to 30 days (BBC August 
24, 1995, November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1997). Only few received longer 
sentences o f a year or so (BBC, September 11 and 22, 1997).43
In addition, certain autonomous groups faced suspension or threat o f 
suspension but not brutal repression for their role in certain unsanctioned rallies held 
in support o f causes the authorities found offensive to the constitution, the security 
and the integrity o f the country. The sociopolitical groups which faced such threats 
include Lad and the Communist Party.44
Unlike Uzbekistan where rallies have been broken and participants shot at and 
killed, Kazakh authorities, for the most part, avoided such approach to curb politics 
of rallies. Save a couple o f reported incidents in which the authorities dispersed 
demonstrators without shooting at them and without any deaths (Agence Frace Presse, 
June 18, 1992; U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1995:911), the Kazakh authorities avoided to interfere with protest
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rallies, demonstrations, marches, and strikes while they were in progress, even if the 
protesters chanted derogatory slogans against Nazarbayev (Agence France Presse, 
December 8, 19%). Legal proceedings were almost always initiated after rallies were 
over.
In fact, Kazakh authorities avoided the violent use o f force to disperse even 
those rallies and public gatherings which were organized by secessionist forces and/or 
in support o f causes prejudicial to the constitution, the security and the integrity of the 
country. Because such rallies were mostly organized by Russian-speaking population, 
it was too risky for the authorities to apply brutal force to disperse these rallies and 
gatherings. The Kazakh president rather used other manipulative methods such as 
seeking help from Russian authorities to stop them and sponsoring counter-rallies and 
gatherings o f Kazakh ethnonationalist groups to convince the Russian-speaking 
population that he is the best choice for them and to justify measures like occasional 
suspension of activities of inconvenient formations and arrest o f leaders involved in 
such activities in the name o f inter-ethnic accord (Russian Press Digest, June 1 and 
September 17, 1991; BBC, September 13, 18, 20, and November 30, 1991; Olcott 
1993b:326).
The explanation of the considerable restraint the Kazakh leadership exercised 
in punishing opposition formations and their leaders for holding unauthorized rallies 
partly lies in the fact that such groups were led by well-known leaders (of national 
and international repute), including former members of the parliament and former 
communist party members who happened to be important members o f their respective
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ethnic communities, and it was of the considerable pressure their longer imprisonment 
could potentially generate within and outside the republic. In the light o f Kazakh 
authorities’ bitter and expensive experience with the arrest and imprisonment of an 
important Russian activist and journalist, Boris Suprynuk, for his allegedly 
incendiary writings and a Cossack leader, Nikolai Gunkin, in 199S for his role in two 
unauthorized rallies and the mounting pressure they faced from the Russian-speaking 
population of the republic, Russian political parties, and Russian authorities for their 
release,45 it was expedient for them to avoid a harsh treatment and rather rely on 
other token punishments of leaders of Russian origin (like Petr Svoik) in order to 
discourage them from politics of protest rallies.
If Nazarbayev avoided an outright and thorough repression o f Russian 
ethnonationalist groups and individual political leaders for fear of further alienating 
the Russian-speaking population, reinforcing secessionist tendencies, and provoking 
the Russian authorities to come to the help of their compatriots in his republic, he 
avoided a thorough repression of Kazakh ethnonationalist groups and important 
individual political leaders because it would have cost him his nationalist credentials, 
weakened his support base among his co-ethnics, and undercut his manipulative tactics 
to deal with the Russian nationality in general and the secessionist forces in particular.
As Kazakh authorities avoided the option o f thorough repression and allowed 
genuine political opposition forces to arise in the post-independence period, the fact 
that these forces would take independent positions on different matters, publicize their 
ideas, and publicly criticize the authorities and their policies was a foregone
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conclusion. The option then the authorities faced and pursued was not how to 
completely stop opposition forces from taking independent position and criticizing 
them but how to either convince them or coerce them to tone down criticism.
Like their record on unsanctioned rallies, Kazakh authorities’ record of their 
tolerance toward their critics is mixed, too. In some cases, the authorities tolerated 
open criticism or discussion of certain topics.4* In other cases, they persecuted their 
critics for such criticism. Interestingly, while some opposition activists were allowed 
to blame Kazakh authorities for serious lapses such as corruption and authoritarian 
practices, others were arrested and convicted on minor, presumptive and fake 
charges.
The law provided for the freedom o f speech. However, the law also imposed 
restrictions which could be bent to punish any criticism or misdemeanor of 
opposition. The subjects which were considered ’off-limits’ included insulting the 
president, members of the parliament, and senior public officials, inciting inter-ethnic 
and social tensions, and endangering the security and integrity of the country. Kazakh 
authorities used the law on the protection o f the honor and dignity o f the president to 
prosecute a number of opposition activists, including the seven members of the Alash 
party in 1991-92 (BBC, October 8, 1992).47 Although the most important 
subject considered to be ’off-limits’ was the personal criticism of the president, some 
opposition activists were prosecuted for other offenses, too.48
In spite o f such cases o f persecution, criticism of Kazakh authorities, 
including the president, and their policies continued throughout the post-independence
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period. In view of the fact that many cases of scathing criticism of the authorities 
went unnoticed and unpunished, the above cases of persecution of opposition activists 
suggest that they were intended to reduce rather than completely suppress the volume 
of open criticism of them. A cursory look at the subjects opposition activists 
addressed, the demands they made, the slogans they shouted, and speeches they made 
at news conferences, round tables of political parties, party congresses, and protest 
rallies clearly supports this view.
As already mentioned, Kazakh authorities faced criticism of their economic, 
social, and ethnic policies, their unconstitutional ways to dissolve the parliament and 
to adopt the constitution and extend the president’s term o f  office through a 
referendum, their manipulative electoral practices, their corruption, and their 
authoritarian policies and practices. In addition, opposition leaders demanded 
resignation of the government and publicly appealed the mass to either boycott or vote 
against Nazarbayev in the 1995 referendum on the extension of his term of office 
(BBC, April 8, 1995).
More importantly, on a number of occasions, the Kazakh president was 
personally criticized and his critics went unpunished. For instance, the leader of the 
Democratic Movement o f Kazakhstan, Erkin Sultanbeko, and disgruntled members of 
the dissolved parliament and leaders o f the Republic, an alliance group of many 
opposition formations, publicly criticized the unconstitutional tactics o f the president 
to enhance his power at the cost o f legislative authority, described the enhancement of 
his personal power as the most serious problem the country was faced with, and
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demanded his resignation (Russian Press Digest, December 2, 1993; BBC, August 18, 
1994 and April 8, 199S). In yet another instance, at a press conference held on 
December 23, 1997, to protest the imprisonment o f the leaders of the Azamat 
movement for organizing an unauthorized rally at the end of November 1997, the 
leader o f the Communist Party and former chairman of the parliament, Serikbolsyn 
Abdildin, said: "As long as Nursultan Nazarbayev is in power, the country will be 
unable to overcome its crisis” (BBC, December 30, 1997 and January 13, 1998). Still 
more derogatory language was used in the slogans the demonstrators shouted during 
an authorized rally held in June 1992, in protest against the president and the delay in 
the payment o f salaries.49 There are no reports to indicate that Kazakh authorities 
took any punitive action against these demonstrators and their leaders.
The preceding discussion suggests that although Kazakh authorities persecuted 
their some critics for certain forms of criticism, they tolerated others who subjected 
them to the same and/or other scathing criticism. It also shows that in addition to 
considerable freedom o f action autonomous sociopolitical groups enjoyed in holding 
founding conferences, party congresses, press conferences, round tables, public 
gatherings, and protest demonstrations, they showed remarkable independence in their 
positions they took on various important matters, including institutional engineering 
and authoritarian practices of the president.
THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL PROCESS: OPPOSITION ON THE 
SIDELINES?
As compared to the considerable freedom of action in the area o f group 
formation, Kazakh authorities provided their citizens with relatively little freedom in
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the exercise of their constitutional political right to choose their representatives 
through a free and fair election. A number o f factors explain why the Kazakh 
leadership continued to exercise relatively tight control over the electoral process. As 
already mentioned, Nazarbayev believed that Kazakh society needed to pass through 
enlightened authoritarianism in order to make a smooth transition from totalitarianism 
to a market economy and democracy. In addition, he believed that economic reforms 
must take precedence over political reforms in such transition. A fair, free and 
competitive electoral process could potentially democratize society beyond limits 
acceptable to him. He feared that such democratization could ruin his economic 
reform project. Such outlook induced him to try to keep the electoral process under 
his control and temper pressures of individual and organized political forces, 
including political activists of the Russian minority and other important communist 
and non-communist political leaders, for an unhindered access to the electoral process 
in the country. In other words, it led him to manipulate presidential and successive 
parliamentary elections to his favor, keeping unwanted elements on the sidelines of 
the electoral process.
Although there were apparently no real electoral competitors to the president, 
the free and fair executive election held during the difficult times o f the post­
communist transition carried the potential risk of his replacement, let alone other 
adverse consequences such as free access o f opposition candidates to the masses and 
their potential mobilization against him and his reform policies. The 1991 uncontested
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presidential election and the extension o f his term through a referendum rather than a 
presidential election in 1995 partly illustrate his manipulative approach.
In addition, due to deep and multiple division among the former communist 
elites, sharp division of society along ethnic lines, and the consequent dispersion of 
political resources, the free and fair parliamentary elections carried the potential risk 
of an independent and divided parliament coming into existence which was most likely 
to complicate the scheme of things the incumbent executive leadership wanted to 
pursue. After he faced serious challenges from the two seemingly compliant 
parliaments elected in 1990 and 1994, such prospect was sure to greatly worry the 
president bent upon running the country single-handedly. The president wanted to 
have his men dominate the parliament, avoiding potential risks associated with the 
election o f an independent parliament.
Given the potential costs of the indiscriminate use of repression of opposition 
forces (which meant hundreds of inconvenient electoral candidates, including ex­
members of the parliament) and the adequacy o f the procedural and judicial methods 
to avoid these risks, Kazakh authorities adroitly used the latter methods toward those 
ends. In addition, due to the short duration and rarity o f election seasons (which 
meant the quick evaporation o f the election-produced activism without the use o f 
repression), they could and did safely and adroitly employ the judicial process and 
electoral procedures to deny most opposition candidates the access to the electoral 
process and to maintain a firm control over it. However, in order to placate certain 
independent political forces, including ethnonationalist activists of Kazakh and Russian
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origin, Kazakh authorities allowed a very limited number o f their candidates to 
participate in and win parliamentary elections.
As of 1997, Kazakh citizens have been allowed to vote in a number of 
elections and referendums. A popular uncontested presidential election, two 
parliamentary elections, and a number o f referendums have been held in the republic 
since it achieved its de facto independence in the wake of the 1991 coup. A number 
o f local bodies elections have also been held during this period. However, we will 
confine our focus to national elections and their openness to opposition participation.
The first national election which took place in the wake o f the 1991 abortive 
coup was the general uncontested presidential election held on December 1, 1991. As 
already mentioned, the pre-independence republican parliament had elected 
Nazarbayev as president in 1990. He could serve out his remaining term o f office. He 
instead chose and justified the need to renew his popular mandate and legitimacy 
through a general presidential election (BBC, October 18, 1991). In principle, all 
candidates who could get the required 100,000 signatures o f the electorate could 
contest the presidential election.
In addition to Nazarbayev, only two more candidates, Hassen Kozhakhmetov, 
the leader of the National Democratic Party, and Olzhas Suleimenov, the leader of the 
People’s Congress announced their plans to run in the election. Olzhas Suleimenov, 
the leader o f the People’s Congress, withdrew from the race because he claimed that 
he had no chance o f winning the election (Tass, November 2, 1991). Kozhakhmetov 
tried to collect the required number of signatures to contest the presidential election.
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However, he did not submit his nomination papers, ensuring the president an 
uncontested victory.30 The National Democratic Party alleged that some unidentified 
persons had stolen the list of 40,000 signatures it had collected in support of its 
candidate (The Reuter Library Report, November 12, 1991). However, it must be 
mentioned that there are no reported cases to show that Kazakh authorities used force 
or other intimidating methods to prevent the leadership of the National Democratic 
Party from collecting the required number of signatures.
The second national level election took place in March 1994. It was held to 
elect the first post-independence national parliament. After the presidential election, 
opposition parties increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the pre-independence 
communist-dominated parliament, depicted it as a vestige of the communist era, and 
demanded its ouster (BBC, June 19, 1992).51 Although Nazarbayev immediately and 
squarely rejected the opposition demands (Russian Press Digest, June 22, 1992; 
Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 24, 1995:26),52 he increasingly became 
supportive o f  the demand for a new parliament for his own reasons.
The parliament, for the most part, cooperated with the president. However, it 
proved less compliant than he wanted it to be. At times, it refused to support him in a 
slavish manner and exercised its constitutional authority which was at variance with 
his preferences. A number of deputies, backed by Kazakh ethnonationalist groups, 
criticized the president’s plan for an economic union treaty with Russia and for 
remaining within the ruble zone (Russian Press Digest, October 1, 1993). The 
parliament also reportedly angered him when it began checking the enforcement of
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laws by the government (Russian Press Digest, October 2, 1993). More importantly, 
the parliament rejected a president-sponsored resolution that was intended to give 
powers to him to speed up economic reforms in November 1993 (CSCE, March 
1994:1).
In addition, he wanted to reward members of loyal parties and other 
individuals faithful to him. A sizable number o f members o f the former communist 
party and parliamentarians had not joined the pro-president parties (Olcott,
1993b:326). Of course, the president could not take their cooperation for granted. 
Also, the fact that the parliament acted at variance with the executive preferences 
demonstrated that such a parliament, with lot of constitutional powers invested in it, 
could potentially pose a serious challenge to the executive authority—a worrisome 
situation for the president.
Not only the national but also the local legislative bodies acted in ways at 
variance with the president’s preferences (CSCE, March 1994:3; BBC, December 7, 
1993). In order to deal with this situation, he began to engineer self-dissolution of the 
local legislative bodies and emphasized the need for a professional national parliament 
with a new popular mandate (Tass, November 8, 1993). The president tried to sell to 
the parliament the idea o f its graceful exit. Although, in December 1993, the 
parliament publicly agreed to dissolve itself due to his forceful persuasion, he 
reportedly threatened to withdraw his men from the parliament if it refused to accept 
his idea of an honorable exit, leaving it devoid of the needed quorum to function and, 
hence, paralyzed. He had already adopted such method to paralyze many local
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legislative bodies (Russian Press Digest, October 1, November 23, and December 2,
1993). In order to ensure the desired outcome, a group o f  190 pro-president deputies 
were made to resign before the parliament began its session on December 8, 1993. 
These members urged their fellow members to follow suit (The Reuter Library 
Report, December 8, 1993).
On December 8, 1993, 218 out o f 360 deputies voted behind closed doors to 
dissolve the parliament and scheduled the election to parliament for March 7, 1994. 
In addition, they voted to give the president extra powers, including legislative ones, 
in the interim so that he could run the country in the absence o f  a legislature.33
A detailed analysis o f the pre-term election to parliament is outside the scope 
of this study. However, a  discussion o f  a question directly relevant to political 
liberalization deserves our attention. That is, the government interference with the 
electoral process. In this regard, we will focus on three issues: a) openness of the 
elections to popular and independent participation; b) campaign and voting; and c) 
electoral outcome. In order to discuss these issues in proper perspective, we need to 
look at the law under which these elections were held.
According to the new constitution o f the republic passed in 1993, there were 
177 seats in the new parliament (Supreme Kenges), including 42 reserved for 
candidates on the "state list" or the so-called president’s list. The registered political 
parties and civic associations and movements could nominate their candidates. The 
self-nomination of candidates was also provided for in the law. However, in order to 
be able to run in the elections, independent candidates needed 3,000 signatures. In
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addition, all candidates had to give an amount, almost five times their monthly wage, 
to the election commission. The law stipulated that those who could not receive five 
percent o f  the polled votes in their constituency would lose their money. Each 
candidate had the right to get 10 minutes o f free airtime on radio and televisions, in 
addition to 100 lines of newspaper space. However, it was unlawful for candidates to 
promote hatred and enmity among the residents of Kazakhstan through ideas of racial, 
national, religious, and social exceptionality (Tass, March 5, 1994; CSCE, 1994:6-7).
The pre-term election to the parliament began with the nomination of 
candidates from December 25, 1993 through January 25, 1994. Except few reported 
problems like the delay in the availability of official signature form to some 
independent candidates, there are no reports to the effect that there was massive 
official interference with the nomination process. However, the same can be said of 
the registration process.
A period of two weeks from January 26 through February 8, 1994, was 
reserved for the registration of candidates. A total of 754 candidates were registered. 
Altogether 29 public associations, including three registered political parties, the 
Union o f National Unity of Kazakhstan (a party closely associated with the president), 
the Socialist Party (the reincarnated communist party), and the People’s Congress, 
and popular and ethnonationalist associations like LAD (a Russian-oriented group) 
were able to register their candidates (BBC, March 19, 1994; CSCE, march 1994:7- 
9). A number o f independent candidates were also registered. Interestingly, Alash, a 
radical nationalist-cum-religious movement accused of extremism, could not nominate
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its candidates because it was not registered, but its deputy chairman was registered 
and contested election as an independent candidate (CSCE, March 1994:8).
Although a number o f independent individual and party candidates were 
registered, the registration process was used to screen out inconvenient candidates. 
According to the press reports, more than 900 candidates tried to register as 
candidates in the pre-term parliamentary election, but Kazakh authorities refused to 
register about 200 candidates, including independent journalists, leaders of 
independent trade unions, ethnonationalist groups, and critics of the central and local 
authorities (The Washington Post, March 8, 1994: A 14; BBC, February 15, 1994). In 
fact, most registered candidates were president’s men in one way or another.54 Some 
analysts believed that the list o f 754 registered candidates was prepared by the 
national and regional authorities who intentionalLy prevented many prospective 
candidates and associations from registering for the election (Financial Times 
(London), March 8, 1994:4).
A large number of truly independent candidates complained that the local 
election commissions rejected their nomination papers and refused to register them for 
unjustified reasons, including false signatures (The Washington Times, March 9,
1994:A 12; BBC, February 15, 1994; Agence France Presse, March 4, 1994). For 
instance, the Russian ethnonationalist association, LAD, protested to the central 
election commission that the local election commission chairman in Kokshetau openly 
said that the commission would not register candidates who advocate the desirability 
of dual citizenship (CSCE, March 1994:11). The disqualified candidates also had
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often little time to appeal their disqualifications. In certain cases, the appellate courts 
could not reportedly overrule the decisions o f the local election commissions even if 
the complaint of a disqualified candidate was found to be justified (CSCE, March 
1994:10).
Although a large number of independent candidates of different ethnic origin 
received arbitrary treatment, candidates of Russian minority who would promote its 
controversial causes such as dual nationality and Russian language in the parliament 
were specially targeted in this regard. They lodged a strong protest over the 
discriminatory treatment they received in the registration process by pointing out the 
fact that Kazakh authorities registered only 128 Russian-speaking candidates as 
compared to 566 Kazakhs (Financial Times (London), March 8, 1994:4; CSCE 
1994:6)—an unrepresentative figure o f  their share of the population of the republic. 
Speaking at a press conference held to  protest over the biased attitude of the local and 
central election commissions, Leonid Solomin, the leader of the Independent Trade 
Union Center, pointed out that Russian-speakers constitute 70% o f the population of 
the Tastak rayon of Alma-Ata but authorities knocked out "virtually all Russian- 
speaking candidates" for a number o f reasons (BBC, February 15, 1994). Of course, 
this is by no means an exhaustive inventory of fraud cases in the registration phase. 
The press reported numerous stories o f  the heavy-handedness o f the authorities toward 
opposition candidates in the registration phase (Agence France Presse, March 4,
1994).
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Kazakh authorities partially respected the law which allowed candidates to 
freely campaign and publicize their program. They provided the allotted 10 minutes 
free airtime on state radio and television to the registered candidates. The candidates 
were also able to make use of the allotted 100 lines in newspapers. In addition, they 
could and did freely organize meetings with their voters. While a predominant 
majority o f the candidates touched common and general issues such as economic 
reforms and inter-ethnic harmony, a number of candidates were very critical o f the 
authorities and presented bold and independent platforms. For instance, the deputy 
chairman o f Alash ran newspaper advertisements which accused the president and his 
administration o f incompetence and branded them as a "bureaucratic-criminal mafia" 
(CSCE, March 1994:8). Kazakh authorities patiently put up with some instances of 
independent and critical campaign activity like this.
However, most independent candidates were not so lucky. They faced serious 
restrictions on their campaign activities. Beyond the allotted airtime on the state- 
controlled radio and television and 100 lines in the official newspapers, the state mass 
media did not cover election programs of most independent candidates. The official 
newspapers at times censored the election program o f independent candidates before 
publishing it. For instance, one candidate o f LAD complained that important points 
such as the need for dual citizenship and making Russian a state language were 
deleted from her 100 lines printed in the official press (CSCE, March 1994:10). 
Kazakh authorities also reportedly prohibited television stations not under direct state
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control from providing any coverage to opposition candidates or their election 
program (Agence France Presse, March 4, 1994).
In addition, some institutions o f independent media were shut down for 
supporting independent and opposing pro-govemment candidates. For instance, the 
local authorities in the capital city closed down an independent television station 
during the campaign for broadcasting stories critical of the city’s mayor and the 
election itself. The television station was owned by Sergei Duvanov whose application 
for registration as a candidate in the election was rejected by the authorities (The 
Washington Post, March 8, 1994:A 14). In another instance, state-controlled printing 
facilities ceased printing 17 newspapers, including opposition ones, during the 
campaign period on the pretext that such a move was unavoidable due to paper 
shortage and mechanical problems in the facilities (Agence France Presse, March 4, 
994). The authorities also used other intimidating methods to obstruct the campaign of 
independent candidates. For instance, LAD complained that the authorities shut down 
the headquarters o f local chapters of independent associations (CSCE, March, 
1994:10-11) and Hassen Kozhahmet, a leader of the Kazakh nationalist movement, 
Zheltoqsan, had to suspend his campaign because his campaign agents were subjected 
to mounting pressure (Agence France Presse, March 4, 1994).
Like the registration and campaign, the voting also had both positive and 
negative sides. In some cases, the chairman o f the polling station observed the 
election rules and conducted the voting in a  fair way. However, in many cases, the 
voting was marred by numerous violations. These violations included multiple voting,
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returning officers telling voters how to vote, harassment of media, and ballot stuffing 
resulting in discrepancies in the number of votes cast and the votes counted (CSCE, 
March 1994:11-12; Reuters World Service, March 9, 1994).
Although there is no hard evidence to impute these irregularities to the 
executive leadership and these clearly appeared to be the handiwork o f the local 
authorities and election commissions, a look at the election results leads one to 
reasonably suspect that the local authorities enjoyed some sort o f blessing o f the 
executive leadership in this handiwork. The electoral outcome surely pleased the 
president because the new parliament was dominated by his men. In addition to 42 
seats on the president’s list, 33 seats went to the president’s party, the Union of 
National Unity of Kazakhstan, and 11 seats were won by the Federation o f Trade 
Union, another public association closely associated with the president and involved in 
harassing independent trade unions (CSCE, March 1994:9, 13). A number of other 
associations which each won one seat were also pro-goverament. The People’s 
Congress won 9 seats and the Socialist Party 8 seats. Although at times both parties 
took independent positions on various matters and have been critical o f certain 
policies of the president, both were expected, in view o f the president’s hand in their 
creation and subsequent close cooperation with him, to support him in the new 
parliament. However, in addition to a number of individual independent candidates, 
the truly independent public association with a noticeable presence in the parliament 
was LAD which won 4 seats in the election (CSCE, March 1994:13). The total
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opposition seats were 32, according to one press report (The Christian Science 
Monitor, March 11, 1994:8).
The electoral outcome hardly pleased opposition parties and they loudly 
protested. LAD was the fust opposition group (followed by others) to lodge its formal 
protest over serious violations which occurred in the voting. In a letter delivered to 
the central election commission, a leader o f LAD condemned serious violations in the 
election and demanded its cancellation (Rueter World Service, March 9, 1994). The 
Kazakh nationality was overrepresented with 105 seats (or 60 percent o f seats) in the 
parliament, whereas they constituted close to 43 percent of the population. The 
Russian nationality was underrepresented with 49 seats (or 28 percent o f seats) in the 
parliament, whereas they constituted close to 37 percent of the population. The 
Russian individual activists and associations like LAD protested over this situation. 
Their complaints were supported by the Russian government officials (Tass, March 
11, 1994; Agence France Presses, March 10, 1994; Official Kremlin International 
News Broadcast, March 11, 1994).55
The victorious candidates represented other nationalities, too. There were 10 
Ukrainians, 3 Germans, 3 Jews, and a number o f other nationalities each with one 
seat (CSCE, March 1994:13). It looked, at least at that time, as if the president got 
what he wanted—a pliant parliament made up o f deputies representing various 
nationalities.
However, the immediate jubilation of the executive leadership over the 
electoral outcome was dampened by the negative assessment o f some important
222
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
international observers such as the delegations from CSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly 
and the Helsinki Commission, the Russian mass media, and the local press (The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1994:8; Reuter World Service, March 9, 1994; 
CSCE, March 1994:12).56 While these international observers praised the 
government for holding multiparty elections, allowing opposition groups to participate 
in the election, inviting international observers, and showing "a desire...to  move 
toward democracy" (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 994:A7), they in the final analysis 
concluded that the election did not meet international standards and refused to 
consider it free and fair (CSCE, March 1994:12).
Although some international monitors, including the French members of the 
CSCE’s parliamentary delegation, came to his rescue by observing that the election 
was relatively free and fair and that many problems resulted from inexperience rather 
than from deliberate attempts to rig elections (CSCE, March 1994:13; Los Angeles 
Times, March 9, 1994:A7; The Reuter European Community Report, March 15, 
1994), the negative assessment o f some important international observers cast a 
shadow on the authenticity o f electoral results and greatly angered the president and 
his administration. He vehemently rejected the charges and considered election 
democratic in a televised address on March 10, 1994 (CSCE, March 1994:13). 
However, this defense later came to haunt him when the Constitutional Court 
invalidated the 1994 parliamentary election on the basis of a number of irregularities, 
including multiple voting.
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The second reason that dampened the jubilation o f the executive leadership 
over the electoral outcome was that it soon learnt that its efforts to create a pro- 
presidential parliament were coming to naught. Soon after the election, a number of 
parties and movements joined forces to form a  constructive opposition bloc which was 
to promote democratic-buiiding through its faction in the parliament. The so-called 
constructive opposition bloc publicly said that the main reason for the disastrous 
position of the people was not "legal but often illegal decisions ami actions by 
Kazakhstan’s state authorities" (BBC, April 19 and May 18, 1994).
After the opening session which went smoothly, the opposition faction, Legal 
Development o f Kazakhstan, circulated a statement that sharply criticized the 
government and demanded the resignation o f the government. Within days 85 
members of the parliament supported the statement (Russian Press Digest, May 28,
1994). Although the president was abie to avert the immediate crisis with the help of 
his allies in the parliament, he later appointed a new government which entered into a 
dialogue with the disgruntled deputies (Russian Press Digest, May 28, 1994; BBC, 
October 22, 1994). The lesson of this crisis was clear to the president: He could no 
more trust the parliament as a united presidential bloc. What made this lesson more 
clear was the fact that the parliament resisted the president on a number of important 
issues. For instance, it rejected his proposal to convert the parliament into bicameral 
parliament and overruled him when he vetoed the laws on social security issues, 
including the minimum wage (BBC, August 18, 1994).
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In March 1995, the Constitutional Court provided much-needed relief to the 
president when it decided a complaint about the legality of the 1994 parliamentary 
election. The Constitutional Court ruled that the election was illegal because of a 
number of irregularities, including discrepancies between the number o f  votes cast 
and the actual number o f voters. Both the president and the parliament objected to the 
ruling, but the Constitutional Court reconfirmed its decision.
Whether the president engineered it, as some of his critics (including the 
members of the parliament) and political analysts claim (Agence France Presse,
March 15, 1995; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 12, 1995) or not, the ruling surely 
provided him with a unique opportunity to try to restructure political system with the 
executive position impervious to future institutional challenges.
After the Constitutional Court rejected his objection to its ruling, Nazarbayev 
decreed that the parliament ceased its existence as of March 6, 1995, the day the 
court handed down the decision to this effect. Most parliament members tried to defy 
the judicial verdict as well as the presidential decree. They suspended certain articles 
of the constitutions, passed resolutions, staged hunger strike, and set up an alternative 
People’s Parliament, but all came to naught. The president prevailed (Russian Press 
Digest, March 14, 1995; Agence France Presse, March 15, 1995). He assumed 
special powers, both executive and legislative, which were bestowed upon by the 
parliament in December 1993, and promised to hold the next parliamentary election 
within two to three months. However, he soon abandoned the idea, inaugurated a
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period o f presidential rule by decree, and attended the project o f political restructuring 
in order to make his position impervious to the parliamentary pressure.
The first thing he did was that he convened a People’s Assembly which voted 
to extend his tenure as president until 2000. He then held a successful national 
referendum to seek a popular approval o f the extension in April 1995. He single- 
handedly drafted a new constitution and held another successful national referendum 
to approve it in August 1995. All of this was being done over the objection and 
protest o f a  number of leading individual politicians, opposition parties, and above all 
the judges o f the Constitutional Court. After the Constitutional Court judges expressed 
their views that the draft constitution published in June 1995 contained undemocratic 
provisions which would give the president extensive powers (but would not hold him 
responsible for anything), greatly limit the power of parliament to only lawmaking 
(but with no right to change the constitution), and infringe on human rights (Russian 
Press Digest, August 30, 1995), the president dropped the provision o f the 
Constitutional Court in the final draft and instead proposed a Constitutional Council 
controlled and guided by the chief executive (Agence Frace Presse, August 31, 1995).
After the referendum on the 1995 constitution, he scheduled legislative 
elections for December 5 and 9, 1995. The new constitution restructured the 
parliament. The new parliament was composed of two chambers, the Majlis (or lower 
house) with 67 seats and the Senate (or upper house) with 47 seats. The lower house 
members would be elected in a one-seat territorial constituencies through direct vote, 
whereas two senators will be elected in each of the republic’s 19 regions and the
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capital city through electorate college o f  the representative bodies o f the regions. The 
president would hand-pick 7 more senators.
Nomination o f candidates for the upper house took place between October 10 
and November 4, and the period for nomination o f candidates began from October 10 
through October 29, 1995. The registration results were announced on November 17, 
1995. A total o f 49 candidates were registered to contest 40 seats in the upper house. 
285 candidates vied for 67 seats in the lower house. A total o f 30 public associations, 
including political parties and movements, took part in the election (Tass, November 
3, 1995) and nominated a total of 193 candidates. 138 candidates were self- 
nominated, including 10 for the upper house and 128 for the lower house (Tass, 
December 9, 1995).
The majority of candidates were nominated by the pro-president sociopolitical 
associations such as the Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (38), the Federation 
of Trade Unions,candidates (21), the Democratic Party (22), and the Kazakh Peasant 
Union (13). The representation of real opposition parties was quite small (Tass, 
November 17, 1995). Most of the registered candidates were leading local officials, 
businessmen, managers in state-run enterprises and companies, and members o f the 
sociopolitical associations close to the president (Russian Press Digest, December 1, 
1995; BBC, November 19, 1995).
As compared to the 1994 parliamentary election, there were fewer complaints 
about the nomination and registration processes in the 1995 elections. In fact, the 
main reason for fewer complaints and small representation of opposition parties was
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that the main opposition parties and movements such as the Socialist Party, Azat, the 
Worker’s Movement and Social Democratic Party boycotted the election (Agence 
Frace Presse, December S, 1995). In fact, immediately after the election commission 
announced the time table for the legislative elections, most opposition parties and 
movements met in the capital city to express their fears about the "complete 
dependence of the future parliament on the executive structures” and about its 
inability "to work as a full-fledged legislative body” (BBC, October 14, 1995). They 
also doubted the legality of the elections held in accordance with the constitution 
which was illegally adopted and feared that the executive bodies and election 
commissions formed by them might create obstacles in the way o f opposition parties. 
As a result, they announced their reluctance to take part in the 1995 legislative 
elections. O f all the parties which attended the meeting, only the Communist Party 
took a different decision and participated in the elections because it had thought it 
could win seats in the upper house (BBC, October 14, 1995; Agence France Presse, 
December 5, 1995). Interestingly, the Communist Party fielded only 10 candidates for 
both the houses (Agence France Presse, December 5, 1995).
Although a number of independent candidates were allowed to register,
Kazakh authorities did not hesitate to block their arch critics or those candidates 
whose campaigning was judged to be contrary to the constitution from running in the 
election. In one important instance, the authorities arrested a Cossack leader, Nikolai 
Gunkin, in Alma-Ata on October 28, 1995. He was reportedly trying to register 
himself as a candidate in the election for the lower house. The authorities took him in
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custody on charges o f holding illegal rallies (BBC, October 31, November 2 and 4,
1995) in January 1995. The time lapse between the rally and the arrest raised serious 
questions about the motives of the authorities and provoked strong protest from the 
Cossack community and a short-lived crisis in Russian-Kazakh relations (BBC, 
November 6 and 20, 1995; Russian Press Digest, November 14, 1995; Tass, 
November 20, 1995). In addition, the authorities canceled the registrations o f a 
number of candidates for specific campaign violations.37 However, as compared to 
the 1994 elections, the number of such incidents was insignificant, thanks to the 
boycott of most opposition parties, in the 1995 legislative elections, and, as a result, 
helped the authorities receive an overall satisfactory assessment from most 
international monitors.
Almost 100 international observers monitored the elections. The lack of 
alternative candidates in the upper house was too apparent to escape their eyes 
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Dec 5, 1995). In addition, they noted a number of 
previous but less serious violations, although most international observers, including 
the European Parliament’s delegation, considered the conduct of the 1995 legislative 
elections as an improvement on the previous one (The Reuters European Community 
Report, December 14, 1995). While crediting the Kazakh authorities for adopting a 
number of international observers’ recommendations such as "simpler candidate 
registration process, greater dissemination of opposition views, more funding 
opportunities for candidates and the inclusion o f independent domestic" monitors, the
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OSCE delegation noted the downside o f the elections, including the practice o f family 
voting and the lack o f standardized voting procedures across the country.
O f course, such violations were far less serious than the ones committed in the 
previous legislative elections. In addition, the OSCE delegation noted that the election 
campaign was "exceptionally quiet, with little debate or information" (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, December 11, 1995). O f course, when most candidates were the 
president’s men and members of the pro-president parties, and when most opposition 
parties were staying out of the elections, it could hardly been otherwise. In any event, 
thanks to the opposition boycott which saved Kazakh authorities the trouble of 
keeping inconvenient candidates out o f the electoral process under the close scrutiny 
of international observers and the consequent international embarrassment, they were 
able to finally put in place a truly pliant parliament—an outcome which hardly 
surprised opposition circles and others, including journalists and analysts, who were 
expecting it.
The preceding discussion of the electoral process highlights two important 
points. First, although independent individual candidates and political parties were 
provided a limited access to the post-independence electoral process, Kazakh 
authorities made it sure that this restricted access did not result in any strategic 
advantage for the opposition forces. In other words, because of their limited access to 
the electoral process, opposition forces would have no real chance o f either replacing 
the executive leadership or dominate the parliament. Second, Kazakh authorities
230
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
predominantly relied on manipulative practices and procedures rather than on outright 
repressive methods to avoid these potential risks.
THE RISE O F INDEPENDENT MEDIA W ITH DEFIN ITE LIMITS
Like their approach toward other aspects of political liberalization. Kazakh 
authorities pursued a less than consistent approach toward the mass media in the post- 
independence period. As compared to the pre-independence period, independent 
sociopolitical forces were also relatively free to set up independent media outlets in 
the post-independence period. In fact, as already mentioned, independent institutions 
of the mass media witnessed quantitative as well as qualitative progress in the post­
independence period. In other words, not only the number o f independent media 
outlets increased in the post-independence period but also they continued to put out 
certain information and material quite critical of Kazakh authorities. However, they 
continued to face a number of serious restrictions and were subjected to various 
repressive measures in the post-independence period.
As already mentioned, once they allowed a number of autonomous formations 
to arise in the post-independence period due to the high cost involved in the complete 
depoliticization o f opposition forces, including political activists of the resourceful 
Russian minority and important communist and non-communist political leaders, 
Kazakh authorities lost, for all practical purposes, the option o f completely stopping 
them from all sort o f independent political activity. Hence, the fact that these groups 
would engage in a number o f independent activities, including efforts to set up their 
own media outlets, was a  foregone conclusion. In addition, once they allowed
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opposition groups to hold press conferences, party congresses, round tables, and 
protest rallies (both authorized and unauthorized), the fact that the media outlets, both 
the state-owned and independent, would cover these events with critical remarks about 
them and their policies was yet another foregone conclusion. The use of outright and 
indiscriminate repression o f independent and opposition media outlets could 
potentially entail by and large similar repercussions and costs which in the first place 
obliged the Kazakh leadership to tolerate the rise of autonomous sociopolitical groups 
and their engagement in a  number of independent activities. The truly affordable 
option then Kazakh authorities faced and pursued was not how to completely stop 
opposition forces from setting up their own media outlets and from criticizing them 
but what topics to keep off-limits, how to keep independent media outlets within 
definite limits, and how to reduce the volume of overall criticism o f their policies. 
Thus, Kazakh authorities’ less than consistent approach toward the mass media is the 
product of the interplay between their desire (and attempts) to slow down the 
democratization process and pro-reform pressures generated by the political activism 
of the Russian minority and members of the split elite structure in the post­
independence period. In the following pages, we will discuss our empirical data on 
the mixed record of the Kazakh leadership on the question of the press freedom.
While the law guaranteed freedom of the mass media and the Kazakh 
leadership generally tolerated independent media outlets in the post-independence 
period, certain restrictions, including the registration requirement and the prohibition 
of discussion o f certain ’off-limits’ subjects discussed in the preceding pages, were
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also codified in order to apparently prevent the abuse o f such freedom. In addition, 
Kazakh authorities’ control over printing facilities, printing paper, distribution system, 
and subsidies further increased the vulnerability of independent media outlets to 
official pressure and manipulation.
Although the law contained a number of restrictive provisions, Kazakh 
authorities mostly refrained from overstretching them in order to curb all sorts of 
criticism in the media and prosecute every seeming violation o f such provisions. In 
fact, they discretely invoked these restrictive provisions to curb the discussion of ’off- 
limits' subjects in the media, encourage independent media outlets to practice self- 
censorship in other matters, coerce their certain critics in the media, and curtail 
freedom of independent media outlets without attempting to completely eliminate 
them.
Kazakh authorities adopted varied responses toward their critics in the media, 
and independent journalists and media outlets that were judged to have violated the 
media code. In some cases, they took no action. However, in most cases, the 
authorities did take some action against those who were judged to have stepped 
outside the loosely defined limits. A variety of sources, including the press and 
human rights groups, have reported and documented these varied anti-media actions 
throughout the post-independence years.
In some cases, independent journalists and media outlets found to be in 
violation of the guidelines were only warned and cited.38 In other cases, critics of 
the authorities in the press and electronic media were tacitly harassed by the national
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and local authorities. In other words, they took administrative actions to harass 
independent media outlets but did not formally charge and prosecute them. The outlets 
which were dealt with in this way include Birlesu (the independent trade union 
publication), Telemax (an independent television station in the capital city), the 
Almaatinsky Birzhevoy Vestnik (Almaty Stock Exchange News), ABV (Auction 
Bulletin), Karavan (the most independent newspaper in the capital city and the largest 
circulation newspaper in Central Asia), and Zvezda Priirtyshya (Star o f the Irtysh 
River Region).
The case o f Karavan deserves further comments because it clearly illustrates 
how even tacit anti-media actions contributed to the impulse o f the largest circulation 
paper in Central Asia to self-censorship. Karavan has been the target o f the disguised 
pressure from local authorities for its independent views from the outset. However, 
close to the 1994 parliamentary election, a specific incident which increased the 
official disguised pressure was that it (and the Almaty Stock Exchange News) 
published an open letter from the head of a  major corporation who questioned the 
mayor’s ability to administer the capital city. As a result, the newspaper was 
subjected to various administrative measures without facing a formal charge in the 
court (Tass, February 18, 1994). In addition, the newspaper ran critical stories about 
the dissolution o f  the parliament in March 1995—a step which constituted an indirect 
criticism of the president. After the newspaper ran such stories, a warehouse of 
Karavan burned down for reasons disputed between the newspaper and the authorities. 
In any case, a loss o f about 1 million dollars in the fire incident caused the newspaper
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to gradually reduce its coverage of political topics (U.S. Department of State, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995:910).
A look at such harassment cases shows that most cases occurred during the 
national election and referendum periods. In other words, it suggests that Kazakh 
authorities became more sensitive to open criticism and relatively more aggressive in 
their dealing with opposition and independent media outlets during these periods. The 
opposition and independent media outlets, including those run by powerful economic 
and political figures, acknowledged this connection, and yet increased the volume of 
criticism of the national and local authorities during such periods (Tass, February 18, 
1994) to resist official heavy-handedness and to protect the available independent 
space.
In still other cases, a number of critics in the media were subjected to some 
sort of undisguised punitive measures such as dismissal from service, detention, 
arrest, prosecution, and conviction for their criticism o f Kazakh authorities and for 
other offenses ranging from insulting the honor of the president and leading public 
officials to inciting ethnic tension in the republic. In addition, a number o f 
independent media outlets were either banned altogether or suspended temporarily or 
sued or threatened with a  law suit under similar charges.59 The fate of the state- 
owned media which tried to step out of the loosely defined limits was no different 
from that of independent media outlets. For instance, the General Prosecutor’s office 
closed down the official newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, and initiated legal
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action against the editor of the newspaper for inciting ethnic tension in the republic 
(BBC, April 6, 1995).
In addition to the preceding anti-media actions toward national journalists and 
media outlets, Kazakh authorities displayed heavy-handedness toward foreign 
journalists and media outlets as well. A number o f  international journalists have been 
reportedly expelled, warned, detained, arrested and/or convicted for violating the 
media code. In one instance, the authorities blocked Russian correspondents from 
transmitting reports to Moscow about ethnic tensions in May 1993. International 
media outlets were also subjected to official heavy-handedness for similar violations. 
For instance, in April 1996, Kazakh authorities charged a Russian newspaper, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, with fanning ethnic tension and requested the court to 
suspend the newspaper for six months. In fact, the newspaper had published an article 
of a Russian writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who advocated annexation of northern 
provinces of Kazakhstan with Russia. After independent journalists requested the 
court not to take any action and more importantly after the newspaper dissociated 
itself from the article and its claims, the authorities dropped the case (Tass, June 7, 
1996; Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press, no. 19, 1996:17; BBC, July 26, 1996).
In addition to the above clear-cut example o f official heavy-handedness toward 
both national and international independent journalists and media outlets, there are a 
number of doubtful cases o f the closure of certain independent media outlets. In other 
words. Kazakh authorities on the one hand and opposition and independent sources on 
the other offered different versions about why and how some media outlets went out
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of business (The Xinhua News Agency, July 6, 1993; BBC, February 6, 1997; U.S. 
Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996:993-94). 
Such outlets include Pravda (the mouthpiece of the CPSU), Max radio and television 
company, a number of radio and television stations which went off air due to the 
auction o f frequencies in 19%, and All-Russian Television and Radio Company.
The official heavy-handedness toward independent journalists and media 
outlets, the fear of punitive official reactions to concocted violations of the law, the 
government control over printing facilities, printing paper, subsidies, and registration 
surely contributed to the impulse to self-censorship and reduced the volume of 
criticism o f Kazakh authorities in the media. A wide variety of anti-media actions, 
disguised and undisguised, and so many victims of such actions can understandably 
create an impression that the mass media in Kazakhstan enjoyed little or no freedom 
in the post-independence period. A number of opposition and independent sources, 
including the Association of Independent Electronic Media o f Central Asia (ANESMI) 
hold this view (CSCE, March 1998:36; U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1141). In spite o f the above large body of 
indisputable evidence, this view is partly true. There is also an almost equal amount 
of indisputable evidence which persuasively tells the second half of the story. That is, 
in spite of many restrictions and many examples of heavy-handedness of Kazakh 
authorities, independent media outlets have been able to arise, create a sizable 
independent space for themselves, and win an official, however grudging, recognition 
of this space in the post-independence period.
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In fact, all the available evidence on the official heavy-handedness toward 
independent media outlets does not prove the case that Kazakh authorities ever 
launched a frontal attack to eliminate all o f their critics in the media, independent 
journalists and media outlets. There is strong evidence to show that, in spite of their 
heavy-handedness in many cases, the authorities tolerated sizable independent space 
for the mass media in the post-independence period. Throughout the post­
independence years, independent media outlets continued to express their own views 
on various important matters and criticize the authorities, o f course within definite 
limits, with impunity.
A comprehensive look at the total available evidence in this context suggests 
that both the state-owned and independent institutions of mass media continued to 
appear and disappear in the post-independence period for political and economic 
reasons and that both restrictions and freedoms characterize the post-independence 
period. If some independent media outlets were at times shut down by the government 
for political reasons, other independent institutions o f mass media were allowed to 
arise and operate. If the local authorities cut off electricity to the television station 
Telemax for its critical broadcast, they tolerated its critical broadcast from a different 
location and continued to allow its affiliate radio stations to broadcast news critical of 
them (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Practices for 1994:859).
There are several other similar instances which further illustrate the fact o f  the 
continued existence o f independent institutions o f  mass media in Kazakhstan in the 
post-independence period. The fact that independent media outlets, especially the
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press, have been relatively free in Kazakhstan throughout the post-independence years 
is acknowledged by opposition political parties and other independent associations, 
including human rights groups (CSCE, March 1998:35). Of course, leaders of most 
opposition parties and independent human rights groups can not fail to confirm this 
relative freedom o f the mass media because their press conferences, party congresses, 
round tables, unauthorized rallies, and their speeches and remarks critical of the 
authorities have, for the most pan, regularly appeared in both the state-owned and 
independent media outlets without any punitive action against the reponing media.
By the end of the first year o f its independence, Kazakhstan was reported to 
have a large number o f both registered and unregistered independent publications and 
electronic media companies. Most opposition groups, including unregistered and 
radical groups, could and did publish their own newspapers in the post-independence 
period (BBC, August 27, 1992; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1992:815). By and large, this situation persisted 
throughout the post-independence period. As of 1997, there were 31 independent 
radio and television stations in country, including 11 in the capital city alone; each 
population center housed at least one independent publication; the capital city alone 
housed 7 major independent newspapers (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1140-1141). It is outside the scope o f this study 
to discuss in detail each and every opposition and independent newspapers and other 
institutions of mass media which existed in Kazakhstan in the post-independence 
period. It will suffice for our purpose here to list notable opposition and independent
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media outlets and briefly discuss the freedom o f  expression they enjoyed in the post­
independence period.
In addition to some independent media outlets cited in the preceding pages, 
other notable independent and opposition newspapers which were allowed to appear in 
the post-independence period include Delovaya Nedelya (Business Weekly), Novoye 
Pokleniye (New Generation), Karavan Blitz, and Twenty-first Century. The 
newspapers like Delovaya Nedelya, Novoye Pokleniye, and Twenty-first Century 
truly emerged as voices for the opposition.
In addition to providing considerable coverage to the opposition’s activities and 
positions critical of Kazakh authorities (BBC, September 26 and November 27, 1996), 
independent (and official) newspapers debated several unsavory issues in ways critical 
of the government and its policies. The flawed economic transition policies, poor 
social policies (BBC, August 18, 1994), bureaucratic mismanagement, and heavy- 
handedness o f  law-enforcement forces (BBC, September 26, 1996) were common 
unsavory issues the press could and did freely report on and debate (BBC, November 
21, 1997). More unsavory topics the independent press discretely reported on and 
debated with impunity include concentration of power in the president, constitutional 
matters (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, no. 16, 1995:22), power struggle 
between the executive and the parliament, (BBC, January 28, 1993), electoral 
violations (Tass, February 18, 1994), and official corruption. In addition, independent 
print media increasingly criticized not only the parliament*0 but also certain
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presidential decisions, including the agreement with Russia on the lease o f Baikonur 
space center (BBC, July 25, 1995).
Although the key subjects which have remained and have been considered to 
be "off-limits” almost throughout the post-independence period were the ethnic 
relations, personal criticism of the president and his family, and corruption of political 
office holders, the press has taken remarkably bold steps to print critical material 
about some o f these topics. Some independent newspapers have lately dared touch on 
most ’off-limits’ subjects. Karavan has reportedly gained respect and become the most 
widely circulated newspaper in the republic for its independent stance on various 
issue. It was admired for ”taking on Alma Ata’s powerful former mayor, and 
publishing detailed articles on the discontent o f Kazakhstan’s Russian population” 
(Financial Times (London), February 13, 1995:2). Its affiliate, Karavan Blitz, a 
tabloid newspaper, also carried news about hard economic conditions in Russian- 
dominated towns and cities (BBC, October 18, 1996).
In August 1996, Karavan and another independent newspapers, Delovaya 
nedelya (a Russian-language business weekly in the capital city) "broke a national 
taboo by criticizing" the president and got away with it (Financial Times (London), 
September 10, 1996:6). Karavan carried an article by a former cabinet minister and 
the leader of Azamat, Petr Svoik. The writer described Kazakhstan a "banana 
republic" and accused Kazakh authorities of nepotism. He blamed the president rather 
than his advisers for the lack of progress in democratic reforms in the republic 
(Financial Times (London), September 10, 1996:6). The second article published in
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Delovaya Nedelya lashed out at foreigner investors for questionable practices, 
including hiring relatives of senior officials, to ensure lucrative contracts. The author 
with the pseudonym of Maxim Mikhailichenko lamented the role o f  bribes and 
connections in shaping things in the republic. He went on to assert that there were no 
equal opportunities and that if he had been married to the daughter o f  the president he 
would be one o f the "wealthiest businessmen" in the country. The one day detention 
of Svoik by police for driving a stolen car during his tour of the country can be 
attributed to the article but no action was taken against both Karavan (the most critical 
newspaper published by one of the most resourceful person in the republic) and 
Delovaya Nedelya (Financial Times (London), September 10, 1996:6).
The publication o f the two articles was not the last time that the press broke a 
national taboo. In fact, Karavan dared publish two more articles on October 3, 1997, 
which contained sharp and direct criticism of both the president and the prime 
minister. The first letter called upon the president to oust the prime minister, Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin, for leading the country to a "catastrophe" and for his image "among 
businessmen and high government bureaucrats" as a corrupt person who "does not 
just take (bribes and kickbacks), he takes a lot" (CSCE, March 1998:35). Although 
the letter was ostensibly aimed at the prime minister, no one could mistake that it 
implicitly tried to discredit the president, too, for presiding over this situation. The 
second letter was far more explosive and direct in its attack on the president. It was 
first published in the Moscow press. However, Karavan reprinted it, unedited. The 
letter chronicled, in an accusatory fashion, his political engineering in the post-
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independence period and levelled a number o f  other serious charges. More 
specifically, it accused the president for incessantly experimenting with the 
constitutions and governments, for dissolving two disobedient parliaments and creating 
one totally under his control, for wielding unlimited authority without being 
responsible for any action, for placing family members in lucrative positions, for 
creating personal dictatorship with the potential for a family dynasty, for coercing and 
intimidating leaders o f autonomous sociopolitical associations on a regular basis, and 
for allowing the overwhelming majority to impoverish and a small group o f people in 
power to appropriate great riches (CSCE, March 1998:36-36). The letter stopped 
short of personally accusing the president o f corruption.
There are various theories as to how the authors dared and why karavan 
published such letters and why the authorities tolerated them. According to one 
theory, the second letter was sponsored by the prime minister and his close ally, Boris 
Giller, the publisher of Karavan and the biggest media tycoon in Central Asia. The 
motive behind their sponsorship of the letter was to prepare the way for the former to 
become a formidable challenge to the president in Kazakh politics, especially in the 
next presidential election. If this theory is true, it means that division and political 
struggle among powerful elites contributes, as we expected, to political liberalization 
in the post-communist countries in Central Asia. According to another view, the 
president himself sanctioned the publication o f the letter to demonstrate how open is 
Kazakhstan under his rule (CSCE, March 1998:36). Whatever the case may be, the 
fact that the newspaper was not punished underscored the possibility of open and
243
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
personal criticism o f the president who was once considered to be the key ’off-limits' 
subject.
The preceding discussion suggests that in view of political mobilization of the 
large, resourceful Russian minority and the split elite structure, the affordable option 
Kazakh authorities faced and pursued in line with their desire to avoid full scale 
democratization of society was not a frontal attack but a selective use of coercion to 
reduce rather than eliminate criticism of them in the mass media. If some independent 
media outlets were at times closed, others were permitted to arise and operate. In 
other words, both restrictions and freedoms characterize the post-independence 
relationship between Kazakh authorities and the mass media outlets.
CONCLUSION
In the pre-independence period, political openness belatedly made its way to 
Kazakhstan initially as a weak reflection o f the center-sponsored reform program. 
However, ethnonationalist policies o f Kazakh authorities, political activism of ethnic 
groups, especially the Russian minority and the titular nationality, and the growing 
fragmentation o f  the communist elite structure later supplemented the positive impact 
of the perestroika and glasnost processes on political liberalization. The political 
liberalization process experienced an incremental improvement during the three 
successive leaders, Kunayev, Kolbin, and Nazarbayev, who oversaw the 
implementation o f  the Gorbachev reform program, in spite of their continued aversion 
to independent sociopolitical initiatives. In spite of the greater salience independent
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sociopolitical initiatives acquired under him, Nazarbayev, like his predecessors, 
jealously guarded the electoral process from the rising autonomous societal forces.
After independence, an overall improvement occurred in various areas of 
political liberalization in the republic. A weak, but genuine, political opposition was 
able to arise and function within definite limits. Not only the number of independent 
political groups increased but also the range of independent activities in which they 
could engage widened in the post-independence period. The independent mass media 
also witnessed qualitative as well as quantitative progress in the post-independence 
period. A sizable number o f independent institutions o f mass media continued to 
appear and disappear for both economic and political reasons in the post-independence 
period. Of course, some topics were declared or considered to be 'off-limits’ and both 
the official and private mass media practiced self-censorship. However, they could 
still cover activities and views o f opposition forces, take independent position on 
important matters, and publish and broadcast information critical of Kazakh 
authorities and their policies. O f all the areas of political liberalization, the 
independent individual and organized electoral participation experienced least 
progress. Because a fair, free and competitive electoral process could potentially 
politicize, mobilize, and empower social groups, including the Russian minority, 
beyond limits acceptable to them, Kazakh authorities jealously guarded the post­
independence electoral process from independent individual and organized 
participation. In spite o f this, the post-independence electoral system was still an 
improvement on the previous one.
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In line with its cautious reform approach in which enlightened authoritarianism 
is a stage in the transition from totalitarianism to a market economy and democracy 
and economic reforms take precedence over political reforms, the Kazakh leadership 
moderates pro-reform pressures and tries to keep the post-independence political 
liberalization process within definite limits acceptable to it rather than to seek 
complete depoliticization of society. In fact, to seek complete depoliticization of 
society is not a  safe and feasible option for Kazakh authorities because it requires 
excessive and indiscriminate repression which, in the presence o f  a large, resourceful 
Russian population and fragmented elite structure along ideological, ethnic and tribal 
lines, entails a prohibitive cost. Thus, the safe option which they face and pursue is 
how to keep the political liberalization process within acceptable limits. The result of 
this pursuit is that both freedoms and restrictions characterize the post-independence 
political scene in the republic. In other words, as a result o f an interplay between pro­
reform pressures and cautious reform approach of the Kazakh leadership, the overall 
record of Kazakhstan on political liberalization in the post-independence period is 
mixed, earning it a place between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the political 
liberalization scale.
How long is Kazakhstan likely to stay at this point on the political 
liberalization scale? Is the republic likely to slide in either direction on the political 
liberalization scale in the foreseeable future? What are the future prospects o f political 
liberalization in the republic? Indeed, it is hard to predict with confidence the future 
of the political liberalization process in countries like Kazakhstan which are passing
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through the unprecedented, monumental post-communist transition and rank low on 
socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with political democracy. However, 
broad, educated speculations about the future direction of the political liberalization 
process are possible on the basis o f our theoretically informed analysis and certain 
evident objective conditions.
Kazakh authorities have thus far postponed full scale democratization of their 
society on various pretexts, including Asian mentality, economic recovery through a 
transition to market-based relations, and inter-ethnic accord. If  this is a genuine 
assessment, it can be safely said that full scale democratization of public life is a 
distant prospect in Kazakhstan and that the Kazakh leadership is more likely to stay 
the present course o f permitting political liberalization within definite limits acceptable 
to it. In fact, both economic recovery and inter-ethnic accord are still illusive goals 
for Kazakhstan. And, we have no persuasive reason to expect the so-called oriental 
mentality to experience a suddent, fundamental pro-democratic change in the 
foreseeable future.
However, we have other reasons to expect that full scale democratization of 
public life is not on the horizon in the republic, but it will continue to experience 
political liberalization within definite limits in the foreseeable future. There is no 
indication that the incumbent leadership has developed any detailed blueprints for 
launching an intensive and extensive democratization process in the near future. In 
fact, quite the contrary. Nazarbayev has consolidated his personal power and built a 
rigid institutional power structure around him. He is in no mood to decentralize it.
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Rather, he can be tempted to misuse it again to prolong his rule beyond the year 
2000. If he does so, he is more likely to rely on institutional engineering and political 
manipulation accompanied with limited repression rather than massive repression 
which is really not a  safe option for him in this context. In other words, even if he 
chooses to perpetuate his personal rule, Kazakhstan will continue to experience some 
sort of political liberalization due to certain safeguards, including the large, 
resourceful Russian minority and fragmented elite structure, against its backsliding 
into a despotic state like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The most serious threat to the present level o f political liberalization arises 
from the breakout o f  armed hostilities due to the intensification o f already sharp 
subcultural differences in the republic. In particular, the armed resistance o f the 
Russian minority for one reason or another can potentially lead to a complete 
breakdown of the ongoing political liberalization process at least for some period of 
time, though it may deepen the democratization process in the long run if Kazakh 
authorities found a negotiated settlement with the help o f Russian authorities. If the 
past experience is o f  any guide, Kazakh authorities are more likely to offer their 
Russian population limited political concessions, including limited local autonomy and 
access to national political processes, to preempt the rise of such armed resistance. In 
other words, the continued presence of a large, resourceful Russian minority enjoying 
the potential support o f Russian authorities is an effective safeguard against the rise of 
an abject repressive regime in Kazakhstan. Hence, we expect the republic to continue 
to experience some sort o f political liberalization in the foreseeable future. What
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further enhances this prospect is the fact that there is little or no chance of consensus 
building among most elites o f different colors and ethnic origins on the need to roll 
back the political liberalization process underway in the republic within definite 
limits.
The preceding assertions by no means suggest that full scale democratization 
of public life is out o f question for the foreseeable future. In fact, in order for 
Kazakhstan to move out o f the present middle position between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan and climb up on the political liberalization scale in the near future, it 
requires certain favorable conditions. More specifically, the full scale democratization 
process is more likely to begin in the republic under the three most propitious 
conditions, in addition to the ones discussed above. First, the replacement o f the 
incumbent cautious leadership with a more forward iooking, reform-oriented 
leadership in Kazakhstan. Second, the replacement of the incumbent Russian 
leadership by a democratically oriented leadership with a genuine commitment to 
promote socioeconomic welfare and democratic rights o f the Russian population in the 
former Soviet space. Third, an enduring alliance between political elites of different 
colors and ethnic origins, especially Kazakh and Russian, to build effective pressure 
from below on Kazakh authorities to deepen the democratization process in the 
country.
NOTES
1. Nazarbayev hired foreign experts to plan economic transition. Gorbachev and the 
local party bosses in Kazakhstan expressed displeasure with him for hiring foreigners 
to resolve domestic economic problems (Russian Press Digest, March 27, 1991).
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2. Wisdom was national-patriotic club of reserve soldiers o f Russian origin. In a 
meeting held in May and June 1988, the group issued a slogan to the masses 
forbidding the marriage o f Russian people with foreigners and calling for the 
expulsion o f  Jewish and other immigrants to their historic homelands (BBC, January 
14, 1989).
3. In October 1990, the republican parliament declared Kazakhstan a sovereign 
republic. This declaration shifted control of natural resources and economy of the 
republic from central to the republican authorities. The legislation provoked protests 
in the Slav-dominated cities in the north (Pomfret 1995:79).
4. Nazarbayev later stated that Kolbin was "selected by the apparatus in the worst 
tradition of the stagnation period" as the central committee members tacitly voted for 
him without asking any question (Tass, February 23, 1990).
5. Nazarbayev is described as a  cautious, moderate reformist by many observers of 
Kazakhstan (Khazanov 1995:148; The Washington Post, March 8, 1994:A14). 
According to Olcott, he "is content to permit diversity of opinion and expression as 
long as it does not interfere with the state's ability to fulfill its basic functions”
(Olcott 1995:220;
6. Nazarbayev forcefully called for an economic decentralization to reduce the 
center’s direct economic control o f the republics (United Press International, June 22, 
1989; Tass, August 25, 1989).
7. To the displeasure of Gorbachev and some local communists who described his 
economic approach as radical, the Kazakh leader hired Western economists to help 
him prepare for a Shift to a  market economy (Russian Press Digest, March 27, 1991).
8. In one o f his statements, he made it clear that ”there will be no swift turn” due to 
"our oriental ways’ (The Times, March 14, 1991). His prime minister, U. 
Karamanov, cited the need for "iron-clad social guarantees." He also proudly 
announced that his government was able to elaborate its own concept o f transition to a 
market economy which took into account "ethnic and regional peculiarities" (Russian 
Press Digest, June 13, 1990). The Kazakh deputy premier, Karatai Turysov, also 
expressed similar views (Tass, October 9, 1990).
9. Close associates of Nazarbayev also made no secret of such views. While speaking 
of the need for strict discipline, they refer to the economic miracles of South Korea 
and Taiwan and relate them to the dictatorial regimes in those countries (BBC, July 
18, 1991).
10. According to l|is opinion, a  strong executive is necessary in order for his country 
to make a smooth‘transition to a market economy because it has "no parliamentary 
culture or seasoned multi-party system" (Agence France Presse, August 31, 1995).
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11. Warren Christopher, US Secretary o f State, called the referendum "a step 
backward for Kazakhstan” (Los Angeles Times, April 30, 199S:A4).
12. Kunayev was addressing an election rally in Alma-Ata on February 11, 198S. In 
his speech, he also paid rich tribute to Chernenko’s enormous experience, strength 
and energy ( BBC, February 13, 1985).
13. The republican leadership was accused of a number o f lapses, including arbitrary 
planning, inertia of thinking, disrespect for public opinion, repression o f criticism, a 
near total absence o f self-criticism, violation of the principles of social justice, 
promotion of incompetent and corrupt personnel on the basis o f tribal and regional 
affiliation, report-padding, and misappropriation of socialist property (Pravda, March 
18, 1985; Current Digest o f the Soviet Press no. 11, 1985:3; Pravda, March 29.
1985; BBC, December 29, 1986).
14. In addition to his call for socioeconomic and cultural revitalization o f the country, 
Gorbachev did speak of the need to deepen socialist democracy (Current Digest of 
Soviet Press no. 8, 1986:11). However, at the initial stage of his reform program, the 
deepening of socialist democracy essentially meant freedom for the party cadres to 
express their concerns and to support him in his effort to expose corrupt party leaders 
and remove obstacles to the socioeconomic and cultural development of the country.
15. Religion could be a potential source of autonomous societal organization in the 
republic, but the Kunayev administration adopted a hostile and repressive policy 
toward religion during this period. In fact, this policy was also very much in 
accordance with the hostile approach o f the central authorities toward religion in the 
Central Asian republics.
16. The central authorities blamed the Kazakh leadership for environmental 
degradation. Whereas the republican press published articles on such problems as soil 
erosion and held the previous central authorities responsible for them.
17. The central leadership sent Gyorgy P. Razumovsky, the secretary of the CPSU 
central committee for organizational and personnel questions, for this purpose 
(Reuters, December 16, 1986; Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 51, 1987:1).
18. In fact, his removal was being expected since Gorbachev came to power. Many 
observers expressed surprise when he was re-elected first secretary o f the republic 
communist party in February 1986 (The Associated Press Dec. 16, 1986). Just one 
day before his retirement, international press was predicting his removal (U.S. News 
& World Report, December 15, 1986:45).
19. According to initial official reports several hundred but according to official 
figures disclosed years later, almost 3,000 people participated in these riots which 
lasted for two days (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1987:10). According to
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Western sources, almost 10,000 people inarched on the republican communist party 
headquarters (Guardian Weekly, December 28, 1986:7).
20. According to the report of the parliamentary commission set up (years later) on 
the demands of people to reinvestigate the riots, almost 58 people died and two 
hundred were hospitalized out o f 768 wounded. According to some sources, at least 7 
policemen and 13 demonstrators died (The Guardian, December 28, 1986:7). In 
addition, thousands o f people were arrested and some of them were beaten at the 
police stations (Russian Press Digest, September 2, 1990).
21. As a result o f this campaign, 83 out of 99 people who were put on trial were 
convicted and imprisoned; 707 people were arrested under administrative charges; 
1164 cadres were expelled from the communist youth organization, Komsomol; and 
266 students were expelled form educational institutions. In addition, scores of party 
members were expelled and more than a thousand were admonished and reprimanded 
(Russian Press Digest, September 2, 1990).
22. In 1987-88, when independent political activity was erupting in Russia and the 
Baltic republics and their authorities were increasingly being challenged by the new 
political forces, the Kazakh authorities were focused, in one way or another, on the 
Alma-Ata riots and anti-corruption campaign and Kazakh activists were slowly 
coming out of the shock of the riots and were in search of less provocative causes and 
less provocative methods to promote them. A small number o f people who dared to 
engage in organized or unorganized political activities in one way or another adopted 
a very low profile and avoided an open confrontation with the republic authorities 
along the line of confrontation then underway in Russia and the Baltic republics.
23. Kazakhstanskaya pravda (February 8, 1989) accused the group of communist 
scientistic movement under the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee—in the city 
of Temirtau in Karaganda oblast. It alleged that this group did not involve in an y 
kind of scientific movement, rather it tried its best to protect and extol those members 
of independent organizations who were deliberately conducting subversive work.
24. A Russian was replaced from a top post and a Kazakh was appointed in his place 
(The New York Times, January 11, 1987: A8; Los Angeles Times, January 11, 
1987:13). The press also reported that republican authorities would give useful jobs to 
rioting students who were expelled from colleges (Reuters, January 11, 1987; The 
New York Times, January 11, 1987:A8). In particular, Kolbin began to speak of the 
need and introduce a number o f measures to promote Kazakh language and urge other 
nationalities in the republic to learn it. In addition, he changed his earlier position of 
holding the Kazakh nationalism solely responsible for the riots. He conceded that 
"People o f various nationalities were among opponents of perestroika who provoked 
riots in 1986. So there are no grounds to talk about the nationalism of the Kazakh 
people" (BBC, June 24, 1988).
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25. In fact, Kolbin had thought that the rise o f independent sociopolitical initiatives in 
the republic was a remote possibility (FBIS, December 9, 1988:69).
26. He expressed his aversion in his interview (FBIS Dec 9, 1988:68-74).
27. A host of autonomous sociopolitical formations that were active toward the end of 
the Kolbin era included environmental groups such as Green Front, Initiative, 
Ekologiya (Ecology) and Nevada Movement, peace groups such as the Kazakh Peace 
Committee, socioeconomic groups such as Youth Housing Complex Movement (which 
was involved in building houses for homeless), ethnic groups such as Wisdom (a 
Russian-oriented group), Zheltokstan (a Kazakh-oriented group), and political groups 
such as the Alma-Ata People’s Front and Democratic Union (FBIS, December 9, 
1988:68-74; BBC, December 24, 1988; January 14, 1989; Tass, February 7 and 
March 10, 1989).
28. For instance, in 1987, a freelance journalist working with a magazine, Ara 
(Bumblebee), was sent to jail for five days for a critical publication (BBC, February 
3, 1987) and people like Daukenov, a  serviceman and republican communist party 
activist in Dzhambul, were taken under control for what the authorities called 
unhealthy activities aimed at destroying social peace and inter-ethnic harmony. In the 
case of Daukenov, he was arrested for his attempt to hold a founding congress to set 
up "Atameken (Fatherland) Society”—a political group which the authorities claimed 
was being organized around a program dangerous to the welfare of Kazakh society. 
More specifically, what reportedly irked the authorities most was its program which 
allegedly called for "the unification o f Kazakhs and their isolation from the other 
people of the USSR, first and foremost in the sphere o f language” (FBIS December 9, 
1988:72).
29. Kolbin used pressure and other manipulative tactics to keep inconvenient 
candidates out o f the March 1989 election for the all-union parliament. The republican 
authorities and press sought to discredit them and emphasized the need to protect the 
masses from their anti-social, subversive platforms and actions (BBC, March 4,
1989).
30. Rebirth questioned the legality of the inclusion of the Urals area in Kazakhstan 
and demanded to revoke all the decrees issued in this context (BBC September 29,
1990). Cossack Society demanded a referendum in eight norther regions o f the 
republic on the question o f their accession to Russia (Official Kremlin International 
News Broadcast, September 25, 1990).
31.For instance, National Democratic Party was critical o f the imperial policies o f the 
center and rejoiced over the declaration o f sovereignty for republic—an unwelcome 
development for an overwhelming majority o f  the Russian nationality. Although 
Yedinstvo was formed to promote inter-ethnic peace and harmony in the republic, its 
opposition to the sovereignty declaration and its demands (such as recognition o f
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Russian language as a state language on equal footing with the Kazakh language 
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, September 21, 1990) provoked 
Kazakh protests and sullied its reputation as an inter-ethnic association among Kazakh 
activists.
32. Kazakhstan also witnessed the rise o f a large number of apolitical groups which 
on many occasions made potentially political demands. Human rights groups like 
Sakharov Committee and Kazakhstan Committee, trade and labor unions like 
W orkers’ Movement and Independent Union o f Miners, environmental groups like 
Union for the Salvation of the Aral and Amu Darya, and historical and educational 
society like Adiiet (Justice) can be included in this category of apolitical groups.
33. According to an official source, autonomous groups held 40 rallies, 
demonstrations, and protests in Alma-Ata from January through October 1990 
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 18, 1990).
34. The deputies asked Nazarbayev to drop the post o f first secretary of the party 
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 16, 1990).
35. For example, the official press published statements and views of the leaders of 
Democratic Kazakhstan and Azat who lashed out at the republican authorities for their 
respective reasons (Russian Press Digest, October 1, 1990; BBC, July 18, 1991).
36. The Kazakhstan’s Social Protection Coalition was reportedly made o f almost 250 
political parties, civic and national movements, and religious organizations (Russian 
Press Digest, January 23, 1993).
37. It was set up on May 24, 1997 at a round table meeting initiated by the Liberal 
Movement o f  Kazakhstan (BBC May 26, 1997).
38. People’s Front was created in late 1997. The members of this front include the 
communist party, the Worker’s Movement, the Azat, the Lad, and others (Current 
Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 52, 1998:17).
39. Kazakh authorities refused to reregister Yedinstvo because it called for making the 
Russian an official language; suspended activities o f the Semirecheye Cossack Society 
in November 1994 because of its involvement in paramilitary activities and for its 
efforts to promote ethnic intolerance (U.S. State Department, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1992 and 1994:816 and 860 respectively). The Cossacks 
o f Petropavlovsk rejected the offer that their association would be registered if they 
recognize the borders of the republic (CSCE, March 1994:6).
40. Nazarbayev has all along appealed for preserving social peace and sought to 
convince opposition forces that politics o f rallies was harmful to national interest 
during the transition period. As he did in the pre-independence, he proposed a year
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long moratorium on protest actions in the pre-independence period. Pro-government 
formations demanded and accepted it but most opposition groups rejected it (U.S. 
Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1143).
41. The local authorities in Shymkent and Zhambyl reportedly denied permits for 
rallies because o f the "danger of epidemics arising among large groups of people” 
(U.S. Department o f  State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1997:1142).
42. In June 1992, opposition parties, including unregistered ones, held a series of 
unauthorized protest rallies which lasted for several days in front o f the parliament 
building. In spite o f their threatening tone, Kazakh authorities took no punitive action 
involving persecution o f the protesters (BBC, June 18, 1992).
43. One of political dissidents to have received a longer sentence o f one year was 
Made! Ismailov, the leader of the ardent opposition group, the Worker’s Movement o f 
Kazakhstan, for holding an unauthorized rally in support o f pensioners (BBC, 
September 22, 1997).
44. For instance, Kazakh authorities suspended activities of the local branch of the 
Russian ethnonationalist group, LAD, in Ust-Mamenogorsk and began investigation of 
the Communist Party, threatened to suspend its activities and fined a number of its 
local chapters for their sponsorship of unauthorized rallies held in support of the 
Russian parliament’s vote to invalidate the 1991 decision to break up the former 
Soviet Union. Both formations had to bring their chapters into compliance with the 
law and acknowledge Kazakhstani sovereignty in order to renew their registration 
(U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1996:994).
45. The arrest and sentence of Gunkin became an inter-state issue between Russia and 
Kazakhstan. After this and other incidents of arrest o f a  number of other Cossacks, 
Russia decided to deploy Cossack units on its borders with Kazakhstan. Kazakh 
authorities dreaded the prospect of cooperation between these units and its Cossack 
population and protested to Russian authorities over this action but of no avail.
46. For instance, in June 1992, Nazarbayev threatened to start criminal proceedings 
against those participants in unauthorized rallies who insulted him and members of the 
parliament (BBC, June 18, 1992). However, the threatened action was not taken.
47. Others who were persecuted include a university instructor in 1992-93 for 
publishing the information that the president slapped a popular poet and politician, 
Madel Ismailov, the leader of the Worker’s Movement of Kazakhstan, in 1997 
(Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press, no. 52, 1998:17), and three youths for 
writing anti-presidential slogans on the walls in the town o f Uralsk in 1997 
(Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1142).
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48. For instance, a Cossack journalist, Boris Suprynuk, was convicted for inciting 
inter-ethnic enmity, insulting a public prosecutor and using "bad language” during his 
trial in 1995; and a prominent leader of an ethnic Russian movement was arrested, 
beaten during her detention, and put on a trial for insulting the public officials and 
assault on the court representatives in 1996.
49. According to the press accounts, the demonstrators chanted the following slogans: 
The "head of bandits govern us," "Step down on your own," "Nazarbayev: You are 
our Hitler" (Agence France Presse, December 8, 1996).
50. Given a high rating of Nazarbayev (Tass, November 22, 1991) and support of 
major political parties, including the Socialist Party, the People’s Congress and Azat, 
Kozhakhmetove was unlikely to win this election.
51. In June 1992, opposition parties held a series of unauthorized rallies in  front of 
the parliament building for a  number of demands, including the ouster o f the former 
communists and seats for opposition parties in the national legislature (BBC, June 18 
and 19, 1992).
52. Nazarbayev also blamed the national-radical elements for fanning inter-ethnic 
tensions, suggested the parliament to ban activities of unregistered associations, and 
threatened to prosecute the protesters for insulting the president and the members of 
the parliament (BBC, June 18 and 19, 1992; Russian Press Digest, June 22 , 1992; 
Current Digest o f  Post-Soviet Press, no. 24, 1995:26).
53. Some deputies saw the self-dissolution o f the parliament as a "coup d ’etat" 
masterminded by the president (CSCE, March 1994:4; Tne Reuters Library Report, 
December 8 and 9, 1993). Some opposition groups like the Democratic Committee on 
Human Rights criticized the president’s machinations to engineer the self-dissolution 
of the parliament. They rather demanded his resignation ( Russian Press Digest, 
October 2, 1993).
54. According to one press report, out o f 754 registered candidates, 169 w ere 
directors of state enterprises, 101 member of the government apparatus, 72 former 
parliamentarians, and 53 heads of the local administration. After looking a t the 
breakdown of candidates, one Western observer remarked that these figures show us 
in advance "what kind of parliament Kazakhstan is going to get" (Agence France 
Presse, March 4 , 1994).
55. The observer team of the Russian parliament complained about the treatment the 
Russian-speaking population was receiving from the Kazakh government. I t  went to 
the extent of saying that the election was won before the vote was cast (Tass, March 
11, 1994). Andronik Migranyan, a political adviser to Boris Yeltsin remarked that 
"There was evident discrimination... (and) this was another attempt to preserve the
256
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dominant position for the native Kazakhs over everybody else" (Agence France 
Presse, March 10, 1994).
56. The local press also joined the international observers. Kazakhstanskaya pravda 
and Sovety Kazakhstan in their March 10 issues wrote about such violations. The 
former noted that "the violations are so varied that just listing them would create the 
impression o f chaos" (CSCE, March 1994:12).
57. For instance, an ethnic Russian candidate was dropped from the electoral race 
because her electoral program contain, in the eyes o f  the authorities, provisions which 
could incite "ethnic hatred" (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1995:913).
58. The weekly newspaper, Economika Segodnya, was cited for not including in its 
masthead all the information required by the government regulation. In addition, after 
questioning its editor about an article which quoted an opposition leader criticizing the 
president, Kazakh authorities warned him that one more citation would result in the 
suspension o f its business license (U.S. Department o f  State, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1997:1140).
59. Independent institutions o f mass media which were banned, suspended temporarily 
or sued under these charges include Khak (Truth, the Alash party’s press organ), 
Kazakhskaya Pravda (Kazakh Truth, a Kazakh nationalist newspaper), Rabocheye 
Delo (the Communist Party’s newspaper), Tvin (an independent television station), 
Dozhivem do ponedelinka and Orda (the mouthpiece o f  the Republican Party of 
Kazakhstan). Khak was banned for spreading radical religious views in 1992 (BBC, 
August 27, 1992); Kazakhskaya Pravda was temporarily shut down in April 1994 
under the charges o f inciting ethnic tension (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 
No. 16, 1995:22); and Rabocheye Delo was closed down in June 1997, after Kazakh 
authorities refused to re-register it because the newspaper had allegedly called for a 
violent overthrow o f the social system—a claim the Communist Party contested and 
unsuccessfully sued the authorities for their heavy-handedness (BBC, June 30, 1997).
60. Not to talk o f opposition publications, many independent newspapers and 
journalists have criticized the new bicameral parliament as a "tame parliament in the 
President’s pocket” (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1996:993).
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CHAPTER 5
KYRGYZSTAN 
FROM "OASIS OF DEMOCRACY" TO THE THRESHOLD
OF DICTATORSHIP?
INTRODUCTION
In the wake o f the August 1991 abortive putsch in Moscow, Askar Akayev, 
the president o f  Kyrgyzstan, one of the IS Soviet republics, declared full 
independence for his republic on August 31, 1991. Like other Soviet republics, 
Kyrgyzstan was in the throes of the center-sponsored economic and political reform 
measures at the time of the August 1991 coup and the subsequent formal breakup of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991. However, unlike other Central Asian republics 
which were governed by more or less politically unreformed communist elites, 
Kyrgyzstan was ruled by a non-communist reformist president at the time of its 
independence. Consequently, it surpassed them in dismantling the communist order 
and in deepening political liberalization—an area in which it was well ahead o f them 
at the time o f independence— in the post-independence period. As a result of his 
impressive democratic record in the early post-independence period, laudatory titles 
such as "a true Jeffersonian democrat" (CSCE 1995:2) and "as an oasis o f democracy 
in an authoritarian desert” (CSCE 1998:17) were awarded to Akayev and his republic 
respectively.
Although by mid-1994 the political liberalization process which was making 
impressive strides began to falter as Akayev launched a limited and selective 
authoritarian offensive primarily against the opposition press and journalists, this
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authoritarian offensive did not degenerate into an abject repressive regime1 as has 
been the case with Tajikistan (from late 1992 to mid-1997), Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. In spite of several reversals which the political liberalization process 
suffered down the road, Kyrgyzstan continued to surpass other Central Asian 
republics in terms of political liberalization. One of the premises o f this study is that 
the post-communist regime Akayev built in the post-independence period is the prime 
example of politically reformed regimes in Central Asia.
The impressive record o f Kyrgyzstan in the area of political liberalization is 
intriguing because socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with it are 
comparatively quite weak in that country. In this chapter, we intend to address this 
intriguing question. We will examine our empirical evidence on political liberalization 
and its correspondence with our theoretical expectations. Before we examine our 
empirical data, it is important for us to first discuss the extent to which our three 
independent variables, the Russian minority, elite structure, and political attitudes of 
the leadership, hold in the republic. A concise discussion in this regard will be useful 
for interpreting the empirical evidence and for assessing its correspondence with our 
theoretical expectations.
In order to adequately appreciate the level of political liberalization Kyrgyzstan 
achieved in the post-independence period, we will examine glasnost under both 
Akayev and his predecessor, Absamat Masaliyev, in the pre-independence period. The 
remainder of the chapter will focus on various aspects of political liberalization in the 
post-independence period. More specifically, the rise of political parties and social
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movements, politics of the electoral process, and freedom of the independent mass 
media will receive our special attention. The politics of the authoritarian turn 
beginning in mid-1994 will also be examined with the special focus on the 
confrontation between the presidential leadership on the one hand and the opposition 
print media and independent journalists on the other. Main findings o f this chapter 
will be summarized in the conclusion.
A LARGE AND POLITICALLY ACTIVE RUSSIAN MINORITY
At the time o f independence, Kyrgyzstan housed almost one million ethnic 
Russians who made up 21.5% of the population (see Table 1). The Russian minority 
is mostly concentrated in the capital city, Bishkek, making up 55.8% of its population 
(see Table 3). Although the titular ethnic group, Kyrgyz, made up 52% of the total 
population, it made up only 22.7% of the capital city’s population in 1989 (see Tables 
2 and 3; Huskey 1995:6; Heleniak 1997:370). A sizable number of ethnic Russians 
also live on the most fertile and arable lands in southern Kyrgyzstan (Khazanov 
1995:150). According to the 19% estimate, the size of ethnic Russians shrank to  15% 
and Kyrgyz increased their share of the total population to 59.9% (see Table 2).
Although the Russian minority has been increasingly shrinking in proportion to 
the titular nationality primarily due to its out-migration since the 1980s,2 it continues 
to be a very resourceful ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to its large size, its 
concentration in the urban areas, and occupation o f fertile lands, its technical and 
professional skills and the official and private support it draws from its co-ethnics in
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Russia significantly contribute to the resourcefulness o f the Russian minority in the 
republic.
Industry, medicine, and other important fields are mostly manned and managed 
by ethnic Russians, and their out-migration is reportedly decimating these important 
fields, accelerating the economic decline o f the republic (Olcott 1995a:219; 1997:
213; Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 17, 1993:12).3 This situation caused 
serious concerns in the republican political leadership which has been offering its 
Russian minority a number o f incentives to prevent the exodus o f a skilled labor force 
(Huskey 1995:829; Heleniak 1997:372). The Russian government’s concerns 
regarding the welfare of the Russian minority also account for such incentives.
Russian authorities have not only provided critical political support to ethnic Russians 
by taking up their causes with Kyrgyz authorities at the bilateral level but have also 
provide material aid to them.4 The presence of Russian troops on Kyrgyz soil further 
underwrites the security o f the Russian minority in the republic.
The resourcefulness of the Russian minority resulting from both internal and 
external factors is not without consequences. Its resourcefulness has induced its 
members to set up sociopolitical organizations to pursue their interests, compete with 
other social groups, including the titular nationality, in the republic, and make 
demands on the state. A number of ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan were among the 
leading elements who answered the call o f the central reform-oriented forces to 
advance the cause of perestroika in Kyrgyzstan (FBIS October 7, 1987:53-7; June 8, 
1988:66-7; July 29, 1988:64-5). Gennadii Shipitko, the local correspondent of Izvestia
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and arch rival o f  Masaliyev was one of such people. He also contested the March 
1989 all-union parliamentary elections as an independent candidate and defeated his 
communist competitor in the capital city.
Of course, Shipitko and three other independent candidates3 who defeated 
their communist competitors owed their victory to the Russian residents Bishkek. The 
electoral victory o f  these independent candidates clearly signified the readiness and 
willingness o f the Russian minority to defy the communist leadership in the republic. 
In fact, ethnic Russians were among the pioneers who organized the first informal 
group, Demos—a political discussion club formed in the capital city in spring 1987 
(Huskey 1995:832). The subsequent organization of informal political groups was also 
facilitated by the active participation of the Russian minority. For instance, its 
members actively participated in the formation the Voter’s Club which played an 
instrumental role in the victory of a sizable minority of independent candidates in the 
cities, including Bishkek, in the February 1990 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. 
The same independent candidates later played, in collaboration with the Voter’s Club 
and other independent political formations, an important role in the defeat o f the 
communist leadership in the October 1990 presidential elections and the victory of 
Akayev, a non-party reformist candidate.
The Russian minority’s political activism did not end with the independence of 
Kyrgyzstan. If anything, the Russian minority has become more alert due to the 
transition policies o f the government in the post-independence period because most of 
these policies are tailored to the interests o f the titular nationality. In order to promote
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its interests, it has set up many sociopolitical formations in the post-independence 
period. Notable among them are the Slavic Fund, the Assembly o f the People of 
Kyrgyzstan, Soglasie (Accord), and Association of Ethnic Russians. These Russian- 
oriented formations advocate social equality and press for making the Russian the 
second state language in Kyrgyzstan (CSCE 1995:6; 1998:16). Some of these groups 
have pooled their resources to publish their own newspapers, Soglasie, in Osh in 
order to educate their own co-ethnics and influence public opinion and decision 
making process in the republic. In short, the Russian minority continues to survive as 
a resourceful ethnic group with a capacity to enormously increase the price o f its 
repression in the post-independence period.
FRAGMENTED ELITE STRUCTURE IN KYRGYZSTAN
In the early days of glasnost, the republican communist leadership was in firm 
control of political life in Kyrgyzstan. The republican communists supported 
Masaliyev’s efforts to circumvent the center-sponsored reform program. However, 
this unity of purpose did not last long. As the central authorities began to deepen their 
political reform program, an increasing number of republican communist elites 
deserted their conservative leadership to join the central and republican reform- 
oriented forces.
The first serious crack in the communist elite structure appeared on the eve of 
the March 1989 all-union parliamentary elections. In fact, these elections exposed to 
public view serious rifts and fault lines among the republican communist elites, 
especially between the Russified urban and Central Asian rural areas. Some
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candidates like Akayev who owed their victory to the republican communist party 
refused to follow its leadership. As a result, Masaiiyev failed, for the first time in the 
history of the republic, to lead a united delegation to the all-union parliament (Huskey 
1995:821; 1997:250).
The February 1990 republican parliamentary elections further eroded the 
communist base and elite structure in Kyrgyzstan. The communist leadership failed to 
keep the republican communist elites in line and to reduce these elections into a 
Soviet variety of electoral contest with the party leadership in full control o f the 
whole electoral process. As a  consequence, the republican parliament saw the rise of 
a very vocal group of reformist deputies.6
Although the 1989 and 1990 elections clearly revealed widening rifts within 
the communist elites themselves, the most serious fissure in the Kyrgyz elite structure 
occurred in the wake of the Osh incident, a  series o f violent clashes between Uzbek 
and Kyrgyz ethnic communities over a piece of land in Osh in June 1990. The 
republican communist authorities not only failed to prevent the Osh incident but also 
tried to blame the extremist, anti-state, and criminal forces, including the informal 
groups, for the bloody incident. However, they found it hard to sell this explanation 
outside as well as inside the communist party circles. A sizable number o f communist 
parliamentarians were quite dissatisfied with the performance o f the republican 
communist leadership in handling and more so with its explanation o f the incident. As 
a result, in September 1990, a group of 114 deputies announced its existence under
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the name of "For Democratic Renewal and Civil Harmony in Kirghizia" in the 
parliament.
In its political platform published in the local press, the group attacked the 
communist leadership for its overall anti-reform approach as well as its poor handling 
of the Osh incident. The group also promised "to develop its own point of view on 
current public-political, social and economic processes through open debate, to 
propose legislative initiatives and to draw up alternative laws, decisions and other 
Supreme Soviet documents" (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 38, 1990:23).7
The formation o f  such an independent reformist group in the parliament was 
an unprecedented occurrence which further eroded the communist leadership position 
and shook the communist elite structure to its foundation. In fact, the defection of 114 
deputies proved quite fateful. The disgruntled deputies played a critical role in the 
failure of Masaliyev to conduct and win the October 1990 presidential election in the 
old Soviet style. Masaliyev had to face two other career communist leaders in this 
election.8 The electoral contest between the three career communist leaders supported 
by their respective supporters in the republican parliament was indicative o f a  serious 
rift among the communist elites. As victory eluded all the three candidates because 
none of them received the required number o f votes to consummate his victory in the 
presidential election, the hung parliament voted Akayev, a pro-reform member o f the 
all-union parliament, into power.
The victory o f  Akayev accelerated the disintegration of the communist elite 
structure. After he assumed power, a sizable number o f communists joined his
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reformist team.9 This disintegrative process continued in the post-independence 
period. The Kyrgyz communist party proved incapable of bringing back its defected 
members and regaining its internal unity once it was lost in 1989-90. In fact, 
independence further eroded the internal integrity of the communist elite structure. A 
number o f important communist leaders either became allies o f the incumbent 
government or left the communist party to join other sociopolitical and ethnic-oriented 
groups in the post-independence period. At times, important communist leaders 
competed against each other in national elections.10
The post-independence political elites were divided not only along ideological 
and ethnic lines but also along regional lines. According to Martha Olcott, elite 
structure in the republic reflects the existence of three factions which correspond to 
clan-based geographic divisions: Naryn, Talas, and Osh (Olcott 1993a:55).u This 
division is not without consequences. According to Matveeva, political barons 
representing these regions "put serious constraints on the extent o f presidential power” 
(Matveeva 1999:28).12 In 1992, the election of Bekmamat Osmonov as the chairman 
of the Soviet Executive Committee o f a southern province, Jalalabad, against 
Akayev’s will (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, March 10, 1992:5) is a case in 
point. In fact, this election also reflected the growing defiance of southern elites.13 
In the February 1995 parliamentary elections, southern elites and masses defeated 
placemen from the north—an outcome which made it clear that southern elites were 
no longer ready to accept the traditional dominance of northern elites in politics.
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The resistance of southern elites in general and their defiance during the 1995 
election in particular, division between elites o f the Russified urban and Central Asian 
rural areas, and the split communist party clearly revealed that the post-independence 
elite structure was anything but cohesive. The continued confrontation between the 
executive and legislative branches of the government on a number of issues, including 
corruption, economic reforms, and constitutional matters, in the post-independence 
period further supports this assertion.
The continued disintegration of elite structure in the post-independence period 
was not without consequences. The communist party ceased to be a cohesive political 
force capable o f halting altogether the political reform process in the republic, 
although communists still occupy important positions in the government and can 
potentially slow it down.14 In addition, networks of patron-client relationship ceased 
to be an asset o f a single political force, be it ruling group or opposition, in the post­
independence period. In other words, more power was dispersed in Kyrgyz society in 
the post-independence period than in the pre-independence period—a situation 
expected to be conducive for political liberalization.
ASKAR AKAYEV: A REFORMIST POLITICAL LEADER
As compared to his successor, Masaliyev, who openly expressed his anti­
reformist views (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 26, 1989:11 and no. 3, 1990:4), 
Akayev presented himself as a leader with a reformist political outlook. The 
communist party helped Akayev win his seat as a non-party candidate in the 1989 
parliamentary elections. However, once in Moscow, he became active supporter of
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the Gorbachev reform program. As compared to anti-reformist speeches o f Masaliyev, 
Akayev’s speeches in the all-union parliament stressed the need to deepen political 
reforms and emphasized the positive consequences o f democratization of public life in 
the country.13 Unlike Masaliyev who blamed democratization of public life, 
especially the informal groups, for negative phenomena like inter-ethnic tensions, 
Akayev blamed the republican communist party and its leadership rather the center- 
sponsored reform program for the slow pace of reform and other social problems, 
including inter-ethnic bloody disputes, in the republic (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, 
no. 25, 1990:14). His reformist views endeared him to Gorbachev and helped him 
defeat the career communist candidates in the October 1990 presidential elections in 
the republican parliament.
As a result o f their conflicting approaches toward political reform underway in 
the country, both president Akayev and the republican communist leadership took 
different sides on the eve of the August 1991 putsch in Moscow. The communist 
leadership supported the coup whereas Akayev opposed it. He described the 
supporters o f the coup as "political opportunists" who were willing to sacrifice their 
own people for the sake of their "selfish political ambitions" (Current Digest of Soviet 
Press, no. 33, 1991:25).16 Unlike other Central Asian leaders, especially Karimov of 
Uzbekistan, Akayev viewed the republican communist party as an obstacle rather than 
an asset in the transformation of communist order.17
In the post-independence period, Akayev’s reformist views remained 
unchanged. He continued to see the plurality o f political views as a natural
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phenomenon in the development process.18 According to him, people must "form a 
wide network o f autonomous and capable civic institutions independent of the state 
authorities and political structures" (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 5, 
1996:23)—a suggestion clearly meant to empower civil society vis-a-vis the formal 
state structures. The opposition press and political parties are, according to his 
opinion, important forces to keep the incumbent government on the right track 
(Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 12, 1992:34). Addressing news media 
executives o f the leading newspapers of the CIS who were attending a  conference in 
Bishkek in March 1992, he invited them to assist him in building a law-governed civil 
society and in forming democratic values and ideas through their critical analysis of 
his policies. However, he expects opposition press to perform its functions in a 
civilized manner (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 12, 1992:34).19
Although Akayev emphasizes the importance of order, he does not see political 
stability and democratization o f public life as two competing goals. As compared to 
Karimov who prioritizes economics over politics and consequently postpones political 
reforms, Akayev sees both economic and political reforms as equally important goals 
which can be pursued simultaneously. Likewise, he refers to the underdevelopment of 
democratic culture o f his people,20 but does not see it as a  justification for an 
authoritarian regime. In fact, Akayev believes that such culture can be developed 
through democratic practices like competitive national and local elections. Regretting 
that candidates, voters, and election officials committed some excesses in the 
February 199S parliamentary elections, he remarked that "All o f us in Kyrgyzstan are
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still beginners in democracy, and perhaps we still understand it with our heads, not 
with our hearts. " However, he hoped that the next election would be truly 
democratic, free, and competitive (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 
1995:15).
In view of the above discussion about political outlooks of Masaliyev and 
Akayev, we expect different outcomes concerning political reforms in the pre- and 
post-independence periods. In other words, we expect Masaliyev to circumvent rather 
than facilitate political liberalization in the pre-independence period, but we expect 
Akayev to promote rather than sabotage political liberalization before and after 
independence.
GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE MASALIYEV ERA
Some Soviet republics experienced glasnost much earlier and more 
significantly than others. Like other Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan also 
witnessed its late arrival for a number o f reasons. The common reasons the Central 
Asian republics shared for the late arrival o f glasnost have already been discussed in 
the third chapter.21 Here, we shall confine our discussion to reasons specific to 
Kyrgyzstan.
Specific circumstances responsible for the late introduction of glasnost are 
related to the role o f the conservative leadership o f Absamat Masaliyev. In 1985, 
Masaliyev replaced the longtime party boss, Turdiakun Usulbaliyev, as the First 
Secretary of the Kyrgyz communist party. He initially cooperated with the central 
authorities in their anti-corruption campaign22 which was an important component of
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the center-sponsored reform program. However, he soon found himself at odds with 
the central authorities for a number of inter-related reasons, including his dislike for 
glasnost. He chose very sensitive forums such as All-Union CPSU Conference, USSR 
Supreme Soviet, and the press to express his utter dislike for the Gorbachev reform 
program (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 26, 1989:11 and no. 3, 1990:4). A 
leader so openly opposed to glasnost was unlikely to confine himself to simply 
expressing his anti-reformist views. He could be expected to do more. As compared 
to his little or no role in shaping the central reform politics,23 Masaliyev made 
serious efforts to prevent the deepening of glasnost in his own republic, especially to 
the extent it occurred in Russia and the Baltic republics. However, his anti-reform 
efforts were only partially successful. As we shall discuss below, the pressure of 
central authorities, active political participation of ethnic groups, and growing 
fragmentation among the republican communist elites counter-balanced such efforts.
As part of its reform strategy, the central reformist leadership called upon the 
mass media to promote the cause of restructuring. As already mentioned, a number of 
central newspapers tried to play the assigned role and exposed serious problems in 
Kyrgyzstan. Masaliyev disliked their pro-reform crusade and master-minded a 
counter-attack on them. However, he confined himself to a verbal counter-attack 
because the central press and its local Russian correspondents enjoyed the protection 
of central authorities and the support of the Russian minority in the republic. As a 
result, an independent source of information in the form o f central newspapers 
remained available to the masses in his republic.
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As compared to the central press, the republican mass media and its 
representatives had to endure a different fate. In fact, the latter were under the direct 
control o f the republican government. It provided them little freedom for independent 
and critical coverage of many deep-seated problems in the republic.34 A repressive 
policy was pursued toward those journalists who were somewhat reluctant to toe the 
official line. They were subjected to various coercive and punitive measures such as 
character assassination, expulsion from the party, dismissal from service, and trial on 
various charges.
The Kyrgyz leadership was no less hostile to the formation o f independent 
sociopolitical groups and movements. However, as compared to its effective control 
over the local mass media, it was less successful in curbing the rise o f independent 
sociopolitical formations in its republic. Its hostile approach was able to delay, but 
could not arrest altogether, the rise of such formations. A number o f discussion clubs 
such as Demos, Soveremennik, and Pozistsia arose in 1987-88. The Russian minority 
actively participated in the formation of these clubs. These clubs were allowed to 
debate political issues, including the political future of socialism.35
!n spite o f a narrow scope of their activities, the above pioneer groups were 
indicative of the possible existence of independent associations outside the communist 
fold. The message was not lost on various societal forces eager to partake in 
socioeconomic and political processes in the republic. A number of new informal 
groups, initially loosely organized around economic, social, cultural, and ethnic 
causes, began to rise and evade the controlling hand o f Kyrgyz authorities. Some
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main apolitical groups which arose and made an important contribution to the 
expansion o f independent political space during the Masaliyev era are: Ekolog (an 
environmental group), Ashar, Asaba, and Osh Aimagy (Kyrgyz-oriented groups), the 
United Council o f Labor Collectives (a group o f Russian industrial workers created to 
defend their interests), and Adolat (an Uzbek-oriented group). However the basic 
apolitical character o f these groups, many o f them, especially those created to 
promote interests of particular ethnic communities, made demands of political nature 
and became explicit political formations over time. Hence, the very existence of these 
groups and their pursuit of ostensibly non-political agendas significantly contributed to 
the rise of independent political activity during the Masaliyev era.
After the Kyrgyz authorities grudgingly conceded a space to independent 
environmental, socioeconomic, and ethnic-oriented informal associations to operate in 
the capital city, more explicit political groups were organized to test political waters. 
These groups include the City Voter’s Club and Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan 
(DMK). The former was organized in the capital city in August 1989. Although this 
group had an inter-ethnic character, the Russian residents of the capital city actively 
participated in its organization and activities. The republican communist leadership 
experienced for the first time the real political clout of this group in the 1990 
republican and local legislative elections in the capita] city. This group humbled the 
communist leadership with its instrumental role in securing the victory o f some 
independent candidates over their communist competitors in these elections. The 
second (but the most important) political group, DMK, was a merger of 24 small and
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large informal groups. It was created in May 1990 to consolidate divided independent 
societal forces, coordinate their activities, and build effective pressure from below to 
accelerate the democratization process in the republic.26
The democratization process received tremendous impetus from another 
development, too. That is, a growing split in the republican elite structure, especially 
in the wake o f the Osh conflict. This split effectively fhistrated Masaiiyev’s anti- 
reform efforts and ultimately cost him leadership position in the republic.
The Osh conflict claimed hundreds o f lives27 and greatly discredited the 
republican leadership.28 As already mentioned, the republican communist authorities 
tried to blame the anti-state forces, including the informal groups, for the bloody 
incident. A sizable number of communist parliamentarians as well as independent 
sociopolitical forces refused to accept this explanation. They rather publicly blamed 
the communist leadership. Even some local newspapers joined them in their criticism 
of the communist leadership (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 25, 1990:15). More 
importantly, the disgruntled deputies formed a reformist group in the parliament in 
the wake o f the Osh incident. This group lashed out at the communist leadership for 
mishandling the Osh conflict. The local press provided an extensive coverage to its 
platform. The same group later played an instrumental role in fhistrating Masai iyev’s 
attempt to run unopposed in the parliamentary election for president in October 1990, 
and in his failure to secure the office in the two rounds of election.
In line with their overall manipulative anti-reform approach, the republican 
authorities tried to manipulate, like other components of glasnost, the electoral
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process in order to preserve firm communist control in the republic. Although they 
were able to secure an overwhelming victory in the March 1989 all-union and 
February 1990 republican legislative elections because of their better material and 
organizational resources and manipulation of the election rules, their successes proved 
temporary. Their manipulation o f the electoral process failed to produce the intended 
enduring results. In other words, in spite of all its manipulative efforts, the 
communist conservative leadership failed to block the democratizing impact of the 
centrally mandated competitive elections on the republican politics and its replacement 
with a pro-reform political leadership in the republic.
The first competitive elections held under the central scrutiny were the March 
1989 ali-union parliamentary elections. These elections proved a painful experience 
for the republican leadership. In spite of its effort to transform these elections into a 
Soviet variety, contested elections took place in 34 out of 43 electoral districts—an 
unprecedented event in the electoral history of the republic. In addition, four 
independent candidates with the active support of Russian voters were able to defeat 
their communist competitors in the capital city. As already mentioned, the local 
correspondent of Izvestia and arch rival of Masaliyev, Gennadii Shipitko, an ethnic 
Russian, was among the successful independent candidates. As a result, the republican 
leadership failed to send to the all-union parliament a united delegation with an 
appropriate character reflecting various societal sections such as women, workers, 
peasants, and minorities.
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The next competitive elections were held for republican and local legislative 
bodies on February 25, 1990. In spite of the fact that conservative leadership won an 
overwhelming compliant majority, these elections also accelerated the political 
liberalization process and eroded the communist base in the republic. A total of 1032 
candidates stood in the parliamentary elections. Only 86 out o f 350 seats were 
uncontested, all in the rural areas. The three month long election campaign produced 
lot of political heat and commotion. The communist leaders had to focus on many 
troubling fronts during these elections, including protest rallies in the capital city.29
Still, more troublesome for the conservative leadership was the bold 
participation o f informal groups such as the Russian-dominated Voter’s Club in the 
elections and the consequent victory of a sizable number of independent candidates 
over their communist competitors. The true value o f this victory became evident at 
the opening session o f the new parliament on April 10, 1990, when independent 
deputies voiced their opposition to the communist party and its practices and tried to 
put up their own candidate against Masaliyev in the election for the chairman of the 
new parliament, threatening to end the established practice of unopposed election for 
that office. The presence o f a solid bloc of opposition deputies clearly exposed serious 
limitations on the capabilities o f the communist leadership to shape political arena to 
its taste. In fact, over time its capabilities to control the political process in the 
republic were weakened to the extent that it failed to secure a desirable outcome in 
the October 1990 presidential election in the parliament.
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As already mentioned, in the wake of the Osh violent incident, a  sizable group 
o f communist deputies broke ranks with the leadership and entered into an alliance 
with the independent deputies in the republican parliament. This alliance played a 
critical role in the failure o f the conservative party leadership to conduct and win the 
October 1990 presidential election in the old Soviet style. In fact, this alliance became 
a formidable electoral force and a challenge for the communist leadership when the 
Chairman of the Council o f Ministers, Apas Jumagulov, joined it and decided to 
oppose Masaliyev in the presidential election. The defiance o f Jumagulov and the 
central authorities’ endorsement o f competitive election ruled out any real possibility 
o f the use of force against this alliance. In addition to Jumagulov, D. Amanbayev, 
the first secretary of the party committee in the Issyk-Kul province, was also a 
contender. The electoral contest between the three career communist leaders 
supported by their respective supporters in the republic parliament was indicative of a 
serious rift among the communist elites. In other words, Masaliyev could no longer 
command traditional communist loyalty of the communist elites. Thus, he had little 
choice other than contesting the election.
In the first round o f election, victory eluded all the three candidates because no 
one received the required 50 percent votes. In the second round of voting, Masaliyev 
and Jumagulov both received almost equal number of votes but each fell short of the 
required number o f votes to consummate his electoral victory. As a result, in 
compliance with the exclusionary clause their names were removed from the ballot, 
and the parliament considered a new slate of six presidential candidates.
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The hung parliament and presence o f the picketers and hunger strikers outside 
the parliament had created a crisis-like situation in the republic. The center seized this 
moment and interfered in the electoral process producing unpropitious political 
consequences for the conservative leadership. The central reformist team preferred 
Akayev, a member in the all-union parliament and chairman of the National Academy 
of Sciences in Kyrgyzstan. More importantly, he was an ardent supporter of 
Gorbachev and his reform program. In addition, he had the support of certain other 
democratically oriented forces, including informal political groups such as DMK. In 
the second round of election, the republican parliament ended the electoral deadlock.
It voted Akayev into power—an auspicious decision for the political liberalization 
process in the republic. In fact, this fateful development that some call "silk 
revolution" (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 8, 1994:27-8) transferred the 
power o f political decision-making from the party leadership to a reformist president 
and ushered in a truly new political era remarkably conducive for greater political 
liberalization in Kyrgyzstan.
GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE AKAYEV ERA
As already mentioned, the republican communist authorities before Akayev 
assumed power were opposed to the center-sponsored political reform measures. 
However, in spite of their sustained opposition, political liberalization continued to 
progress in a slow but steady manner in Kyrgyzstan. A number of factors, including 
the central leadership’s continued support for political reform, disintegrating 
communist elite structure, and willingness and readiness of Akayev to take actions
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conducive for political liberalization, rendered the communist opposition ineffective. 
After Akayev took power, he enjoyed the support of both the central leadership and 
Russian minority for his effort to accelerate the reform process in his republic. His 
own support and encouragement became available to democratically oriented political 
forces in their effort to challenge the dominance of the communist party.
In line with preferences o f his own, his local allies, and above all the central 
authorities, Akayev began to introduce political and economic reforms through 
presidential initiatives. The purpose of such reform initiatives was to accelerate the 
political liberalization process through building a strong support base for it. His 
12-member presidential council was one such initiative which pioneered independent 
participation in the authoritative political decision-making in the republic. This council 
included Qazat Akhmatov, the co-chairman of the DMK (Haghayeghi, 1995:135). He 
permitted political forces of different colors under the central law to organize and 
operate without any fear of repression and systematic official obstacles. In fact, 
registered and unregistered autonomous political groups were able to carry out their 
activities without intimidation and repression under Akayev. After the republic 
parliament finally sanctioned political pluralism in December 1990, one important 
addition to the list of autonomous formations was the nationalist party, Erkin Kyrgyz, 
in February 1991.
Likewise, Akayev pursued a benign press and media policy in line with the 
August 1990 all-union law which guaranteed the press freedom. The law permitted 
state bodies, public organizations, political parties, social movements, and individual
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citizens o f 18 years to found media outlets (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 25, 
1990:16-17). As a result o f his faithful practice of this law, the press was made 
accessible to opposition forces and journalists could freely write about sensitive and 
controversial issues facing the republic without facing punitive reactions.
As an astute politician, Akayev tried to accelerate the political liberalization 
process without engaging in a direct confrontation with the party apparatus. However, 
because the party leadership was well aware of the grave consequences of his reform 
measures for the future o f the party, it began to openly oppose his reform initiatives. 
The conservative communist deputies sought to block his reform initiatives on the one 
hand and passed laws with potentially harmful effects on the political liberalization 
process on the other. For instance, in spring 1990, a bill was passed in the parliament 
which recognized the republic's territory as the exclusive property of ethnic Kyrgyz. 
This bill had enormous potential for provoking inter-ethnic bloody conflict, hence 
prejudicial for the fledgling political liberalization process in the republic.
In the wake o f a  number o f encouraging developments such as Masaliyev’s 
resignation as chairman o f the parliament, Akayev took many bold decisions to 
overcome the communist opposition and advance the political liberalization process in 
the republic. For instance, in January 1991, he replaced the conservative Cabinet o f 
Ministers with a smaller relatively young reformist Cabinet. He also used his 
presidential veto power to kill the above bill which stipulated that the republic’s 
territory exclusively belonged to ethnic Kyrgyz. In addition, he took other political 
and economic measures which were certain to reduce the role and influence of the
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communist party, providing more space to the fledgling autonomous political forces in 
Kyrgyz society.
The above political trends constitute pan  of the evidence which clearly 
indicates that in spite o f a systematic communist effon to undermine Akayev and his 
reform program, political balance continued to shift over time in his favor. The 
republican communist leadership made the most serious move to reverse this shift 
during the August 1991 coup. After the coup leadership announced its takeover in 
Moscow, the republican communist party announced its "full and unconditional 
support" for it and discussed ways to remove Akayev from power. The commander of 
the Turkistan Military District, General Fuzhenko, was also poised to send his tanks 
to support an action against Akayev (Russian Press Digest, August 23, 1991; Current 
Digest of Soviet Press, no. 34, 1991:47-8).
For his part, Akayev took all necessary precautionary and preemptive 
measures against the looming threat o f a similar coup attempt in the republic. He 
ordered the republic television to repeatedly broadcast every two hours Yeltsin’s 
declaration in which the latter called upon the people to defeat the putsch (Bozdag, 
1992:282; Haghayeghi, 1995:136). He also dismissed the chairman o f the republic’s 
KGB who did not inform the former o f the communist plans in time (BBC, August 
22, 1991), and ordered the troops o f the Interior Ministry to surround the headquarter 
of the republican communist party central committee. In addition to these measures, 
in his statement o f support for anti-coup forces, Akayev lashed out at the republican 
communist party leadership for its support for the coup in the country. He viewed
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such support as an anti-democratic and unconstitutional act. More importantly, he 
issued a presidential decree on departyization which effectively reduced the vanguard 
party to a simply another public association in the republic. After the coup failed, 
criminal proceedings were initiated against the First Secretary, Central Committee 
secretaries and politburo members for helping those who carried out an 
unconstitutional coup in the country (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 33, 1991:25; 
no. 34, 1991:47-8). In a move to further weaken the communist party, Akayev issued 
a decree which banned the communist party and nationalized its property in the 
republic.
Although Akayev's action of banning the communist party is not in line with 
his liberal thinking and it violates theoretical premises of political liberalization, this 
and his other actions such as departyization facilitated the political liberalization 
process in the post-independence period. In fact, in the wake of these actions, the 
communist party lost its open access to state resources, suffered more internal splits, 
and was reduced to a  mere another public association. As a result, the ability of the 
main anti-reform political force to obstruct the reform process underway in the 
republic was greatly diminished, providing Akayev an unprecedented political latitude 
to introduce more meaningful reform measures and deepen political liberalization in 
the republic in the post-independence period. Thus, as we expected not only reformist 
political outlook but also actions (though some of them, including the ban on the 
communist party, did not correspond to liberal thinking) of the leadership had a 
positive impact on political liberalization during the Akayev era. In addition,
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disintegrating communist elite structure, and the support o f both the central leadership 
and other democratically oriented forces, including the Russian minority, for 
Akayev’s reform policies proved, as we expected, beneficial influences for political 
liberalization in the republic.
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA
The above chain o f actions and reactions which the August coup set in motion 
conclusively shifted political balance in Akayev’s favor, further fragmented the 
communist party, and eroded its dominance in society—a situation conducive for 
political liberalization. After independence, Akayev proceeded in alliance with 
democratically oriented forces, including the Russian minority, to accelerate the 
implementation o f his political reform program. As already mentioned, his impressive 
democratic conduct in the early post-independence period earned him international 
praise. However, over time, the political liberalization process failed to maintain a 
linear progress in the post-independence period. It rather suffered reversals in certain 
areas down the road. In spite o f these reversals and aberrations, Kyrgyzstan continued 
to surpass all other Central Asian republics in terms o f an overall progress in almost 
all aspects o f political liberalization. The remaining chapter is devoted to the 
discussion and explanation of the progress Kyrgyzstan made as well as reversals it 
experienced in various aspects o f political liberalization in the post-independence 
period. More precisely, we shall focus on the rise o f autonomous sociopolitical 
associations and the extent o f their access to the political process, the rise of 
independent mass media and its relationship with the government, and the extent to
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which the electoral process is transparent and open to the opposition political forces in 
Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence period.
THE RISE OF WEAK BUT INDEPENDENT SOCIOPOLITICAL 
FORMATIONS
One of the areas in which the post-independence political liberalization process 
recorded sustained progress with few minor aberrations is the freedom of political and 
social forces to organize themselves, engage in independent political activity, and 
pursue their stated programs. In fact, almost all the necessary parts for a multiparty 
political system were already in place before independence. As mentioned earlier, 
political pluralism was sanctioned in the central as well as republican law, and several 
leading independent individuals and groups were directly or indirectly involved in 
political activities before independence. However, the legal foundation for political 
pluralism was truly put in place after Akayev became president and independent 
sociopolitical groups had more freedom o f action under him than his predecessor.
After independence, in line with his favorable opinion about the plurality o f political 
views, the legal foundation for political pluralism was further fortified, and Akayev 
and his team made no sustained effort to circumvent rules in order to curtail the 
freedom o f action of various political parties, social movements, and civil groups in 
the republic. In fact, corresponding to his liberal outlook, Akayev took certain actions 
which made it much easier for a host of political and social forces to organize, 
receive official recognition, criticize the government and its policies, and participate 
in sociopolitical processes in the republic in the post-independence period.
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One o f such decisions conducive for political liberalization was the decision of 
Akayev not to join any political party in the post-independence era. Although he did 
not join any political party, he drew support from many existing political parties and 
social movements. In fact, a large number o f important former communist leaders 
representing their respective concerns either formed or joined various sociopolitical 
formations. These leaders and their sociopolitical formations have a common interest: 
to resist their depoliticization. Therefore, the incumbent leadership has to pay a heavy 
price to deactivate these elites and their associations. Also, it is difficult for Akayev 
to unify so many important political elites with diverse interests under him—a unity 
which could have tempted him to use authoritarian methods to deal with the small 
number of remaining political dissidents.
In addition, these leaders and formations have been supportive o f Akayev on 
some important issues such as his confrontation with the communist party leadership 
but have been critical of him on other relatively less important issues such as various 
economic and political transition policies. In this situation, an outright repression of 
these elites and sociopolitical associations could have eroded his own support base and 
weakened his position, especially vis-a-vis the unreformed communist party which 
could still draw on its support base inside and outside the government to complicate 
things for him. Although the reformed communists supported him and he patronized 
their political parties, the conservative faction o f the communist party continued to 
oppose him and had the potential to regroup itself and threaten his power position in 
the republic. In fact, his informal shifting alliance with various sociopolitical
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formations served as a counterweight against the communist party, obviated the 
reunion o f the splintered communist (and former communist) forces, and enabled him 
to enhance his own leverage vis-a-vis other sociopolitical formations, including his 
informal democratically-oriented and reformed communist allies. Thus, the presence 
of a variety o f sociopolitical formations posed no serious threat to his dominance in 
national politics, rather it improved his political standing, legitimized his rule, and 
confirmed his democratic credentials.
A number of additional powerful constraints rendered the option of 
indiscriminate repression of sociopolitical groups quite costly and, hence, less 
attractive for Akayev. As already mentioned, members o f the Russian minority were 
active in sociopolitical groups like Voter’s Club even before independence and later 
joined different political parties and movements such as the DMK. After 
independence, a number of explicit Russian-oriented groups arose in large part in 
reaction to the formation of Kyrgyz-oriented groups before and after independence. 
The demands of the Russian-speaking population and the titular nationality are often 
at variance with each other. A number o f former communists of both the Russian and 
Kyrgyz origin also support their respective ethnic communities in pursuit of their 
interests, further enhancing the significance of the ethnic factor in national politics in 
the republic. The looming threat of a strong Russian reaction (including active 
intervention) to safeguard the interests o f the Russian-speaking population continues to 
discourage Akayev from using indiscriminate repression to achieve a thorough 
political deactivation of various societal forces, including the Russian minority. Also,
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the use of repression to deactivate the Russian-speaking population would defeat 
Akayev’s efforts to stop its migration out of his republic through favorable policy 
measures.
The selective and discriminate repression also became difficult to practice, and 
the republican authorities have exercised restraint in such use o f repression. In fact, 
the republican leadership can not afford to ban Kyrgyz sociopolitical groups but allow 
sociopolitical groups o f the Russian-speaking population to function in the republic. If 
it does, it would risk losing its nationalist credentials and vital support base among the 
titular nationality. As a result of the above factors, the republican authorities have so 
far refrained from hindering the group formation (and dissolution) process and from 
using sustained repressive measures to curtail the freedom of action of various 
sociopolitical groups in the republic. Thus, a host of political parties and social 
movements which were formed before independence continue to exist in one form or 
another and a number o f new sociopolitical formations with diverse orientations and 
programs continue to proliferate in the republic in the post-independence era.
Before we discuss these sociopolitical formations, their orientations, and the 
freedom of action they enjoyed in the post-independence period, it is important to 
record a number o f important observations about them. Firstly, although political and 
social formations proliferated and operated with greater freedom after independence, 
no one has been able to build a strong mass support base and become a strong force 
capable of shaping the course o f politics in the republic. In fact, the existing political 
parties and social movements are weakly developed in the republic and many o f them
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face a real danger of marginalization in the national political life and a potential threat 
of an outright political extinction.
Secondly, the sociopolitical group formation process lacks a predictable 
character. In other words, it continues to remain fluid. As already mentioned, several 
informal groups which initially advocated specific, overtly apolitical causes (such as 
economic well-being, ethnonational and cultural revival, and environment protection) 
later broadened their programs to include sensitive, explicitly political demands such 
as sovereignty and independence for the republic and an end to the communist rule in 
the pre-independence period. After independence, many o f them transformed 
themselves into political parties and strove to achieve their respective political aims.
In addition, while some political and social groups continue to organize and may 
coalesce into larger formations, others continue to fragment into several splinter 
groups. The conglomerate groups such as DMK have been particularly vulnerable to 
fragmentation due to many reasons, including personality clashes and ideological 
differences among its leaders.
Thirdly, the existing political parties and social movements represent a wide 
variety of ideological orientations and interests ranging from radical ethnonationalist 
to communist to democratic. However, these orientations and interests are not fixed, 
but are rather mutable as it shall become clear below. And, finally, almost all notable 
parties and movements advocate some variant o f democracy.
A detailed discussion of all the existing independent political and social 
formations and their orientations in Kyrgyzstan is outside the scope o f this study. For
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the purpose o f this inquiry, it will suffice to briefly discuss a representative sample of 
these sociopolitical formations, their orientations, and the freedom o f action they 
enjoyed in the post-independence period.
ETHNIC-ORIENTED (DEMOCRATIC) PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
These groups are primarily focused on promoting interests of specific ethnic 
communities in Kyrgyzstan. Almost most sizable ethnic communities have formed 
such parties and movements to advance their respective interests. O f course, the most 
notable and active ethnic-oriented sociopolitical formations have been organized to 
protect interests of the titular nationality, ethnic Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz ethnonationalist 
formations range from radical to moderate. One of the radical groups seeking to 
promote interests of ethnic Kyrgyz is Asaba (Banner). It advocates a political program 
with an exclusive focus on "the defense of the economic, social and political interests 
o f the Kyrgyz people" (Hunter, 1996:50). Asaba has a strong anti-Russian bias. It 
demands an authoritative action to reduce the presence of non-Kyrgyz population in 
the republic and strongly opposes privatization of state sector, especially land, and the 
idea of dual citizenship. It has asked the parliament more than once to pass legislative 
measures in this regard( Haghayeghi, 1994:193; Chukin, 1994:171; CSCE, 1995:8).
In spite o f its overall political support for Akayev, the Asaba leadership has been 
quite critical o f him and his team for their insensitivity to these demands and for 
doing very little to improve the plight o f the most under-privileged ethnic group, 
Kyrgyz, in the republic.
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The second ethnonationalist political group formed to advance interests of 
ethnic Kyrgyz is Erkin (Free) Kyrgyzstan. However, it is relatively less radical than 
Asaba. Erkin Kyrgyzstan, which was organized and registered in the 
pre-independence period for Kyrgyz causes, continues to pursue them in the 
post-independence period. Although it never lost sight o f its basic goal, it has shifted 
its position back and forth. Like Asaba, Erkin first demanded the expulsion of 
non-Kyrgyz from the republic; however, it later dropped this demand and shifted its 
emphasis from "Kyrgyz interests only" to "Kyrgyz interests first" (Haghayeghi, 
1994:193; 1995:117). It is one the few sociopolitical associations which publish their 
own newspapers.
A number of other Kyrgyz-oriented ethnonationalist formations, though 
relatively less significant than Asaba and Erkin Kyrgyzstan, also exist in the republic. 
Askar (Mutual Aid) is one such group which champions interests o f ethnic Kyrgyz in 
the Osh region. The Kyrgyz Language Society and some local groups can also be 
added to the list of such groups (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 25,
1992:10; Chukin, 1994:171).
The radical ethnonational demands of the Kyrgyz-oriented formations and 
several other developments such as poor economic conditions in the republic, the 
adoption o f Kyrgyz as a state language, and the declaration o f independence caused 
multiple reactions among non-Kyrgyz ethnic communities. These reactions included 
migration, especially of Russian and German minorities, and the formation of a
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number of non-Kyrgyz ethnonationalist groups to defend their interests in the 
republic.
In addition to Uzbek-oriented groups like Adolat which was an important party 
to the Osh conflict, several Russian-oriented formations have also arisen in 
Kyrgyzstan. Notable among them are the Slavic Fund, the Assembly of the People of 
Kyrgyzstan, Soglasie (Accord), and the Association of Ethnic Russians. These 
Russian-oriented formations advocate social equality and press for making the Russian 
the second state language in the country (CSCE, 1995:6; 1998:16). The stated 
programs of these groups are of cultural nature, but some such as Slavic Fund have 
been politicized especially after independence and now contain radical forces. The 
leadership has always emphasized the cultural nature o f the Slavic Fund, but the 
radical forces in it openly express their determination to counter ethnonationalist 
efforts of the Kyrgyz-oriented groups in the country (Hunter, 1996:51; Bozdag, 
1992:285-6).
The Russian-oriented groups have enjoyed the same degree o f freedom of 
action which has been available to the ethnonationalist groups of the titular nationality 
in the country. Some of these groups have pooled their resources to publish their own 
newspaper, Soglasie, in Osh (CSCE, 1995:6), and have been able to disseminate their 
programs and try to influence public opinion and decision making process in the 
republic. In addition to the above Russian-oriented formations, the Society of 
Germans of Kyrgyzstan, representing the interests of the German minority in the 
republic (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press no. 25, 1992:10), and a Cossack
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organization, representing Cossack interests, has also been founded in the post­
independence period.
Most o f these formations have been informal political allies o f Akayev in the 
post-independence period. As a result, the use o f repression to curb them, to prevent 
them from articulating their demands, and to prevent from occasionally criticizing his 
government and policies would surely hurt his interest and weaken his position in 
Kyrgyz politics. In fact, he rather tried to take certain measures, such as opening a 
Slavic university in the capital city, to protect their interests even at the risk of 
displeasing his own coethnics.
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
A host o f political parties and social movements with a  liberal democratic 
outlook o f  varying degrees exist side by side with the ethnic-oriented democratic 
formations in Kyrgyzstan. Like the ethnonationalist democratic groups, the liberal 
democratic formations differ in terms o f  their social bases. In addition, they exhibit 
differences on a host of broad as well as specific issues of post-communist economic 
and political restructuring and social policies in the country. Like the ethnic-oriented 
formations, the liberal democratic parties may support or oppose the government 
policies depending on the nature o f issues involved. Some liberal parties are product 
of the breakup process which ethnonationalist and liberal democratic parties alike have 
been experiencing in the republic.
As already mentioned, the first most significant informal political group in 
Kyrgyzstan before independence was the DMK with a liberal democratic charter,
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although it comprised liberal as well as ethnonationalist informal groups. The 
temporary removal of the Kyrgyz communist party from the political arena in the 
immediate post-independence period left the DMK as the most significant and 
privileged political force in the country. However, it failed to build itself into a strong 
political force. In fact, the breakup process which it began to witness within six 
months after its formation continued in the post-independence period, greatly 
undermining its potential to shape post-communist politics in the republic. After 
several splits, the DMK under the leadership o f Jepar Jeksheev was registered as a 
political party in July 1993. The party leadership has been quite critical o f several 
economic policies o f the Akayev government. It has also opposed certain cultural and 
educational policies such as opening o f a Slavic university in Bishkek (Current Digest 
of Post-Soviet Press, no. 41, 1992:8).
As an off-shoot o f the DMK, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) was 
established and registered as a political party in March and September 1992 
respectively. It claims to have come into existence "to fight against discrimination on 
ethnic, social, and religious grounds” (Haghayeghi 1995:122). It also claims that it 
would act as a constructive opposition, if not in power. The party takes a very liberal 
stance on many sensitive issues including language and religion. However, it is an 
advocate of an egalitarian society and, like several other liberal as well as 
ethnonationalist parties, opposes the introduction o f rapid economic reforms in the 
country. Its estimated 3,000-membership and political and financial support comes 
from labor, intellectuals, parliamentarians, and businessmen.
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The liberal members o f the Erkin Kyrgyzstan split from its radical members to 
form a new political party called Ata Meken under the leadership of Kamila 
Kenebayeva in September 1992. It is multi-ethnic in its composition. It was officially 
registered in December 1992. Ata Meken reportedly came into existence with the 
blessings of Akayev (Huskey, 1997:263). The party leadership has often shown its 
willingness to cooperate with the Akayev government. However, it has been critical 
of it for certain monetary and economic policy measures including the introduction of 
national currency and privatization of agricultural sector. Ata Meken offers a 
Iiberal-centrist political alternative. It supports cultural and religious revival provided 
it is done within the confines of the reality o f a multiethnic and secular state 
(Haghayeghi, 1995:121-2).
Unlike the above political parties and social movements which have been 
organized mainly by various non-communist societal forces, the Social Democratic 
Party formed and registered in July 1993 and December 1994 respectively offers a 
political program which has been inspired by reform communism. The party calls for 
introduction o f democratic socialist principles. It has been under a sharp attack o f its 
counterparts for being a party of "the present ruling nomenklatura" and a protege of 
Akayev (Haghayeghi 1995:130).
A number of less significant political parties and movements with 
issue-oriented and narrow but still democratic platforms also exist in the country. The 
list of such registered formations include Agrarian party and Democratic Party of 
Women o f Kyrgyzstan (Huskey 1997:262).
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THE COMMUNIST PARTY
As already mentioned, Akayev banned the Kyrgyz communist party in the 
wake of the 1991 abortive coup. The party, however, reentered the political arena 
after it held its founding congress in June 1992 and received official recognition in 
September 1992. Its platform espouses restoration of the Soviet Union and Soviet-era 
social rights. In addition, it is opposed to most economic reform measures underway 
in the post-communist era in the republic. Like other political formations, it has been 
allowed to participate in the post-independence electoral process.
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
In conjunction with ethnonationalist, liberal democratic, and communist 
political parties, a  number of groups have been organized to monitor the human rights 
situation in Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence period. In 1991, the Ministry of 
Justice registered one such group, the Human Rights Movement o f Kyrgyzstan 
(HRMK). The focus o f its activities was on monitoring ethnic-based discrimination in 
the workplace and excesses of the security forces in the country. Although in 1992 
the Ministry of Justice turned down the request o f a human rights organization for 
registration on the ground that another human rights organization was unnecessary, 
this policy was subsequently reversed to register a number o f human rights 
organizations, including Kyrgyz-American Bureau on Human Rights and Law 
Protection. The Bureau was registered in December 1993. The aim o f this group is to 
monitor human rights situation in the country and publicize it around the world. The 
Bureau, in alliance with the independent newspaper, Delo No, has publicly exposed
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and criticized various constitutional violations and defended the alleged victims o f the 
police excesses in the republic. These human rights organizations have so far 
smoothly operated in the republic.
AN ASSESSMENT
As already noted, all the existing political parties and social movements have 
so far failed to deepen their roots in Kyrgyz society. An overall poor performance of 
all the registered political parties and social movements in the 1995 parliamentary 
election must suffice to illustrate the above point. In fact, the twelve political parties 
and thirty social movements which contested the election failed to field their 
candidates in all one hundred and five electoral districts. The electoral result was 
more disappointing. Only 38 candidates with party affiliation won their seats as 
compared to 67 unaffiliated candidates (Huskey, 1997:262-264).
However accurate the observation that sociopolitical formations are weakly 
developed, their weakness can not be interpreted as a sorry state o f political 
liberalization. The underdevelopment o f  these formations may hinder democratic 
consolidation. However, so far as political liberalization is concerned, it is the 
freedom o f action available to political and social formations which defines its level in 
society. Judged from this standpoint, Kyrgyzstan has more or less a sustained 
impressive record in the post-independence period. With one important exception of 
the religious political formations which are prohibited in the May 1993 constitution, a 
host of other political and social forces have been free to establish independent 
formations, disseminate their views, propose alternative reform programs, hold party
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and mass gatherings, publish newspapers, and participate in the electoral process in 
the country. Of course, there have been few aberrations at certain times which will 
be discussed at appropriate places below.
The constitutional right of association is generally respected in Kyrgyzstan. 
The law requires all political and social formations to register. Of course, in addition 
to bureaucratic mentality and bottlenecks, there are some complex legal requirements 
which make the registration process somewhat tedious. As of 1997, only a few cases 
have been reported where registration o f certain formations was delayed. For 
instance, a Cossack cultural and economic organization applied three times before it 
was registered in 1993.30
Almost all the political and social formations which have so far sought 
registration have been registered. As o f 1997, in addition to a number o f registered 
human rights organizations, 17 political parties and more than 30 social movements 
have been registered in Kyrgyzstan. The singular reported case where registration 
was denied involved a Uighur organization. The organization was denied registration 
in 199S because its stated mission included the establishment of an independent 
Uighur state in northwest China (Huskey, 1997:261-3; State Department, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 and 1997:919, 1157 respectively).
In addition to the freedom of group formation, the existing political parties and 
social formations, including human rights groups and labor unions, have been 
generally free to conduct their other activities, too. As already mentioned, some of 
these formations, especially political parties, have openly and repeatedly criticized
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certain reform policies o f the government and have been able to propose alternative 
reform programs within and outside the parliament.
The Akayev government has been at time sensitive and responsive to their 
views. It has also been tolerant of the protest rallies these formations held in support 
of their demands. The government has routinely issued permits political and social 
formations require for holding public rallies and marches. Over the past six years 
there have been numerous authorized and unauthorized rallies and demonstrations 
across the country. The government has generally Tefrained from using force even 
against the unauthorized rallies. As of 1997, unlike Uzbekistan where the use of force 
against demonstrators has caused several deaths, there has been no report o f such 
incidents in Kyrgyzstan.
In addition, the government has generally respected the law allowing political 
and social formations to publish their own the newspapers. Hence, Kyrgyzstan has 
newspapers like Erk and Soglasie published by political parties and social movements. 
In fact, the primary cause for the failure of many aspiring political and social 
formations to establish their own mass media institutions, especially newspapers, 
appears to be the lack of financial resources rather than insuperable official 
restrictions. For example, Asaba’s effort to establish its own newspaper have failed 
due to a lack of financial resources (Haghayeghi 1995:116).
Of course, since mid-1994 the press has been facing growing problems and 
journalists have wound up in jail. A detailed discussion of such essentially 
media-related issues is conducted below. However, for our purpose here, it will
298
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
suffice to note that these cases involved official vendetta against certain newspapers 
and journalists who allegedly sullied the honor o f the president and other government 
officials. In spite o f this, the law on protecting the honor and dignity o f the president 
has not been overstretched to silence all kinds o f criticism of Akayev and his policies 
and to curtail the freedom of political and social formations to propagandize their 
alternative reform programs in the country. In fact, in spite of the potential threat of 
punitive measures under the law on protecting the reputation of the president, various 
political leaders have been able to criticize various actions and policies o f Akayev 
with impunity.
There have been no political prisoners under the above law or otherwise before 
the December 1995 presidential election in Kyrgyzstan. Although prior to the 1995 
presidential elections, journalists and human rights monitors have reported some 
politically motivated prosecutions at the local level (State Department, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992:918), there is no evidence to attribute 
such prosecutions to the Akayev government. The observation that political opposition 
enjoyed freedom o f action is partially supported by the fact that while discussing 
human rights situation for 1993, the Human Rights Watch did not include Kyrgyzstan 
among the countries with a poor human rights record (Human Rights Watch, 1994). 
This situation, however, changed when two campaign workers of an opposition 
candidate, Medetkan Sherimkulov, were arrested in December 1995, in Issyk Kul 
oblast for distributing campaign pamphlets allegedly slandering the president. In 
February 1996, there was another arrest in Naryn on similar charges (State
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Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 and 1996:918,
1001 respectively). Perhaps, more prominent case was the arrest o f Topchubek 
Torgunaliev, chairman o f the Erkin Kyrgyzstan Party, and former rector of the 
Bishkek Humanities University, and his assistant Timur Stamkulov on charges o f theft 
of state property, malfeasance and abuse of power. The former was arrested on 
December 17, 19%, after he participated in a peaceful protest rally o f pensioners in 
Bishkek. In January 1997, both were convicted and sent to jail to serve their 
sentences (CSCE, 1998:25).
The above cases do indicate an unmistakable deterioration in the level of 
political liberalization from the previous years. Still, Kyrgyzstan does not qualify to 
be lined up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the basis o f  such aberrations.
Although these few cases tarnish the political liberalization record in the republic, 
they pale to insignificance when compared to similar cases in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. In fact, these cases by no means constitute an ample evidence of a 
systematic official effort to silence organized political opposition and individual 
political activists in the country. There are several instances some of which have been 
cited above clearly show that political parties and their leaders critical of Akayev and 
his policies have not always been subjected to official vendetta. Also, the above cases 
involving the arrest and imprisonment of the campaign workers of the opposition 
presidential candidate must be seen as isolated incidents rather than part o f a sustained 
government effort to completely close the electoral process to independent 
sociopolitical formations. In fact, in spite of several problems, the post-independence
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electoral process in Kyrgyzstan has been much more open to independent organized 
participation than in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This point is made quite clear in the 
next section on the electoral process.
AN OPEN AND COM PETITIVE NATIONAL ELECTORAL PROCESS?
The political right of citizens to choose their representatives and change their 
government through election is codified in the May 1993 constitution o f Kyrgyzstan. 
As o f 1997, two general presidential elections, one uncontested and the other 
contested, one competitive parliamentary election, and a number of competitive 
by-elections for vacant seats in the parliament have been held in the country, in 
addition to three national referenda. There have also been competitive local bodies 
elections. However, our focus in this section will be on national elections and on their 
openness to opposition participation.
The first national election which took place after independence was the general 
uncontested presidential election held on October 13, 1991. As already mentioned, 
Akayev was elected president in the October 1990 parliamentary election. After 
independence he could serve out his remaining term as the parliament was poised to 
do for itself. He instead decided to renew his political mandate and legitimacy through 
a popular presidential election. In principle, the election was open to all qualified 
candidates who could collect the required number o f voters’ signatures. There is no 
report that the Akayev government prevented a registered opposition party from 
fielding a candidate in the election. In fact, while the communist party whose 
candidate could have made election a genuine electoral contest was banned and other
301
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
significant sociopolitical formations chose to support his candidacy, it was unlikely 
that Akayev whose popularity rating was very high in the country at the time would 
have a real electoral competitor. The lack o f organizational and material resources 
had made it extremely difficult for other potential individual candidates to run for 
office. As a result, Akayev ran unopposed and won the election receiving more than 
95 % o f the cast votes.
In January 1994, well before the expiry o f his five year term, Akayev held a 
successful popular referendum to ascertain the popular support for his political and 
economic reforms underway in the republic and whether he should serve his entire 
term (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 5, 1994:23; CSCE, 1995:4). What 
obliged Akayev to hold this confirmation referendum was a set of interactive 
circumstances which paved the way for the self-dissolution of the parliament in 
September 1994, a popular referendum on constitutional changes in October 1994, 
and a competitive parliamentary election in February 1995. In view of their 
importance, it is appropriate to briefly discuss these circumstances which led to the 
February 1995 parliamentary elections.
A unique political situation prevailed in Kyrgyzstan until the self-dissolution of 
the communist-dominated parliament in September 1994. That is, an uneasy 
coexistence between a communist-dominated conservative parliament and a 
reform-oriented non-communist president. In spite of what happened to the 
communist party in the wake o f the 1991 putsch and its own conservative orientation, 
the communist-dominated parliament chose not to block most o f the reform measures
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Akayev introduced after independence. However, the parliament rarely offered its 
support in a slavish manner as has been the case in Uzbekistan. Rather, it continued 
to exercise its constitutional authority which at times was at variance with the 
executive reform preferences. Although Akayev occasionally made use o f decrees and 
veto power to push some of his reform initiatives and to overcome parliamentary 
resistance, he refrained from launching a full scale effort to end the communist 
dominance in the parliament or reduce the parliament to a mere rubber stamp as has 
been the case in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As a result, the uneasy coexistence 
between the communist-dominated parliament and reform-oriented president survived 
for almost two years without any serious direct confrontation between them.
However, the political distance between the two widened over time, culminating into 
a fateful direct executive-legislative confrontation after both sides leveled corruption 
charges and counter-charges against each other in 1993-94.
As the post-communist transition deepened in the republic, many scandals of 
widespread official corruption cropped up. One such scandal focused on awarding 
gold mining rights to a Canadian firm, Cameco, without inviting competitive bids 
from other interested firms. The parliament authorized an inquiry in this regard. The 
communist as well as reform-oriented sections of the parliament began to openly 
criticize the government of the prime minister, Tursunbek Chingishev, for its corrupt 
practices. They also criticized the presidential leadership for its failed reform 
measures as well as for its failure to curb official corruption.
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In response to this criticism and the mounting political crisis, Akayev initially 
adopted a political and conciliatory approach. Even after the 1993-94 crisis worsened, 
he relied on political manipulation rather than on the use o f force to deal with it. In 
addition to his own pro-reform views and policies, a  number o f other factors made 
the use force to deal with the 1993-94 political crisis a less attractive option than 
political manipulation.
In fact, the use o f force against those who spoke about official corruption 
involved prohibitive costs. In order to completely silence his critics through coercive 
methods, he needed a  large scale repressive operation. The sheer large size o f his 
important opponents (i.e., approximately half o f the parliament members, let alone 
other political opposition leaders and activists), the resources (personal, party, 
regional, and tribal) available to them, the uproar o f some o f his own (former) allies— 
-reform-oriented political figures—against the growing official corruption in the 
republic, and the presence of the Russian-speaking political activists surely increased 
the cost o f a  thorough political deactivation of his opponents through repression. In 
other words, he needed not only to disband the parliament (or at least put away his 
critics in it) but also to crack down on hundreds o f critics outside the parliament, 
including his own allies and members of both Kyrgyz and Russian nationalities. The 
use of force against even a small number o f his Russiam critics would have mocked 
his actions he took and proposed to please Russian residents o f  the republic in 1994 
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no 24, 1994:13). Thus, not only his own 
democratic orientation but also the potential costs o f such a large scale repressive
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operation led him to choose political and procedural machinations rather than outright 
repression to deal with his critics and the growing crisis in the republic.
In order to enhance his own political stature, Akayev announced on November 
29, 1993, that he would hold a confirmation referendum on his presidency in January 
1994. He also indirectly challenged the parliament to renew its popular mandate. He 
rationalized his decision o f referendum and his challenge to the parliament to renew 
its mandate by observing that Kyrgyzstan, like many other former Soviet republics, 
was in political and economic crisis situation which required "all the branches of 
power to strive to gain people's trust" (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 50, 
1993:24). The parliament was least interested in his proposal. It had rather different 
plans.
After a five-day heated debate in the second week of December 1993, the 
parliament passed a vote o f no confidence against the prime minister. In addition to 
passing a vote of no confidence against the prime minister in December 1993, the 
parliament called upon its chairman to empower the parliamentary commission to 
uncover corrupt practices, especially in the privatization of state assets. The chairman 
empowered the commission to expose any violation o f law and corrupt practices 
committed by parliamentarians, members of the central government, and heads of the 
local administration involved in the privatization process (Current Digest o f Post- 
Soviet Press, no. 27, 1994:20).
In the subsequent months, a  large number of reports of massive corruption 
surfaced in the country. These reports implicated parliamentarians, leading executive
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officials, local administrators, and relatives of state functionaries, including the wife 
of Akayev and her brother. A torrent of accusations and counter-accusations which 
followed created an acrimonious political atmosphere in the country. The central as 
well as local state functionaries refused to cooperate with the parliamentary 
commission. The newspapers took sides, publishing articles for and against the 
parliamentary investigation. The government newspapers carried article and letters o f 
well-known individuals who asked the parliament to stop its "witch-hunt" because it 
threatened to erode national unity with a potential danger o f turning the country into 
another Tajikistan (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 27, 1994:20; no. 36, 
1994:21). Above all, Akayev decided to abandon his conciliatory approach to the 
parliament and joined the battle against it.
In June 1994, for the first time he publicly accused the parliament of engaging 
in "power struggle and political intrigues" (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 
36, 1994:21). He charged that it was "stopping at nothing" in this struggle and was 
undermining his reform program through its political machinations (CSCE, 1995:4). 
He also charged that some members of the parliament have "accumulated capital as 
fast as possible while trying to deceive the electorate with empty demagoguery" 
(CSCE, 1995:4). Although Akayev quickly moved against the parliament and took a 
number of steps to undermine the parliament and its constitutional role, here we will 
focus on those moves which set the stage for the February 1995 parliamentary 
election.
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In the midst o f accusations and counter-accusations o f corruption, in July 
1994, a group o f deputies loyal to Akayev called upon the parliament to dissolve 
itself. In addition, the speaker o f the parliament and the parliament-owned newspaper, 
Svobodnye gory (Free Mountains), were accused o f conspiring to overthrow Akayev. 
In addition to his reliance on his parliamentary support, as part o f his move against 
the parliament, Akayev entered into an informal alliance with administrative heads o f 
the six regions in Kyrgyzstan in order to improve his position against the parliament.
In connivance with the regional heads and a  group o f deputies, Akayev was 
able to engineer the self-dissolution of the parliament. The parliamentary session 
slated for September 27, 1994, was expected to discuss findings o f the parliamentary 
commission which was appointed to investigate cases of official corruption. Akayev 
and his allies preempted the session and, hence, its discussion o f the cases of official 
corruption. Before the parliament convened, over half of the deputies loyal to Akayev 
refused to take part in the proceedings o f the forthcoming parliamentary session. This 
deprived the parliament of a quorum it needed to carry out its legislative functions. 
The 23-member Cabinet of Ministers resigned and issued a statement which asserted 
that as a consequence o f the permanent boycott o f 165 deputies, the parliament has 
ceased its legislative work. It also called upon the president to fulfill his constitutional 
responsibilities to end the constitutional crisis in the country. Akayev accepted the 
resignation of the government. He also concurred with the majority o f deputies to 
hold a new parliamentary election (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 36, 
1994:21).
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Taking advantage of the absence o f the parliament, Akayev resorted to 
questionable practices, including holding o f a  national referendum in October 1994, to 
alter the political institutional design o f  the country according to his own 
preferences.31 The constitutional amendments approved in the October 1994 
referendum sanctioned a bi-cameral legislature. The bi-cameral legislature comprised 
a 35-member lower house (Legislative Assembly) and a 70-member upper house 
(Assembly o f People's Representatives).32 These measures drew criticism from 
opposition quarters (CSCE, 1995:5).33 However, such critical voices failed to budge 
Akayev from his plan. As scheduled, the election was held for a 105-seat bi-cameral 
parliament in February 1995.
A detailed discussion of this election is outside the scope o f  this 
study. However, a  discussion of an important issue directly relevant to the question of 
political liberalization deserves our focus. That is, the government interference with 
the electoral process. In this regard, we will focus on three aspects: a) openness of 
elections to popular participation; b) campaign and voting; and c) electoral outcome.
Although an acrimonious political atmosphere preceded the parliamentary 
election, there is no report to indicate that eligible individual opposition candidates or 
registered sociopolitical formations were forcibly kept out o f the nomination and 
registration process. Even critics who note irregularities in certain aspects o f the 
electoral process refrain from questioning the openness o f this election to all eligible 
candidates (Pryde, 1995:115-8; Huskey, 1997:259-265). In fact, it was the first 
national election since independence which was truly multi-candidate and multi-party.
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The Central Election Commission registered 921 candidates, including those 
who were being investigated for their involvement in financial corruption. An average 
of 9 candidates competed for each of the 105 seats. As already cited, 12 political 
parties and 30 social movements with diverse orientations nominated their candidates 
in the election. However, only 161 candidates were affiliated with parties. Labor 
collectives and residents nominated more candidates than political parties and social 
movements. There were also a sizable number o f self-nominated candidates. Although 
19 nationalities were represented, the candidates o f the titular nationality 
disproportionally outnumbered the candidates of other nationalities. 870 candidates 
were Kyrgyz, 60 Russians, 46 Uzbeks, and 10 Ukranians. Other ethnic communities 
were represented in the single digit (CSCE, 1995:9).
As compared to the nomination and registration phase the openness and 
fairness of which are beyond doubt, the campaign and voting evoked mixed reactions 
and assessments. On the one hand, we have official circles and most international 
observers who maintain that in spite of certain problems during the campaign and 
voting, the election was generally free and fair. After noting a number of problems 
which marred the campaign and voting, a report o f Commission on Cooperation and 
Security in Europe concludes that "unlike Turkmenistan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, 
which permit no opposition parties or opposition press, Kyrgyzstan held multi-party, 
multi-candidate contests. Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary election was much freer and 
fairer than elections or referendums in these other newly independent states of Central 
Asia" (CSCE, 1995:11). On the other hand, local critics and certain international
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analysts dismiss the above overall positive assessment as politically motivated which 
both Akayev and his external admirers needed for a continued aid-based relationship. 
They rather conclude that the election was far from being free and fair and that the 
problems which occurred in the campaign and voting were so grave and widespread 
as to warrant its cancellation (Pryde, 1995:115-118; Huskey, 1997:259-265).
At least, the two groups agree that irregularities occurred during the election, 
although they differ on how grave and massive these problems were and the 
conclusions they reach, including whether the election was generally free and fair and 
whether the problems which occurred warranted the cancellation of the election. In 
order for us to reach any conclusion with respect to our concern with political 
liberalization, it is important to understand the nature of the reported irregularities and 
how far they are imputable to the Akayev government.
There were reports o f pressure on and intimidation o f  candidates. However, it 
is important to note that rival candidates as well as local officials were the main 
sources o f  this pressure (Pryde, 1995:115). The local officials reportedly used a 
number o f pressure tactics to lure rival candidates out of the electoral races or to 
harass them so that they were unable to effectively campaign. These pressure tactics 
against the rival candidates include threats of various sorts, denial of mandated 
airtime, use o f official machinery (including mass media) in support o f the favored 
candidates, and the dismissal of the relatives, trustees, and assistants o f the rival 
candidates from their jobs (CSCE 1995:9; Huskey 1997:259-261). Besides local 
officials, individual candidates were also involved in malpractices such as intimidation
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and bribing o f rival candidates, and the use of money and other deficit commodities 
such as gasoline, food packets, flour, rice, shoes, etc., to buy votes. In this respect, 
the candidates who were being investigated for their involvement in corruption and 
were under the threat o f jail sentences outperformed others. Almost 30 percent o f the 
new deputies were under legal scrutiny for their corrupt financial dealings (Pryde, 
1995:115; Huskey, 1997:260-261; CSCE, 1995:9).
Like the campaign, the voting was also marred by numerous reported 
violations. There were reports that the election officials ignored formal voting rules. 
Some reports implicate them in acts o f favoritism, including the cancellation of 
elections. There were also numerous reports of older men voting for their wives and 
families and o f ballot stuffing (Huskey, 1997:2610. At certain places, the election 
commission officials allowed voters to cast ballots without proper documents of 
personal identification. One correspondent of a newspaper was able to vote nine times 
for various candidates at one polling station. She stuffed into the ballot box a wad of 
papers. The two local observers did not either notice her or did not object to what she 
did (CSCE, 1995:10-11; State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1995:919). The victory o f the former prime minister, Chingishev, and 
defeat o f the former parliament speaker, Medektan Sherimkulov, were also imputed to 
serious electoral malpractices. In the initial vote tabulation, Chingishev trailed his 
main opponent. However, as a result o f reportedly mysterious appearance of several 
thousand ballots for him, he was able to win his seat (Huskey, 1997:260). The 
second-round defeat of Sherimkulov by a candidate favored by Akayev was reportedly
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a local sensation. The supporters of Sherimkulov held a protest demonstration and 
demanded a recount of votes. His defeat was blamed on officials in his election 
district. In order to look into Sherimkulov’s charges of vote fraud in his election 
district, Akayev appointed a 34-member independent public commission which was 
later self-dissolved without reaching a conclusion (CSCE, 1995:11; Current Digest of 
Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 1995:15; Pryde, 1995:118).
It is hard to dispute the conclusion that irregularities occurred during the 
campaign and voting. However, while such irregularities are highlighted, little effort 
is made to show how far they are imputable to the central government and whether 
they were part o f a  coherent manipulative strategy Akayev and his team pursued to 
produce a specific electoral outcome. In addition, no persuasive argument is presented 
to adequately explain why most international monitors offered a positive assessment of 
the 1995 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan. The argument that the international 
positive assessment was politically motivated because both Akayev and the aid donors 
needed it for a continued aid-based relations is less than persuasive. It is a weak 
argument because Kazakhstan, which was equally, if not more, admired in the West 
and was in need o f aid, could not secure such assessment for the March 1994 
parliamentary elections.
A sober look at the list o f the reported shortcomings makes it abundantly clear 
that most cases were of individual and local nature with no plausible link with the 
central government. Most cases o f irregularities in the campaign and voting appear to 
be a handiwork o f local officials at various levels (especially the regional heads) and
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powerful individual candidates especially from what some call "new plutocracy" 
comprised of directors of state enterprise and private businessmen (Huskey, 1997:260) 
rather than the central government. Only few cases such as the defeat of the former 
speaker o f the parliament against a candidate supported by Akayev can arguably be 
imputed to the central government. Still, such cases are far from being part of a 
well-planned manipulative electoral strategy of the central government to secure an 
intended electoral outcome.
A closer look at the electoral outcome further substantiates the above assertion. 
After two rounds o f election, 11 political parties were represented in the parliament. 
Interestingly, only 38 out o f 105 deputies had party affiliation. The most successful 
political party was the Social Democratic Party with 14 seats. None of the other 
political party had more than four members in the parliament. 67 deputies were 
unaffiliated, mostly executive officials and businessmen (Huskey, 1997:261-264).
If the electoral outcome embarrassed the political parties, it displeased 
Akayev, too. His displeasure is confirmed even by those who have been critical o f the 
way the election was conducted. They admit that few candidates supported by Akayev 
could get elected (Pryde, 1995:115; Huskey, 1997:259). If we interpret the above 
problems in the campaign and voting as part of a concerted effort of Akayev to 
produce intended results, then his failure to get his candidates elected must be 
explained. However, such an explanation is still lacking. It becomes more paradoxical 
when his failure is compared to the success of the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents in 
producing the intended electoral results without any difficulty.
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In fact. Akayev also had some other reasons to regret the electoral outcome.
A* already  mentioned, one o f  the main reasons for his direct confrontation with the 
previous parliament was the rising official corruption. Akayev had been facing 
enorm ous difficulties in combating official corruption. The electoral result 
com pounded  his difficulties in this regard. As already mentioned, before their 
electoral victories, almost 30 percent of the new deputies were under investigation for 
their corrupt financial dealings. Akayev himself, among many other concerned voices, 
voiced his concern that many new deputies sought a parliamentary seat for immunity 
from  prosecution on charges of corruption (CSCE, 1995:9). A parliament run by such 
deputies was hardly the parliament Akayev desired and anticipated. It was obvious 
that the new parliament, like the old one, would be a reluctant partner o f Akayev in 
the  transition process. Quite expectedly, it did not take Akayev and the new 
parliament long to run into troubles with each other.
The reduced representation of women and non-Kyrgyz ethnic minorities in the 
new parliament also bothered Akayev. In fact, the new parliament was 
disproportionally dominated by members of the titular nationality. This outcome was 
hardly helpful in his effort to lure the Slavic population to stay in the country. What 
further disappointed Akayev, and, due to its potentially far-reaching political 
implications, was the victory of many local southern candidates over placemen from 
the north of the country. The victory o f many southern candidates signalled a clear 
shift in the balance o f power in Kyrgyzstan. It showed that the traditional political 
relationship between the southern and northern parts o f the republic was no more
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viable. In other words, it meant that the south would no longer leave to the 
traditionally dominant north the responsibility of managing political and economic life 
of the country.
In fact, from early on, the success of many southern candidates reportedly 
began to influence political decisions in Bishkek. Sources close to Akayev disclosed 
that shortcomings and outcome of the election alarmed him and he seriously 
contemplated cancellation o f  the election. The fear o f potential hostile reaction o f the 
resourceful southern deputies reportedly prevented him from taking this radical 
decision. It was feared that the southern deputies with their powerful interests at stake 
and with ample weapons in hand were likely to foment an open conflict if the election 
was annulled and their new privileges and parliamentary immunity withdrawn (Pryde, 
1995:115-116). As our theoretical model expects and the case of the southern deputies 
demonstrates, although the split among the former nomenklatura cost it access to the 
state resources, its continued access to personal, regional, and tribal sources of 
support makes it harder for the government to use repression to depoliticize it. In 
concrete terms, in addition to his own pro-reform orientation, the potential high cost 
of a punitive action against the resourceful southern deputies discouraged Akayev not 
only from blocking their electoral participation but also from canceling the election.
In spite o f his reportedly private negative assessment about the election,
Akayev did refrain from openly questioning the electoral outcome. He rather accepted 
the electoral outcome and tried to rationalize his acceptance. In his expressed opinion, 
there were some, not massive, violations which occurred in the election and imputed
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them to the under-development of democratic culture of society. While he sounded 
optimistic that the next parliamentary election would be truly democratic, competitive, 
free and fair, he emphasized the need to change the current electoral law which 
neither fit the "specific features of Kyrgyzstan" nor the "mentality of its people" 
(Current Digest o f  Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 1995:15). What the preceding discussion 
of the electoral outcome suggests is that the Akayev government's manipulation and 
control of the campaign and voting, if at all, were o f restricted nature and produced 
limited desirable consequences.
In addition to the electoral result, there is another body of evidence which 
clearly shows that the republic authorities have been greatly reluctant to interfere with 
the electoral process. As already mentioned, the CEC had registered even those 
candidates who were involved in financial corruption. The same candidates also spent 
huge black money to win election. The Prosecutor General twice requested the CEC 
to allow the former to prosecute several candidates (former deputies and some 
directors o f enterprises) suspected of financial corruption (CSCE, 1995:9).34 
Prosecution of these candidates would have certainly affected the campaign and voting 
and perhaps the electoral outcome would have been quite different. In spite of the fact 
that the government could round up several candidates and remove them out of the 
electoral race, it did not pressurize the government-dominated CEC into accepting the 
government demand. The government appears to have tolerated participation of 
corrupt candidates in the election rather than provoke accusations of intimidation of 
opposition candidates and o f interference with the electoral process. It appears that
316
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the local officials especially the regional heads acted on their own, independent of the 
preferences of the Akayev government. The result was a parliament which Akayev 
had hardly wished and anticipated.
There is also evidence of serious government concern and effort to educate the 
people about and conduct a free and fair election. In this regard, the government 
broadcast public service announcements twice a day in Kyrgyz and Russian. A 
number of international agencies helped the Kyrgyz government prepare such 
announcements. In fact, parallel to the reports of irregularities, there were reports of 
lawful electoral practices in the campaign and voting. If  few candidates were refused 
television airtime, there were hundreds o f electoral contestants, including opposition 
candidates, who received their mandated airtime on government-controlled television 
and radio. In addition, independent as well as government-owned newspapers 
provided a considerable coverage to the campaign. They printed platforms of 
candidates as well as instructions on how to vote in the election (CSCE, 1995:9). If 
there were reports that at certain places election officials ignored or violated formal 
electoral rules, there were also reports that they enforced such rules. At many places, 
the election officials "staunchly refused to let people vote for others or to vote without 
proper documents" (CSCE, 1995:10). After mentioning the election commission 
officials’ lapses in observing the badly drafted election law, one British journalist who 
witnessed the election (and has been critical of certain aspects o f the election) 
concedes that "voting at many polling stations was nevertheless reasonably fair"
(Pryde, 1995:115).
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The above discussion highlights two important points. First, the Akayev 
government did not make a concerted effort to control the campaign and voting in 
order to produce a specific electoral outcome. The few irregularities which can 
arguably be imputed to it were o f individual nature. Secondly, most irregularities 
which occurred in the campaign and voting were the handiwork o f  the regional heads 
and powerful individuals rather than the Akayev government. These elements took 
advantage o f  the inaction o f the government and absence o f any meaningful 
government interference in the electoral process rather than government interference 
in it. As a result, they were able to run the campaign the way they deemed fit. 
Although the government inaction might be prejudicial to the interests o f a handful of 
individual candidates in the short run and to democratic consolidation in the long run, 
it did provide considerable space and freedom to hundreds of candidates in the 1995 
parliamentary election.
In April 1995, it became quite clear that the new parliament was far being a 
rubber stamp or a more pliable body than the previous parliament. Taking the lead 
from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan where terms of the incumbents 
presidents were extended through Soviet-style national referenda, the Akayev loyalists 
inside as well outside the parliament launched a campaign to do the same in 
Kyrgyzstan. A signature campaign was organized for this purpose. However, the 
majority o f the deputies voted down a resolution for such a referendum describing it 
as unconstitutional (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 43, 1995:21). In 
accordance with the parliamentary decision, Akayev organized and contested a multi-
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candidate presidential election in December 1995. If the parliament could not get its 
way, nor could Akayev—a situation conducive for political liberalization. In other 
words, both could not dictate terms to each other. And this case amply demonstrates 
how a split elite structure in Kyrgyzstan promoted the cause o f political liberalization. 
In fact, not only his own democratic outlook but also the refusal o f the members of 
the parliament to assume a totally pliant role forced Akayev to contest a competitive 
presidential election in December 1995.
According to the election law, a presidential candidate needed 50,000 
signatures, gathering a certain number from each of the six provinces o f the country. 
Initially, the CEC registered six candidates including Akayev. Almost two weeks 
before the election, three opposition candidates were deregistered after local 
government officials successfully proved in the court irregularities in their lists of 
signatures required for registration o f a presidential candidate. The disqualified 
candidates along with their assistants staged a huger strike but it was o f no avail.
After the disqualification o f three candidates, Akayev had to compete with two more 
candidates, Absamat Masaliyev o f the communist party and Medetkan Sherimkulov, 
the former speaker o f  the parliament and a former Central Committee Secretary.
Although the three of the five opposition candidates were disqualified during 
the last stage o f the presidential campaign, all the five electoral opponents of Akayev 
were free to campaign. There were no reports, except an isolated incident, that they 
faced any serious hurdles from the government. All the five opposition candidates 
were free to subject his market-oriented reforms to serious criticism. The isolated
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incident involving the government action against one of the opposition candidates 
occurred two days before the election. This incident involved the arrest of two 
campaign workers o f Sherimkulov for distributing pamphlets which allegedly 
slandered the president. Likewise, except isolated instances of fraud reported on 
election day, the election was quite free and fair: Akayev was able to easily defeat his 
two electoral competitors who were weak candidates partly due to the fact that both 
relied on and divided up among themselves their communist supporters.
It is clear from the above discussion that Akayev avoided the use o f coercive 
methods to close the electoral process to his critics and opponents (of course, with the 
questionable exception of two presidential candidates). However, he did not pursue 
the same open approach toward the opposition press and journalists in a consistent 
manner in the post-independence period. The next section will deal with the degree 
of freedom which was available to the opposition press in the post-independence 
period.
GOVERNMENT-PRESS RELATIONS: FROM HONEYMOON TO 
CONFRONTATION
The press and media policy Akayev and his team pursued in the 
post-independence period can be divided into two broad phases. The first phase began 
with the independence and ended in mid-1994. The Akayev administration pursued a 
considerably liberal press and media policy in the first phase. One can assert without 
any doubt that especially the independent press was far more free in Kyrgyzstan than 
in any other Central Asian republic during this period. The independent print media
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had relatively greater freedom to take root, debate sensitive issues, and publish 
material even critical of the government and its policies in Kyrgyzstan.
The liberal phase ended in mid-1994 to usher in the second phase with a 
relatively restrictive press and media policy. The Akayev government curtailed the 
freedom of independent newspapers and journalists. A host of intimidating and 
punitive measures sullied the impressive record of political liberalization the 
republican leadership was able to build in part due to its previous considerably liberal 
policy toward the independent print media and its representatives. These punitive 
measures include the closure of various opposition newspapers and persecution of 
journalists for their criticism of the leading executive officials.
Although the honeymoon period for the independent press ended in 1994, the 
restrictive press and media policy Akayev and his team adopted in the second phase 
was still the least restrictive in the entire region. A detailed discussion of the two 
phases is attempted below in order to further clarify the above points and 
observations.
As already mentioned, after he was elected president in October 1990, Akayev 
pursued a benign press and media policy in line with an all-union law on the press 
and media. The all-union law which came into effect on August 1, 1990, guaranteed 
the press freedom. After independence, the all-union law continued to serve as the 
basic legal framework to deal with the press, and Akayev continued his 
pre-independence benign policy toward the national as well as international print 
media. In July 1992, the republican parliament passed a new mass media law, almost
321
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a carbon copy o f  the above all-union law. The July 1992 law guarantees freedom of 
the mass media. It supports a journalist’s right to obtain and publish information 
without prior approval or restraint. A journalist is also guaranteed the right to protect 
his sources of information. The law also requires that all institutions o f mass media 
must register with the Ministry of Justice and await the official approval before 
engaging in any operation.
While basic guarantees for the press freedom are provided in the law, certain 
restrictions are also codified in order to supposedly prevent the abuse o f the freedom 
of the mass media. These restrictions deal with state secrets, forcible overthrow of the 
existing constitutional order, calls for war, violence, and intolerance toward various 
social groups, and desecration of national values. The law also makes it impermissible 
for the press to encroach on the privacy and honor and dignity o f individual citizens 
and to publish false information. A similar clause on the protection o f honor o f the 
president was considered but was dropped because Akayev was opposed to it (State 
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 and 1993:821 and 
943 respectively).
The July 1992 law, like above the all-union law, contained a number of 
provisions which could be stretched and exploited to restrict freedom o f the press and 
media. For instance, the requirement that all media must seek and await official 
recognition before beginning to operate could be used to curb the rise o f  independent 
print media. However, Akayev and his team eschewed such tactics during the first 
phase. The Akayev government pursued a  very liberal registration policy. There are
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no reports to indicate that the government refused to register a publication for 
political reasons. As a result of a liberal registration policy, independent institutions 
of news media continued to rise in the republic.
In addition to the state-owned news media, fully independent mass media 
institutions such as newspapers, magazines, television networks, and radio stations 
have appeared in Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence period. These institutions of 
mass media have a host o f founders, including political parties, social movements, 
professional groups, civil and cultural formations, and individual citizens. The 
parliament also had its own newspaper, Svobodnye gory, which played the role of 
opposition before it was shut down in August 1994.
It is outside the scope of this study to discuss in detail each and every 
independent newspaper which existed in the post-independence period. It will suffice 
for our purpose to identify notable independent media outlets and briefly discuss the 
freedom o f  expression they enjoyed in the post-independence period.
In addition to Svobodnye gory, other notable independent and opposition 
newspapers which have existed in the post-independence period include Vechemii 
Bishkek, Res Publica, Delo No, Politika, Erk, Asaba, and Femida. Vechemii Bishkek 
is an independent and the most professional newspaper with the largest circulation in 
the country. Res publica and Asaba are the most impeccable representatives o f the 
opposition press. Politika was founded and edited by a woman until it, like Svobodnye 
gory, was closed down in August 1994. Politika was a supplement to Delo No, a
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Bishkek-based moderately opposition-oriented newspaper. Erk is the mouthpiece of 
Erkin Kyrgyzstan, an ethnonationalist political party.
Like Erk which seeks to promote interests of ethnic Kyrgyz, newspapers 
representing interests o f other ethnic groups have also cropped up in the country. As 
already mentioned, Soglasie and several other Slavic associations have founded their 
own mouthpiece, Soglasie. Although the Osh city features independent and small 
circulation Russian and Uzbek newspapers such as Mizon of Uzbeks and Devovoi Osh 
(Business Osh) o f Russians, these newspapers have usually eschewed the role of 
opposition. Osh also features independent, private television stations such as Osh TV 
and Mizon TV. Mizon TV is an Uzbek-language station. Osh TV has wider audience. 
It has its own facilities. As of 1997, Osh TV was reportedly moving, though quite 
slowly and cautiously, in the direction of featuring political commentaries (CSCE, 
1995; 1-6; CSCE, 1998:16-26).
As already mentioned, Akayev generally respected the freedom of the press 
even before the July 1992 law was passed. In fact, he wanted to have a close and 
respectable relationship with the national as well as international press and media. It 
became quite obvious shortly after independence that unlike other Central Asian 
leaders, Akayev wanted more rather than less news coverage of the entire region of 
Central Asia. He took personal initiatives to court the news media in this regard. In 
March 1992, he organized a conference in Bishkek o f news media executives from the 
leading newspapers o f the CIS and the representatives of the press services o f the 
Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. In his address to the conference participants,
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Akayev pressed upon them to provide the region more newspaper space. He lamented 
the information vacuum in Central Asian a t a time when values and ideas were 
forming in the region. By way of assuring the press and media that he would tolerate 
even critical news coverage of his republic, Akayev asserted that he did not expect 
everyone to agree with his democratic ways and ideas or his ways of creating a 
law-governed society. He further noted that he needed not only allies in the press, but 
also opponents who could be just as useful as allies because opponents forced him to 
think better and act enthusiastically. However, he expected the opposition press to 
perform its duties in a professional and civilized way (Current Digest of Post-Soviet 
Press, no. 12, 1992:34).
Whether the opposition print media lived up to his standards and expectations 
or not, Akayev generally remained faithful to his views at least until mid-1994. 
Although his government exercised influence over the state-owned media, the 
independent and government newspapers have been generally free to print material 
without prior government approval or restriction. The government press and media 
avoided direct criticism of the executive leadership and were susceptible to 
self-censorship. However, leaving aside self-censorship cases which are difficult to 
document, there were no reports to indicate that the government imposed prior 
restriction or censorship on the independent and state-owned news media.
Until m id-1994, journalists working for various newspapers across the country 
were free from government pressure, intimidation, and threats. In August 1993, the 
Ministry of Justice made an effort to curtail freedom of the press and its
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representatives. The Ministry tried to initiate a screening process for press material in 
order to stop publication of classified information. The independent as well as 
government newspapers lashed out at the move as an effort to reinstitute censorship. 
In the absence o f Akayev, the Vice President quickly issued an executive decree to 
reverse the initiative and to reaffirm the government’s commitment to the freedom of 
the press.
In fact, during the first three years o f independence, the press freely debated 
several unsavory issues in ways critical o f  the government and its policies. Inter- and 
intra-ethnic disputes, nature and failure o f  the transition policies, distribution o f 
power, constitutional matters, official incompetence, mismanagement and corruption 
were some o f  these unsavory issues. Shortly after independence, press debates broke 
out on a number of politically sensitive and potentially divisive issues. Let alone the 
common heated debates on inter-ethnic issues, reports of intense intra-Kyrgyz disputes 
were regularly published in the press. For instance, in early February 1992, two 
popular newspapers raised a politically sensitive controversy over the preponderance 
of the northerners over their southern coethnics in the state power structures (Current 
Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 10, 1992:5). It was not a one time episode, rather the 
press continued to cover it in the subsequent period (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet 
Press, no. 43, 1992:24-25).
The republican leadership not only tolerated such politically sensitive debates 
and other cases o f adverse news coverage o f the republic but it also defended authors 
of these critical debates and commentaries and tried to present its own case to the
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press. For instance, in September 1993, in a  statement of the government press 
service, a local Russian journalist working for the Russian television network, 
Ostankino, was accused of pejorative reporting about Kyrgyzstan. The statement 
concluded that it was not lawful for a  foreign journalist to insult the people of his 
temporary abode.
In fact, the journalist was born in Bishkek, lived in the republic for the past 30 
years and was a  Kyrgyz citizen of Russian origin. The local Russian-language 
newspapers lashed out at the government press service statement. The press service 
was criticized for portraying the journalist as a foreigner and for its clumsy effort to 
suppress accurate presentation of the negative side o f the life in the country. Above 
all, Akayev publicly defended the journalist and criticized the press service officials 
for their clumsiness. Although the press service defended its version but assured the 
news media that the episode has no bearing on the news media as a whole (State 
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993:943). Likewise, 
Akayev had a two-hour discussion with a Russian reporter o f a  Moscow-based 
newspaper in order to successfully dispel his skepticism he expressed in an article on 
the future o f ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 
22, 1994:23). In line with our theoretical expectation, these episodes clearly 
demonstrate that the readiness and willingness o f the Russian-speaking population and 
the local and foreign Russian-language press to defend their interests and the 
sensitivity o f the republic leadership to their concerns exert a positive impact on 
political liberalization in the republic in the post-independence period.
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In addition to ethnic issues, other questions were also freely and regularly 
debated in the press. The independent press continued to publish criticism o f the 
government and a host of its policies in 1991 and 1992. Such criticism intensified in 
1993. Political parties also sharpened their criticism of the government. For example, 
Asaba and Erkin Kyrgyzstan became more vocal in their attacks on the government. 
In a conference of democratic forces held at the initiative of Akayev in March 1993, 
Erkin Kyrgyzstan and Asaba presented an ultimatum and demanded the resignation of 
the prime minister, Tursunbek Chnigishev (Haghayeghi, 1995:118). Such attacks of 
political parties were regularly published in the independent and opposition 
newspapers. After all, Erkin Kyrgyzstan had its own newspaper, Erk, to publish its 
criticism o f the government and its various actions.
The most acrimonious debate the national press covered since independence 
was focused on official corruption. The central authorities were most vulnerable and 
sensitive to accusations of corruption. Politics and details of such accusations have 
been discussed in the previous section. Here, we will confine our focus to the role of 
the press and government reaction.
In 1993, the opposition sharpened its criticism of the government for 
widespread official corruption. The independent and opposition newspapers like Res 
Publica, Politika, and Svbodnye gory played an active role in exposing and reporting 
cases o f official corruption. The press and media were spared in the early responses 
Akayev adopted to deal with the mounting political crisis. However, as the 1993-94 
political crisis worsened, he connived with the regional heads to successfully weaken
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the parliament and included the press, too, on the list of problems to deal with. As 
part o f his presidential responses to the political crisis, he reviewed his approach 
toward the independent and opposition press and ushered in a moderately restrictive 
phase of his press and media policy in the summer of 1994.
In the wake o f the 1993-94 political crisis, Akayev began to use for the first 
time the July 1992 law on the mass media to hold the press and journalists 
accountable for what they wrote and published. In May 1994, in line with the law on 
protecting state secrets, the Akayev government restricted the subjects journalists 
could write about. In fact, the 1992 law was supplemented with other restrictive 
decrees, orders, and laws. For instance, the 1993 Constitution has been amended to 
make honor of the president inviolable.
In the wake of the 1993-94 crisis, Akayev also, for the first time, began to 
openly criticize the press for its continued irresponsible behavior. In fact, the press 
accounts implicating him personally in the widespread official corruption were 
prejudicial to his image as an upright, genuine democratic reformer. He was not 
willing to let the opposition press publicly call him corrupt under the cover o f the 
press freedom. He reversed his earlier position and set up a committee for the defense 
of his honor (Huskey, 1997:257-8). The committee was assigned with the 
responsibility to ensure that no one used false information to sully the honor and 
reputation o f the president.
As the executive-legislative confrontation intensified, the pro-Akayev deputies 
accused in July 1994 the parliament speaker and the parliament-owned newspaper,
329
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Svobodnye gory, o f hatching conspiracies to overthrow the president. In August 1994, 
Akayev himself lashed out at the newspaper for harboring communist sympathies, for 
publishing anti-Semitic information, and for printing material critical of other states, 
hence damaging Kyrgyzstan’s relation with them. The last objection referred to the 
newspaper’s criticism on other Central Asian leaders. Akayev initiated legal action 
against the newspaper and a Bishkek court shut down the newspaper in August 1994. 
The editor of Svobdonye gory offered, however, a different reason for the 
government action against the newspaper. According to her, the newspaper had 
received a report from the parliamentary investigative commission on official 
corruption and was preparing to publish it, but the central authorities wanted to stop it 
(CSCE, 1995:4-5).
On August 19, 1994, the same day the government impounded the 
parliament-owned newspaper, Akayev issued a presidential decree sanctioning the 
formation of a council on activities of the mass media. The council was sanctioned 
to "help journalists in their work and prevent the use o f the media from causing 
political instability and upsetting interethnic accord and civic peace" (State 
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994:866). In effect, the 
council sought to stop the publication of material critical of the authorities, especially 
the president. In addition to the council, the authorities used the security apparatus, 
the MNB, to contact the editors of the opposition newspapers and journalists and 
block news coverage critical o f the government and its policies (CSCE 1998:22-24).
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T h e  closure of Svobodnye gory and formation of the presidential council on 
the m aw  m ed ia  preceded a series of anti-press actions in the subsequent period. A 
n u m b er of other opposition newspapers were closed down, and opposition journalists 
were intimidated, threatened, beaten, tried, fined, banned from practicing journalism, 
and  imprisoned on the charges of publishing false information and damaging the 
h o n o r and reputation of the president and other high ranking officials. In addition to 
S v o b o d n y e  gory, Politika was closed down within less than a week after the closure 
of the former for its criticism of the president. The central and regional high ranking 
officials readily followed the footsteps o f Akayev in their dealing with the opposition 
press and journalists. For instance, the prime minister secured the closure of Kriminal 
in March 1997, for falsely implicating him in financial corruption, and in September 
1997, the Osh local authorities sued an Uzbek-language newspaper, Mizon, for 
publishing a false article about excesses and corruption o f the local police. The fate of 
individual opposition journalists from opposition newspapers such as Res Publica and 
Femida was no different. The editors and journalists from these newspapers were 
beaten, fined, and imprisoned for slandering the president and other leading executive 
officials (CSCE 1998:22-24; State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1995, 1996 and 1997:918-9, 1003, 1154 respectively).
The above discussion o f anti-press measures the Akayev government adopted 
since mid-1994 offers three important points. Firstly, it is quite clear that the press 
and journalists received a heavy-handed treatment from the central and local 
authorities since m id-1994. Secondly, at times the press made indiscriminate personal
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accusations without proof and, as a result, rendered itself defenseless in law suits. 
Thirdly, the opposition press and journalists proved resilient. In spite of their 
constant confrontation with the press since mid-1994, the central authorities have been 
unable to silence the independent press and journalists. The opposition press never 
ceased to publish reports critical of the president and government.
It is important to note that the press has been able to show resilience in large 
pan due to the restraint the Akayev government exercised in its dealing with the 
press. Although Akayev and other leading executive officials have shown readiness to 
punish those who hurl personal accusations o f corruption on them without proof, they 
refrained from suppressing and silencing all forms o f criticism and difference of 
opinion expressed in the media outlets. They have also avoided flushing out all the 
independent newspapers. As of 1997, there were approximately 40 to 50 independent 
newspapers and magazines in Kyrgyzstan (State Department. Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1997:1154).
Since mid-1994, a number of independent opposition newspapers and 
journalists have printed reports critical o f the local as well as central authorities and 
suffered no punitive government reactions. In 1994, local newspapers reported stories 
of local police excesses. The same year the Kyrgyz-Human Rights Bureau and an 
independent newspaper, Delo No, joined hands to champion the cause of the reported 
victims of police injustices (State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1994:865, 868). While the local authorities in Osh sued Mizon for its
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report on police corruption, Delo No was able to write on the same subject without 
provoking official ire (CSCE, 1998:23-24).
In spite o f the effort o f the presidential council on the mass media to 
discourage critical coverage o f the president in the press, independent newspapers like 
Res Publica, an impeccable representative of opposition newspapers, continued to 
publish articles critical o f the President, the Government, and government policy 
(State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995:919). Like 
Res Publica, Asaba, in spite o f government warning, also continued to publish articles 
critical o f the republic leadership. In September 1997, one issue o f Asaba featured 
eight articles against Akayev. This fact serves as an ample proof that even impeccable 
representative o f the opposition newspapers like Asaba were free to publish material 
without prior censorship.
In October 1997, Vechemii Bishkek defended Dooronbek Sadyrabaev, a 
deputy from Osh, when he ran into troubles with the government over his remarks 
about the possible secession of the southern regions due to unwise economic, political, 
and cadre policies of the government. In his remarks, the deputy faulted the president, 
too. The Prosecutor General warned the deputy that his remarks had "an 
anti-constitutional character” because they threatened territorial integrity o f the 
country. The deputy maintained that he warned the government o f possible secession, 
rather than called for it. Vechernii Bishkek featured his defense on its front page, 
concluding that his position sounded credible (CSCE, 1998:21). Even opposition 
leaders partially confirm the above assertion regarding the freedom o f the press. For
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instance, while they criticize Akayev and his policies during their meetings with the 
international visitors concerned with human rights situation and complain about the 
lack o f a  real independent television, many opposition parliamentarians concede that 
there are few newspapers which can voice criticism o f the authorities. These things 
are "unthinkable in Uzbekistan" (CSCE, 1998:18).
CONCLUSION
The way the political liberalization process unfolded in Kyrgyzstan in the pre- 
and post-independence period makes it clear that political orientation, actions, and 
strategies o f the leader in power are o f important consequences for the transition 
process in relatively less developed former communist polities. However, it also 
becomes clear that although these factors may magnify or weaken the situational 
stimuli, structural factors continue to exercise an independent influence on political 
liberalization in such polities. This is true of both the Masaliyev and Akayev eras in 
Kyrgyzstan.
In spite o f his anti-reformist views and efforts, Masaliyev was only partially 
successful in circumventing the implementation o f glasnost in Kyrgyzstan because the 
pressure o f central authorities, active political participation of Russian minority, and 
growing fragmentation among the republican communist elites increasingly neutralized 
such efforts and weakened his control o f politics in the republic. Informal 
sociopolitical groups arose and opposed the communist party, certain republican 
newspapers and journalists engaged in independent and critical news coverage 
especially after the Osh conflict in June 1991, a  number o f independent candidates
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were able to participate and defeat their communist competitors in national and 
republican parliamentary elections, and challenge the communist leadership during the 
Masaliyev era. This situation ultimately cost him power position, brought Akayev into 
power, and paved the way for greater political openness in the republic.
If Masaliyev sought to circumvent glasnost in line with his anti-reformist 
views, Akayev sought to expand and deepen it after he became president in October 
1990. The latter’s reformist orientation supplemented the existing factors favorable to 
glasnost such as the central leadership’s support, active participation o f ethnic groups 
such as Kyrgyz and Russian in the political process, and increasingly disintegrating 
communist elite structure. Before independence, only under Akayev opposition groups 
were for the first time able to function without fear of intimidation and repression. In 
alliance with democratically-oriented local forces and with the blessings of the central 
authorities, but contrary to the wishes o f the republican communist leadership,
Akayev was able to accelerate the political liberalization process in his republic 
through presidential initiatives. As a result o f  his efforts, legal foundations for 
political pluralism, and especially all the necessary parts o f a multi-party political 
system, were put in place before independence.
Except the Soviet pressure for political reform, all other factors conducive for 
political liberalization in the pre-independence remained more or less intact in the 
post-independence period. In other words, Akayev’s reformist orientation, political 
participation o f  large, resourceful Russian minority, and fragmented elite structure 
saw no significant change. Consequently, Akayev continued his reform agenda in the
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post-independence period. As a result of his relatively liberal policy, a host of 
independent political parties and social movements (ranging from ethnonationalist to 
liberal democratic ones) with diverse orientations have been able to freely form, 
operate, and participate in the political processes (including electoral process) in the 
country in the post-independence. In fact, freedom of independent political and social 
forces to organize themselves and pursue their expressed objectives is one of the areas 
in which Kyrgyzstan has recorded more or less sustained progress and other regional 
countries have so far been unable to emulate it. As a result o f this freedom, a 
genuinely independent, although weak, multiparty system has appeared in Kyrgyzstan 
in the post-independence era. More or less similar degree of freedom was available to 
the independent mass media, at least in the immediate post-independence period.
The political liberalization process came under strains by mid-1994. It suffered 
reversals in certain areas, especially the press freedom, in the wake o f the 1993-94 
political crisis rooted in the executive-legislative branch confrontation on a number of 
issues, including the widespread official corruption. The sources o f these reversals 
include Akayev’s political strategies to deal with this confrontation and the 
irresponsible behavior o f the mass media.
In spite of these reversals in the political liberalization process since mid-1994, 
Akayev exercised restraint in his dealing with his political opponents. The sources of 
this restraint included his own liberal views, his concern to prevent migration of 
ethnic Russians for economic as well as political reasons, and fragmented elite 
structure, especially the independent parliament and powerful individual political
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actors affiliated with various clans and regions. As a result, even after the limited 
authoritarian offensive began in mid-1994, there were still vibrant independent mass 
media institutions, journalists, and political parties in Kyrgyzstan—a fact which sets 
that country apart from other Central Asian countries in terms o f an overall progress 
in all aspects of political liberalization.
Is the present level o f political liberalization likely to hold in the foreseeable 
future? Will it evolve into the next stage of democratization, which the recent regime 
transition literature expects to occur, on the road to consolidated democracy? Or will 
it evolve into another viable political alternative based on the rule o f law? Or will it 
degenerate into an abject repressive regime such as in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan? 
It is hard to answer these questions with an element o f certainty for various reasons, 
including the uncertain post-communist situation in Kyrgyzstan. However, a good deal 
of information is available to help us broadly speculate about the future prospects of 
political liberalization in that country.
Of course, the reformist leadership of Akayev is an important reason for the 
lead Kyrgyzstan achieved over Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in almost all areas of 
political liberalization in the post-independence period. There is no signs o f imminent 
change in his political orientation and his political choices so far do not smack of 
latent authoritarian tendencies. Also, if his past record is any guide, socioeconomic 
crises of ordinary proportion are unlikely to lead him to impose a violent authoritarian 
order. Therefore, we can safely say that the political liberalization process is unlikely 
to degenerate into an abject repressive regime under his remaining presidential term
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which is coming to an end in 2000. The Supreme Court has allowed him to run for a 
third term because his 1991 election occurred prior to the adoption o f the current 
constitution according to which an individual can become president for two terms 
only. A number of political forces are opposing this decision. If he runs for the 
another term and decides to stay in power beyond 2000, he is more likely to resort to 
political tactics rather than brutal force to deal with this opposition. In other words, 
the political liberalization process is unlikely to suffer a  serious setback so far as 
Akayev remains content with the Supreme Court’s interpretation o f  the constitution 
and refrains from prolonging his rule beyond the third term.
If Akayev is replaced with a conservative leadership, the political liberalization 
process in the republic can suffer setbacks in certain areas. However, chances o f the 
rise of an abject repressive regime are still minimal for two reasons. First, two 
important factors conducive for political liberalization, the resourceful Russian 
minority and powerful elites divided along ideological, ethnic, tribal, and regional 
lines are likely to hold good in the foreseeable future. The conservative leadership 
will find it extremely hard and risky to neutralize these two important favorable 
factors. The Russian minority is unlikely to support the imposition o f a violent 
authoritarian order for several reasons, including the fear of provoking anti-Russian 
feelings among politically active groups in the republic. The resourcefulness of the 
Russian minority, including the support o f Russian troops based on the Kyrgyz soil, 
will effectively protect it from excessive repression. Also, powerful elites are so 
sharply divided that it will be very hard for a conservative leadership to unify them
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on the need for an abject repressive regime. Second, in spite o f representing a wide 
variety o f ideological orientations and interests, almost all organized political forces 
advocate some variant of democracy. All such forces are likely to resist the 
imposition o f a violent authoritarian order, increasing the cost o f rolling back 
whatever political liberalization is available to them. And it will be hard for any 
leadership to perpetuate such an order without the support o f an organized political 
force. Hence, Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to degenerate into an abject repressive regime in 
the near future. In other words, its lead over Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in almost all 
areas of political liberalization is likely to hold in the foreseeable future.
NOTES
1. The primary target of the authoritarian offensive that began in m id-1994 was the 
opposition press and journalists and the parliament. Although it later engulfed a small 
number of individual political activists, no political party was banned as has been the 
case in Uzbekistan.
2. In 1996, the Russian minority made up only 15.6 % o f the population in 
Kyrgyzstan (Heleniak 1997:371).
3. At the time o f independence, approximately three times more Russian-speakers 
were employed in industry than members o f the titular ethnic group. The Russian- 
speakers also outnumber the titular ethnic group in the makeup o f the technological 
elite. This is the reasons why some have described the flight of non-titular population 
as "brain drain” (Olcott 1997:213; Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 17, 
1993:12).
4. For instance, the Commission for the Support of Compatriots, set up by the 
Russian government to look after the interests of the Russian minority in the former 
Soviet space, provided newsprint and computers and other equipment to the Slavic 
Fund and Concord (Soglasie), two leading Russian-oriented sociopolitical associations 
in Kyrgyzstan (Huskey 1998:270). In addition, Russia helped in setting up a Kyrgyz- 
Russian investment fund to convert enterprises in Kyrgyzstan that employ mainly 
Russian-speakers into joint ventures (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 8, 
1994:27).
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5. Besides Shipitko, three more independent candidates succeeded in defeating their 
communist competitors in these elections in the capital city. These three independent 
candidates are Oleg Igumnov, a high school teacher, E. Akramov, a surgeon, and A. 
Komarov, the director of an environmental research institute (Huskey 1995:820).
6. The true value o f this group became evident once the new parliament opened its 
first session on April 10, 1990. At the opening session of the new parliament, a 
number of reformist deputies voiced their opposition to the communist party and its 
practices. Above all, these deputies tried to put up their own candidate against 
Masaiiyev in the election for the chairman of the new parliament. However, by a 
majority vote, the communist deputies refused the independent candidate a slot on the 
ballot.
7. The group also openly accused the party leadership and economic bureaucracy for 
making a sustained effort "to foil all grass-roots political initiatives in the 
development of democratic process." The fact that the new republican parliament was 
"becoming hostage to this practice” was lamented. The party leadership was criticized 
for continuing the past practice of deciding "everything...at the level of the Party 
committees, and not in completely objective and principled fashion" and for 
disregarding the sovereignty o f the new, democratically elected republican parliament 
by keeping actual policy process out of its control. A special reference was made to 
the fact that the parliament was denied an opportunity to express its views on the Osh 
incident which literally rocked the whole republic (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 
38, 1990:23).
8. Apas Jumagulov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and D. Amanbayev, 
the first secretary of the party committee in the Issyk-Kul province, were the other 
two presidential candidates.
9. The impact of such defections was clearly felt on two occasions. First, on the eve 
of the August 1991 coup, the republican communist party leadership which supported 
the coup failed, despite its desire, to move against Akayev. Second, it failed to 
prevent him from initiating legal proceedings against its members for supporting the 
1991 coup and from banning its activities in the republic in the post-independence 
period.
10. For instance, two out of three candidates who contested the December 1995 
presidential elections were important communist leaders, Absamat Masaliyev, the 
First Secretary of the communist party, and Medetkan Sherimkulov, the former 
speaker of the parliament and a former Central Committee Secretary of the party.
11. A number of important political leaders represent these geographic regions. For 
instance, the longtime party boss Usubaliyev and president Akayev come from Naryn, 
and Masaliyev represents Talas (Olcott 1993:55).
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12. Due to the shortcomings of the 1995 parliamentary elections, Akayev reportedly 
contemplated to annul the elections. However, the fear of potential hostile reaction of 
the resourceful southern candidates who succeeded in these elections reportedly 
prevented him from taking such a radical step (Pryde 1995:115-6).
13. In early 1992, the republic’s press reported the protest of the southern political 
elites over the preponderance of the northern elites in the state power structures 
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 10, 1992:5; no. 43, 1992:24-5).
14. Khazanov is o f  the view that the main problem Akayev is facing is his relations 
with the former communists because they still occupy the dominant positions in the 
government and administration and constitute the most serious political force in the 
parliament. He believes that they "are able to sabotage any serious attempt at 
reforms" (Khazanov 1995:148). It is true that the former communists are occupying 
dominant position in the government, but they can not (and did not) put up an open 
challenge to the political reform program.
15. In his speech on the introduction of presidential rule in the country, Akayev 
supported this reform measure but at the same time expressed his apprehension that 
excessive concentration o f power in the president’s hand could lead to an authoritarian 
regime. He demanded to formulate more precisely and more clearly constitutional 
guarantees that presidential power would not develop into authoritarian power 
(Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 12, 1990:6).
16. According to Akayev, the people who carried out the coup and those who 
supported it were motivated by their "desire to preserve the state power and 
totalitarian regime that are slipping away from them" (Current Digest of Soviet Press, 
no. 33, 1991:25).
17. The fact that, in spite of his liberal orientation, he banned the communist party in 
the post-independence period partly supports this assertion.
18. In spite of the fact that he suspected the commitment of the communist party, the 
most organized party in the republic, to democracy, he suggested to hold 
parliamentary elections on the basis o f lists provided by political parties (Current 
Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 42, 1992:7)— a measure bound to strengthen national 
political parties, including the communist party, rather than individual local political 
leaders.
19. Initially, Akayev was supporter o f maximum freedom of the press. He was 
opposed to libel laws. Over time, as the opposition press began to put out information 
implicating him and other officials without evidence, he supported the idea o f holding 
such people responsible for their actions. As a result, he supported libel laws to 
prosecute institutions o f  mass media for putting out false information.
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20. Referring to the shortcomings of the 1995 parliamentary elections, Akayev 
remarked that the current law on elections does not fit either the specific features of 
Kyrgyzstan or the mentality o f its people (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 
1995:15).
21. These common reasons include: a) Gorbachev’s view of Islam as a reactionary 
force which could undermine his reform initiatives (Olcott 1990:375); b) a massive 
anti corruption campaign in Central Asia; c) the Soviet authorities’ view of the 
Central Asian informal groups as accomplices o f the corrupt officials and sources of 
growing anti-Soviet direction, ethnonational tensions, and violent conflicts in the 
region (Critchlow 1991:146-7) and d) overcautious population.
22. The list of corrupt party members who were purged after Masaliyev took power 
in 1985 included the second party secretary and two oblast secretaries, in addition to 
several hundred other party and state functionaries (Haghayeghi, 1995:50).
23. Although the Gorbachev reform program was essentially beyond his independent 
manipulation, Masaliyev sought to line up behind the anti-reformist forces active at 
the center under the leadership of Yegor Ligachev to block it (BBC, September 12, 
1989; Huskey 1995:818). When Ligachev visited Kyrgyzstan in September 1989, he 
shared the concern with the republican communist leadership that certain mass media 
were biased in their negative coverage o f the state o f affairs in the republic (BBC, 
September 12, 1989). In addition, the First Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz Council 
o f Ministers made an important revelation in August 1990 that the Kyrgyz leadership 
permitted Lighachev and his emissaries to dictate the cadre policy in its republic 
during this period (Huskey 1995:818).
24. As some representatives o f the local press confided to their colleagues in the 
central newspapers, any serious material that debated important societal problems and 
criticized the republic communist leaders even at the district level for one reason or 
another was prevented from reaching the Kyrgyz masses. If a  critical item ever 
escaped official censors, an immediate effort was made to convince the public that it 
was false (FBIS, July 29, 1988:61).
25. As these clubs sought to assume a more explicit and independent political profile 
over time, their activities were curtailed (Haghayeghi 1995:108; Current Digest o f 
Soviet Press, no. 2, 1989:18; Huskey 1995:832; 1997:250).
26. The DMK played an important role during the Osh conflict. After the communist 
authorities failed to prevent the bloodshed, they enlisted the support o f the DMK. The 
DMK leadership obliged the communist authorities but humbled them by organizing 
rallies in the capital city and by making wide ranging demands, including the 
independence of the republic with a right to secede from the center, adoption o f a 
multi-party democratic political system, and resignation o f the incumbent ruling elites 
(Haghayeghi 1995:109).
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27. According to official statistics, which were conservative, 320 people were killed 
in these violent clashes (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no 1, 1993:6).
28. In Osh, people raised banners in Uzbek language with the following slogan:
"There is no justice" (The Financial Times, July 20, 1990:2). The serious erosion of 
the communist leadership’s standing in society also became obvious when Masaliyev 
failed, despite his repeated requests, but the opposition leader o f the DMK,
Tupchubek Turgunaliev, succeeded in dispersing a mass protest rally o f ethnic Kyrgyz 
in front o f the communist party headquarters in the capital city.
29. Let alone their electoral competitors, they had to face at the peak o f the election 
campaign several mass demonstrations of ethnic Kyrgyz in support of their nationalist 
demands, including the demand for an immediate implementation o f the new language 
law in the republic. In order to pacify the demonstrators and prevent a law and order 
situation, the communist authorities took a number of steps including open forums 
which were scenes of heated debates between senior party and government officials on 
the one hand and representatives of demonstrators and informal groups on the other 
(Huskey, 1995:822-6).
30. According to the official sources, the delay occurred due to the fact that a  number 
of clauses in its initial charter referred to it as a paramilitary formation. According to 
the Cossack version, the authorities resisted registration on the pretext that the 
Cossacks had no historical ties to the country (State Dept, Country Reports On 
Human Rights Practices for 1993:944).
31. One of such arbitrary and unconstitutional measures was his decision to sanction 
the formation o f a  constitutional assembly to revise the constitution. Another 
questionable decision involved holding of a  national referendum on constitutional 
amendments in October 1994.
32. The lower house is a permanent legislative body, whereas the upper house is 
designed to hold scheduled sessions rather than on permanent basis to approve the 
budget, presidential appointees and important laws.
33. For instance, the speaker o f the former parliament questioned the need for and the 
wisdom behind a bi-cameral rather than a single chamber legislature in a  unitary state 
like Kyrgyzstan (CSCE, 1995:5).
34. In one instance, a  candidate contested and won his seat while hiding from the 
government (CSCE 1995:9).
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
CONCLUSIONS
After their independence in 1991, the Central Asian republics, experienced 
several common political outcomes such as the dominance o f  the executive, 
secularism, and a high degree of statism—seemingly legacies o f their communist past. 
The fact that the post-communist Central Asian republics share several common 
socioeconomic, cultural, political, and historical features seem s to have led students o f 
Central Asia to focus on these and other common political outcomes, envision more 
or less similar trajectories of their political development, and overlook and/or 
deemphasize political variance among them in the post-communist era. However 
salient common political outcomes, they do not overshadow the fact that these 
countries experienced significant variation in the area of political liberalization.
This study is clearly the product of our concern w ith this gap and its adequate 
theoretical explanation. In this study we tried to show that three Central Asian 
countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, significantly vary in political 
liberalization and provide an adequate theoretical explanation o f this variation. The 
central question this study raised and tried to adequately answer was: Why these 
countries which share several common characteristics experienced significant variation 
in political liberalization within few years of their independence? We believe that this 
study has succeeded in this endeavor.
344
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VARIANCE IN POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
This study has clearly illustrated that our thesis about differential rates of 
political openness in Central Asia has merit. In other words, the three Central Asian 
countries can be located at different points on the political liberalization scale: 
Kyrgyzstan leads the group in all aspects of political liberalization, Kazakhstan 
follows with some important achievements, and Uzbekistan is far behind either of 
them with little or no progress in the post-communist political transition. Kyrgyzstan 
needs to institutionalize many liberalized practices and put an end to few aberrations 
in order to evolve into an enduring political alternative; Kazakhstan needs to 
institutionalize some liberalized practices and liberalize many authoritarian practices; 
and Uzbekistan is yet to introduce, let alone institutionalize, genuine political reforms 
in society.
The Central Asian republics began to experience varying rate of political 
openness in the wake of the Gorbachev reform program in the pre-independence 
period. The pre-independence variance in the rates of political openness among them 
became more pronounced in the post-independence period. Kyrgyzstan represents a 
case of relatively very high level o f political liberalization in Central Asia. By mid- 
1994, the political liberalization process which was making steady progress began to 
falter and suffered setbacks down the road after Akayev launched a limited 
authoritarian offensive primarily against the opposition press and journalists. Still, this 
authoritarian offensive did not degenerate into an abject repressive regime like the one 
in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan continues to surpass other republics in terms of an overall
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progress in almost all areas o f political liberalization. Barring few aberrations, 
autonomous sociopolitical forces are free to organize themselves, receive official 
recognition, disseminate their political views and visions through press conferences, 
newspapers, and mass rallies, and participate in national elections. Although the 
honeymoon period for the independent press ended in mid-1994 as some independent 
newspapers were shut down and journalists were persecuted thereafter on charges of 
sullying the honor o f the president, it faces the least restrictive policy in comparison 
to the independent press in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan represents a moderate case which can be located approximately in 
the middle between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the political liberalization scale. 
After independence, it witnessed an overall improvement in the pre-independence 
level of political liberalization and sizable independent political space became 
available to Kazakh society. The Kazakh opposition is largely spared o f the kind of 
indiscriminate, brutal repression the Uzbek opposition is subjected to in the post­
independence period. In Kazakhstan, autonomous sociopolitical formations appear and 
disappear for various reasons. Many pre-independence autonomous social groups 
evolved into explicitly political parties. Also, a number of new autonomous political 
formations and independent newspapers were allowed to arise and play the role of an 
active opposition in the post-independence period. However, at the same time they 
face serious restrictions, including denial o f registration and suspension. Also, 
opposition forces are seldom allowed to hold rallies; opposition activists are in most 
cases subjected to disguised and undisguised punitive measures for their role in
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unsanctioned rallies; and independent newspapers and journalists are at times 
persecuted for sullying the honor of the president and for endangering inter-ethnic 
peace and security o f the Kazakh state. In addition, although Kazakh authorities allow 
limited independent individual and organized participation in the national political 
process but they effectively preclude a real electoral contest between opposition and 
government-backed candidates in the national elections. Although this record o f 
political liberalization is modest in comparison to the one Kyrgyzstan achieved in the 
post-independence period, it is certainly superior to that o f Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan represents a case of consciously arrested political liberalization— 
one of the worst cases o f political liberalization in Central Asia. The basic pre­
independence authoritarian orientation and character o f the Uzbek regime remains 
unaltered in the post-independence period. Tactics aside, the Uzbek leadership, which 
never ceases to extol virtues of gradual reformism in the transition from communism 
to political pluralism, has so far made no genuine effort to liberalize its any 
authoritarian practices in the post-communist era. Since mid-1992, there has been no 
tolerated independent political space and activity in the republic. Uzbek leadership 
uses widespread repression as part of its determined effort to thoroughly emasculate 
and eliminate both individual and organized opposition voices in the republic and to 
establish one of most repressive and least reformed post-communist regimes in the 
region— a regime which has all the democratic trappings but no content.
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RUSSIAN MINORITY AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The central reform measures, including the promotion of local cultures, aimed 
at socioeconomic and political revitalization of the country clearly politicized societal 
forces, including the ethnic Russian minority and many members of the republican 
communist parties, along eth no national lines in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in 
the pre-independence period. This conducive condition persistsin both the countries in 
the post-independence period. The members of the ethnic Russian minority who were 
active in sociopolitical groups before independence either joined different national 
political parties or formed their own sociopolitical groups exclusively committed to 
Russian causes in the post-independence period. The demands of the Russian-speaking 
population and titular nationalities in both the counties are often at variance with each 
other—a factor which complicates not only the satisfaction of such demands but also 
the use of indiscriminate repression of opposition forces in both Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan.
What further enhances the significance of the ethnic factor for political 
liberalization in both the countries is the fact that a number of former communists of 
Russian, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz origin support their respective ethnic communities in 
pursuit of their interests. The demonstrated Russian material and political support to 
the Russian minority in the two countries and the looming threat o f the Russian 
military intervention to safeguard the interests of this minority potentially raises to a 
prohibitive level the cost o f indiscriminate repression to thoroughly emasculate 
independent political forces, including the Russian minority, in them. Political
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concessions, including the permission to form sociopolitical and cultural associations, 
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities concede to the Russian minority for political and 
economic reasons could not be denied to their titular nationalities for fear o f losing 
nationalist credentials and a national support base—a prospect which would undercut 
their manipulative tactics to deal with opposition forces, including the Russian 
minority. As the authorities in both the countries avoid the option of thorough 
repression of societal forces, including the Russian minority, and allow them to set up 
genuine independent sociopolitical formations, the fact that these formations would 
take independent positions on various matters, publicize their political views, and 
publicly criticize the authorities and their policies is a foregone conclusion. The safe 
option then Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities face and pursue is not how to completely 
depoliticize opposition force but how to either convince them or coerce them through 
selective repression to tone down their criticism and minimize their involvement in 
undesirable political activities like protest rallies.
An indiscriminate policy of repression remains an ill-advised option for both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the selective use of repression of certain 
activists o f the Russian minority in Kazakhstan with no such parallels in Kyrgyzstan 
can be explained by the prevalence o f secessionist tendencies and demands among 
some sections o f this minority. Such tendencies and demands unnerve the Kazakh 
authorities and induce them to take limited risk o f selective repression of certain 
unwanted elements among the Russian minority by using the pretext of maintaining
349
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inter-ethnic harmony and protecting security and territorial integrity of the Kazakh 
state.
Uzbekistan, in contrast, inherited a proportionally small Russian minority—a 
factor which impedes its politicization and induces it to leave its welfare to the 
goodwill o f  Uzbek authorities. The Russian minority is among the least politically 
active ethnic group in Uzbekistan with no association of its own working to promote 
its interests. This fact works to the advantage of Uzbek authorities. They would have 
paid a greater price to suppress the most resourceful ethnic minority in the country if 
it had acted on its own to protect its interests in the post-independence period. 
Another factor which benefits Uzbek authorities is the absence o f the official Russian 
support to the Russian minority not only because o f its small size but also because of 
the close collaboration between Russia and Uzbekistan on certain important 
geopolitical issues, including the civil war in Tajikistan and the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Thus, Uzbekistan remains devoid of an important conducive 
condition for political liberalization in the post-independence period.
Thus, one of the important findings of this study is that the ethnic diversity, 
which most scholars consider a negative influence in the post-communist transition 
process, exerts a positive influence on political liberalization if one resourceful ethnic 
group has a powerful state behind it and if such a group articulates its demands in 
democratic terms and refrains from threatening the survival of the country in which it 
lives. Another important finding o f this study is that a  powerful country with little or 
no commitment to democratic promotion around the world can facilitate it for its own
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tactical reasons. Two important practical implications derive from these findings. 
First, a number o f  actors, including local political groups, international institutions, 
and countries, interested in democratic promotion in Central Asia need to enlist 
support of the Russian government for their cause. Second, the democratic cause and, 
hence, the political and civil rights of the Russian minority in Central Asia will be 
served better if Russian authorities publicly and seriously adopt such cause and cease 
to support the incumbent authoritarian rulers even if they promise to act as a bulwark 
against the so-called Islamic and nationalist threats.
ELITE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The pressure o f the central reform measures, including the anti-corruption 
drive and promotion o f local cultures, caused multiple division among republican 
communist party elites in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in the pre-independence 
period. This division persists in both the countries in the post-independence period 
and continues to keep the authoritarian impulses o f their leaders in check and prevent 
them from backsliding into abject repressive regimes. This division dispersed political 
resources in society, eroded a cohesive organized support base for political elites in 
power and for their repressive policies, strengthened political society in these 
countries as numerous influential old communists joined various opposition formations 
and, hence constituted a powerful constraint against abject repression in both the 
countries in the post-independence period.
The republican communist parties as cohesive political groups lost their direct 
control of the state in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in the post-independence. However,
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the old communists in their individual capacity still command formidable financial and 
political resources with their continued access to key positions in the public sector and 
their personal, regional, and tribal sources of support and, thus, remain an important 
political force thereafter, complicating the option of indiscriminate repression of 
opposition forces in these countries. What makes them a formidable constraint against 
indiscriminate repression is not only their continued access to internal resources but 
also their ability to enlist external, especially Russian, support in their domestic 
political struggle. This is another important finding o f this study. Unlike most other 
cases of political liberalization where reform-oriented elites o f a  ruling coalition relied 
on their internal sources o f support in their bid to push for political reform, old 
communist elites, both reformist and non-reformist, who remain outside the ruling 
coalitions in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, make an effective use o f their external 
sources of support to become a formidable political force, preventing the incumbent 
regimes in these countries from lapsing into abject repressive regimes.
It is true that due to the constraints produced by the relatively large Russian 
minority and fragmented elite structure both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan did not lapse 
into abject repressive regimes along the lines in Uzbekistan. However, they 
considerably differ in the level of political liberalization. Thus, the fact that both 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a relatively large ethnic Russian minority and 
fragmented elite structure but display considerable variation in the level of political 
liberalization warrants an explanation. The presence and demands o f secessionist 
forces of Russian origin provides part of the explanation. As already mentioned, such
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forces unnerve Kazakh authorities and induce them to use selective repression against 
certain unwanted elements under the pretext of maintaining inter-ethnic harmony and 
neutralizing threats to the security and territorial integrity of the republic. However, 
pan o f the explanation lies in the views o f political leadership about political 
liberalization and is discussed further below under the section on political leadership.
As compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which both inherited dispersed 
elites structures, Uzbekistan inherited a remarkable elite unity which developed and 
solidified during the Soviet period and was clearly demonstrated in the wake o f  the 
center-sponsored anti-corruption drive. Barring few instances o f small splits and 
defections from the former republican communist party, including the short-lived 
appearance o f a crack which was partly responsible for a short-lived period o f limited 
political openness in the immediate post-independence period, the elite structure in 
Uzbekistan remains intact. The intact elite structure preserved the organized support 
base for the regime in power and its policies and prevented the dispersion o f political 
resources in society, enabling the ruling elites to thoroughly emasculate its political 
opponents without paying a high cost in the post-communist period.
It is true that the large Russian minority and fragmented elite structure act as 
powerful constraints on the authoritarian impulses in the Central Asian republics, but 
they have their own limitations. They account for the broad variance in the general 
direction o f the political liberalization process in these countries, but they can not 
adequately explain many specific puzzles, including aberrations in the political 
liberalization process in a republic when the two structural explanatory variables
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remain constant and considerable variance in the levels of political liberalization 
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan when both have a proportionally large Russian 
minority and dispersed elite structures. The political orientations, strategic behavior, 
and actions o f the Central Asian provide answer to these questions.
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The incorporation of the political leadership variable in our theoretical model 
is guided by both theoretical assumption and empirical evidence. In other words, the 
decision to focus on political leadership is based on the theoretical assumption that 
political leaders are not simply forced by impersonal influences into a pre-determined 
direction but rather retain some degree of autonomy and mediate the impact o f such 
influences on the political process. Therefore, political orientations of political 
leaders, the decisions and choices they make, and the preferences and strategies they 
adopt for one reason or another are relevant to the study o f the political liberalization 
process. Our detalied case studies provide empirical support to this theoretical 
assertion.
In this study, we found that views o f the Central Asian political leaders about 
political liberalization mediate the gross impact o f the structural constraints and 
influence the political liberalization process in one way or another. In addition, we 
found that their certain concrete actions (even though such actions do not correspond 
to their general political orientation) produce a cumulative effect of one sort or 
another on political liberalization in their countries.
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All the three countries experience a continuity in the political leaderships and 
in their political orientations in the post-independence period. In addition, they also 
witness a continuity in the impact of certain pre-independence decisions on political 
liberalization. In other words, not only the views and actions of the Central Asian 
political leaders in the post-independence era but also those of the pre-independence 
period influence the variance in political openness in the post-independence period. In 
addition to directly influencing political liberalization, the respective political 
leadership o f these countries mediate the impact o f the Russian minority and elite 
structure on political liberalization in the post-independence period.
In Kyrgyzstan, Akayev remains committed to political reforms and unlike the 
Kazakh and Uzbek leaders does not use cultural traditions as a pretext to justify his 
anti-democratic practices. He rather speaks o f his determination to transform his 
republic into a Central Asian Switzeralnd, voicing optimism about its future political 
and economic development. The limited authoritarian offensive he launched in mid- 
1994 especially against the press and journalists was justified as an appropriate 
response to false personal accusations rather than a response dictated by cultural 
traditions and/or political stability. The informal alliance he forged with the 
democratically-oriented forces before independence continued in one form or another 
in the post-independence period. Although he did not join any autonomous political 
formation in the post-independence period, he continues to draw support from many 
to face challenges, including the communist challenge. His ban on the communist 
party in the immediate post-independence period, although an anti-democratic action
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in nature, proved beneficial for political liberalization in the post-independence period 
for two reasons. First, this situation split the party and provided non-communist 
autonomous political forces an opportunity to improve their position in society.
Second, it continued to underscore Akayev’s continued need o f their support for his 
reform program and to counter the looming communist and other political challenges.
In Kazakhstan, the pre-independence skepticism of the Kazakh leadership about 
the impact o f  political liberalization on Kazakh society continues in the post­
independence period. It is rather reinforced in the post-independence period due to 
sharp division o f Kazakh society along eth no national lines and the presence and 
demands o f secessionist forces in the republic. The moderately negative view of 
Kazakh political leadership about political liberalization and the pretext o f secessionist 
forces it used to selectively repress opposition activists explains the mixed record of 
Kazakhstan in political liberalization and considerable variation in the levels of 
political liberalization between Kyrgyzstan and that country.
Although Nazarbayev did not ban the communist party along the lines in 
Kyrgyzstan, he took certain steps which produced more or less similar beneficial 
consequences for political liberalization. In the wake of the August 1991 coup, he quit 
the republican communist party, issued a presidential decree banning the presence of 
all political parties in state structures and forbidding people with formal party 
affiliation to hold senior positions in the government, and publicly promised not to 
join any political party himself. All these steps further eroded the position and unity 
of the republican communist party, diminished its usefulness as an effective tool of
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political control in the republic, and induced former communists to jo in  and organize 
other sociopolitical formations.
Once Nazarbayev lost attraction in the communist party, he had little incentive 
to use state power to try to rebuild a  divided political organization as a strong base at 
the cost o f other emerging autonomous political formations. An outright drive to 
crush all opposition forces along the Uzbek lines involves a prohibitive cost and a risk 
to undermine his own support base. Such drive requires repression o f individual 
political leaders o f international repute and formations with considerable political clout 
whose support he needs and receives on many critical issues, including the 
presidential elections. And repression of Kazakh nationalist formations and the 
absence o f their demands which are often at variance with demands o f  the Russian 
minority could potentially deprive him of the pretext he uses to convince the Russian 
minority in the republic and the Russian authorities in Moscow that as compared to 
other potential alternative nationalist leadership he is best suited to serve their 
interests. The presence of moderate Kazakh and nationalist formations provides him 
with a leeway to repress his hardened political opponents among Kazakhs and 
extremist and secessionist elements among Russians, while pointing to the existence of 
moderate groups as a manifestation his tolerance of autonomous nationalist groups. 
Thus, the freedom of action for moderate political forces to organize themselves and 
to engage in a  number of independent political activities and repression o f the 
hardened and radical political opponents o f Kazakh authorities constitute two distinct 
elements o f their political strategy in the post-independence period.
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In Uzbekistan, in the absence of two conducive conditions, the large size of 
the Russian minority in proportion to the titular nationality and the fragmented elite 
structure, the importance o f the political orientations, decisions, and preferences of 
the Uzbek leadership for political reform increases in the post-independence period. 
Before independence, the Uzbek leadership was anything but reformist. Tactics aside, 
after independence the leadership makes no secret o f its anti-reform orientation, its 
negative view of the impact of glasnost and political liberalization, and its 
determination to insulate Uzbek society from such an impact until appropriate 
conditions are created for a smooth transition to democracy. Because the anti-reform 
orientation of the Uzbek leadership remains intact, Uzbek society continues to be a 
victim of indiscriminate repression in the post-independence period and the Uzbek 
leadership continues to justify such repression on various pretexts, including the 
Uzbek cultural traditions, raising serious doubts about the likelihood o f introducing 
genuine political reforms in the near future.
FUTURE OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
This brings us to the question of the future o f political liberalization in these 
countries. O f course, it is hard to predict with certainty the future of political 
liberalization in countries which are in the transition phase and lack most propitious 
socioeconomic conditions condcive to political democracy. However, on the basis of 
our preceding analysis and a good deal of information available on certain evident 
objective conditions in these republics, we can make broad, educated speculations 
about the future o f political liberalization in them.
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As our analysis suggests, ethnic diversity can be of positive influence on 
political liberalization under certain conditions. Thus, compatibility of high level of 
political liberalization and multinational society is reassuring for all the three 
countries. However, according to our analysis, only Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
appear to fulfill the requirement under which this compatibility holds. In other 
words, the continued presence of a large Russian minority in proportion to the titular 
nationalities and the availability of Russian support to it in these two countries will 
prevent their backsliding into abject repressive regimes. Hence, we expect these 
countries to continue to experience some sort of political liberalization in the 
foreseeable future. What further improves the prospect of the political liberalization 
process stay the course in these two countries is little or no chance of consensus 
building among most elites on the need to roll back whatever political liberalization 
exists in them.
The serious threat to the existing level o f political liberalization in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan arises from the breakout of armed hostilities, including civil wars, 
due to intensification of ethnic, tribal, and regional rivalries supported by political 
elites, or in response to the continued, however limited, repression especially in 
Kazakhstan. The armed resistance by the Russian minority in support of their 
demands, including the secessionist demand, can potentially lead to a complete 
breakdown of the ongoing political liberalization process in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan is 
spared of this eventuality but is susceptible to inter-ethnic, regional, and tribal armed 
conflict. However, the threat of a civil war will continue to discourage the leaders of
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these republics from imposing a violent authoritarian order along the lines in 
Uzbekistan. In other words, they are more likely to continue to provide their societies 
with some independent political space within definite limits.
in Kyrgyzstan, the reformist leadership is, to a great extent, the most 
important reason for its consistent impressive lead over other Central Asian republic 
in almost all areas o f political liberalization. O f course, we have no reason to expect a 
sudden change in Akayev’s pro-reform orientation. Given his past record, we can 
safely say that the political liberalization process can suffer some setbacks, but is 
unlikely to degenerate into a despotic state like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan due to 
socioeconomic and political crises of ordinary proportion under his rule. Broad, 
though still fragile, foundations of a democratic order are in place in the republic; 
howerver, there may be some ups and downs in the protracted process of 
consolidation o f such foundations.
The deepening of political liberalization in Kazakhstan is another matter. The 
Kazakh leadership has postponed it on various pretexts which all suggest that it is a 
distant prospect there. There is a more important reason to reach this conclusion. In 
fact, there is no indication that the incumbent leadership has made any preparation to 
deepen political reforms in the near future. Nazarbayev is rather in no mood to 
decentralize the centralized power structure he has built around him. He can be 
tempted to misuse it again to prolong his rule. If  he does so, the chances of full scale 
democratization o f Kazakh society will be further reduced. In fact, the full scale 
democratization process is more likely to begin in the republic under three most
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propitious conditions, in addition to the ones discussed above. First, the coming of a 
reform-oriented leadership into power in Kazakhstan. Second, a democratically 
oriented Russian government committed to promoting democratic rights of the Russian 
population in the former Soviet space. Third, a  broad consensus among political elites 
of different colors and ethnic origins on the need to build effective pressure from 
below on Kazakh authoritie to deepen political reforms.
The Uzbek leadership has postponed political liberalization on various pretexts, 
too. There is no indication that the incumbent leadership has developed any blueprints 
to initiate the political liberalization process. In fact, Karimov has consolidated 
personal power and is unlikely to dismantle the power structure and political machine 
he took lot o f pains to build around himself. Because the incumbent leadership 
appears ready to unleash excessive repression in the absence of constraints entailing 
from a large Russian minority and fragmented elite structure, adequate pressure for 
political liberalization is unlikely to develop from below in the foreseeable future. If 
the political liberalization process is to begin under the incumbent leadership, the 
most favorable condition for such a prospect would be the rise of a powerful 
challenger to it from within the ruling alliance accompanied by a split in the hitherto 
cohesive elite structure along regional and tribal lines. If this happens, Karimov will 
face the following two likely options: a) to initiate political liberalization, enlist 
support o f  the excluded and marginalized societal forces in order to improve his 
position vis-a-vis the splintered groups, and to accommodate the latter in the newly 
created independent political space; or b) to use excessive repression to neutralize the
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challenge and risk a civil war along regional and tribal lines. Such a  challenge is by 
no means on the horizon; however, it is more likely to develop if the incumbent 
president decides to perpetuate his rule with no end in sight for ambitious political, 
regional and clan leaders. More likely but less dramatic scenario is the leadership 
change. In other words, a genuine movement toward political liberalization will have 
to await the departure o f the incumbent leadership. The best hope is that after the 
incumbent leadership leaves office, the political machine built around it is likely to 
weaken and certain reformist elements in the power structure (or tribal and regional 
groups within the ruling alliance) may demand more independent political space for 
themselves and hence prove catalyst for the relaxation of excessive political control in 
the country.
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APPENDIX
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1 Location of Central Asian Countries on Political 
Liberalization Scale
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
(Political Liberalization)
High | Moderate | Low
Ethnic Composition
Large Russian Minority 
Small Russian Minority
Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan*
Uzebkistan
Elite Structure
Elite Coherence 
Elite Fragmentation
Political Leadership
Uzebkistan
Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan
Pro-Reform
Cautious
Anti-Reform
Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan
Uzebkistan
*The explanation of the mixed record of Kazakhstan lies in the cautious attitude of 
Kazakh leadership toward liberalization and its impact on Kazakh state and society. A 
fuller explanation of this phemonenon is provided in chapter 2 and 4.
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Table 1 Russian population in the Soviet republics, 
by 1989 (in thousands of persons)
Republic | Total population | Russians I Percent |
Armenia 3305.0 52.0 1.6
Azerbaidjan 7021.0 392.0 5.6
Belorussia 10152.0 1342.0 13.2
Estonia 1565.0 475.0 30.3
Georgia 5401.0 341.0 6.3
Kazakhstan 16463.0 6228.0 37.8
Kirgizia 4258.0 917.0 21.5
Latvia 2667.0 906.0 34.0
Lithuania 3675.0 344.0 9.4
Moldavia 4335.0 562.0 13.0
Russian Federation 147000.0 119865.0 81.5
Tadjikistan 5093.0 388.0 7.6
Turkmenistan 3523.0 334.0 9.5
Ukraine 51452.0 11356.0 22.1
Uzbekistan 19810.0 1652.0 8.3
Source: Anatoly M. Khazanov, Alter the USSR: Ethnicity. 
Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press. 1995), p.247.
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Table 2 Change in Russian and Titular Nationalities in Central
Asia 1989-1996 (Percent)
Country Russians Kazakhs Kyrgyz Tajiks Turkmen Uzbeks
Kazakhstan 1989 37.8 39.5
1996 33.9 47.0
Change % •9.8 19.1
Kyrgyzstan 1989 21.4 52.0
1996 15.6 59.9
Change % -22.8 22.0
Tajikistan 1989 7.6 62.1
1996 3.4 68.1
Change % -48.9 26.3
Turkmenistan 1989 9.5 100.0
1996 6.6 100.0
Change % -16.8 19.2
Uzbekistan 1989 8.3 71.0
1996 5.6 76.6
Change % -22.6 24.5
Source: Tim Heleniak, T h e  Changing Nationality Composition of the Central 
Asian and Transcaucasian States," Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics 38: 6(June 1997), pp.369-375.
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Table 3 Percentage of ethnic groups in the capitals of the 
Central Asian states (in percent)
ITashkent [Alma-Ata (Almaty) I Frunze (Bishkek) I Dushanbe lAshghabad |
Uzbeks 44.2 10.6
Kazakhs 22.5
Tadjiks 38.3
Turkmen 50.8
Kyrgyz 22.7
Tatars 6.3
Russians 34.0 59.1 55.8 32.8 32.4
Ukrainians 4.1 5.5
Armenians_______________________________________ 4.6
Source: Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity. Nationalism, and Politics in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press. 1995), p.247.
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Table 4 Structure of Gross Domestic Product and Work Force 
(in percent)
[Country [Indicator iSector | 19921 19931 19941 1995| 1996|
Uzbekistan Share of GDP Agriculture 34.8 29.9 36.2 32.3 26.1
Industry 26.1 26.1 24.0 17.9 19.7
Construction 10.4 9.3 9.6 7.6 8.2
Services 29.8 36.5 38.3 39.8 44.3
Share of work force Agriculture 43.5 44.6 44.3 43.7 43.5
Industry 13.9 14.8 13.1 13.6 13.6
Construction 7.2 6.7 6.4 6.6 6.6
Services 35.4 34.9 32.2 36.1 36.3
Kazakhstan Share of GDP Agriculture 23.4 16.1 14.8 12.8 12.6
industry 25.9 31.3 28.2 29.0 24.6
Construction 10.0 7.8 10.5 10.8 6.4
Services 36.0 37.5 45.2 45.4 56.2
Share of work force Agriculture 24.4 25.4 21.5 22.0 21.5a
Industry 20.5 20.3 18.8 18.2 16.6
Construction 10.3 10.1 9.0 7.3 5.6
Services 45.8 45.2 46.8 53.0 55.8
Kyrgystan Share of GDP Agriculture 39.0 40.0 40.9 43.7 49.5
Industry 33.0 25.7 30.9 16.8 12.7
Construction 4.1 5.6 3.5 7.1 5.6
Services 23.9 28.8 34.7 32.4 32.2
Share of work force Agriculture 38.2 39.0 42.0 42.0 49.2
Industry 16.3 16.1 14.7 14.6 12.0
Construction 6.2 5.3 4.7 4.7 3.9
Services 39.3 39.6 38.6 38.7 34.9
Source: Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, "Broader Parameters: Development in the 
Twentieth Century," in Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov (eds.), Central Asia: 
The Challenges of Independence (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp.72-3.
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Table 5 Indebtedness of Central Asian States to Russia for 
Interstate Credits (billions of dollars)
| Country | At the end of 1994 | At the end of 1997 |
Kazakhstan 1402 1684
Uzbekistan 422 557
Tajikistan 188 296
Turkmenistan 242 186
Kyrgyzstan 147 150
Total 2401 2873
Source: Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, "Between Two
Gravitational Poles: Russia and China," in Boris Rumer and 
Stanislav Zhukov (eds.), Central Asia: The Challenges of 
Independence (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p.155.
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Table 6 Social and Economic Characteristics of Central Asian
Population GNP GNP per capita Literacy Urban
millions $ billions $ billions Population
1996 1996 1996
Kazakhstan 16.0 22.2 1350.0 98.0% 60.0%
Kyrgyz Republic 5.0 25.0 550.0 97.0% 39.0%
Tajikistan 5.0 2.0 340.0 99.0% 39.1%
Turkmenistan 5.0 4.3 940.0 100.0% 45.4%
Uzbekistan 23.0 23.5 1010.0 97.0% 41.0%
Source: Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1997 (Pittsburg:
Superintendent of Document, Bank, 1998); Cenral Intelligence Agency. 
The World Fact Book 1994 (Washington, D.C.: CIA Office of Public and 
Agency Infromation, 1994); Stanislav Zhukov, "Economic Development in 
the States of Central Asia," in Boris Rumer (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 
p.131.
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Table 7 Freedom House Rating of Central Asian Countries on
Political and Civil Rights Index
Country ] 1992 ! 1993 | 1994 I 1995 | 1996 I 1997 | Ave. |
Kazakhstan 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.2
Kyrgystan 4.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.8
Tajikistan 5.0 5.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.4
Turkmenistan 5.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.7
Uzbekistan 5.5 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.5
Scale: Free Party Free Not Free
1 -7 1 -2.5 3- 5.5 5 .5 -7
Source: Freedom House, Freedom Review. 1992,1993,1994, 1995,1996, 1997
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Table 8 Freedom House Rating of CIS Countries on Political and Civil
Rights Index
I Country I 1»»2 I 1993 || 1994 I 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | Ave. |
Armenia 5.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.0
Azerbaijan 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 5.6
Belarus 4.0 3.5 4.5 4.0 5.0 6.0 4.5
Estonia 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 2.3
Georgia 5.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.0 4.8
Kazakhstan 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.2
Kyrgystan 4.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.8
Latvia 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.5
Lithuania 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 2.0
Moldova 4.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.3
Russia 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4
Tajikistan 5 0 5.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.4
Turkmenistan 5.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.7
Ukraine 3.0 6.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.9
Uzbekistan 5.5 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.5
Scale: Free Party Free Not Free
1 - 7 1 -2.5 3 - 5.5 5.5-7
Source: Freedom House, Freedom Review. 1992,1993,1994,1995,1996,1997
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Table 9 Freedom House Rating of East European
Countries on Political and Civil Rights Index
| Country I 19901 19911 19921 1993| 19941 19951 1996| 19971
Albania 7.0 6.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0
Bosnia 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0
Bulgaria 7.0 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5
Crotia 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Czech R. 6.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Finland 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Hungary 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Macedonia 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
Poland 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5
Romania 7.0 5.5 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 2.5
Slovakia 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.0
Slovenia 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Scale: Free Party Free Not Free
1 -7 1 -2 .5 3 - 5.5 5 .5 -7
Source: Freedom House, Freedom At Issue (January-February 1990):18-19;
Freedom House, Freedom Review January-February, 
1991,1992,1993, 1994,1995.1996, 1997
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Table 10 Public Opinion on Best Political System of Kazakhstan
Western democracy
Communism
3%
Anything that brings 
order 
62%
Source: Nancy Lubin, "Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: The Views 
of the Led,” in Timothy J. Cotton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in 
Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder Westview Press, 1995), p. 219.
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Table 11 Public Opinion on Best Political System of Uzbekistan
Wbstcm
democracy
11.5%
Islamic state 
10.0%
Capitalism
3.6%
Socialism
11.8%
Communism
2.6%
Don't know 
7.9%
No
Anything that 
brings order 
50.4%
2.2%
Source: Nancy Lubin, "Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: The Views 
of the Led,” in Timothy J. Cotton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in 
Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder Westview Press, 1995), p. 220.
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VITA
Muhammad Islam was bom on April 13, 19SS, in Balwal, a small village in the 
Chakwal district, Pakistan. He was the fourth child o f  his parents, Hafiz Lai Khan and Sat 
Bharai who raised his three brothers and three sisters. Islam grew up in a rural 
environment and attended village schools before his eldest brother, Muhammad Altaf, who 
was then a captain in the Pakistan army, shifted him to the Jhelum city for education 
purposes in 1969. After his university education, he served in various research and 
teaching institutions in Islamabad. In August-September 1985, he also visited the United 
States as a student tourist, h i July 1989, he married Farhat S. Raja. His first daughter,
Izza, was bom on May 9, 1990. Inaash, the second daughter, was bom on May 13, 1991. 
In January 1993, Islam travelled to the United States for his Ph.D. program. His wife and 
two daughters later joined him in August 1994. His third daughter, Haneen, was bom in 
Baton Rouge, on November 27, 1996. Islam and his family left the United States in July 
1999 to live in Islamabad where he took up a teaching position.
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